Identities in Flux

Globalisation, Trauma, and Reconciliation

Edited by
DAGMAR KUSÁ

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Identities in Flux. Globalisation, Trauma, and Reconciliation: Introduction

Dagmar Kusá

Since the third wave of democratisation reached Central and Eastern Europe in 1989 and its communist regimes began to crumble, the fate of liberal democracies has become polemicised. In 1989, the end of another grand ideology of the twentieth century was hailed as the "end of history", proclaiming liberal democracy the final form of government and the "triumph of the Western *idea*" (Fukuyama, 1992). Liberal democracy was now the only game in town, having defeated all viable ideological competitions. Not only in the Western world, but in regions such as East Asia, including China, the liberal idea was taking root and setting off on the path of capitalist consumerism.

Many expected liberal democracies to gradually spread to all corners of the globe. Yet, despite the hope inspired by the Arab Spring across North Africa and the Middle East in 2011, the mood has grown more sombre over the years as several countries of the 1989 wave have backslidden democratically, and the Arab Spring has seen mixed results, even descending into violent conflict, resulting in mass migration. Growing ranks of political leaders in the transitioning countries, as well as in the old democracies, are moving away from liberal democracy toward apocalyptic populism and authoritarian practices.

"Globalisation crisis" is a term often misused to strike fear into the hearts of many who deem their traditional identities and economic securities threatened. In response, political participation is becoming more contentious. "Assertive citizens" in the democratic and democratising world trust political leadership less and less (Norris, 2011; Dalton & Welzel, 2014). The annual Edelman Trust Barometer shows a global decline in trust, reaching a crisis point in 2017. In 2018, the world battles for truth. Trust is increasingly polarised between the informed public—those who are college educated, consumers of the media, and with the top 25% of income—and the general public (Edelman Trust Barometer, 2018).

It is worth mentioning that Fukuyama's article on the "end of history" does not end on an optimistic note. He comments that while there may be no viable ideological alternative to a liberal democracy, it is quite capable of coexisting with identity politics, ethnic, and nationalist violence (Fukuyama, 1992). In his most recent book, he continues to develop this idea, claiming that there were two streams of identity politics unleashed with the French Revolution: one devoted to the pursuit of personal dignity and individual autonomy, the other to the pursuit of collective autonomy and dignity (Fukuyama, 2018). At times, these are pursued simultaneously,

as is the case of the European human rights framework, particularly the human rights documents enshrined within the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe which make a point of collective rights pertaining to national and/or linguistic minorities.

The long-term global democratisation process was propped up by the spread of the global human rights culture. Since the Second World War and the passing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights—drafted under the auspices of Eleanor Roosevelt and an international team of lawyers and scholars in under three years—dozens of global and regional human rights covenants and declarations, some having reached near universal status, have been signed and ratified by almost all governments represented in the United Nations. Even ruthless dictators pay lip service to human rights, testifying to their global acceptance. This has contributed to the understanding of a democracy centred on the concept of dignity. Although the concept itself has been evolving since the Enlightenment's ideas of autonomy, it was the international framework of human rights that placed it front and centre in the concept of democratic society, as human rights are the tools for its implementation. Dignity serves as the benchmark for democracies, advanced and developing alike. For the old democracies, the dignitarian framework provides criteria upon which the depth of the quality of democracy can be evaluated: to what extent it meets the conditions for free and equal development of human potentials, how effective it is in protecting the most vulnerable in the society, and how it fulfils the implementation of civil and political rights or is able to ameliorate the social and economic disparities between people.

The collective pursuit of dignity has taken on many forms, from the quests for self-determination to the pursuit of securing minority rights and access to representation and decolonisation movements in the post-colonial world. Founded upon membership in a collectivity, the collective dignity is derived from narratives that shape identities, oftentimes formulated in antagonism towards a narrative of a different collectivity. Narratives of ethnic groups are of a tragic form, interweaving the episodes of the past with the emotions of pity and fear, serving as the glue that binds together and endows the community with a purpose.

Countries of the third wave transition were faced with the added burden of the transformation process. Not only did they have to address economic and social transformations, and the institutional remake of the societies to enable the transition to democracy; the leaders and the civil society of countries in Central and Eastern Europe, parts of Africa, Latin America, and East Asia also had to reinvent their identities, facing the ghosts of oppressive past regimes. Some stayed the course, with greater or lesser difficulty, others slid back into authoritarianism of various sorts. The burst of democratic participation brought millions of people closer to

political life, and the stakes decided within are intertwined with personal stakes, grievances, and dignity needs. Processes of transitional justice had to mediate the flood of demands, needs, and expectations. Some managed through robust institutional processes to address the need for justice in the case of the former perpetrators and healing in the case of the former victims, and truth-finding, establishing archives for documentation of the crimes and atrocities committed in the past. Others opted for more modest institutional redresses, and a controlled narrative of the past to secure the legitimacy and stability of new governments.

These negotiations depended on the constellations of the actors within the societies' elites and former oppositions, the nature of the transitions, the amount of negotiation and settlement between the old and new elites, and, essentially, the access to the authorship of the narrative framework at the onset of the transitions. Some of the societies, such as South Africa and those in Latin America, also had to address the legacy of mass violence and the resulting cultural trauma which continue to haunt both the individual survivors and their families and communities. The lingering guilt, shame, quest for recognition and justice, and the unaddressed personal as well as cultural trauma are all added challenges that transitional societies have to navigate while pursuing (more or less successfully) the quest for individual and collective dignity.

Furthermore, transitional societies also exist in the larger frameworks of post-colonialism and post-socialism. The collective narratives within these regions are shaped by the structures of dependence that have historically framed broader relations, and impacted identities within. The legacy bequeathed by both structures on the post-colonial and post-socialist societies are perceptions of being on the periphery, a mistrust in the Big History written by the North and the West, and a sense of victimhood and betrayal. These influence how identities evolve during transitional times, and to what extent they are able to convert the tragic narratives into more constructive stories, thereby addressing the ghosts of the past.

The trends outlined above are the themes touched upon by the authors of this book, both theoretically as well as in case studies. They cover various parts of the world, with an emphasis on Central European countries and South Africa, but also include Nigeria, Japan, Spain, and the United States.

The Journey of this Book

This book is a collection of contributions from conferences and research conducted within the following research project: *Philosophical Anthropology and Contemporary Civilisational Situation* under the contract No. APVV-15-0682, supported by the Slovak National Research and Development Agency.

A few of the contributions were presented at the *Historicity of Man* colloquium in May 2018. And, although some of the contributions in this publication are drawn from a larger pool of authors, it was November 2017 Liberal Herald conference on "(Dis-)continuous Identities: Globalisation, Trauma, and Reconciliation" in Bratislava, Slovakia, that became its core. The Liberal Herald annually brings together close to thirty researchers, practitioners, and students from all over the globe to present their research in a variety of disciplines. The concept purposely calls for the intermingling of students from undergraduate to doctoral level with the experts in the field. It is an exchange that is mutually beneficial.

This book has been made possible by collaboration with several partner institutions that have been essential in bringing the inspiration, research, and the people together. The home base for these projects and conferences is the Bratislava International School of Liberal Arts (BISLA) and its research project partner, the Philosophy Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences. Under the joint project, *Philosophical Anthropology and Contemporary Civilisational Situation,* individuals from these two institutions, authors and others, have brought this book to publication. By a stroke of luck, if not fate, the Department of Theology at Stellenbosch University became an important partner on this journey, bringing several of the authors to the 2017 Liberal Herald conference, in cooperation with the Jena Center for Reconciliation in Germany.

As a result, the book offers diverse disciplinary traditions, including phenomenology, political science, theology, communication studies, and international relations perspectives.

OVERIEW OF THE BOOK

The topic of shifting identities is approached on three levels. The first examines the philosophical inquiry into the topics of identity, reconciliation, and historical narratives. The second is devoted to the topics of reconciliation in the countries of transition, grappling with the narratives of their past, and dealing with the questions of justice and truth. The third zooms out to consider the legacies of colonialism on the questions of reconciliation of identities and narratives and on the impact of globalisation on identity groups relations.

I. HISTORY, MEMORY, AND IDENTITY
IN PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT

Professor František Novosád in his chapter lays out the contributions of philosophical anthropology to the study of the human in relation to self and making sense of the world, in relation to others in a web of intersubjective relations, and in relation to nature and society, mediated through objects and symbolic structures. This framework is useful for approaching

all the subsequent chapters in this book as all are located on these levels of the study of the human and their environs in the fast-changing world.

Daniele Nuccilli's chapter on Wilhelm Schapp's use of the en-tanglement of individual and personal stories with history provides a useful theoretical springboard to the prevalent narrative approach utilised in subsequent chapters. Human life is a storied life; storytelling allows for the creation of meaning out of disparate events in personal life, and it is only through stories can a person be understood. Inspired by Dilthey, Schapp highlights the individual lived experience of history on the one hand and, on the other, the placement of history in collectivity and in the specific context, connected to other contexts in space and time. Schapp introduces the concept of We-entanglement—the mediating meso-structure between individual life stories and the universal History. Entanglement is also important for the story-teller, however, as we are bound by our horizon of interpretations, and unable to grasp the universal History but partially and subjectively.

Peter Šajda's chapter on the historiography of the vanquished is a continuation of the reflection on the storyteller's—the historian's—position vis-à-vis the story, the interpretation of the past. The chapter ponders the epistemological advantages of writing history without the burden of being in a position of a victor in a historical process. The position of the vanquished invites and allows for a deeper explanation, free from the ideology and demands of power. He or she does not have to tell the story leading up to victory or defend a plan or a status quo, but can analyse long-term processes, identify patterns, and thus produce a more objective analysis. And with that comes a historian's responsibility to seize those opportunities.

The chapter on classical education by Jon Stewart (re-)considers the place of classical education in the rapidly changing societies of today. Current understanding of classical education is distorted, it flattens the richness and diversity into a cliché that is difficult for students to connect with. The misunderstanding stems from modern prejudices, which segregate science away from humanities and social sciences, and omits religion from the equation. We are also selective when it comes to the negative sides of the Greek and Roman world, excluding, for example, the Arabic scholars from the concept of "classical" education. Put together, current classical education is a fabrication which lacks the depth and moral significance that it could offer. However, it still has a place in the globalising world if reconceptualised properly. The world of ancient Greece and Rome was diverse, interconnected, complex, struggling with some of the same challenges as exist today. Integrating the ignored elements into "classical" education can help current students navigate the globalising world, see parallels, ponder the challenges the changing world poses on identities and societies, creating an awareness of our interconnectedness through time and space.

The final chapter in this section brings us to the topic of re-conciliation from a vantage point of phenomenology. James Griffith introduces Judith Butler's concept of vulnerability into Merleau-Ponty's thinking on the flesh in order to better understand the phenomenon of violence, allowing for the relational component—particularly for ascertaining the intent behind a harmful action. The link between the two presented authors is in the intersubjectivity of human existence and the concept of primary vulnerability here underscores that even the most intimate zones of personal experience, such as grief, are inherently relational. The need for the Other is foundational to one's existence, and this vulnerability opens the individual to the possibility of exploitation. Violence is the disturbance of meaningful relations to others, on personal and communal levels alike. It elicits emotions of grief and rage, which the legal and institutional structures that manage rights designed to protect cannot take into account.

II. RECONCILIATION AND WORKING THROUGH CULTURAL TRAUMA IN POST-TRANSITION

The second thematic section of the book examines the impact of lingering cultural traumas on the quality of democracy and the capacity for social cohesion in transitioning societies.

Christo Thesnaar studies the patterns of long-term humiliation on those still carrying it today in post-apartheid South Africa and the potential for intervention and transformation of such emotions into constructive forces by practical missiology approaches. He argues that if social emotions of guilt and shame for the roles people played in the past go unaddressed, they are passed on to the next generations. Shame can serve as a constructive trigger for empathy and collaboration, but can also be a destructive force, tied with existential fear, having debilitating consequences on day-to-day life. Guilt can be addressed in the processes of reconciliation if responsibility is taken (otherwise, it may continue to harm self and others) and if there is willingness to enter into a dialogue with the past and across generations. It is important to overcome the dichotomy between victim and perpetrator and remember the latter's humanity and capacity for good.

The chapter by Dagmar Kusá continues to examine topics of historical guilt and responsibility through the concept of the "memory holes"—manipulated, selective narratives—of the twentieth century past in Central Europe, which "export" the responsibility for the totalitarian regimes to the West and to the East. These memory holes are partially the outcome of an exclusivist citizenship and an ethnicised understanding of "who really belongs" in a political community. They have concrete consequences on the quality of democracy, particularly in a weakened capacity for social cohesion, tolerance of diversity for all minorities, and also an impoverished rule of law.

Mateusz Mazzini shifts the focus from transitional to a post-transitional justice framework, which, unlike the former, does not have a goal of upholding the newly established democracies, but evaluates the outcomes of the transitional process. He points out that re-irruptions of memory need not always be positive (which is the most widespread focus in transitional justice literature), but often appear as tools of memory politics. Much in line with the previous chapter, Mazzini points out the danger of monopolisation of the past as seen in the case study of gradual Polish capture of the politics and institutions of memory and the expansion of memory conflict, contrasting it with the management of memory in post-transitional Chile that evolved in the opposite direction, allowing for a diversity of actors and a gradual depoliticisation of discourse.

Continuing in the same vein, Fleur Damen's case study of the current narrative of the Spanish Civil War, the Franco regime, and the Transition is an analysis of a commanded memory, a single-story narrative pushed forth by the political elites of Spain to pursue current political agendas. The case study demonstrates how closely the publicly interpreted past depended on the constellation of power in the country. The ownership of the interpretation of the past to some extent holds the keys to political power today, with parties that negotiated the Transition in Spain, yet losing public support, guarding this ownership jealously.

The bulk of the work of reconciliation, healing of communities, mending relationships, and building sustainable networks of cooperation after violent conflict or the end of an oppressive regime happens at the community level. Walter Philander explores the opportunities and challenges for reconciliation in South Africa, in light of the legacies of the apartheid that present challenges for reconciliation: social and economic inequality, corruption and nepotism, and failing service delivery vis-à-vis the continuing wealth of the old white and new black elite. The chapter emphasises the limits of a national institutionalised process like the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the importance of local face-to-face dialogue to address the burdens of the past that linger in communities. It also points out the importance of pastoral work in mobilisation towards such dialogues today.

The impact of botched reconciliation policies and approaches and their repercussions on continued psychological traumas is well illustrated in the case of the failed integration of former combatants into South African society. Mbulelo Patrick Gcaza offers a narrative not represented in the official narrative of the past and of the transition, one of an excluded community of military ex-combatants in South Africa. He shows how lingering exclusion, marginalisation, and ignorance lead to perceptions of violated dignity and connected reactions to that—from depression, to resentment and violence. The chapter also points out how cultural trauma can be inherited by the next generation, saturated with emotions of the same

intensity experienced by their parents' and elders' generations. The chapter resonates with Christo Thesnaar's reflection on guilt and shame in the process of reconciliation, showing a community of victims struggling with its own shame and existential anxiety. Reconciliation attempts have to be more inclusive and diversified to facilitate a true reconstruction of societies, serving as a platform for the humanisation of former combatants, thus enabling the restoration of their dignity and personal integrity.

Another argument for a balanced narrative about a traumatic past in order to promote healing is set forth in "Remembering and Misremembering: A Reconsideration of Narratives of the Nigerian Civil War 1967-70" by Dominique Otigbah. The Nigerian Civil War and the Biafran efforts to secede are ethicised in the current political discourses, both on the side of the Nigerian state, as well as on the side of the pro-Biafran separatists. These discourses ascribe the sole agency in the Biafran region to the Igbo ethnic group, omitting the ethnic diversity and integrational mindset of the region at the time. It is an interesting illustration of how a manipulated narrative serves as an arena for political ends pursued by variety of actors. The minorities, meanwhile, are left out from both dominant narratives entirely.

III. REPERCUSSIONS OF GLOBALISATION AND DECOLONISATION

The third part of the book widens the horizon and considers the impact of broader regional and global relations and structures on the shifting identities and narratives that weave them. Authors in this section study the legacies of colonialism, regional and global security dilemmas, and globalisation on domestic discourses on identities.

Junjiro Shida's treatment of the narratives of Japan's war past shows how the worsening of relations and growing security uncertainty in the region lead to the escalation of the internal conservative narratives about Japan's war past. Building on victimhood, the narrative is used to prop up the nationalist sentiment, reactive to the Chinese narrative of the war past and shaping the Japanese narrative in opposition to it. "History Wars" is a narrative security dilemma, where the past is used as a tool of offense.

Oholiabs Tuduks' chapter on dis-continuous identities traces the legacies of colonialism on religious identities and tensions in Northern Nigeria. The chapter examines the lasting impact of colonialism on the present-day perceptions and status of Christian and Muslim religious groups. Perhaps contrary to lay expectations, the British colonial administration elevated the Muslim religious group to the status of power, relegating non-Muslims to the inferior position. The lasting structures of the inequality, referred to as coloniality, result in discrimination and exclusion of non-Muslims and a dysfunctional relationship between the religious groups in the region.

Tuduks proposes reconciliation strategies toward *decoloniality*, aimed at rehumanisation of the "Other" through inter-religious dialogue, policies of inclusion, and development of functional relations at the individual and communal level, in line with the religious teachings of both communities.

"The New Language of Hate" by Daniel Odin Shaw examines a significant identity shift of recent time—the rise of conservative masculinity linked to the process of globalisation and the emergence, and political expression of, "new" identity groups on the traditionally white male dominated political scenes of the West and nourished by the politics of apocalyptic populism. Shaw examines this brand of masculinity within the context of the Alt-Right movement in the United States, pointing out that it is not only driven by an economic agenda, but by an underlying anti-feminist and misogynist sentiment, which seems to be the dominant cause for economic grievances. Frustration stemming from the inability to propose an alternative model to neoliberal economy, which they see as stripping them of former power and glory, is transferred to women and other minorities—economic anxiety and a hateful mindset mutually reinforcing each other.

Darina Petráňová's excursion into media treatment of minorities and migrants in Slovakia following the migrant crisis of 2015 shows that the patterns in labels media ascribe to various minorities—the Roma, the Hungarian minority, LGBT community, and migrants—closely follow the moods and developments of political discourse. Her chapter points out the important distinction between "othering" and dehumanising frames, the latter implying a hierarchy of value, thus allowing for the justification of unequal treatment of the dehumanised. Importantly, this investigation into the Slovak media discourse shows that media frames (and prior to that likely frames used in a political discourse adopted by the media) directly shape public attitudes. With the de-escalation of dehumanising stances toward the Roma in the media, public use of dehumanising language also decreased significantly. Minorities are "othered" in various ways—a more tolerant stance toward the autochthonous minorities was not paralleled towards the LGBT community, still perceived as the "distant Other".

Marta Boniardi's argument for multiculturalism brings the thread back to the philosophical underpinnings of this book. Her chapter describes refigurations of personal identities from the point of view of the migrants and refugees entering the European space through the phenomenological lens of intersubjectivity, applying an interesting parallel of the master-slave dialectic that Frantz Fanon used to study acculturation in colonial settings. The path to a tolerant and cohesive society is through reciprocal recognition, including that of the "host" by the "Other". On a collective level, mutual recognition has to be aided by normative and structural environment conducive to such dialogue. The opening of the host identity group towards the incomers is advantageous to both and provides stimuli for adaptation and, hence, development away from stagnation.

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**Basics of Philosophical
Anthropology**

František Novosád

Abstract

This chapter lays out the main lines of the development of anthropological thought, where man is thought of in contrast with God, animals, and machines, and in relation to himself. It offers an interpretation of the basic human relations to the world. The starting point is the understanding of the human as a being whose relation to the world is mediated by tools, institutions, and symbolic frameworks.

Keywords: Mediation, tool, institution, symbolic framework, empathy, norm, power, contract, coordination, conflict

I.
HISTORY, MEMORY, AND IDENTITY IN PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT

Theses on Human Beings

1. A human is a being that can only live in a world which it understands at least to some extent.
2. A human is a being typically having a mediated relationship with other people, to itself, and to objects.
3. The naturality of a human being is constituted in such a way that it allows for a mediated relationship to the world.
4. The human relationship to the world is mediated. At the same time, it stands for a tool, a standard, and an institution.
5. Mediation gives more power to a human being, both over itself and over the conditions of its existence; however, it also brings about risks related to its existence.
6. History can also be understood as a search for balance between power and the risks that arise when more power is acquired.
7. A human is a being that has to and wants to look after itself.
8. The ratio between the things that a human being "has to" and "wants to" look after changes over time.
9. History is primarily a change in the relationship between "I must" and "I want", and a change in the structure of needs.
10. Care satisfies given needs and creates new ones.
11. Self-care always occurs in a certain cultural and historical framework into which individuals are "thrown".
12. The things which individuals encounter as given are the natural conditions, the performance of their predecessor, and that of their contemporaries.
13. "Thrownness" into the world forces a human being to establish a relationship with itself and with others.

14. A human is a being that always differentiates between that which "is" and that which "should be". The relationships of humans with the world always have a normative dimension as well.

15. The relationship of a human being with others, and subsequently with itself, is mediated by normative frameworks.

16. Relationship with others always has at least three dimensions: existential, pragmatic and power-related.

17. In the existential dimension, we acknowledge each other as human beings.

18. In the pragmatic dimension, we are useful to each other.

19. In the power-related dimension, we encounter others in a certain hierarchical configuration.

20. A human being perceives itself as a dependent being that strives for independence.

21. A human being always seeks an explanation for its dependence.

22. Freedom is based on the ability to "manipulate" one's dependencies.

A commentary and an outline of the reasoning behind the theses on human beings

An old Chinese proverb says that the person whom the gods wish to punish is allowed to be born into interesting times—that is, into a turbulent age marked by changes in the basic social structure, a time where the old ways of living are discarded and where righteousness is tested, broken—yes, that happens in such times—and sometimes proven. Those times are usually ones of destruction. However, the optimists among us add that only the cases of creative destruction count, on that which opens up opportunities for new and more productive ways of living.

In the intellectual sphere, these periods of creative destruction include initiatives in thinking that are commonly called "anthropological shifts", initiatives that put forward human beings and the purpose of their existence instead of the question of being in itself.

That said, it should be noted that the question of who we are—who a human being is, what our options and limitations are—belong to the "essence of man" and, as such, are not limited to a certain era. In one form or another, we keep asking these questions and keep finding them, along with their answers, in various forms and stages of explicitness. In its implicit form, we can find the answer to the question of who we are in the way of life and the configurations of social life which we take for granted. As for the explicit answers, we need them in places and situations where the primary evidence, i.e. the given factors that take on the era of a particular way of life, disappears; we need them in the setting of secondary evidence, i.e. religion, art, and—in certain historical configurations—science.

The problem of human beings most commonly arises in turbulent times. In these situations, we are forced to ask questions for which we do not have any answer. From the gnoseological perspective, these periods have several meanings and are typically asymmetrical with regard to the ratio of questions and answers. It is the time where both deep thinkers and charlatans who juggle with ideas flourish. In such times, intellectual depth and pretentiousness are mixed in such a way that they are almost impossible to tell apart.

The history of ideas could be written as the dialectics of depth and charlatanry, deep thinking, and malevolence.

Let us now mention a couple of examples where depth and charlatanry coexisted. In 1487, *Malleus maleficarum* was published (Institoris, Sprenger, & Mackay, 2006); ten years later, Pico della Mirandola published his title *Oration on the Dignity of Man* (Pico della Mirandola, 2012).

The Enlightenment period is also somehow "double-edged". On the one hand, we can view the Enlightenment as a major advance in the emancipation process; on the other, it was the ideas of the thinkers of the Enlightenment that served as a pretext to legitimise revolutionary violence. The invention of the printing press was a substantial contribution not only to the spread of information, but also to the spread of various kinds of prejudice. This "double-edged" nature is also present in contemporary means of communication.

Hegel viewed history as the process in which one's awareness of freedom developed (Hegel, 1975). Today, no one dares to take this thesis literally and we tend to prefer the thesis of J. J. Rousseau which asserts that a human being is born free, yet chained everywhere (Rousseau, 1782/1762). If we see freedom as the possibility and necessity to choose, we may be able to agree with Hegel. History may not necessarily mean growth in the awareness of freedom. However, it may certainly mean growth in the awareness of alternative-based development. Although history has always been a choice between alternatives, people have not accepted that, stating the inevitable as their motivation, be it the will of gods or God, or of the internal laws of history. Any anthropological reflection enters the spotlight in the periods when we are explicitly forced to choose one of the options in front of us, regardless of whether these are really, or only seemingly, our choices. That is because each of our choices is directed by an implicit or explicit concept of a human being. In the background of our important decisions, there is a certain concept of a human being, a measure that helps a human being see the possibilities and find out the limitations it has. The anthropological aspect of decisions is probably best seen in the issues of biotechnologies and their application, or in the choice of schools, insurance, and security systems. The basic space of anthropological thought is framed within Kant's questions:

What can I know?

What should I do?

What can I hope for?

What is a human?

These questions gain an authentically anthropological dimension when I begin to ask why and how human beings were given the ability to know, or to what extent the human being is at the mercy of knowledge and why it is not enough to be pragmatically at terms with the environment in which we live. And actually, what does knowledge have to do with the knower? What kind of a being gets to know?

Analogically, the second question of what to do becomes an anthropological question when I begin to ask what kind of a being is a being that lives in permanent tension between that which "is" and that which "should be" and whose actions are ruled by norms, a being that controls itself, both more overtly and quietly. The third question of what one can hope for shows humans as beings that see their lives as problems, beings that are never sure if the issue of their lives actually provides definitive answers.

The first explicit project of anthropology in the proper sense as the theory of human beings can be found in antiquity with thinkers to whom we refer as Sophists. It is probable that the programme of anthropology was most impressively defined by Protagoras. It is his fragment that is at the foundation of every anthropological way of thought: "Of all things the measure is Man, of the things that are, that they are, and of the things that are not, that they are not" (Sprague, 2001, 80 B1).

Taking into account other preserved fragments and the overall context of thinking at that time, the above quote may be interpreted in various ways. The differences in its interpretation arise primarily from the way in which we understand the term "measure" and the way we understand the relationship between the measure and that which is measured. However, it is important that man is understood as a being whose relationships with the world are always doubled as if there always was a relationship and its measure at the same time. This double nature also applies to the relationship of a human being with itself. Man is a being that measures and also a measure which it creates when measured.

However, what is important is the fact that according to Protagoras, man himself is the creator of the measure and he neither assumes it from "above", nor does he take it from things. In a different fragment, Protagoras explicitly states, "With regard to gods, I cannot even know that they are, nor that they are not, and I cannot know their form either. It is because many things prevent this from being known: the unclarity of the issue and the shortness of life" (Sprague, 2001, 80 B4). Protagoras can be considered the initiator of a strong line of anthropological thought that is based on the

conviction that man can only be understood by himself. This line strives to define the nature (i.e. the essence) of man in relation to itself.

M. Heidegger operates along this line as well if we consider his reflections in *Being and Time* to be a stimulus for anthropology. After all, one of the basic features of man (Heidegger uses the term "Dasein") is the fact that he defines himself in relation to his own facticity (Heidegger, 1990). Heidegger himself would probably vehemently protest such anthropologisation of existential analytics, seeing that he kept stressing that he was not creating a concept of anthropology, instead asking about the issue of being and analyses the premises and conditions under which we asked the question of being.

From the historical point of view, thinking that attempted to define what the human essence or nature was did not move along the Protagorean line, but along three others. The second line determined the character of human nature in relation to God, both in the positive sense (Nicholas of Cusa) and in the negative (Kant: *intellectus archetypus* vs. *intellectus ectypus*). However, this line is also occupied by thinkers we "would never see as such", specifically K. Marx and F. Nietzsche. The third line strives to define human nature in relation to *other living beings*, especially in relation to anthropoid primates. This line was especially strengthened by Darwin's evolutionary theory. This line, highly productive as of late, is the line of ethology and evolutionary biology. The fourth line, which currently claims dominance, aims to define human nature in relation to machines. This line has its roots in Descartes and one of the current issues studied by it is the issue of artificial intelligence.

These four lines have overlapped in various ways, either by their simple combination or by drawing consequences from one of them. Descartes combines the line which defines humans in relation to God and the line that defines humans in relation to machines. Kant typically combines the definition of man in relation to God and to the animal. Analogically, E. Cassirer, when defining man as an *animal symbolicum*, combines naturalism and transcendentalism (Cassirer, 1955/1929).

What is essential for the present day is the fact that clear-cut borders between the individual lines are being blurred: the notions of organism and machine are converging, man gains the ability to manipulate his own genetic code, forcing his way into the position of God.

Compared to the tradition, the present premise of understanding man is his physicality. In current concepts, man is understood as a physical subject incorporated into culture and history, relying on networks of interdependence. Contemporary anthropology strives to understand man from his culture, from the set of his activities and relationships in which he exists. Anthropological reflection defines three basic relational sets in which man exists: the relationship to himself, to others, and to things.

These relations are always coextensive and consubstantial; that is, these relationships assume each other, represent conditions for each other, and define each other. In theoretical reflection, one of these relationships assumes a somewhat privileged position. In this way, naturalism and naturalist interpretations of man derive man from his relationships to objects. Man assumes the role of *homo faber,* the toolmaking animal, a being that shapes and forms the conditions of its existence. The ability to use tools subsequently defines the relationships with other people and the relationship of man with himself. On the other hand, personalist concepts give the privileged position to interpersonal relationships, those relationships with others, whether in cooperation or conflict. The relation to oneself and to an objective reality is only a reflection of a relation to others.

Finally, existential concepts give the privileged position to the relation to oneself. Man is an incomplete being and needs to "complete" himself. Every living being exists in a tri-relationship: to the environment, to organisms of the same species, and to itself. We live in society, that is, in relations and dependencies. We need others and others need us. We have certain requirements of others who, in turn, have certain requirements of us. The confrontation of requirements forms boundaries and rules which define what we can legitimately expect from others and what others can legitimately expect from us. The dependence from others has both institutional and psychological dimensions. The institutional are objectivised in ethics, law and etiquette. It is etiquette, the rules of conventional politeness, which represents a transition from institutional to psychological forms of coexistence.

The specific nature of human beings lies in the fact that all of our relationships are mediated by tools, institutions, systems of signs, values, and norms. This means that the human relationship to beings themselves, to others, and to the world are mediated by the creations of man. This is what gives human beings a mouldable, differentiated and complicated nature. Man acquires the possibility to manipulate his relationships towards himself, others, and the world.

We know that basic relationships assume each other and, from the methodological perspective, it is probably most productive to start at interpersonal relationships. The privileged status of interpersonal relationships is also confirmed by the contemporary concepts of anthropogenesis, proving that the specific nature of human societies and man himself grows from the processes of cumulative cooperation.

From the formal point of view, all relationships may have the form of reciprocity, symmetry, or asymmetry. We can differentiate between personal and institutionalised relationships. From the perspective of content, our relationships with others always have three dimensions that influence each other: existential, pragmatic, and power-related dimension. This means that we respect each other, are helpful to each other, and define or are defined.

The existential level is primary and is the site of mutual respect. I need to respect and accept a human being as equal, more or less than me in basic matters. That said, to accept each other as unequal, we need to accept each other as human beings. From the historical point of view, we know that accepting others as equals cannot be taken for granted at all.

A philosophically pervasive model of how the equality model prevails is offered by Hegel's dichotomy of the peasant and the lord. From the anthropological perspective, it is necessary to follow the intricate historical relationships between us and them, us and the barbarians, the free and the enslaved, Christians and pagans, men and women. The layer of existential relationships also includes those relationships which we identify as personal: love, hatred, and indifference.

Existential relationships, too, take an institutionalised form with the idea of equality one of the basic ideas of modern law. Pragmatic dimensions expand upon the existential dimension of coexistence. These are defined by the historically changing ways of how tasks are assigned and distributed. All human relationships include a dimension of power—it is always decided who is to determine and who is to be determined. Each of these dimensions of interpersonal relationships—existential, pragmatic and power-related— is specifically institutionalised. Historically and systematically, particular societies are created by joining these dimensions.

One of the most important objectives of philosophical anthropology is to explain the "diversity" of the ways of human life, both on a chronological and synchronic plane. The basis of anthropological reflection is the idea of biological indefiniteness and polymorphism of man as a biological being. It is a fact that elementary actions of life, along with the performance of a human being, are dependent on their anatomical and physiological structure. However, we can see a surprising differentiation in the performance of human beings as early as at the elementary level. An example can be seen in nutrition, those things that a human being considers to be food. It is certain that nature has given us a spectrum in which the "products of nature" can become food for us. This spectrum is differentiated by geographical, historical, social, and cultural conditions. The primary basis, however, are geographical conditions—we primarily eat and drink the things that nature offers to us in our environment. That said, even in the same geographical conditions, the structure of nutrition differs according to the society and social stratum in which we find ourselves. This is why we see a surprising variety of the "substance" and the form of food within the same biologically and geographically defined space. Apart from that, even in the most primitive form, food assumes a cultural significance as we eat in line with the instructions of our social status. We see analogical diversity in sexual

relationships, in the education of our families, in forms of entertainment, and in the understanding of the world. We could say that even at the elementary level, each society solves the same issue—the issue of how to survive—in a specific way. That means that human beings can typically approach survival in a number of different ways. The production of one's living conditions becomes an expression, and the expression becomes a means of self-creation. Man is a being that creates its own world and itself.

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History and Stories: Schapp's Ontological Conception of the Entanglement

Daniele Nuccilli

Abstract

W. Schapp's philosophy has not had much impact on contemporary philosophies of history, assuming one can speak of philosophy of history in the strict sense with regard to the most recent historiographical approaches. Such little success is primarily for two reasons: firstly, Schapp speaks briefly on history in a scientific and methodological sense, showing himself much more interested in the hermeneutical-individual dimension with regard to the understanding of the past; and, secondly, thanks to its effectiveness, the concept of entanglement-in-stories lends itself to a superficial and immediate use, without there being any need to investigate its theoretical assumptions. The work focuses on the attempt to establish a possible route between the history intended in its broadest sense and history in the way Schapp defines it, by seeking to deepen the conceptual structure of the entanglement-in-stories.

Keywords: Schapp, history, stories, entanglement, networks of stories, phenomenology, narrativity, hermeneutic, philosophy of history

Introduction

In his monumental work *The Phenomenological Movement*, H. Spiegelberg introduces E. Levinàs with the following words:

> There are philosophers whose path of thought can be described without taking account of their path of life. Edmund Husserl is the obvious case to mention. [...] In the case of Levinàs things are completely different. His life is not only 'entangled in stories' (using a title by Wilhelm Schapp) as is that of every human life, it is entangled in history itself, into the history of Europe in the twentieth century obsessed by passions and so rich in atrocious catastrophes. And Levinàs' path of thought cannot be understood if one completely disregards this circumstance. (Spiegelberg, 1982)

This excerpt not only attests to the reputation of Schapp's theoretical proposal, but also raises a particularly important point: What kind of relationship exists between the concept of history, as argued by Spiegelberg, characterised by a supra-individual dimension where world-wide events occur, driven by forces similar to those the ancients used to call

"fate"[1], and the single individual stories in which, according to Schapp, all human beings are "entangled"?

To answer this question, the first task is to identify the key factors which make possible the convergence and the divergence between the Spiegelberg's concepts of *stories,* in the plural, and that of history, in the singular. Without encroaching on an epistemological assessment of the historical science's statute, nor yielding to philosophical explanations concerning the history of those authors I intend to mention later on, I will try to highlight two ways of understanding the word "hi-story" in a conceptual manner: the first one, "universal"; the other, "individual". Then, by showing how these two modes occur in certain important authors of German classic thought, I will try to show how they can be compatible within the Schapp's concept of history and the way they can integrate into his entanglement-in-stories framework.

Hi-story as Knowledge

As Steiner points out, the term "story" derives from the Greek *historia*, which refers first and foremost to investigating, experiencing and exploring. In this regard, "history" is intended as a knowledge that involves, in general, empirical experience concerning the knowledge of the world in the broadest sense[2] (Steiner, 2008). Later on, Hugh of Saint Victor describes the process of historical knowing as *video et narro* by highlighting the consubstantiality with regard to the experience and the process of putting into words, where the latter characterises the historical experience in the ancient world. In this specific case, "history" would reflect the complete experience of the world, whereas "story" would rather represent the stage where the experience is put into words. As far as I see it, it is precisely in this vision that a first core of the individual or personalist conception of history can be detected. "*Narrare necesse est,*" Odo Marquard would say later, recalling Schapp's philosophy of stories, and thus highlighting an ineradicable feature of human essence with regard to storytelling (2004, p. 56). In fact, Polybius already spoke of the historian as the one who, either writing or narrating, puts the events respectively in front of the reader's eyes or the listener's ears, therefore triggering a process of sharing stories, which is the basis for an empathic joint participation in the narrated events (Leidl, 2011). Basically, it is precisely this intersubjective dimension of participation in the event to trigger a rationalisation process of the historical understanding. The need to formulate rules and establish a re-

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1   The history with an "inhuman face", as Marrou defines it, H. I. Marrou, *De la connaissance historique* (Paris: Edition de Seul 1954) p. 16.

2   Examples for such an ancient idea of history are Pliny's *Naturalis Historia,* Aristotle's *Historia Animalium* and Theophrastus' *Historia Plantarum,* not to mention all the other works of ancient historiography.

liable method for the historical knowledge arises, in turn, from the need to discriminate the true from the false, and the roots in the dispersed and multiple nature of oral narratives and written chronicles of past events.

As Lateiner pointed out, the first seeds of a methodical approach can already be found in *Herodotus' Histories* (1989); nevertheless, as shown by Goetz, an early form of rationalisation of empirical data offered by stories lies in Augustine's *De Trinitate libre quindicem*. According to Augustine, there is a fundamental difference between *historia*, intended as a form of knowledge with regard to a singular event and *scientia*, which rather deals with general things that go beyond the historical contingency (1861). Both of these forms of knowledge unravel on two different levels and pursue, at the same time, the sole objective of *sapientia* and *veritas* (Augustinum, 1861). According to Augustine, history does not belong to the order of the reason but rather consists in an act of faith towards the way the events occur in time, all in accordance with a divine will. Thus, Steiner states that history, as Augustine understands it, would not only provide a description of how the world was created, as per the hermeneutical slant in biblical interpretation, but would also be concerned with understanding the theological meaning of the world taking place (2008). From this viewpoint, there seem to me to be two key elements, both belonging to the two ways of conceiving history typical of early contemporaneity. On the one hand, the attempt to grasp the progress of history in its entirety forms the basis of the providentialist conception of history, which is a basic feature of German idealism from Fichte to Hegel, and, on the other hand, the hermeneutical element underlies Dilthey's historicism.

From Hegel to Dilthey

As Loriga points out, German idealism plays a crucial role in the singularisation of history (2014). The *epos* of the great historical representations of the past was clearly focused on great historical personalities, which provided plural-voicedness and irreducible multiplicity to the historical narrative. However, it is likewise true that Hegel causes history to channel into a single evolutionary line, that is to say that it is identified as a universal process of the World-spirit and endowed with a Reason that permeates and guides the passions of those who move history. In *The Philosophy of History*, Hegel writes:

> A World-historical individual is not so unwise as to indulge a variety of wishes to divide his regards. He is devoted to the One Aim. [...] The special interest of passion is thus inseparable from the active development of a general principle for it is from the special and determinate and from its negation, that the Universal result. It is not the general idea that is implicated in opposition and combat, and

that is exposed to danger. It remains in the background, untouched and injured. This may be called the *cunning of Reason*. (1956, pp. 30-31)

The origin of the gap between a "human" surface of history and a more intimate and substantial essence (Hegel, 1956, pp. 25-26), untouchable by any event, lies in Kant's philosophy. In his work *Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht* (1784), Kant writes:

Individual end and even entire nations little imagine that, while they are pursuing their own ends, each in his own way and often in opposition to others, they are unwittingly guided in their advance along a course intended by nature, they are unconsciously promoting an end which, even if they knew what it was, would scarcely arouse their interest (Kant, 1991).

However, in opposition to Kant's position, Hegel takes the stance that the realisation of the idea of Spirit, on the one hand, and the historical progress, on the other, move in parallel in recognising the individual existence as participant in a universal movement:

The History of the world begins with its general aim—the realisation of the Idea of Spirit—only in an implicit form (*an sich*), that is as Nature; a hidden, most profoundly hidden, unconscious instinct; and the whole process of History, is directed to rendering this unconscious impulse a conscious one. (Hegel, 1956)

Hegel's position builds on a fundamental issue, i.e. the dialectic relationship between individual and history, which takes form, in *The Philosophy of History*, in the participation of the individual in becoming conscious of the Spirit within the processuality of world's history. With regard to the history of the effects, it seems to me that this problem has resulted in two additional forms of interpretation of history, which explicate on two different planes. The first concerns the individual's belonging to *history*, understood as a universal movement and pertaining to a certain ontological plane, where "individual" is intended in the meaning provided, for example by Trendelenburg[3]; the second focuses instead on a more hermeneutical issue, namely the opportunity to get a deeper understanding on the universal history, starting from the plurality of individual events. As regards the first, one of the paradigmatic perspectives is the one given by von Humboldt, while as for the second, it gains a central role in Dilthey's philosophy

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3   See Trendelenburg, F. A. (1868). *Naturrecht auf dem Grunde der Ethik*. Leipzig: Hirzel, p. 43.

and, consequently, in that embraced by Schapp, even though, in both cases, the concept of universal history becomes desubstantialised and depleted from the teleological value previously existing in Hegel's philosophy.

Preserving the characteristics typical of Hegel's teleological need to understand the events that lead peoples and individuals, von Humboldt formulates in the early 19th century the idea of a "universal history" that needs to be investigated by following the natural science models, particularly those used in physics. He argues that past, present, and future follow mechanical laws and, therefore, their processuality can be understood only through the mathematical method. Von Humboldt writes in his *Betrachtungen über die bewegenden Ursachen in der Weltgeschichten* (1818):

Even those events that at first glance might be seen as random, i.e. weddings, stillbirths, crimes, show in a few years' time a surprising regularity that can be explained only if we accept that voluntary human actions are bearers of the character of nature, which always follows uniform rules that are repeated over time. Such a mechanical and chemical way of explaining the universal history is of the utmost importance and achieves excellence when leads to the exact knowledge of certain laws, according to which individual elements of history, forces and reactions contained therein act and retroact. (von Humboldt, 1964, p. 318)

This way to proceed is based on the study on the efficient cause rather than on the final cause, as is the case of Hegel's and Fichte's philosophy. Von Humboldt's historiographical methodology applies to three branches of knowledge: the nature of things, human freedom and the commands of fate. The history, be it of a nation or related to the whole of the human race, behaves like a system, whose individual components interact with each other and play a fundamental role in the progress of events. The individual or the single nation entertains a mutual relationship with the things of the world and fate that can be subverted, as is sometimes the case for humankind's great personalities or *"genii"*, as called by von Humboldt, who can act as foreign bodies within the historical progress' mechanism; in other words, forces that loom suddenly out of nowhere:

The universal history's connections are partly mechanical [...] when entering the area of freedom, any form of calculation no longer stands, and simultaneously everything new and unexperienced can suddenly arise out of a great spirit or a powerful entity that can judge only starting from a wider range of new parameters. This is the most beautiful and exciting moment of universal history [...] It cannot be denied that genii's effectiveness and deep passion belong to an order

of things which is completely different from the mechanical way na-
ture proceeds in space and time. Taking it as it is, nature concerns
every single emanation of human individuality: everything behind
it is itself unfathomable. (von Humboldt, 1964, p. 320)

Von Humboldt's historiographic model appears as a spurious model:
on one hand, it is coherent with the systematic needs of Hegel's substantial-
ist philosophy in proposing a unitary dynamics with regard to the historical
progress (Eucken, 1921); on the other, by including the case in the kinetics of
its universal history and foreseeing within an integrated model the emer-
gence of inexplicable elements from a historical and speculative viewpoint,
it anticipates some of those issues that will characterise Ranke's historical
investigations and Dilthey's philosophy, more attentive to the biographical
aspect and the lived experience of historical figures (Eucken, 1921). As von
Humboldt explains, the appearance of unforeseeable elements in history
must lead to a *Zerstörung* of the teleological view of history, typical of the pre-
vious philosophies of history's teleological and materialistic approaches.
     What was the cause of a *Zerstörung* in von Humboldt in fact takes
the shape of a true pluralisation of history in Dilthey. As discussed in
the writing *Die Entstehung der Hermeneutik*, the problems concerning his-
torical knowledge are based on two essential assumptions. The first is
that the understanding process of other people's lived experiences, in-
cluding those that took place in the past, occurs through the deduction
and the projection into their personal experiences, thereby following
the footsteps they have left about themselves, their works, cities and
laws. The second is the hypostatisation of such knowledge of the sin-
gular on the level of objectivity, which determines a typing of certain
historical aspects and a reconstruction of the relations they entertain
within the single individual's historical conscience (Dilthey, 1909). Ac-
cording to Dilthey, it is through these two mechanisms that the histori-
cal conscience can materialise and make present the history of all man-
kind. As indicated in the paragraph entitled *Das Problem der Geschichte*
contained in *Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften*,
human beings are nothing but the crossroads of the different systems
that have emerged over time and characterise the society in which they
live, historically determined and serving as the basis for the principles
that make the individual a historical being in all respects (Dilthey, 1992).
As Dilthey argues, the individual stories represent the web of relations
which lie at the root of past cultures and nations. The historians, Dilthey
explains, are "faced with a huge amount of material, a thousand threads
lead them up to the unconfined domain of all the memories belong-
ing to the whole mankind" (Dilthey, 1992). Dilthey furthermore argues
that:

Historiography, moving backward from the present to the past, con-
stitutes a starting point for representing everything that still lives
in the memory of the present generation, everything that can thus
be a memory in the proper meaning of the term. All that is left of
this is the expression after the extinction of life itself, in the form
either of a direct expression, by which certain souls have shown what
they were, or of narratives concerning events relating to individuals,
communities and states. The historians find themselves having to
cope with such heaps of countless number of past things made up
of facts, words, sounds and images: souls that cannot be recognised
as such anymore. How can he summon them? His work consists in
interpreting all the preserved remains. (Dilthey, 1992, p. 278)

Dilthey concludes that "all this is interpretation, that is to say, a her-
meneutical art" (Dilthey, 1992, p. 278). Schapp will then build on the theo-
retical structure of that hermeneutics, albeit adopting a phenomenological
approach. As far as the gnosiological aspect is concerned, Schapp's criti-
cism addressed to any form of essentialism can only incorporate also the
objectification of the single expression, on which Dilthey based the spiritu-
al sciences in general and history in particular.
     According to Dilthey, the major problem of science intended as his-
tory was based on the need to bridge the individual moment (Marquard,
1982). What happens if the connection between more individual existences
or complex systems, such as states, cultures and historical periods, come
into play in place of the single existence? What happens when the histor-
ical demand changes from the single existence to the historical period,
when such a history achieves its universality and, therefore, comes to the
fore?
       Dilthey's answer starts from the assumption that even before be-
ing observers of history, human beings are in history and make that history
(Dilthey, 1992, p. 283). Against the background of our conscience and within
our thought processes, social categories—such as right, duty and mutual
collaboration—bind the individual to a collective reality that has become
established over time and bear characteristics rooted in the time and place
in which it developed. Each theoretical assessment or perception of histo-
ry grounds itself in humans' archetypical condition, which corresponds to
that of the *homo historicus* (Carr, 1989). The knowledge of the past, as well as
every reflection on current events, that is to say the attempt of retrieving
the actions done by men near or distant in time, is implemented within
man's inner experience or *Erlebnis*, as pointed out by Dilthey.
     The word *Erlebnis* describes the interior experience that enables
the individual to know the objects and the historical events according to
a specific explicit purpose. This reflection tries to answer a fundamental

question that Dilthey was asking himself in *Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften* concerning the historical knowledge:

> How can a historical conscience come about if detached from the individual experience, when it comes to formulating assertions about subjects that represent connections between individuals, that is to say cultural systems, nations or states? (Dilthey, 1992)

With such a question, the philosopher from Berlin wants to unhinge Hegel's distinction between the objective and the subjective sides of history[4] and thus move it from the substantialism, characterising the summary of these two aspects, to the psychological-hermeneutical question of the experience and lived experience of history within the individual conscience. In the same way, Dilthey does not want to isolate the historical experience within the single perspective, but rather place it within a collectivity, either by thinking in a horizontal manner, i.e. the society and the period in which a specific historical conscience takes shape, or in a vertical manner, i.e. the link with past collectivities and individuals, projecting on to us their culture and vision of the world[5].

"Entanglement" in the Philosophy of W. Schapp

Schapp was a pupil of Dilthey in Berlin, from whom he inherits the plural vision of history (Marquard, 2004), which will lead him, through the Heideggerian filter, to put the stories on a fundamental ontological plane. Schapp's concept of entanglement-in-stories has the same hermeneutical and existential scope as Heidegger's *In-der-Welt-sein* (Greisch, 1992). The stories represent to Schapp the first unavoidable ontological element that which make it possible to understand all aspects of reality (Greisch, 1992;

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4   As J. Watanabe points out, the philosopher from Stuttgart distinguishes between '*res gestae*', which coincides with the occurrence itself, and *historia rerum gestarum*, which corresponds to the historical narrative, i.e. the narration of the events. On the one hand, the *res gestae* represent the objective side of history, existing by itself beyond all whatever form of understanding it may generates; on the other hand, the *history rerum gestae* represents the subjective side of history, that is, the receipt of the historical understanding and its process of putting into words from a peculiar perspective, i.e. the Greek concept of *Historia*. See J. Watanabe, Zwischen Phänomenologie und Deutschen Idealismus (Berlin: Duncker-Humblot 2012) p. 93-95.

5   In this respect is undeniable the great influence of Trendelenburg's thoughts: "Der Mensch ist ein historisches Wesen, ein Wesen der Gemeinschaft in der Geschichte, in der geistige Substanz einer Geschichte geboren, auferzogen, von ihr genährt und wiederum sie fortsetzend, weiterführend, ein lebendiges Glied von der Vergangenheit zur Zukunft, immer in einem grossen Uebergange thätig. Denn der einzelne Mensch ist allenthalben durch das bedingt, wash hinter ihm liegt, durch die vorangegangenen Geschlechter der Familie, in welcher er geboren wird, durch die Geschichte seines Volkes in dessen Zustände er eintritt, durch die gegebene Religion die an ihm arbeitet" (Trendelenburg, *Naturrecht*.... p. 44).

Schapp, 2012). Likewise, the hermeneutical concept of horizon has the same size and borders of the Gadamer's *Verschmelzung*, and how the latter is rooted, in turn, in the phenomenological approach provided by Husserl (with whom he graduated in 1909 in Gottingen) (Schapp, 1959), an essential basis leading Schapp to determine the various modes by which past stories recur (Wälde, 1985). However, I do not want to go on at length about philosophical assumptions and theoretical implications relating to such perspectives; rather, I will seek to provide only a few hints to give a more comprehensible insight into how Schapp addresses the issue of the relationship between individual story and universal history, both from a gnosiological and an ontological point of view. From an ontological point of view, Schapp would reply to Dilthey's question previously mentioned that all this could happen through the emergence (*auftauchen* in German) of past stories; whereas, from a hermeneutical point of view, the *co-entanglement* of individuals and stories of men of the past would allow this to be done.

Networks of Stories: The Things-for

The first level that allows Schapp to showcase the existential condition of the "entanglement" is the description of the relationship that man has with reality or the external world (Sepp, 2010). According to him, this relationship is channelled by objects of daily use, the so-called things-for, which constitute the common horizon between men's stories and those pertaining to the external world (Rolf, 2004). Indeed, they refer to the builder plan and have been produced in order to be used by someone, and thereby build a first network of stories between individuals, for instance artisan or producer and consumer (Nuccilli, 2018). Secondly, during the production process, a certain material is chosen, made of a specified composition that is fit for the purpose and processed with tools suitable to forge it. Within this process, certain elements characteristic of the external world emerge, such as rigidity and hardness, that are normally analysed only from a physical point of view, but rather assuming in Schapp's proposal a unique meaning within man's productive activity (Schapp, 2012). To sum up in fewer words, the thing-for has its own story that moves onto the horizon of men's stories that have to do with it. By following a sort of path made of concentric circles, the thing-for in turn represents the horizon of meaning where considerations concerning the thing itself, its colours and materials can be allowed to emerge (Schapp, 2012, p. 19). Starting from the formation of the thing-for, then comes the time of the emergence of stories. They are primary formations from which derive all the others, and hence, within them, arise all the other formations characterising the perceptive aspects of the external world: colour, reflexes, distance, noise, light, and void. This aspect of Schapp's philosophy is the one where the definitive break with Husserl's

eidetic is carried out (Liebsch, 2010). The knowledge of the phenomenon is no longer attributable to essences or ideal models of manifestation but appears intelligible only beyond the story of each single object (Schapp, 2016), if we follow the path undertaken by the thing-for through the whole production process and widen our horizon until we reach the man working on the thing-for, i.e. the structure of the entangled-in-stories. Using the same example above, the artisan not only has in mind the steps to follow and the gestures to make in order to create the thing-for—thus proving that he is not only entangled in the story of the thing-for—but also bears in mind the story of men who previously worked on the development of prototypes with regard to the thing itself or the tools suited to create it. An object, for example a cup, recalls the story of the man who made it and at the same time it is part of the story of those men who make use of it. This object, in turn, brings back the story of its invention and the cultural context in which it was invented (Schapp, 2012, p. 160).

Co-entanglement and History

Therefore, if thing-for's stories appear on the horizon of the stories in which men are entangled, those stories belonging to the entangled one intertwine on a wider horizon, characterised by past and future stories, at the centre of which other entangled individuals are situated. Those things which apply to a cup apply as well to the great works of man that recall a whole historical period, for instance, the Colosseum, the Pyramids, and the Parthenon (Schapp, 2012, pp. 3-4). Together with and against this background, according to Schapp, a horizon full of stories presents itself to us, which tells us both the socio-cultural context in that given period and the plot of stories of each individual that are related to the above-mentioned works (Schapp, 2012, pp. 3-4). These stories, then, join up our personal understanding that we have of that period, such as, for instance, the witnesses concerning the building of the Colosseum reported in history books, the stories of the gladiator fights, the Vespasian's dreams, the Colossus of Nero and, by means of it, his delusions of grandeur—factors that involve us deeply. Schapp defines this manner of taking part in the story as 'co-entanglement', which represents the hermeneutical presupposition that underlies every understanding, not only the historical, but also those relating to the world around us and any other single human life (Schapp, 2012, p. 136). In order to understand the ontological-hermeneutical turning point brought by Schapp to the Kant and Hegel conception of History under the influence of Dilthey's historicism, we could draw on a significant example in his masterpiece *In Geschichten verstrickt* (Entangled in stories). This will help us to understand the way history, on one side, and the stories, on the

other, interweave in Schapp's philosophy of entanglement, even if, as we will see, any form of distinction is only conceptual and never real[6].

Schapp tells of the encounter between two comrades in arms from the same regiment who fought in the First World War. As soon as they meet, even after several years, many memories come back from the past: their comrades, the enemies they killed, the battles they fought and, finally, the background of the Great War. Starting out from this universal event, their single stories are illustrated along with the causes and effects of such a disaster. This conflict represents the common story shared and experienced by these two men, a catastrophic piece of history that constantly keeps them entangled, but still a common historical background involving life past and future stories of an entire generation of human lives, and future generations too (Schapp, 2012, pp. 112-113). There is no discontinuity between the background of the Great War and the dimension in which the stories of each individual are located, which instead interact with one another and, consequently, give life to a permanent feature of human history, i.e. the condition of entanglement, through their stories. It is at this point that Schapp's thought deviates from the idealistic conception of history. Through what O. Marquard calls "pluralisation of history" (Marquard, 2004, p. 47), man is not only "historical" but also "storical", that is to say, that he represents an intertwining of stories in which could emerge every individual or collective memory of all humankind. From this point of view, Schapp criticises Dilthey's theory of *Erlebnis*. He states, in the chapter 10 of *Entangled in Stories* that the inner experience is only a fragment of a greater whole composed of the story of which it forms a part (Schapp, 2012, pp. 121-122). The story can be regarded as a series of events provided with an internal coherence and able to show a clear picture of a given aspect of man's life, thought, and personality. This ontological aspect leads to a fundamental hermeneutical breakthrough: man can be known only through his story. Schapp summarises this theory in his most well-known sentence: "The story stands for the man" (Schapp, 2012, p. 103). With this statement, the philosopher claims that there can be no understanding of man without trying to understand his stories. The same applies to historical figures. For instance, according to Schapp, the episode of the Alexander's helmet, narrated by Plutarch in *Life of Alexander*, reveals more about the figure of the king, in command of an army struggling with thirst in the middle of the Balochistan desert, than any military victory or conquest mentioned in history books. As a matter of fact, Plutarch relates how Alexander refused to take advantage of his status to the detriment of his soldiers by emptying a helmet filled with water previously brought by a slave. This episode, according to Schapp, reveals an

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6   See G. Scholz, *Das Verhältnis der Geschichten zur Geschichte* in K. H. Lembeck, *Geschichte und Geschichten: Studien zur Geschichtenphänomenologie Wilhelm Schapps*, (Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann 2004) p. 58.

aspect of Alexander's personality that explains his political and military success in a far more effective way than in-depth analyses of his political choices and military decisions.

History and Entanglement-in-stories

What has been in relation to the possibility to acquaint themselves with history through relevant historical figures' individual stories, or the monumental works that constantly provide us with entire historical periods, is set, according to Schapp, within a continuist conception of human history. However, such a continuity is not justified by an intimate harmony that characterises the events along the timeline of the historical progress, but rather is based on the entanglement-in-stories' hermeneutical-ontological structure and the co-entanglement's gnosiological mechanism (Scholz, 2004, p. 59).

Schapp's intention is to phenomenologically recreate the horizon of the understanding of the past from the single individual perspective. He writes in his *Philosophie der Geschichte*:

> The single entangled is always at the centre of our research. Starting from him or his stories, we advance in all directions as far as we can. That being so, no obstacles stand in the way. We are not only entangled in our stories, but also in all the stories up to the creation of the world and, consequently, up to the furthest man back in time. (Schapp, 2016, p. 46)

From a gnosiological point of view, the entanglement of which Schapp speaks—and thanks to which we can come to the dawn of world history—finds nourishment in what the author calls "positive world" (Shapp, 2016, pp. 54-103). By the expression "positive world", he refers to the world to which the entangled-in-stories belongs, built on a universal history that involves an indefinite number of human beings, along a timeline that projects itself up to the ancient times (Greisch, 2010, pp. 195-197). The western positive world is based, for instance, on the universal history of the world's creation, from Hesiod to Dante (Schapp, 2016, p. 51). The only access to this world is our stories that lead us, then, into the horizon of the positive world to which we belong, to other entangled-in-stories individuals' stories, with which we come into contact and within which we can, in turn, be co-entangled. The entangled one finds himself/herself co-entangled within a universal history, which serves as a horizon for the single individual stories (Greisch, 1992, p. 266). It is precisely that horizon, then, that is located at the centre of an endless number of horizons, likewise determined by other universal histories that build the horizon of further positive worlds, within which other individual stories take place. We can access those individual stories through the identification of an anchor, set between the horizon of stories that constitutes their world and the horizon that configures ours.

Being man involves being entangled-in-stories, but it also means being or living in a positive world, in a certain period of time. Living in a positive horizon means, then, living in a world at the horizon of which arise further endless positive worlds. Every man finds himself/herself in a single positive horizon, and thereby can see other indefinite or specific worlds. (Schapp, 2016, p. 44)

The most obvious example of such a plurality of worlds is the history of the great monotheistic religions, which share a common horizon with regard to the Old Testament God[7] (Cfr. Schapp, 2016, pp. 42-44).

The different individual stories, spread throughout the positive world upon a common diachronic horizon, occur to determine what Schapp calls the "We-entangled". The extension of this 'We' depends on the extension of the co-entangled individuals within the single story or in the single stories taken into consideration by turns. The concept of We-story has a crucial relevance in Schapp, as it represents the linking element between single story and universal history:

> The transition from the individual story to the universal history takes place either through the co-entanglement or the We, where even the tiniest individual story already contains a We. We must admit that this We shows up in stories in an infinite number of nuances, such as the We uttered among two given siblings or the We that identifies families, the clans, a village, states, a barracks, or a workplace. Each individual story becomes suddenly a We-story. (Schapp, 2016, p. 201)

By identifying the intrinsic and plural collective structure of the entanglement-in-stories, Schapp aims to build the hermeneutical horizon[8] within which it is possible to quickly understand the stories concerning the vicissitudes and the vision of world of men very far from us in space and time. Such an understanding takes place by following the threads that stitch together each single story and the stories involving the We, from time to time offered to us by the horizon of history (Scholz, 2004, p. 58). Such We lies at the foundation of collectivities that fit into each other, ranging from the family unit to all of humankind, which entangle the single individual

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7   See M. Pohlmeyer, *Die Allgeschichte des Christentum* in K. Joisten, *Das Denken Wilhelm Schapps* (Freiburg: Karl Alber Verlag, 2010) pp. 131-133.

8   See M. Pohlmeyer, *Geschichten-Hermeneutik, Philosophische, literarische und theologische Provokationen im Denken von Wilhelm Schapp. First edition. LIT.*

in stories with an ever-widening horizon. It is by acting in this way, and by letting our gaze go up from the single story to the collective horizon in which it is situated, that we can bring out entire cross-sections of societies and civilisations belonging to other historical periods.

To use the same Schapp example, starting with the story of Alexander we can pass, by following the horizon of stories in which he is entangled, to the events of the epigones that experienced that event and, from their story, to the story of the division of the huge territories Alexander conquered and to the consequences arising from this action that brought about the rise of the kingdoms, cultures, and religions that later developed. It is evident how, for each change in gaze along the horizon of this positive world, a new collectivity presents itself to us, a collectivity that is involved with one or more stories come down to us and behind which Hellenic culture stands out, that is, the philosophy of Aristotle, the tutor of Alexander, and the Greek mythology rooted in Homer's and Hesiod's epics. Even more clear is the fact that each form of our understanding of this story will be affected by the way we access it, and will take place in the stories that have characterised our knowledge of Aristotle, Homer, Alexander and his epigones.

According to Schapp, the last horizon of the We is the one that encompasses the entire history of mankind, within which single individuals of the past, present and future have their precise location. However, Schapp states that such a universal history, able to bring together the whole history of humankind, will remain nothing but a *desideratum*, even to the most ambitious historiography:

> We might perhaps seek to start out from the stories of peoples, nations or states, as well as we receive them: Hesiod, Thucydides, Livy, Ranke or Mommsen; the so-called scientific stories written with the greatest claim to objectivity. However, within these stories we do not meet the 'We' we have been seeking; the enveloping 'We'. (Schapp, 2012, p. 1)

According to Schapp, systematic conceptions of history like Hegel's are nothing other than attempts at creating some snapshots of the universal history, both as it structures itself at a time when the historian gets entangled and from the restricted perspective of the horizon to which the individual might access. Every methodological attempt at realising an objective history, passing through the search for a meaning intrinsic to it, or aiming to the mere reporting of facts, cannot go beyond such a structural perspectivism, being bound to the different position each individual's holds in history. This awareness, though, has no relativistic implications. Each historical explanation, even the most mystifying, as well as any

ambiguous narration or conflicting testimony, marks a decisive new stage, a new trail within the intricate cartography of stories, leading us in fact, thanks to the co-entanglement's gnosiological device, both to the single individuals and to the repercussion history has in the horizon of stories that entangles them and, by radiating out, provides us with the starting point for any historiographic investigation on the whole historical and cultural world in which he lived.

Conclusions

The problem mentioned at the beginning concerning the semantic overlap of the words *history* and *story* took me to investigate, from a philosophical viewpoint, the common root at the base of the two words and to identify the right time when they separate from each other. Through a historical recognition, then, I highlighted two possible ways to understand history: the first one is universal, the second one is individual. The former falls under the word *history*, while the latter is enclosed in the word *story*. They entertain a dialectic relationship within the historiographic reflection carried out by the German contemporary philosophy.

Starting from demerger taking place in ancient times between the empirical and narrative dimensions of history, I then went on to the more strictly ontological question of belonging (in Kant and Hegel) of individual stories to the universal history and that concerning their impact (in von Humboldt) on it. In these authors was highlighted the attempt at conceiving the universal history as a movement, either materialistic or idealistic, that moves the individual stories, even though it is von Humboldt that emphasises the role of the individual in history. Then, I sought to show the way Dilthey makes the attempt to put history within the boundaries of a psychology of the lived experience. Within such a perspective, as I see it, a certain prerequisite for a fragmentation of the previous monolithic individual experience is generated, as well as for a new structure of the historical understanding, which starts from the individual experience and the historical context in which it is situated.

In my opinion, such prerequisites serve as basis for Schapp's conception of the *entanglement-in-stories*. In Schapp's philosophy, each individual represents a hermeneutical horizon permeated with his/her own and others' stories, in his/her turn prone to understanding the stories of the past. Such stories emerge with their own strengths from the historical narratives or from the remains and works the great civilisations have bequeathed to us, and constantly take us to the stories of individualities or collectivities of the past, depending upon the extension of the entangled-in-stories, who can range from the single inner self to the whole civilisation to which he/she belongs. We are all caught up by their stories, where we can come across connections with our world and our experience.

The horizons of the universal histories overlook the inside of such a being-caught-up, labelled as *entanglement* by Schapp. Those horizons flow through the entire mankind and represent the mosaic in which our story is located. That mosaic does not have any predefined order, nor has it a necessary position. One could say that it is like a sextant with which it is possible to surf the endless expanse of the entire humankind's university of the past, but it is more than that. Schapp transcends the hermeneutical plane and gives life to a real ontologisation of stories. These, understood in the Schappian meaning, represent the place where every form of understanding can exist.

This point is essential to explaining the Schapp perspective on the close relation between the individual story and the universal hi-story and on the other side the ontological location for any thematic and methodological consideration about history. Any modulation of historiographical research, from the report to the explanation, from the historical narrative to the annals, is nothing other than a different way stories can perpetrate and move through the events, in order to emerge on the plane of existence provided by the entanglement. It is on this level, that individual story and universal history flow into each other, and the manifestation of one or the other depends on the access we have to the story, understood as a fundamental ontological nucleus.

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Writing Better Histories: On the Epistemological Potential of Being Vanquished

Peter Šajda

Abstract

The paper aims to challenge the philosophical-historical principle *History is written by the victors* by highlighting Carl Schmitt's and Reinhart Koselleck's reflections on the epistemological potential of the experience of defeat. Both authors point out that this experience contains a unique potential for creating innovative historical approaches and interpretations that have long-term usefulness. Negative historical development intensifies explanatory pressure on the vanquished historian and directs his attention to long-term factors that have influenced this development. Non-ideological analysis of these factors facilitates the discovery of historical connections which are repeatable and are likely to occur in later historical contexts.

Keywords: historiography; theory of conflict; theory of defeat; epistemological potential

The title of the book suggests that it aims to deal with two profound human experiences: *trauma* and *reconciliation*.[1] I would like to add that these two experiences are intrinsically linked to a third life-changing experience: *conflict*. The result of a conflict is often a sharp division of its participants into two groups: the victors and the vanquished. On the one hand, this dualistic result can be a source of deep trauma or even tragedy for the vanquished. On the other, it might be the only way to end a conflict or at least its most intensive part.

It is often the case that both the victors and the vanquished write their respective histories of the conflict. Historians of both sides feel the urge to analyse *what* happened, *how* it happened, and *why* it happened. They search for causes of the conflict, determine its decisive moments, and examine the consequences of the actions that took place. They attempt to trace the trajectory of the conflict. The basic human experience, with the historical accounts produced by the victors and the vanquished, is that the formers' matter most. This experience is succinctly expressed in the saying

History is written by the victors. According to this saying the interpretations of the victorious power(s) ultimately overshadow dissenting interpretations and become the standard view.

I would like to challenge this by highlighting the contributions of two German thinkers of the 20th century: Carl Schmitt and Reinhart Koselleck. Both have argued that the philosophical-historical principle of *History is written by the victors* does not prove itself in the long term. By contrast, they advocate the principle *Better histories are written by the vanquished*[2] which they base on the epistemological advantage of vanquished historians. This advantage consists primarily in the fact that vanquished historians are exposed to greater explanatory pressure which prompts them to provide a thorough and innovative analysis of medium- and long-term historical processes. They are confronted with a "greater need for evidence than… the victors. After all, for the victors speaks the success itself" (Koselleck, 2006, pp. 48-49). Given this advantage, a special responsibility lies with vanquished historians to provide complex and reliable accounts of the conflicts they were involved in.

Schmitt on the "Productive" Defeats of Alexis de Tocqueville

Schmitt (1950/2017) discusses the issue of the historiography of the vanquished in his essay *Historiographia in nuce: Alexis de Tocqueville*[3] which he wrote shortly after the defeat of Nazi Germany in World War II.[4] In the essay he draws a connection between Alexis de Tocqueville's personal experiences of defeat and his accurate diagnoses and prognoses of historical development. Schmitt considers Tocqueville the greatest historian of the 19th century mainly due to his two prognoses[5] which, although formulated in 1835, proved to be remarkably accurate even more than a hundred years later.

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[2] This formulation is my own, but it is derived from the following statement of Koselleck: "It is striking that the better histories we have generally stem from the vanquished, not from the victors." Cf. (Koselleck, 2012, pp. 5-6) (emphasis in the original). My translation. Schmitt does not express this principle in a brief slogan, but the result of his examination of the history of the 19th century is the finding that the greatest historian of that century was an author who suffered a fivefold defeat.

[3] Schmitt intended to write a larger work on Tocqueville, but he failed to do so. He returned to Tocqueville in spoken commentaries that were recorded and published under the title *C.S.s Tocqueville-Notizen*. Cf. Anaïs Camus and Tristan Storme, "Carl Schmitt, lecteur de Tocqueville. La démocratie en question," in *Revue européenne de sciences sociales*, vol. 49, no. 1, 2011, pp. 8-9.

[4] Schmitt's tragic involvement in the politics of the Third Reich is well-known. His reflections on the historiography of the vanquished are undoubtedly connected to his own situation in 1946. He mentions, however, that he reflected on this issue already in his youth when he was confronted with the historiography produced by the Catholic minority in Germany to which he belonged (Schmitt, 1950/2017, p. 25/p. 25).

[5] Schmitt refers to the Conclusion of Volume II of Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*. The concretisation of the two superpowers represents the climax of this chapter. See (Tocqueville, 2010, pp. 655-657).

The point of departure for the first prognosis is Tocqueville's observation that behind the scenes of the manifold political conflicts of the 19th century two latent processes unfold in an ever greater measure: *centralisation* and *democratisation* (Schmitt, 1950/2017, p. 28/p. 27). He predicted that these processes would further intensify.

The second prognosis identifies the two world powers which would become the chief promoters of these processes: the United States of America and Russia (Schmitt, 1950/2017, pp. 28-29/pp. 27-28). Despite the obvious differences in their organisational forms, both are set to become key constructors of "a centralised and democratised humankind" (Schmitt, 1950/2017, p. 29/p. 28). Schmitt highlights the fact that Tocqueville made this prediction at a time when neither the United States nor Russia were industrialised societies and Europe viewed itself as the prime world leader. Although the European public initially regarded Tocqueville's prognosis as either unremarkable or overly pessimistic (Schmitt, 1950/2002, p. 89/p. 104), it began to change its mind after the revolutionary year of 1848 as the number of self-critical interpretations of Europe's future increased dramatically.

Schmitt sees a direct link between the acuteness of Tocqueville's understanding of historical developments and the fact that he focused on the processes that concerned him in an existential way. His prognosis of the rise of two new superpowers in the East and the West and the concomitant decline of Europe's global influence was not merely a disinterested political commentary. It was also a reflection within the larger framework of Tocqueville's self-interpretation as a vanquished individual. As a *European* he was a representative of a continent that was on the losing end of the shifts in global power and influence (Schmitt, 1950/2017, p. 31/p. 29). The role of Europe in the changing world was diminishing and Tocqueville regarded this as an irreversible trend.

According to Schmitt, Tocqueville suffered four other defeats which affected different parts of his identity. The analysis and comprehension of these defeats enabled him to make penetrating predictions of future developments.

The second defeat affected Tocqueville as an *aristocrat* (Schmitt, 1950/2017, p. 30-31/p. 29). In the new political order there was no place for the social class to which he belonged. Tocqueville predicted that attempts to restore the role of aristocracy would be shattered by repeated revolutions which would be expressions of the increasingly successful trend of centralisation (Schmitt, 1950/2002, p. 90/p. 104). The revolutions would ultimately eliminate aristocracy.

Tocqueville's third defeat concerned his identity as a *Frenchman* (Schmitt, 1950/2017, p. 31/p. 29). In 1815, the joint forces of England, Russia, Austria and Prussia defeated expansionist France in the coalition wars which lasted for more than twenty years. France was to be monitored and controlled by the international community in order to prevent a new conflict.

Tocqueville was also vanquished as a *liberal* (Schmitt, 1950/2017, p. 31/p. 29). This defeat ensued from the dramatic events of 1848. A new revolutionary wave swiftly destroyed the fruits of twenty years of liberal efforts aimed at societal consensus. A deepened radicalism emerged: the "proletarian-atheist-communist movement" (Schmitt, 1950/2002, p. 80-81/p. 100) that would overcome its initial setbacks and grow in strength.

Finally, Tocqueville was defeated as a *Christian* (Schmitt, 1950/2017, p. 31/p. 29). Although his family background, personal experience, and thorough understanding of the dynamic of Christian life predisposed him to become a voice of Christian hope in the political chaos of his time, his compromises with the spirit of the age prevented him from becoming a prophetic voice.[6] He failed to integrate the optimistic notion of Divine Providence into his pessimistic view of the future of humanity.

Schmitt points out the important fact that Tocqueville accepted his defeats. This was noticed already by his contemporaries and François Guizot expressed it in the famous dictum: *C'est un vaincu qui accepte sa défaite* (Schmitt, 1950/2017, p. 31-32/p. 30). In contrast to Guizot, however, Schmitt does not see this as a sign of personal weakness and defeatism, but rather as an expression of Tocqueville's realistic and non-ideological interpretation of historical development. Instead of a denial of political reality and wishful thinking Tocqueville understood correctly the nature of his defeats, which enabled him to formulate insightful diagnoses and prognoses that survived him. This approach made Tocqueville unique and—as Schmitt claims—it helps us "divine the secret [*arcanum*] of the greatness that elevates the defeated Frenchman above all other historiographers of his century" (Schmitt, 1950/2017, p. 32/p. 30).

Unfortunately, Schmitt's analysis of the connection between Tocqueville's personal experiences of defeat and their acceptance on the one hand and his historical acumen on the other hand does not go any further. Schmitt does not provide a systematic account of the transposition of Tocqueville's existential experiences into his understanding of broader historical contexts. Furthermore, Schmitt's insistence on Tocqueville's acceptance of his defeats suggests that Tocqueville acknowledged the irreversible nature of these defeats. However, Tocqueville's two prognoses, which identified irreversible historical trends, do not apply to all the above-mentioned defeats. His defeats as an aristocrat and a European are irreversible since they are caused by the irreversible increase of democratisation and centralisation and of the global influence of Russia and the United States.

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6   For more detail on Tocqueville's spiritual struggles and his *inquiétude* see Jakub Tlolka's outstanding paper "The Restless Liberalism of Alexis de Tocqueville," in *Filozofia*, vol. 72, no. 9, 2017, pp. 736-747.

But Schmitt's essay does not provide any arguments for why the other defeats should be seen in the same way. With regard to Tocqueville's defeat as a liberal, Schmitt provides an additional insight in his essay *A Pan-European Interpretation of Donoso Cortés*. There he explains that Tocqueville's political experiences during his tenure as foreign minister under Louis Napoleon strengthened his fear that humanity was headed towards unfreedom. This made him pessimistic about the fate of liberalism:

> Tocqueville tried to find a place for liberal reservations, and not to lose faith in individual freedom. But his dilemma is unmistakable, especially after his experiences as Louis Napoleon's foreign minister between June and October 1849. At times, his diagnosis already culminates in the vision of a giant anthill and a termite-like humanity. (Schmitt, 1950/2002, p. 90/pp. 104-105)

Even if we categorise Tocqueville's defeat as a liberal as irreversible on the basis of this intertextual evidence, we are still left with two defeats which can hardly be categorised as objectively irreversible. There is no reason to suppose that Tocqueville regarded the defeat of France in the coalition wars as resulting in a permanently inferior position of France on the European political scene. On the contrary, his claim that the revolutionary movement originating from France would intensify and the French Revolution would be repeated in different forms suggests dramatic changes in the European power balance which might actually strengthen the position of France. Finally, Tocqueville's defeat as a Christian seems to be of an altogether different nature than the other described defeats. It represents a subjective defeat, whose connection to objective trends in European and especially global Christianity is unclear. Another problem with this defeat is that it was identified *ex post* by Schmitt rather than by Tocqueville himself. Despite Schmitt's problematic expansion of the claim of irreversibility to all of Tocqueville's supposed defeats his fundamental insight that Tocqueville's experiences of defeat enabled him to identify crucial latent long-term trends is correct. This insight was further elaborated by Reinhart Koselleck who provided a more systematic account of the epistemological advantage of vanquished historians.

Koselleck on the Epistemological Potential of Being Vanquished

Koselleck (2000/2002) devotes attention to the problem of the histories written by the vanquished in the essay *Transformations of Experience and Methodological Change: A Historical-Anthropological Essay*.[7] He acknowledges

Schmitt's influence by referencing his analysis of Tocqueville and also his Nachlass confirms that he considered Schmitt an important source of inspiration (Koselleck, 2000/2002, p. 76/p. 346; Lepper, 2012, p. 13). Unlike Schmitt, he does not focus on the case of a single historian, but rather on general differences between the approaches of the victors and the vanquished to history. He examines especially methodological and interpretational innovations created by vanquished historians and illustrates these with a broad array of examples from antiquity through the 20th century.[8]

On the basis of Koselleck's descriptions we can identify three principal features of the victors' approach to history. First, their historians focus on the short-term perspective. Their most important task is to analyse those events, which were decisively shaped by the victors and ensured their victory. The accounts of victorious historians are dominated by descriptions of favourable processes due to which the conflict ended as the victors planned and hoped (Koselleck, 2000/2002, p. 67-68/p. 76).

Second, in cases when victorious historians describe middle- and long-term processes they tend to integrate them into *the story of victory*. These processes are seen as leading up to the victorious events, which represent their climax. Thus victorious historians apply an approach which can be characterd as "teleology ex post facto" (Koselleck, 2000/2002, p. 68/p. 76). Their victory provides a firm framework within which history is to be explained.

Third, victorious historians resist examining long-term anonymous social-economic processes over which the victors did not exert much control (Koselleck, 2000/2002, p. 67/p. 76). The focus on such processes would diminish the role of the victors.

The historiography of the vanquished has its point of departure in an experience which is contrary to that of the victors: "Everything happened differently from how it was planned or hoped" (Koselleck, 2000/2002, p. 68/p. 76). The vanquished historians' previous interpretations of history proved to be deficient and the moment of negative surprise needs to be explained.

From Koselleck's reflections we can derive three main characteristics of the approach of the vanquished to the history of the conflict. First, due to the negative outcome of the conflict, the vaquished historian is under greater explanatory pressure than his victorious counterpart (Koselleck, 2000/2002, p. 68; p. 77/p. 76; p. 83). This prompts him to transcend the short-term horizon in which the expectations of the vanquished were not

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7   See especially the fifth chapter "Die Geschichte der Sieger—eine Historie der Besiegten" / "The History of the Victors—A History of the Vanquished."

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8   Koselleck discusses the lives and works of Greek historians (Herodotus, Thucydides, Polybius), Roman historians (Sallust, Tacitus, Augustine), historians of the early modern period (Philippe de Commines, Niccolò Machiavelli, Francesco Guicciardini), and historians of the late modern period (Barthold Georg Niebuhr, Wilhelm von Humboldt, Alexis de Tocqueville, Karl Marx, Max Weber).

fulfilled. His scrutiny must extend to middle- and long-term factors, whose analysis provides him with additional insights.

Second, the vaquished historian does not follow a positive teleological line. In this respect, he is in the opposite position as the victorious historian: his examination of medium- and long-term historical processes is not guided by a consistent story. The reasons for the unfavourable development are yet to be determined.

Third, if the vanquished historian does not succumb to a simplistic apologetic view of the conflict,[9] his defeat becomes an impetus to search for medium- and long-term causes of the negative development. Thanks to the defeat, he enters a higher level of abstraction as he methodologically examines historical connections and uncovers causal relations that are *repeatable*. In the unrepeatable situation of a concrete defeat he methodologically transposes *subjective* experience into *objective* knowledge (Koselleck, 2000/2002, p. 77/p. 83). Such knowledge is accessible even to those who do not have the experience of defeat and it can be useful in later historical contexts.

On the basis of his systematic analysis, Koselleck maintains that "the experience of being vanquished contains an epistemological potential that transcends its cause" (Koselleck, 2000/2002, p. 69/p. 77). It provides the vanquished historian with an epistemological advantage that cannot be attained by the victorious historian, whose narrative is "constrained" by the role of the victors. Being vanquished is an experience which can become a point of departure for interpretational and methodological innovations with long-lasting effects.

Conclusion

Both Schmitt and Koselleck highlight the fact that the experience of defeat contains a unique potential for the creation of novel historiographical procedures. Unfavourable historical development directs the attention of the vanquished historian to medium-and long-term factors that influenced this development. The absence of a teleologically structured narrative enables him to follow whatever line of research he deems most productive. On the basis of the aforementioned facts, we consider the main contribution of vanquished historians to be twofold. First, they search for anonymous medium-and long-term social and economic trends that are largely ignored by victorious historians. Second, they uncover causal relations that are repeatable and will occur also in later historical contexts. From this perspective, vanquished historians are charged with special

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9   Koselleck criticizes the moralistic approach of German historians to Word War I.
        Instead of a thorough and extensive analysis of the underlying reasons for their defeat
        they focused on the perceived injustice of the Versailles Treaty. This rendered their
        accounts methodologically unproductive (Koselleck, 2000/2002, pp. 68/pp. 76-77).

responsibility, because they share an epistemological advantage that the victorious historians lack. As Koselleck rightly pointed out, however, this advantage is not a *guarantee* that the vanquished historian fulfils his task. He can just as well ignore the advantage and produce a history that is no better than the history written by the victors.

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Classical Education in a Globalised World and Our Modern Prejudices: Questions of Identity and the Curriculum

Jon Stewart

Abstract

This article argues that classical education is often misunderstood due to a number of modern prejudices which distort the original concept. These distortions include the general neglect of several large spheres: the natural sciences, religion, and other cultures, that is, those beyond the Greco-Roman heritage. The article attempts to correct these misunderstandings in order to present a model for classical education that is truly "classical." At the end, it is argued that this revised model can help us to make a stronger case for the relevance of classical education in the context of a globalised world.

Keywords: classical education, globalisation, science, technology, religion

Education is a field that is often rather vulnerable to new trends, which all claim to have discovered an innovative method of teaching or learning.[1] These trends tend to come and go at regular intervals, each having a fixed lifespan, and each being surpassed by a new one. It is easy to get frustrated by these kinds of discussions and to take refuge in something that seems to be stable and can endure unperturbed in the face of the storm of such debates, namely, classical education.

However, often when there is talk of classical education this tends to have a rather old-fashioned or outdated ring to it in the ears of some people. Our modern world is dominated by fast changes in the social order and rapid developments in technology. So why on earth would someone think that an educational program based on learning dead languages or studying cultures that perished a couple thousand years ago could in any way be relevant for navigating one's way through the complexities of modern life? Are educators really acting responsibly when they insist on such an old model of education? Is this really doing our young people any service? Would they not be better off studying things that are more directly relevant to the real challenges that they will encounter in later life? These are the kinds of concerns and objections that teachers of classical education are used to hearing, and they are worth taking seriously since although classical education served people well in previous ages, there is no *a priori*

reason to infer from this that it is in any way relevant for life in the 21st century.

Especially troublesome for programs of classical education is the claim that students in a modern multicultural society cannot identify with the texts. Coming from many cultural, religious and ethnic backgrounds, many students today regard the insistence on the classical Western canon as a form of cultural imperialism. They feel alienated from the works read in classical education programs, and this robs them of their interest in learning. Here we can easily see that the complex issue of modern self-identity is closely related to that of education.

Over the past several decades many programs of classical education and Western civilisation have been abandoned in favour of new curricula thought to be more representative of a diverse population. The problem that these new programs face has been one of continuity. The length of a semester sets natural limits on how much material can be covered, and it is has proven a massive challenge to replace the Western canon with a more representative one that includes important texts from the different traditions of world history. The size and diversity of the material seems to defy the confines of an individual course.

In this article, I wish to address this complex constellation of questions about whether classical education is still appropriate for life in the globalised world of the 21st century. I wish to argue that it is and in fact that it is more relevant today than it ever has been in past ages. I wish to argue that classical education in fact contains texts that are far more diverse and representative of other cultures than has been acknowledged.

In order to make this case, it will be necessary to recall and define more closely what we really mean by "classical education." This discussion will help us to determine 1) what is "classical" about this program of education, that is, what elements of it reflect something from the classical world, and 2) how well it is suited to answering the needs of the modern world in which we live. I wish to try to show that some of what we usually understand by classical education is in fact a cliché that is in need of critical revision. But once we undertake this revision we will be able to develop an educational program that is truly *classical* in that it is an accurate reflection of certain elements of Greek and Roman culture. Moreover, the revision of our understanding of classical education will also have the additional benefit that it will enable us to argue for its importance and relevance more effectively. Armed then with a revised conception of classical education, I wish, at the end of the article, to reflect on the question of what classical education could mean in the context of the globalised, multicultural world of the 21st century. Here I wish to argue that classical education is indeed well suited to respond to the demands to produce well-functioning citizens equipped to face effectively the challenges of the complex and fast-changing modern world.

Here at the outset I would like to submit that the terms of the critical discussions about classical education are often based on misunderstandings and stereotyped conceptions of what this kind of education really means. I want to try to show that people are often victims of a modern prejudice and ethnocentrism based on modern specialisation, which distorts their understanding of the past. My thesis is that this distorted understanding of what constitutes classical education is what leads to the problems of relevance for classical education. Instead, I submit that if we could modify our conception of classical education to make it fall more in line with what real classical education is, then we would find that substantial headway can be made towards meeting the well-known objection of irrelevance. My goal here is to test our intuitions about these issues concerning classical education. Some people might perceive this as provocative, but my goal is not to provoke but instead to reach a new conceptual clarity, which can help us move forward with the discussion about classical education.

The Need to Rethink What We Mean by "Classical Education"

What do we mean by classical education? Usually classical education is closely associated with the humanities fields, for example, literature, history, philosophy, drama, etc. So standard definitions tend to say something like the following: "Classical education is a program of studies that focuses primarily on the humanities, covering the languages, literature, history, art, and other cultural aspects of Ancient Greece and Rome." According to the standard story, it is from the ancient Greek and Roman authors that we have inherited the rich heritage from these fields that constitutes the basis of Western culture. In the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, the Greco-Roman canon became a formalised course of study in Europe. While there is of course some truth in definitions like this, I wish to suggest that some misunderstandings also lie concealed in this generally accepted view. In what follows I wish to try to identify a few prejudices that can be found in the common understanding of classical education and the educational policies based on this.

The Prejudice about Science and Technology

First, it will be noted that in this definition there is no word about the sciences or technology. Indeed, today we tend to think that education in the sciences is more or less the polar opposite of that of classical education. The standard view is that the two have absolutely nothing to do with one another and that the kinds of knowledge involved are different in kind. Here, I want to argue, we find our first fundamental misunderstanding in what classical education really means.

Today we tend to think of Aristotle almost exclusively as a philosopher. But his philosophical studies constitute only a part of his *corpus*. He was also a natural scientist, specifically, a botanist, a geologist, a physicist, a zoologist, an anatomist, and so on. But these quite substantial aspects of his work tend to be largely neglected today. If this does not sound right, then we need only ask how many people have read Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* or *Politics* and contrast this number with how many have read his work *On the Generation of Animals*.

It is of course no secret that what the world has received from the Greeks and the Romans is not just the highbrow studies of literature, history and philosophy but also the sciences. Who has not heard of the great Greek mathematicians such as Euclid or scientists such as Archimedes? But the problem is that these fields of the sciences are not usually counted as belonging to the core of classical education, which, as we just noted, is reserved for the humanities disciplines. Usually, the sciences are radically separated from these fields. But this is, I submit, entirely arbitrary and, alas, the result of modern specialisation. Why do not the sciences count for classical education as well? If classical education means *per definition* what comes from the Greeks and the Romans, then the sciences too are a part of this rich cultural heritage that we have received from them.

When we think of the Roman "classics" we invariably think of literary texts such as Vergil's *Aeneid* or Livy's *History of Rome*, but we tend not to think nearly so readily of Vitruvius' book on architecture or Frontinus' book on aqueducts. The classics department at most any university is usually a part of the larger department of literature. The education that people receive in these departments is primarily literary. Why is this the case? Why do not classics departments treat the culture of the classical world in a more representative manner?

Most troubling, I believe, is our modern tendency to separate science from the humanities and from culture in general. It is as if there is some fundamental belief that science is something apart from the rest of human culture, as if it develops on its own in a vacuum. Of course, in reality this is not the case. The development of science goes hand-in-hand with social and cultural development, and there is a reciprocal influence of the one sphere on the other. So my suggestion here is to try to look beyond this modern blindness that sees science as something different in kind from culture and the humanities, and instead come to regard it as a fundamental and integral part of human culture as a whole.

This is an important insight for educators who have an investment in classical education since with this idea we can modify our handed-down conception of what classical education means by making room for the sciences as an integrated part of it. This is, I submit, the way in which the Greeks and the Romans conceived of things, and thus it is a more veridical understanding of the concept of classical education. But, moreover, it is also a more veridical reflection of the actual state of things and the

practice of the humanities and the sciences in the real world of today. We should not allow ourselves to be fooled into a false separation of things based simply on the division of the fields in the common college catalogue. Science belongs every bit as much to classical education as does history or poetry.

The Prejudice about Religion

It will be noted that in the standard definition that we gave of classical education at the outset, there was no mention of religion. Once again, I think that it is a common perception that religion is something different in kind from the traditional fields of classical education. In many cases great care has been taken to make sure than no form of instruction in religion appears in the curriculum of classical education. This, I submit, is another example of a modern prejudice that instead of being in harmony with classical education, in fact, radically departs from it.

The works *The Iliad* and *The Odyssey* are often taken to be paradigm cases of texts belonging to the classical canon. If anything, then surely Homer belongs to classical education. These are wonderful works of literature, and, some would argue, they also contain some faint whispers of history. This sounds entirely intuitive and uncontroversial to our ears. But, I wish to submit that this is in part an anachronistic misunderstanding based on a modern perspective. For the Greeks of the archaic and classical period the Homeric poems were far more than simply works of literature or history; rather, they were regarded as objects of great reverence as religious texts. These poems (along with Hesiod's *Theogony*) were the Greeks' main sources of information about the gods and the origin of their deepest religious beliefs and practices. We miss the religious elements in these texts because the ancient Greek religion plays little role for us in the modern world. We thus interpret these texts with modern categories that we are used to using and thus ignoring what seems meaningless to us.

To take another example, surely the Greek dramas of Sophocles, Aeschylus, Euripides, and Aristophanes belong to classical education. They tell wonderful stories about ethical duties and responsibilities, and contain great insight into the human spirit. Thus, they have been the source of endless examples for specialists in ethics or psychology. They are the origin of many forms of modern entertainment from theatre to film. Here again it is not difficult to see how this aspect of Greek culture had a profound influence on modern thinking in these different areas. But all of this is something of a distortion. Greek drama is not primarily about art, entertainment, ethics or psychology. Rather, Greek drama arose from Greek religious rites to the god Dionysius. Dramatic works were always performed in connection with religious festivals. These were never conceived by the Greeks as purely secular works of art or

literature. This is a modern way of thinking or, if you prefer, a modern prejudice.

Greek epic poetry and Greek drama are not isolated examples; indeed, many of the canonical texts that we know from the ancient world in other traditions are also in the end religious texts, although in our modern secular world we tend to treat them as literature, history, etc. In the ancient world, religion permeated every aspect of society and culture. Since it tends to be more limited or compartmentalised in our modern world, people mistakenly take this picture with them when they read ancient texts, and they thus tend not to take too seriously the religious elements in these works, especially when those religious elements seem strange or foreign to us. So, for example, in the Hindu classic the *Ramayana,* Rama is regarded by the modern reader just as a great hero, but people forget that he is the seventh avatar of the Hindu god Vishnu. Once again there is an overlooked religious element that is absolutely central to the work. Our modern secular mindset thus distorts our understanding of these ancient texts both in the Greco-Roman tradition and in other traditions.

But why then do we tend to think of the classics as literary or historical texts and not religious ones? Why do we tend to exclude religion from the curriculum in classical education? The reason for this, I believe, has to do with the origin and development of the field of the classics. The German philologist Friedrich August Wolf (1759-1824) is credited with coining the term "*Altertumswissenschaft*," literally the "science of antiquity," to designate the broad field of classical studies (Marchand, 1996; von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, 1982; Pfeiffer, 1976; Arnoldt, 1861; Sandys; Bursian, 1883). He established the first department of classical studies at the University of Halle in 1787. During Wolf's time the study of Greek and Latin at the university had always been the purview of the Faculty of Theology. But Wolf yearned to read texts such as Homer outside of this context. In time, he came to develop a sense of animosity towards his colleagues at the Faculty of Theology for monopolising the instruction of Greek and Latin. His mission was to create a university institute dedicated to the study of the classical languages independent of theology. Thus when this department was established, it was specifically in opposition to the study of theology. In this context there was a tendency for the budding field of classics to identify itself with literature, history, etc., that is, fields that were as different from the theological fields as possible. But this meant selectively focusing on specific aspects of the ancient world and ignoring others. As a result, scholars in this field and those that sprang from it tended to read the ancient texts in a purely secular manner and ignore whatever religious connotations they otherwise contained. While this development makes perfect sense when seen in the context of Wolf's time, in the big picture this is an obvious distortion caused by modern specialisation. The ancients did not

divide things in this way. Ancient culture was an organic whole. It was not possible simply to ignore the religious element in Greek culture at will.

This is also a valuable insight for us as educators with an investment in classical education. Again, very often religion is considered to be something different and separate from classical education. Some advocates of classical education pride themselves on their religious tolerance and open-mindedness due to the fact that they do not teach any form of religion in their classroom. They regard such teaching as suspect and inevitably doctrinal in some way. Thus, it is argued, the only way to avoid falling into the trap of indoctrinating or, worse, corrupting young minds with religion is not to teach it. But here we can see clearly that there is a real rub between this view and the way the ancients conceived of things. The modern view reflects certain negative conceptions about religion that come from the Enlightenment, that is, from Wolf's time, whereas the ancient view fully embraced religion and made it an absolutely central part of their culture and life. So to say that one is interested in developing a program of classical education but then to eliminate wholly any trace of religion is simply contradictory. Such a program cannot be rightly termed "classical". When one eliminates religion, one eliminates a major aspect of classical culture. This insight tells us that we need to think carefully about how to integrate religion in a responsible manner into our programs for classical education.

The Prejudice About Influence

For my third point, I wish to focus on a set of prejudices or misconceptions surrounding the traditional argument for relevance. In critical discussions about the value of classical education, the argument is often heard that our modern culture derives from classical Greek and Roman culture. So, therefore, in order to understand the foundations of modern society, we need to learn about the classics. Democracy, literature and drama all have their basis in ancient Greek culture, and so when we learn about the Greeks, we are in a sense learning about ourselves. This is often thought to be a strong counterargument to the reproaches of the lack of relevance of classical education.

It will be noted that this argument is based on the premise of influence. The classics are classics precisely because they have exercised a major influence on subsequent Western thinking. This is why, so the argument goes, we should prioritise the culture of the ancient Greeks and Romans in our educational programs. While at first glance convincing, this argument about influence is problematic if we wish to insist on it dogmatically since it makes the classics in a sense dependent on their influence for modern society. This raises three problems which I think all show how selective people are in their conception of Greek and Roman culture and the role it plays in our culture today.

First, there are many aspects of Greco-Roman culture that do not exert any meaningful influence on modern life. Let us take, for example, Greek polytheism; while the stories of the Greek gods and goddesses might be interesting for specialists of mythology or might be useful to literary scholars when identifying specific literary allusions and motifs, it would be inauthentic to say that this aspect of the Greek religion is a central part of our modern society. We do not have large numbers of followers of the cult of Apollo; only the tiniest of groups of neopagans today continue to believe in the Greek gods as a living religion, and even this modern phenomenon is arguably quite different from the actual religion of the ancient Greeks and Romans.

So, given that there are aspects of Greek or Roman culture like this that exerted little long-term influence on modern Western society, should they really be given such a unique privileged position in our educational systems and programs? The point here is simply to show that when we decide to identify Greek and Roman culture as "classic," we are in fact being selective in an arbitrary way since we do not mean *all* of Greek and Roman culture but only certain aspects of it.

Second, part and parcel of the idea of a "classic" in the sense of influence is that the work in question is one worthy of emulation. The idea is that the Greeks and the Romans set the bar high, and we have been trying to reach it ever since. Homer is a classic in the sense that later authors, Vergil, Dante, Milton, Joyce, and others, try though they may, can only imitate him imperfectly. He represents an ideal that will always inspire later ages but which will never be fully attained. In short, the idea of a "classic" is invariably something positive.

But there are a number of aspects of Greek and Roman society that we can hardly regard today in any positive light whatsoever: the cultural arrogance and ethnocentrism of the Greeks; the positive disposition toward military conquest that saw virtue in defeating other peoples; the more or less universal institution of slavery; the merciless suppression of conquered peoples; the oppression of women; the widespread practice of torture and public execution, at times for public entertainment, and on and on. Make no mistake: for all of our adulation of the great cultural achievements of the Greek and Roman world, there was plenty that is and should be utterly repellent to us. Should we regard these institutions and cultural practices as "classics"? Once again, why should we give privilege of place to such cultures that engaged in such terrible brutality and injustice? Are these the values that we want to introduce to and instil in our young people via classical education? The point here is again merely to bring home how selective people tend to be when they think of Greek and Roman culture in the context of classical education. There is a tendency to put certain elements of their culture up on a pedestal and ignore the other aspects of it that do

not fit with the humanistic picture that educators customarily try to convey. Once again, this shows a serious deviation from the reality of classical culture in all of its aspects. Sadly, the relevance argument still works here. Europe and the West have, alas, inherited a number of these negative institutions and practices from the Greeks and the Romans. But the question this raises is whether this is anything we should be particularly proud of or should enshrine as the foundation of our educational system.

Third, if we make the criterion for what a "classic" is the influence that it has had, then it will be noted that this makes it *independent of* any specific culture such as the Greeks or the Romans. In this sense a classic text could in principle come from anywhere, provided that it exercised an important influence in the development of our modern thinking. Thus, this is not in and of itself an argument for studying Greek and Roman culture; rather, it is an argument for studying what has been influential.

If we take a look at the development of science and technology in the European Middle Ages, we find something quite interesting. We see that the leading scientific works of that period come not from the Greeks, the Romans or even the later Europeans but from Arabic authors, for example, Al-Battani's and Al-Kindi's works on astronomy, Al-Farabi's work on geometry, Avicenna's work on medicine, Abu Ma'shar's work on botany, Omar Khayyám's and Thābit ibn Qurra's work on mathematics. These are all thinkers who had a major impact on the development of Western science. But oddly we do not tend to include them as a part of the "classics" since they are not from the Greco-Roman world. But by the very criterion that the advocates of classical education themselves give, namely, influence, they should by all rights be included. For whatever reason these thinkers are generally neglected, although their influence has been so profound.

Let me illustrate this with a simple example. In every school we find zealous young people studying algebra, which is regarded as an important part of their education in mathematics and a preparation for later university studies. If we were to ask all of those zealous 8th-graders who was the founder of algebra, how many of them could come up with the name of Muhammad ibn Mūsā al-Khwārizmī, let alone the title of his main work, *The Compendious Book on Calculation by Completion and Balancing*? Ask them who invented geometry, and they will tell you immediately: Euclid. Who invented the fundamental laws of classical physics: Newton. But then ask them who invented algebra, and you will see lots of stammering and fidgeting.

The conclusion that we need to draw from this is that our conception of classical education is overly narrow and perhaps somewhat prejudiced. If the goal of education is relevance in the sense of teaching our young people things that they need to know about the origins and development of the society and culture that they live in, then we must recognise that the Western tradition is a highly eclectic one that has always readily taken up and incorporated ideas from other cultures. Indeed, this is one of the things that arguably has made it great. We need to make sure that the texts that we select for the canon are ones that truly represent the development of human thought as a whole. While traditionally this has always been associated with Western civilisation, with this example we can see that this is a far more complex story than it is usually thought to be.

A Revised Conception of Classical Education

These examples of the natural sciences, religion, and other cultural traditions should, I submit, enjoin us to rethink our conception of classical education. They show us that there is much more to this than simply the traditional humanities fields.

A much more fruitful way of understanding classical education can, I believe, be found in a concept by the 19th-century German philosopher Hegel. At the very heart of his complex philosophical system, Hegel makes an absolutely fundamental distinction between what he calls "nature" and what he calls "spirit." By "nature" he means the physical world that surrounds us and that is governed by the natural laws. By "spirit" he refers to the human mind and all of its products. Today this is what anthropologists would refer to generally as human culture. We might think of nature as something that is simply immediately there before us as we enter the world, but spirit is something that we ourselves as human beings collectively have to create in one way or another. This involves not just the usual things that we associate with culture, such as the academic fields of literature and history, but also language, technical expertise, religious beliefs, and scientific knowledge. In prehistorical times, for example, it was a *cultural* asset to know how to make and preserve fire.

Again, it is mere prejudice that excludes science and technology from what we usually understand by culture. It is likewise mere prejudice to exclude religion from culture. Perhaps most troublesome of all, it is mere prejudice to exclude foreign traditions from culture. These are all products of the human mind that have every right to deserve our respect and be made the object of serious study. We can follow Hegel's lead and understand classical education as the understanding of the human spirit or mind in all of its forms. Thus, classical education should include all of these fields. It should also include all peoples as an interconnected, developing whole, that is, humanity in general.

The Relevance of Classical Education in the Globalised World

Let us then turn to the specifics of our globalised world and ask what this world demands of its citizens. In modern discussions about education, the idea of an educational program suited to the globalised world and classical education are usually thought to be at opposite ends of the spectrum.

While classical education is thought to be traditional or even reactionary, education for a globalised world is supposed to be progressive and modern. The idea is that classical education has nothing to offer in our modern society of the 21st century. The Greeks and the Romans lived in a very different world and had no inkling of the problems of globalisation. I wish to argue that this conception is also based on certain modern prejudices.

What do we really mean with globalisation? This means living with an awareness that the entire world is interconnected in a myriad of different ways. These interconnections mean that we should be attentive to people with different languages, religious practices, traditions and ways of thinking. We can no longer be content to stick to our own isolated, regional group, so to speak. This all sounds very progressive and modern, but a closer look reveals that this conception was nothing new to the Greeks and the Romans. It is a modern prejudice to think that globalisation is something new. This prejudice comes from the experience of the rise of nationalism in the 19th and 20th centuries, which gave priority to the nation state. It is against this background that globalisation sounds like a new phenomenon, but in fact it is not.

The Greeks were acutely aware of their neighbouring peoples: the Babylonians, the Egyptians, the Persians, the Phoenicians, etc. Educated Greeks such as Herodotus went abroad to learn from foreign cultures. To be sure, the Greeks had a profoundly ethnocentric side, and they dismissed non-Greek speakers as "barbarians." Nonetheless they also had a keen awareness of other cultures and traditions and in some cases stood in awe of them. The Romans created a vast empire that contained a large number of conquered peoples with different languages, traditions and religions. It profited from its tolerance towards these differences. It is difficult to see how their experience differed qualitatively from our modern experience of globalisation. In short, the idea of globalisation is not a modern one but rather an ancient one.

Polybius, a Greek living in the second century before Christ, wrote a history of, among other things, the Second Punic War that pitted Rome against its archenemy Carthage. He explains that this conflict, which took place from 218 to 201 BC, was an epic event that signalled a major shift in history. Since both the Romans and the Carthaginians had colonies throughout the Mediterranean, the war covered a vast geographical area. In his introduction Polybius explains that

> in earlier times the world's history had consisted, so to speak, of a series of unrelated episodes, the origins and results of each being as widely separated as their localities, but from this point onwards history becomes an organic whole: the affairs of Italy and of Africa are connected with those of Asia and Greece, and all events bear a relationship and contribute to a single end. (Polybius, 1979, p. 43)

Here we can see already in antiquity, two centuries before Christ, the first glimpses of a globalised perspective. Polybius realises that with the conflict of Rome and North African Carthage the world had in a sense become smaller. It is no longer possible just to pay attention to one's own private concerns in one's own local region. Now the Mediterranean world is interconnected, and what happens in one place has important consequences for what happens elsewhere. So Polybius' impassioned plea is that in order to understand the Second Punic War, people need to adopt not a local or specialised perspective but a universal, or we would say *global*, one. He complains:

> It is impossible for us to achieve this comprehensive view from those histories which record isolated events...The fact is that we can obtain no more than an impression of a whole from a part, but certainly neither a thorough knowledge nor an accurate understanding. (Polybius, 1979, p. 44)

Polybius then proposes his own view of universal history: "it is only by combining and comparing the various parts of the whole with one another and noting their resemblances and their differences that we shall arrive at a comprehensive view" (Polybius, 1979, p. 45). True understanding is only possible if we can see the whole picture and thus the individual parts in their broader context.

Polybius' progressive vision is highly relevant for our global world today. Things that happen on one side of the globe more and more frequently have an important impact on things on the other side. The world has become smaller as the technological developments in communication, transportation and trade have in a sense made everyone in the world our neighbour. This presents new challenges not least of all to education.

There have been other periods in history like this when the world seemed suddenly to take on a broader perspective, and each of these can be seen as key periods for the development of globalisation. One might refer to the 15th century with the discovery of the Americas and the Jesuit missionaries in China, which gave rise to the field of Sinology. One might also refer to the first half of the 19th century, which saw a dramatically increased awareness of non-Western cultures and the birth of what has been referred to as Orientalism or Asian Studies, with the foundation of the scholarly fields of Indology, Egyptology, Persian Studies and Arabic Studies. Similarly, economists in the 19th century became aware of what we today refer to as the global economy, that is, the ways in which modes of production and marketing of goods in one place expand and have an impact on different places around the world (Marx, 1978). With each of these periods, Europe was obliged to re-evaluate its self-image and its position in the world.

Thus, the phenomenon of globalisation is not unique to our modern world but in fact goes back through history. Therefore, there is every reason to think that certain aspects of a classical educational system that were well suited to other periods in history might well be appropriate today as well. Perhaps the key issue with globalisation is that it means an increased awareness of one's place in the world as a member of one people, one society, one nation, one religion vis-à-vis others. This sounds quite straightforward, but a great deal is implied here with regard to its consequences for education. This means more than a simple sense of general respect for difference and otherness. This should be a given. But it means, more significantly, a serious and dedicated effort to learn about all the things that make people different, or, as Polybius says, to learn about all the parts in all their complexity in order to understand the whole. Here one starts to see that mutual respect is simply the visible tip of a very large iceberg. What globalised education means is a systematic curriculum that educates young people in the history of all the different peoples of the world, in the different religions of the world, and in the different traditions of art and literature. This means learning foreign languages and different modes of communication that facilitate one's interaction with people from all over the world. Only with such a full commitment truly to learn about the other can one genuinely call oneself a full-fledged global citizen in the modern world.

Here we can heed Polybius' words that true understanding is only possible with an overview of the whole. It is necessary to see the role of the part in the bigger picture, and only in this way are the part and the whole truly comprehensible. This is a daunting task, but I believe that with a revised model of classical education we have the basic tools in hand to accomplish this ambitious goal. First, it is necessary to understand science and technology as a central part of our classical heritage on equal footing with literature, history and the other fields traditionally associated with classical education. In this way, we can make classical education fit better with the demands of the fast-changing modern world that is based on science and technology. Second, it is necessary to include instruction in religion as a part of classical education. Specifically, we need to design programs that teach students the basics of the main religious traditions in order to prepare them for life in a multicultural globalised world. Finally, it is necessary to expand classical education to include other traditions that have also been influential on modern society. Classical education has always been about learning about different cultures. This needs merely to be expanded from a more or less exclusive occupation with the Greeks and the Romans to include other cultures of the world.

The approach suggested here has great relevance for the issue of self-identity. This approach will help to overcome the sense of alienation that some students feel from Western Civilisation courses since they do not see in the Western authors a reflection of their own cultural or ethnic background. When they see that Western Civilisation is not a monolithic entity but rather a complex, fluid, and eclectic idea, then they will realise that what is called "Western" in fact encompasses a great many things. The Arabic mathematicians and natural scientists have a rightful claim to be a part of this tradition, just as do previously marginalised figures such as Harriet Tubman and Booker T. Washington. This new understanding of Western Civilisation allows students to see their own identity as a part of the story of the West, since they realise that this story is by no means an uncritical one. Many great Western writers and thinkers are highly critical of what are taken to be typically Western values and ideas. When the students realise this, then they can mobilise their own sense of alienation with the West as a productive motivation to study its history and culture in order to articulate their criticism of it. The approach suggested here thus helps to motivate the modern diverse student body in a way that the traditional encomium for the grandeur of the West did not.

With these suggestions, it should be clear that I am not proposing any kind of radical or revolutionary change. The basics of all of my proposals are already to be found in classical education if this concept is understood correctly. We do not need to start with something entirely new here, but instead we can build on the old strengths of classical education and expand on them in a way that will make it more suitable for our times.

Given all of this, there is no reason why advocates of classical education need to be on the defensive or need to seek desperately for arguments to justify their existence. A correct understanding of classical education provides them with all that we need. But it should be noted that a part of this is a critical understanding, that is, an awareness of the limitations and shortcomings of the Greek and Roman world as the sole basis for an educational program. But I see this critical understanding as a strength and not a weakness. We might have to abandon some cherished clichés and stereotypes about classical education, but nothing will be lost by this, and ultimately we will end up with a more dynamic and robust conception of education that will better serve our students in the challenges that they will meet in the globalised world.

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De Reconciliatione: Violence, the Flesh, and Primary Vulnerability

James Griffith

Abstract

This essay compares Merleau-Ponty's notion of the flesh with Judith Butler's concept of primary vulnerability in terms of their helpfulness for developing an intersubjective ontology. It compares the flesh with Butler's more recent concept of primary vulnerability insofar as she sees both as useful for intersubjective ontology. The hiatus of the flesh is that which spans between self and world and opens Merleau-Ponty's thought onto an intersubjective ontology. While Butler's discussion of vulnerability as a primary condition of human existence also makes this concept intersubjective, her understanding of violence as articulated through vulnerability makes this a more helpful concept for intersubjective ontology than the flesh. While many discussions of an intersubjective way of life focus almost exclusively on its positive possibilities, almost to the exclusion of violence altogether, the understanding of violence Butler presents through primary vulnerability help us to discern whether a violation is benign or malign. In turn, this fuller understanding of violence lets primary vulnerability open onto an ethical imperative of reconciliation, but a reconciliation of what is never whole.

Keywords: Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the flesh, Judith Butler, primary vulnerability, intersubjectivity

In an essay from the late 1980s, Judith Butler criticises the early Maurice Merleau-Ponty for taking up sexuality and gender from the perspective of a male or masculine master dominating a female or feminine slave to the point of incorporating her into his subjectivity, despite Merleau-Ponty's claims to opening up sexuality beyond naturalising categories[1]. On her reading, Merleau-Ponty seems valuable for feminist philosophy because he offers an account of sexuality dislodged from naturalising and normalising tendencies because it "is coextensive with existence" and "as a mode of situating oneself in terms of one's intersubjectivity" because no sexual state is without reference to the world nor does it have a predetermined form (Butler, 1990, p. 85/89). However, his account still tacitly maintains heterosexual assumptions about sexuality because he erroneously distinguishes "biological subsistence and the domain of historical and cultural

signification," meaning that a historically sedimented sexuality presents itself to the body as natural and normal (Butler, 1990, p. 91). In this histori-cal sedimentation, the normal, natural body becomes male and the female body "an object rather than a subject of perception," meaning the female body becomes an essence without existence—seen and never seeing (Butler, 1990, p. 94). Thus, the female body that exists to be seen is "a body without desire" (Butler, 1990, p. 97). For this body to desire, to have a sexuality coex-tensive with existence, to exist in a field of intersubjective relations would be to contradict its status as object.

Still, in the same article she suggests that, in *The Visible and the Invis-ible*, Merleau-Ponty may have finally moved beyond the universalising sub-jectivity associated with a dominating masculinity, at least insofar as that book's focus on the touch, intertwining, and flesh is not as easily reduced to a subject-object divide that universalises a dominating male or masculine gaze in the form of perception. She says that the focus on the touch allows him to describe a "sensual life which would emphasise the interworld, the shared domain of the flesh which resists categorisation in terms of subjects and objects (Butler, 1990, p. 97). In a footnote to her claims that the early Merleau-Ponty's understanding of perception is inherently misogynistic, she says that this shift to the tactile "marks a significant departure" for him (Butler, 1990, pp. 99-100). In this way, she posits the possibility of a phe-nomenological feminism or feminist phenomenology[2], an approach to gen-der and sexuality that takes up the world without reducing that taking up to the subject doing it, without assuming the universality and dominance of the male or masculine gaze at a world of objects subsumed under its sub-jectivity.

One way Silvia Stoller takes up this possibility of a phenomenologi-cal feminism or feminist phenomenology is to argue that, even in his early work, Merleau-Ponty is critical of a phenomenology that begins in, natu-ralises, and universalises a subject who is almost inevitably male or mascu-line. For her, it is important to remember that sexuality for the early Mer-leau-Ponty is an expression of existence and that "the body is responsible for the realisation of existence" (Stoller, 2010, p. 106). In this way, "the body's

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2   'Phenomenological feminism' is Butler's term in the title of her concluding section to this essay as that toward which she hopes to see us turn (see Butler 1990, pp. 97-99). 'Feminist phenomenology' is Anna Petronella Foultier's term for what should engage the future development of Merleau-Ponty's account of a gendered body (see Foultier 2013, p. 779). Silvia Stoller characterises feminist phenomenology as understanding phenomenology to be helpful for feminist philosophy (see Stoller 2010, p. 97). While taking account of the differences between these terms as concerns their potentially chiasmic relationship (see note 5 below) would be interesting and worthwhile, I do not have the space for such an account here. For one account of the differences, see Stoller 2017, 328. See also Stoller et al. 2005.

expression *is* what it signifies" and is not as if from a pre-existing subject (Stoller, 2010, p. 106). Thus, Butler's criticisms of the early Merleau-Ponty may not be as strong as she believes since both are anti-essentialist (Stoller, 2010, pp. 108-109). Similarly, Anna Petronella Foultier argues that Butler's early reading of the early Merleau-Ponty fails to understand his consider-ation of sexual desire as forming a space between the subject and object rather than being the projection of a naturalised gaze from a universalised and masculinised subject upon a dominated, feminised object. She claims that Butler's assumption that existence and essence are oppositional to and exclusive of each other is only true from the perspective of a naïve rational-ism that thinks both objects and perception can be objectively explained, a perspective Merleau-Ponty criticises (Foultier, 2013, p. 776/770). Indeed, the way he gets to his claims of the 'normal' male body is understood here as "offering a 'genealogical' critique" of that perspective by showing how what seems natural is constituted in and through experience, allowing sex-ual desire "to form a realm precisely *in between* subjectivity and objectivity" (Foultier, 2013, p. 778).

While Stoller focuses on Merleau-Ponty's critique or complication of the subject and Foultier on the space created between subject and object, both are most interested in Butler's early critique of the early Merleau-Pon-ty. To be sure, Foultier notes that Butler's more recent engagements with Merleau-Ponty acknowledge more similarities than her early essay, but this is not the focus of her engagement, and those she mentions still focus on the early Merleau-Ponty (Foultier, 2013, p. 778). Leonard Lawlor, however, does take up Butler's suggestion of a phenomenological feminism through the late Merleau-Ponty by noting that, in *The Visible and the Invisible*, there is a hiatus whereby the self keeps the other at a distance precisely insofar as that other is kept close, or is kept close precisely insofar as kept at a dis-tance. That is, in *The Visible and the Invisible*, "the unity of the seer and the seen is never achieved" (Lawlor, 2008, p. 55). The hiatus between then could be understood as "a folding together" or as a "an unfold…, and not as a gath-ering together," understandings that themselves might "refer to two forc-es irreducibly linked to one another around the hiatus," leading Lawlor to suggest in the late Merleau-Ponty a philosophy as a friendship or love of the outside and future (Lawlor, 2008, p. 55). Such a friendship or love "opens the lover to *all* the possible lovers of the beloved, *all* the possible lovers still to come" (Lawlor, 2008, p. 56), an opening Lawlor finds to be a possible connec-tion to the "benign sexual variation" Butler claims the early Merleau-Ponty foreclosed (Butler, 1990, p. 86)[3]. Yet Lawlor also does not take up the more re-cent Butler, focusing again on her early critique of the early Merleau-Ponty.

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3   Though neither Butler nor Lawlor mention this, "benign sexual variation" is most connected with Rubin 1984, pp. 275-284.

An important example of this more recent Butlerian engagement with Merleau-Ponty seems to take up her own early suggestion concerning *The Visible and the Invisible*, and comes in the form of an article on Luce Iriga-ray's reading of the late Merleau-Ponty in *An Ethics of Sexual Difference*.3 Iri-garay claims that, even in *The Visible and the Invisible*, Merleau-Ponty "has no spacing or interval for the freedom of questioning between two. No other or Other to keep the world open," and so is still caught in the problem of a sub-ject subsuming the world to its gaze (Irigaray, 1993, p. 183). Against her, Butler argues that "the subject, as *flesh*, is primarily an intersubjective be-ing, finding itself as Other, finding its primary sociality in a set of relations that are never fully recoverable or traceable" (Butler, 2008, p. 345). It is this point that I want to use to suggest a different node or point of connection between Merleau-Ponty and Butler, one not drawn from the latter's explicit readings of the former. This connection is between the late Merleau-Ponty's thought of the flesh and Butler's more recent thought of primary vulnera-bility.4 In this way, without precisely engaging the possibility of a feminist phenomenology or phenomenological feminism, I want to engage what the impact is of others on selves and selves on others for the late Merleau-Ponty and the recent Butler.

In *The Visible and the Invisible*, Merleau-Ponty is interested in undermin-ing the solipsism of a concept of subjectivity whereby that which is seen by that subject is absorbed within the original, thus originary, subjectivity. In pursuing this interest, he begins with the body and that which it senses, fo-cusing on sight and the seen, touch and the touched, such that the distance between them is not separate from but equal to the proximity of their rel-ative locations. As he explains it, we see things as being in a place and in their being, "which is indeed more than their being-perceived," while being separated from them by dint of looking with a body from a place precisely because "this distance is not the contrary of this proximity,...it is synony-mous with it" (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, p. 135). That is, the body as different and distant from what it senses is not distinct from what it senses but is formed as a body—a sensing body—through and because of this difference and dis-tance. In this way, the body is not precisely a thing as "an interstitial matter, a connective tissue," but is rather simultaneously a being like those beings surrounding it and that which senses them (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, p. 135). As such, it is a being that uses its sensing as "its own ontogenesis" to become a being like other beings, giving it a "double belongingess to the order of the 'object' and to the order of the 'subject'" (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, pp. 136-137). The body is, then, a sensing being insofar as its sensing allows it to become sensed like those beings it itself senses.

Thus, the body that senses things always senses itself in those things, but this means that it is itself sensed, even if only by itself, in the being-sensed of those things, in the distance between itself and them. For this reason, Merleau-Ponty says the body "incorporates into itself the whole of the sensible and with the same movement incorporates itself into a 'Sen-sible in itself'" without the world being in the body or body in world (Mer-leau-Ponty, 1968, p. 138). This sensible in itself he calls the flesh, which "is not matter, is not mind, is not substance. To designate it, we should need the old term 'element,' in the sense it was used to speak of water, air, earth, and fire, that is, in the sense of a *general thing*" (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, p. 139).

The body's sensing of itself makes the flesh "an unlimited notion" in that touching one's own hand makes of each of them both a sensing and sensed being, although the state of sensing and being sensed is reversible between them (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, p. 140). To avoid the solipsism at work in this reversibility, it must be understood that the moment of one's own hand touching the other is not a synthesis of sensing and being sensed. Rather, each hand "has its own tactile experience," each remains, in it-self, built from out of the distance of each from the other whereby that other hand is translated into the first (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, p. 141). The generality of the flesh at work here opens my body onto others' as mutual translations of sensing and being sensed, meaning each is inhabited, even formed by an ability to be sensed. The other's sensing me makes me sen-sible to myself, translatable to myself, thereby undermining the thought that knowing or sensing the other is a task accomplished by a self upon that other: "There is here no problem of the *alter ego* because it is not *I* who sees, not *he* who sees, because an anonymous visibility inhabits both of us,...in virtue of that primordial property that belongs to the flesh" (Mer-leau-Ponty, 1968, p. 142).

Indeed, the very unity of self that a solipsism of domination or self-ag-grandisement requires is impossible with this flesh because the coincidence of sensing and being sensed even in the case of one touching one's own hand "eclipses at the moment of realisation" (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, p. 147).

What dominates is the flesh over the body "*as* touching" through "dehiscence or fission of its own mass" (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, p. 146). These hands are of the same body as a body in and formed by the world as a world of the flesh as an unlimited notion, leaving a "hiatus" that is without void since "spanned by the total being of my body, and by that of the world" (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, p. 148).5 This non-coincidence of the unlimited concept

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4   References are to Butler 2008, where it appeared as an appendix to a special
        anniversary issue of *Chiasmi International*. It was also published as Butler 2006.

5   I will focus on primary vulnerability as discussed in Butler 2004 over and above its
        discussion in Butler 2009 because the former seems to me to give a more helpful
        definition of violence as in explicit connection to vulnerability than does the latter.
        For her discussion of vulnerability and violence in the latter, however, see Butler 2009,
        pp. 33-62 and pp. 165-184.

of the flesh, this hiatus spanned by body and world is the proximal distance or distant proximity of which Lawlor speaks.[6]

This hiatus is why Lawlor suggests that the late Merleau-Ponty may be more amenable to Butler than his early work suggests. If the underside of a subject is the other as forming the subject in its subjectivity, if subject and other are reversible in terms of the non-synthetic hiatus of a unity that disappears in its occurrence, then it is possible for lover and beloved to be the underside of each other, open to each other's future loves and perhaps open to the benign sexual variation that the early Butler claims the early Merleau-Ponty forecloses with his dominating subjective gaze upon the other. For her part, the more recent Butler will say, "One might well conclude that for Merleau-Ponty as well, to be implicated in the world of flesh of which he is a part is to realise precisely that he cannot disavow such a world without disavowing himself" since the subject is insofar as it is in the world, this world being the underside of the subject in the generality of the flesh (Butler, 2008, p. 345). Hence, the subject is necessarily intersubjective. The subject is the other without the other being reduced to that subject, but the subject discovers itself as itself in and through the other.

It is this question of the intersubjective subject that leads me to consider another link between Merleau-Ponty and Butler, though from a different register, and with a different possible underside. It may be that neither Merleau-Ponty nor Lawlor, nor even this more recent Butler acknowledge an aspect of intersubjectivity that another recent Butler does acknowledge: primary vulnerability. Here, I will focus on her discussion of this concept in *Precarious Life*.

Against the belief that grief is a private, even privatising affair, she claims that the experience of disorientation after losing someone indicates a relationality at the heart of the experience of the self, that losing the other is not like losing a possession but closer to losing oneself. In mourning, as she puts it, "I not only mourn the loss, but I become inscrutable to myself" and the loss of the other as someone with whom I was in relation "is to be conceived as *the tie* by which those terms ['myself' and 'you'] are to be differentiated and related" (Butler, 2004, p. 22). In this way, the subject is insofar as it is vulnerable, subject to loss or violation and violence, which is why "grief contains the possibility of apprehending a mode of dispossession that is fundamental to who I am" (Butler, 2004, p. 28). To learn to live in and

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6 The hiatus at work here is an effect or element of the chiasm. As Butler 2008 describes it, 'chiasm' is a term for the grammatico-rhetorical technique of reversing parallel phrases where the meaning of the phrase changes in their reversal. Thus, there is "a formal symmetry" between the phrases that allows for their reversibility, but the very act of reversing them changes the meaning at work (Butler 2008, 346). Her example is "When the going gets tough, the tough get going," where the reversal of 'going' and 'tough' changes their respective meanings and linguistic classes.

with this vulnerability, a vulnerability which precedes the construction of the subject, is to learn to live in and with the need we have of others, not only of the need to be protected but also of the need to be nourished, to be brought to flourishing. And it is to learn to live in and with the possibility that this need can be deprived, ignored, or violated. While this vulnerability is not to be understood "as a deprivation," it is necessary to understand it as a condition for being "exploited and exploitable," an exploitation that includes abandonment (Butler, 2004, p. 31).[7] We are "given over to the touch of the other, even if there is no other there" (Butler, 2004, p. 32). As a result, violence for Butler is to be understood as a particular and "most terrifying" mode of exposure to this primary vulnerability, "a way in which we are given over, without control, to the will of another" (Butler, 2004, pp. 28-29).

Violence understood in this way is not precisely, however, the violation of the rights of a subject who precedes the encounter with violence or is somehow distinct and different from that which violates. Since the body is public to some necessary degree, it "is and is not mine" and others imprint themselves on the body such that "only later, and with some uncertainty, do I lay claim to my body as my own, if, in fact, I ever do" (Butler, 2004, p. 26). Thus, I am in relation with others prior to having a will to be abandoned, exploited, or nourished. Instead, violence is to be understood as a violation of my primary need of others, at the bodily level and at the group or class level, that itself constitutes subjects in their subjectivity.

Nonetheless, this understanding of violence and violation does not preclude invoking rights at the individual and group levels insofar as our understanding of them is built out of a legal tradition of a subject distinct and different from that which violates, or even the violation itself. Indeed, the invocation of such rights, the demand that they be enforced, would seem

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7 I will not enter deeply into the question of language beyond this note because I want to keep focus on trauma and violence, but it is important to remember that sensing a being for Merleau-Ponty opens onto the dimension of the idea. The idea is the invisible of the world of appearances, rendering visible the world as the mutual translation of sensing and being sensed. In this way, the things of the world become the linguistic signs of a second world of a second flesh that is not posterior to the first, but is its underside. There is then an ideality of the (first) flesh and a fleshiness to the idea, each the underside of the other. For this reason, the mute world of appearances is already the possibility of language and language is the hollow within which appearances are experienced, though their reversibility does not constitute a synthesis but is rather another non-coincidental hiatus of a unity that disappears as it occurs (see Merleau-Ponty 1968, pp. 150-155). In that the (first) flesh is not prior to the second, it may be that Merleau-Ponty is acknowledging the kind of historico-cultural sedimentation at work in the construction that the early Butler criticises the early Merleau-Ponty for ignoring (see Butler 1990, p. 91). Foultier, for her part, argues that the early Butler misconstrues Merleau-Ponty on this point because the distinction between the historico-cultural and the biological is merely analytic (see Foultier 2013, p. 777).

to be one of the ways in which we live with and in primary vulnerability. For instance, the claim to a right to bodily autonomy is important "for intersex claims to be free of coerced medical and psychiatric interventions" because this claim is necessarily one of vulnerability to such interventions, to "unwanted violence against their bodies in the name of…a normative notion of what the body of a human must be" (Butler, 2004, p. 25/33). The problem is that in mourning, in loss, in violence and the feeling of having been violated, there is "passion and grief and rage" and the legal tradition by which we invoke these rights fails to take account of the experience of loss and violation at the emotional level, an experience which at least possibly opens onto an ontological awareness (Butler, 2004, p. 25).

What is more, that same tradition can make it easier to extend a process by which violence operates. In the mode of invoking rights whereby the subject is distinct and different from that which violates or from the violation, involved in the invocation is a claim, demand, or expectation that such violation ought not happen, neither before nor again. To separate oneself from the violence is to attempt to flee living with and in primary vulnerability, but of course that attempt only highlights this vulnerability as an ontological state. In such an invocation of a violated right, the living with and in vulnerability is banished, foreclosed "in the name of an action invested with the power to restore the loss or return the world to a former order, or to reinvigorate a fantasy that the world formerly was orderly" (Butler, 2004, pp. 29-30). Especially at the political level (though hardly exclusively there), and perhaps even more especially when invoked by the politically powerful (though hardly exclusively when invoked by them), this demand and this action begin to appear closer to vengeance than justice or reparation, a violence directed at a supposed or known perpetrator of violence who either lost the right to invoke the right to protection from violence or who never had it in the first place, if only by retrospective dint of the supposedly initiatory violence to which the subject would supposedly have been otherwise invulnerable. The logic of this movement of violence building on violence is what Butler questions when she asks, "[I]n what ways has a chain of violence formed in which the aggression the United States has wrought returns to it in different forms? Can we think of the history of violence here without exonerating those who engage it against the United States in the present?" (Butler, 2004, p. 42).

In addition, the legal tradition of invoking rights by a subject considered distinct and different from what violates or from the violation can also extend violence when there is no hope or a lost hope in justice to be found for the violation. That is, the lack of hope for justice in and from a tradition of rights understood as invoked by a subject distinct and different from that which violates can lead to "the other age-old option, the possibility of wishing for death or becoming dead, as a vain effort to pre-empt or deflect the next blow" (Butler, 2004, p. 42). This option is a violence to the violated subject by that same subject, a flight from vulnerability by feeling oneself to be or by becoming dead, immune to violation and violence by disappearing entirely, becoming invulnerable because non-existent, not subject to violation because not subject at all.

To learn to live with and in primary vulnerability, then, is to learn to live with and in the need we have of each other, the fundamental non-wholeness that itself completes the wholeness of what we are. It is to learn to live with and in an intersubjectivity and relationality that is not precisely formulated or constructed from out of an interlocking web of otherwise separate nodes or meeting points, but one whereby the mutual non-wholeness of our being fulfils the always possibly violated promise of what we already are. To deny this vulnerability in the name of a subjectivity that is whole unto itself—whether by way of feeling that wholeness violated or by way of denying the reality of a violence to the vulnerability—is, in the end, to do violence to ourselves as vulnerable.

There is nothing in Butler's account of primary vulnerability that precludes the possibility of violence, to another or to ourselves. Nor does it mean that the reaction to violence within the scope of primary vulnerability will not itself result in a foreclosing subjectivity that itself can result in a continuation of violence. Rather, primary vulnerability opens up a different way of considering violence, trauma, and violation insofar as that which is traumatised and violated is what it is: vulnerable to these experiences as much as opening up a different way of considering community.

In this way, primary vulnerability seems to me to offer a fuller account of intersubjectivity than Merleau-Ponty's notion of the flesh, Lawlor's furthering of that notion in reference to Butler, or even a certain strand of feminist philosophical discourse on similar questions. In that the late Merleau-Ponty attempts to break from the tradition that understands the subject as formulated in a fashion radically distinct from others, the flesh as the non-synthetic unity of perception and its underside can take on an exclusively positive, romantic, and even Romantic register. The flesh as a unity without domination or self-aggrandisement would seem to preclude the possibility of violations of that unity, especially insofar as it is unlimited. Lawlor makes this preclusion more or less explicit in his connection of the late Merleau-Ponty to Butler's appeal to a benign sexual variation.[8] While hedging with a "Perhaps," the openness to all the future loves and

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8   At this point in the text, Butler's image for this primary vulnerability is the infant. In Butler 1990, she uses this same image as part of her argument against Merleau-Ponty's erroneous distinction between the biological and the historico-cultural: "the very birth of the child is already a human relation, one of radical *dependence,* which takes place within a set of institutional regulations and norms" (Butler 1990, p. 91; my emph.).

the love of the future he invokes as emerging from the late Merleau-Ponty nevertheless mentions nothing other than the benign (Lawlor, 2008, p. 56). The feminist phenomenological or phenomenological feminist tradition of taking up intersubjectivity as that which can leave hope for an understanding of performativity of gender and sexuality without reducing the world to a world of my own would also seem to think intersubjectivity as a life that, if it is violated, is only violated in its betrayal. In connecting Merleau-Ponty's understanding of expression to Butler's understanding of performativity in that they can both be "free of gender essentialism," Stoller at least implies that such freedom will be free of the dominance and violence of the male or masculine look that reduces the other to an object without subjectivity (Stoller, 2010, p. 98). In calling for a critique of the "heterosexual and sexist" matrix at work in Merleau-Ponty's analysis of sexuality that better accounts for the 'in between' status of his analysis, Foultier calls for a critique that would allow for the intersubjectivity at work in that status to be free of sexist violence (Foultier, 2013, p. 779). In wondering whether philosophy can function without "the hypothesis that *reversibility* is the final truth," Irigaray wonders if philosophy is possible without the violence of reducing the other to the self, or if some other language would become necessary to live without this violence (Irigaray, 1993, p. 184).

Primary vulnerability, even though opening up a hope for a less (self-)destructive engagement with the world and the world's others, is not so exclusively positive or hopeful. Insofar as it opens different ways of considering the subject and its violence, violation, and trauma, rather than at least implicitly prescribing a mode of behaviour, it is an ontological concept whereby human action and activity can be understood and less an ethical imperative or a demand for action. If we remain vulnerable even in our attempts to flee vulnerability, whether by violating the vulnerability of others (even if only in reactive violation) or by violating our own vulnerability by denying the reality of the violence done to ourselves, then there is nothing in the life lived in and with this vulnerability ensuring that the variations of our life activities, sexual or otherwise, be benign. They can just as easily be malign. What primary vulnerability does help us with, because of the way it helps us understand trauma, violence, and violation, is how to discern these variations as benign or malign.

Thus, if there is an ethical imperative at work in or under this ontological category, it would seem to be in the understanding of the possibility of reconciliation, in what is to be reconciled and how. What meaning is sedimented in this word? What historico-cultural sense does it bring to primary vulnerability, or how does or could primary vulnerability engage this sediment? 'Reconciliation'—a restoration to friendship or harmony, a making consistent, or an acceptance of the unpleasant (*Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary* (11th ed.), 2003)—from *reconcilio*, is bringing together again, reuniting, re-establishing, restoring, recovering, or regaining.

Concilio is bringing different objects together into a whole, uniting in thought or feeling, representing as pleasant, obtaining or purchasing, even producing. A *conciliatus* is a connection among bodies, while a *concilium* is a human assembly or council, a conjunction, or coition. What is brought together in conciliation and what is repeated in reconciliation is sedimented deeply in the word *calo* as calling out, proclaiming, calling together, or summoning (Lewis and Short, 1879). Reconciliation then summons, calls for bodies or humans to come together or to produce themselves as whole in their differentiation, and to do so as a repetition. It recalls what had been called forth insofar as it was called to be a collection or conjunction, restores or re-establishes a collective that itself had to be formed and called.

If what are reconciled are radically individuated subjectivities which happened to interlock in a particular place and at a particular time and which interlocking was ruptured, a reconciliation of such subjectivities would always be temporary, always awaiting and even perhaps expecting, anticipating, and acting in prediction of its violation. Such would be a reconciliation, a bringing back together, that does not deserve the name because what is gathered is predicated on not needing its togetherness. However, if what is reconciled is that which was never whole, or that which is whole precisely in its non-wholeness, in its vulnerability to deprivation or violation of the mutual need that constitutes each of those subjectivities in their subjectivity, then the reconciliation, understood as a recognition of a fuller sense of intersubjectivity, is predicated on a wholeness that is necessarily non-whole, on a gathering of what cannot be gathered because it is, in itself, a perpetual gathering. Such would be an impossible reconciliation, a reconciliation of what was never con-ciliatory, an impossible reconciliation understood as the condition for the possibility of both re-conciliation and con-ciliation, a reconciliation of what can only be reconciled insofar as it was never together from the first.[9]

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9   This is to say nothing of the analysis Lawlor gives of Merleau-Ponty's reading of Proust in Merleau-Ponty 2010, an analysis that is the source of his link to Butler's suggestion of benign sexual variations. Lawlor says that "the male lover imagines himself in the female beloved's position of making love with other men. But since Albertine is homosexual we have a different situation, and it does not matter…whether this character is really a man or a woman" (Lawlor 2008, p. 56). If a man, Marcel imagines himself loving the beloved's female, and so heterosexual lovers, making Marcel heterosexual. If a woman, he imagines himself loving the beloved's female, and so homosexual lovers, making Marcel homosexual. The substitution and reversibility at work here still seems to me to be at least potentially the reduction of the beloved, whether male or female, to the imagination, the fantasy, the gaze of the male or masculine. In other words, in his attempt to link his analysis of Merleau-Ponty to the early Butler's suggestion, Lawlor may have repeated the universalising dominance by the male or masculine over the other, the very tendency in the early Merleau-Ponty that Butler critiques. However, I do not have the space to engage this possibility more here, being focused on the exclusively benignancy of the sexual variations that could follow from this substitution and reversibility.

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II.
RECONCILIATION IN POST-TRANSITION, WORKING THROUGH CULTURAL TRAUMAS

Intergenerational Guilt and Shame Continue to Challenge Relations: Some Thoughts from the Dialogical Intergenerational Pastoral Process.

Christo Thesnaar

Abstract

Given South Africa's past, the occurrence of guilt and shame is a reality that individuals, families, and communities will need to engage with. The truth and the extent of the human rights violations during the time of apartheid continues to cause guilt and shame to many South Africans. Guilt and shame are not only experienced as a result of the past but also as a result of the ongoing human rights violations on a daily basis. In reaction, many South Africans struggle to take responsibility for their guilt and shame and therefore mostly opt to deny, hide, keep silent, talk about it in the third person, or blamed it on others or the previous generation(s). Guilt and shame have a tendency to be transmitted from generation to generation if the current generation does not engage with it. This contribution will, therefore, attempt to provide a short description of the past and current guilt and shame within South Africa. It will also attempt to engage with constructive and destructive shame and existential and intergenerational guilt. In conclusion, it will attempt to explore means of intervention from a Dialogical Intergenerational Pastoral Process perspective in order to engage with guilt and shame and avoid dumping it on the next generation(s).

Key concepts: pastoral caregiving, guilt, shame, intergenerational, relational and Dialogical Intergenerational Pastoral Process[1].

Introduction

In South Africa, the occurrence of guilt and shame is a reality given the comprehensiveness of our country's past. The mandate of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)[2] was to look at the impact of apartheid (institutionalised apartheid) on the people of South Africa within a specific timeframe in the history of our country. As time has elapsed since the end of the TRC process, the extent of the human rights violations on the black population of South Africa has become more and more apparent. These human rights violations were not only orchestrated by the colonisers, the apartheid government, and civil society but were also implemented by Christian institutions.

To many South Africans of the current generation, the extent of the human rights violations that took place during the reign of the apartheid government (and even during the colonial time), as well as the continuous violation of human rights within the current context, continue to cause guilt and shame. Niebuhr already indicated in the 1940's that

> … our national histories do not recall to the consciousness of citizens the crimes and absurdities of past social conduct, as our written and unwritten autobiographies fail to mention our shame. But this unremembered past endures … When we live and act in accordance with our inward social constitution in which there are class and race divisions, prejudices, assumptions about the things we can and cannot do, we are constrained by the unconscious past. Our buried past is mighty; the ghosts of our fathers and of the selves that we have been haunt our days and nights though we refuse to acknowledge their presence. (1941, pp. 30-31)

In reaction, many South Africans have opted to either deny their guilt and shame, hide it, keep it silent, blame it on collective guilt, talk about it in the third person, or blame it on the previous generation(s). Meiring illustrates how offenders can rationalise their shame and guilt:

> Of course we are ashamed of the things that happened, but you must remember we were confronted with a 'total onslaught'. Communism was a substantial danger in the sixties and seventies. We had to fight in various ways. Even though many wrong things happened, our intentions were usually not that bad. (1999, p. 114)

When the previous generation(s) do not engage with their conflicts that cause guilt and shame to them, they have very little option other than to transmit it to the next generation(s). In doing so, the guilt and shame of previous generation(s), based on unresolved conflict is kept "frozen" and continues to impact the current and future generations. The current generation would, therefore, not only need to deal with their experiences of guilt and shame in their current context but also deal with guilt and shame transmitted by previous generations. This contribution will,

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1   Dialogical Intergenerational Pastoral Process is an attempt to find an alternative name for Contextual Pastoral Approach based on the theory of Boszormenyi-Nagy. The reasons for this attempt are to limit the confusion caused by the name 'contextual' as it is not contextual as context but rather relational and ethical. He describes it as "a therapeutic approach based on the empirical knowledge that a person's fair consideration of his or her relational obligations can result in personal freedom to participate in the life's activities, satisfactions and enjoyment. Due consideration is therefore a major relational resource, a wellspring of liberation from a false or inauthentic sense of obligation and from wasteful, inauthentic interpersonal conflicts" (1996, p. 420).

2   See the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report Vol. 1.

therefore, strive to engage with the contextual theory of the Hungarian psychiatric scholar Boszormenyi-Nagy and the integration thereof by theological scholars Meulink-Korf & Van Rhijn in an attempt to seek for ways to break through the challenges of intergenerational guilt and shame that continue to fuel "frozen conflict" within the current South African society. This article will therefore firstly attempt to provide a short description of past and current guilt and shame in South Africa. Secondly, it will attempt to engage with constructive and destructive shame in relation to the past, present, and future. It will, thirdly, attempt to discuss existential and intergenerational guilt; and lastly, it will explore ways of intervention from a Dialogical Intergenerational Pastoral Process perspective to engage with guilt and shame in order to avoid dumping it on the next generation(s).

Guilt and Shame Continues to be a Reality

In 1997, the TRC arranged a Special Hearing for the Faith Communities where faith communities and religious organisations made submissions on their role during the apartheid history of our country, as well as on their commitment to the future of the country. During their submissions, these Faith Communities made significant commitments to reconcile and heal South African society (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 1998). Unfortunately, many of these commitments by the Faith Communities did not materialise. As time elapsed after the change to democracy and the completion of the TRC process, the extent of the human right violations under apartheid became more and more evident. As a result, many white South Africans and white based churches of the current generation are implicated in the human rights violations that took place under the rule of the apartheid government. The notion that they are directly and indirectly implicated in the violations of the past and present causes guilt and shame in many white South Africans. In this regard, white South Africans will need to actively engage with the injustices of the past as well as with the ongoing discrimination taking place today. The challenging question is: How do South Africans (especially white but also black) engage with the current and transmitted guilt and shame?

Faith community leaders officially and unofficially confessed their guilt on behalf of their faith communities during the 1997 faith hearing of the TRC and repeated it again during the 2014 re-enactment[3] consultation of the TRC faith hearing in Stellenbosch (Thesnaar, 2015). Others took the opportunity, officially and unofficially to confess their role during apartheid for the first time. Although the consultation created this platform for

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3   See the unpublished report on the re-enactment of the Truth and Reconciliation
     Commission's faith hearing consultation held at Stellenbosch University from the
     08–09 October 2014, by Thesnaar.

faith leaders and, in particular, the white churches to confess to their role in apartheid and to indicate how they would contribute to reconciliation, justice and healing, it was mostly symbolic. The majority of white South Africans has opted to either deny their guilt and shame, hide it, keep silent, blame it on collective guilt, talk about it in the third person, or blame it on the previous generation. In many ways, it is probably easier to export collective guilt than to engage with it. History has taught us that if a generation does not engage with their guilt and shame, as well as with the transmitted guilt and shame from the previous generation(s) individually and collectively, they have a tendency to be transmitted to the next generation(s).

It was significant that survivors of apartheid atrocities also expressed guilt and shame in their submissions during the re-enactment consultation. Many survivors of apartheid experienced guilt and shame towards those who did not manage to live long enough to experience freedom and to benefit from it. Added to this is a further extension of guilt and shame, currently experienced by those who in the current context benefited from the new freedom in many ways (economically, socially, etc.) versus those still left in the destructive cycle of poverty and who continue to struggle to survive the implications of poverty on a daily basis. Meulink-Korf and van Rhijn refer to this kind of guilt as the "legacy of survivors" (based on the theory of Boszormenyi-Nagy) (1997, pp. 323-338). The legacy of survivors could manifest in any given circumstance, whether it is after a genocide, prosecution, economic disaster, or a political system such as apartheid. Meulink-Korf and van Rhijn specifically warn not to attempt to reduce the feelings of indebtedness of the survivors as that would be an injustice to them and thus indicate a lack of compassion and solidarity (1997, p. 323-338). Boszormenyi-Nagy and Krasner further explain that "... a survivor is indebted to the victims who weren't able to escape" (1986, p. 185). So many immigrants, migrants, and refugees were forced to flee their countries because of ongoing danger and war currently experience survivor guilt. They face constant experiences of guilt and shame towards those who stayed behind to continuously face and survive violence, war, and poverty, to name a few. The student movement known by the hashtag #feesmustfall and organised by the university students of our country could also be understood as survivor guilt as it is mainly a cause fought by black middle-class students on behalf of the majority who cannot get access to universities. According to Boszormenyi-Nagy and Krasner, the key to amending survivor guilt lies in the survivor's options for appropriate action that will ultimately benefit the coming generations (1986, p. 185).

Constructive and Destructive Shame

Shame is very different from guilt. Shame literally entails that you feel bad about yourself. Guilt is more about behaviour, a feeling of "con-

science" from having done something wrong or against one's values. John Patton (1993) also distinguishes in his book *Is Human Forgiveness Possible?* between guilt and shame. He indicates that guilt is something for everyone to talk about and is fairly cognitive in nature. Shame, on the other hand is a deep intense personal emotion that affects one's being and pride. Patton describes shame as the "the most profound experience" (Patton, 1993, p. 9). Shame can give rise to irrational and personal action. When one's pride is affected, the person responds either by exposing himself or herself or by attacking. The person can then either respond by taking power or being powerless (Patton, 1993, pp. 53-78).

Shame as a self-destructive behaviour has the potential, as do guilt feelings, to cause an identity crisis. Shame is harder to acknowledge and claim for human beings as it generally underlies self-destructive behaviours. The reason for this is that shame continuously communicates to the self that the self is not good enough, is lacking, inadequate and substandard. In this sense, humans often hide shame from others. As a result, "hidden shame often drives self-destructive behaviours and other psychological symptoms such as rage, avoidance, or addictions" (Margolies, 2016, p. 1). Shame involves a painful self-consciousness in which a person will feel exposed to others and to themselves as wanting, weak, helpless, and, at worst shameful. Shame also tends to integrate this destructed self-evaluation throughout our whole being.

In terms of spirituality, shame relates to the deepest places of truth in one's being. Shame has the ability to wound the core of our being and our existence. Shame is, however, not only destructive, it can also be constructive. When one experiences shame in a constructive way, it does provide a primary foundation for conscience and for the instinctive sense of what is worthy or unworthy, right or wrong, etc. In short, it is deeply about the ability to develop an ethics for truth.

Shame, as an emotion, relates to the intense sensitive feelings with others, feelings entrenched with love and deep communion. Shame also mostly tends to protect the relationships we as humans have with our friends, spouses, children, family, and our community. As an emotion, it also deeply impacts our relations with God and that what is sacred to us. Shame should also be seen as the caretaker of our self-worth and identity. This can only become a reality when we as humans are able to listen responsively to the voice of our constructive shame. If we are able to achieve this, we undauntedly speak and act from the "centre" of our being. Then we as humans can respond to and act with authenticity, with integrity, and with identity. In this regard, shame can play a distinctive role in the care and nurture of our being. In this regard, Meulink-Korf and Van Rhijn, introduce the term substitutive shame. Substitutive shame is when a person experiences shame on behalf of the other (1997, p. 334). An indication of this

phenomenon within the South African context is when a white person of the current generation is ashamed of all the injustices done to black South Africans by the previous generations. When someone experiences substitutive shame, it should not be understood as inadequate at all, but from his or her relational existence; it is existentially related.

In *Between Give and Take*, Boszormenyi-Nagy adds another category of shame and refers to it as the legacy of ancestral shame and guilt (1986, p. 182). This category of shame requires redress and exoneration as far as possible (Meulink-Korf & Van Rhijn, 1997, p. 316). Boszormenyi-Nagy also alerts us to the reality of family shame (1986, p. 227). Shame and loyalty are in Boszormenyi-Nagy's mind very closely linked. Shame particularly refers to physicality and, in contrast, to loyalty, it links more to the present. Loyalty conflicts are a common reality within families and can easily develop into family shame. This mostly happens during or in the developmental phases of the children, e.g. the teenager would state that he or she is ashamed of his or her parents.

In its destructive form, shame can lead to a destructive conscience about ourselves and our identity but in particular about others. In its destructive and distorted form, it can lead to self-destructive behaviours such as denial, suppression, blaming of others, victimisation, and passiveness. When a person manages to deal with his or her distorted shame, individually and collectively it in turn leads to empowerment and courage to face, for example, the social and economic injustices of our common lives as human beings.

Based on the discussion thus far, it is essential to deal with shame as it has the ability to distort any person, family, or community. To deal with shame will require the need to seriously face the challenges of destructive shame as it will clearly open opportunities for new vitality, intimacy, responsiveness, and attentiveness. Based on this, humans will be able to respect not only themselves but also others as it will reflect our common origin and being a creature of God. This will only be possible if a person is able to deeply trust his or her own "good-enoughness" based on our true worth and effective power to make this a better world. When a person is able to put his or her hand in the wound of the other, only then will they become aware of what it means not to shame someone else. In this regard, Meulink-Korf and Van Rhijn indicate that shame according to Boszormenyi-Nagy is a process whereby a person from their personal accountability wants to start a new in his or her relational reality in order to restore their relational integrity (1997, p. 336). Shame as a process is then fundamentally about being just and doing justice to the other.

Existential and Intergenerational Guilt

Before discussing intergenerational existential guilt, it is essential to indicate the difference between existential guilt and the guilt feelings

people grapple with on a daily basis. Louw emphasises the difference when he distinguishes between guilt and guilt feeling (1998, p. 406).[4] To him, guilt is when there is knowledge of transgression because of a serious misconduct in the light of objective criteria for right and wrong. It presupposes a norm or expectation to which a person is found wanting. Boszormenyi-Nagy refers to this kind of guilt as existential guilt as it affirms that if a person is guilty, he or she actually fails to do justice of the human order (1986, p. 60). Meulink-Korf & Van Rhijn, explain that what they think Boszormenyi-Nagy understood with "the justice of the (or a) human order" is the *search for what is just,* as an important human motivation, this *should not be given up* (2016, p. 49).

Guilt feeling, according to Louw, is a subjective reaction dealing with disappointment, shame, and failure (1998, p. 407). It refers to a person's emotional reactions and the impact of guilt on a person's personal identity and self-image. The distinction between existential guilt and guilt feeling is not because existential guilt is more important than guilt feelings. Both existential guilt and guilt feelings are viewed as significant and, therefore, should be dealt with seriously in pastoral caregiving. Buber's emphasis on existential guilt is to make pastoral caregivers and psychotherapists aware that they should not only focus on guilt feelings, conscious and unconscious, but "within a comprehensive knowledge of help, he (she) must himself (herself) encounter guilt as something of an ontic character whose place is not the soul but being" (1998, p. 113).[5]

In Buber's studies on the theories of Freud and Jung, he concludes that there is "no place for guilt in the ontological sense, unless it be in the relationship of man to him or herself—that is, interpreted as failure in the process of individuation (Buber, 1998, p. 115). This was unacceptable to Buber as guilt is more comprehensive and, therefore, it was not just fair for a person to move his or her guilt to his or her unconscious mind. For Buber, "existential guilt occurs when someone injures an order of the human world whose foundations he or she knows and recognises, as those of his or her own existence and of all common human existence" (1998, p. 117). It is, therefore, clear that when a person experiences existential guilt in his or

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4   Also see Buber (1998, p. 116) who argues for a clear distinction between guilt and guilt feeling. In his understanding, guilt can never be a neurotic feeling of guilt. Guilt is existential rather than limited to a feeling.

5   Louw indicates that guilt consists of five dimensions, namely: Relational, as relationships are broken; Normative, as values and norms have been broken; Ethical, as there is a link between humanity and morality; Anthropological, as guilt is a reaction and a conduct of human behaviour because of our responsibility and accountability; and Theological, as it indicates that in the presence of God, guilt is a state of being which describes our condition of alienation and estrangement. This deepens the understanding that guilt is existential (1998, p. 407).

her personal situation, it cannot just be understood through categories of analytical science, neither through individual psychological analytical theories. To Buber the shortcoming of these theories is that they focus more on dealing with guilt feelings.

According to Meulink-Korf and van Rhijn, Boszormenyi-Nagy argues that all guilt is existential guilt (1997, p. 338). He comes to this conclusion because to him the extent of the wound suffered by the victim constitutes the criteria of existential guilt rather than the extent of the offender's capacity for guilt feelings. With this he affirms that guilt belongs to the fourth dimension (ethical dimension)[6], which is the dimension where existential responsibility is an essential part. In this regard, Meulink-Korf and van Rhijn indicate that Boszormenyi-Nagy assumes that "debt always stays somewhere: in the absence of freedom of action, as loss of entitlement, in the consequences for others. .... The evil then worsens. In order to prevent this, an intervention with an ethical perspective is required" (1997, p. 338).

Before it is possible to explore what an intervention with an ethical perspective will entail, we need to take cognisance when Buber states that one should not deal with existential guilt in the same way one will deal with guilt feelings (1998, p. 116). Existential guilt is much more complex and profound and, therefore, it has the capacity to manifest in a repetitive way. Buber explain that

> A man (woman) stands before us who, through acting or failing to act, has burdened himself (herself) with a guilt or has taken part in a community guilt, and now, after some years or decades is again and again visited by the memory of his (her) guilt. (1998, p. 115)

This comment consciously reminds us that existential guilt should not only be limited to individual guilt, but it also includes collective guilt (Louw, 1998, p. 407) as it forms part of our humanness. Collective guilt has the potential to become acute guilt in situations where, for instance, one generation transmits injustices to the next generation and that can continue to impact following generations. In the same vein, Kayser alerts us to the fact that suppressing guilt can have serious consequences, not only for the current generation but also on coming generations as guilt threatens identity (1989, p. 88). The repetitive character of guilt as well as the fact that it could penetrate the consciousness unexpectedly makes us aware of how deep our historical and biographical guilt (Buber, 1998, p. 122) can

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6   Boszormenyi-Nagy describes his understanding of relational ethical as follows: "life is a chain of interlocking consequences linked to the interdependence of the parent and child generations. In human beings, relation ethics require people to assume responsibility for consequences. But consequences per se constitute unavoidable, existential reality"(1986, p. 420).

exist and how this should not be simplified or classified to the notion of guilt feelings.

Individuals, families and communities who do not choose to deal with their guilt become the bearer or bearers of guilt and they tend to remember the guilt in a repetitive way and to a sufficient degree. Because of this reality, Buber continues to emphasise,

The bearer of the existential guilt remains in the realm of conscious existence. The guilt is not one that allows itself to be repressed into the unconscious. It remains in the chamber of memory, out of which it can at any moment penetrate unexpectedly into that of consciousness, without it being possible for any barriers to be erected against this invasion. The memory receives all experiences and actions without the assistance of man. (1998, p. 136)

Guilt then becomes like a frozen conflict that can erupt at any moment.

Intervention from
a Dialogical Intergenerational Pastoral
Process perspective

To argue for the importance of an intervention from a Dialogical Intergenerational Pastoral Process perspective is to firstly acknowledge that *guilt* should be viewed as a constructive phenomenon (Louw, 1998, p. 408). However, engaging with existential guilt, individually and collectively, is a daunting but constructive process. Guilt is not something we can just let go or get rid of. Sometimes we need to learn to just stay in the guilt for some time as guilt is not something bigger than, us. In this regard, we can rightly ask the question if the TRC did not take place to soon after the transition from apartheid to liberation. Many people, on both sides of the spectrum were simply not ready to engage with the complexity and trauma of the past. Pollefeyt helps us to understand that guilt and shame can give rise to anxiety from especially the offender: "The sense of imminent moral disintegration adds a great existential fear to painful shame and guilt" (1996, p. 169). This is illustrated by the study of a South African Defense Force Chaplain, Pieter Bezuidenhout, when he indicated during the reenactment of the Faith Hearing of the TRC that in his encounters with white staff in the military, who were young men at the time of defending apartheid, now (30–40 years later) want and need to talk about dealing with their guilt (Thesnaar, 2015, p. 199).

Secondly, an intervention from an ethical perspective is only possible when an individual, family, and community demonstrate a willingness to take *responsibility*[7] for their guilt. The German theologian Jaspers[8] argues that guilt is not only an individual responsibility but also a collective one (1947, p. 33). In this regard, individuals, families and communities cannot only take responsibility for their own guilt but also need to take responsibility for the guilt of the previous generations. If individuals, families and communities decline to take responsibility they continue to seek for scapegoats,[9] and this could ultimately lead to new never-ending violence (as we see evidently in our country at present). Moss and Meulink-Korf indicate that the dialectical approach from Boszormenyi-Nagy prevents scapegoating in relationships (2009, p. 235). It is in this sense evident in Buber's argument by opposing the theories of, for example, Jung that when a person follows these psychological theories to engage with their guilt feelings, they easily neglect to take responsibility. When someone is guilty but neglects to take responsibility, they continue to damage the other as well as the trustworthiness of being human. Good and evil are in every person. As humans, we need to remember that we can be offender and victim at the same time and, therefore, we need to take our responsibility for individual and collective guilt seriously. This will entail that we need to get involved with the person, family, or community we have violated and respond to their particular calling when asked for.

Taking responsibility, therefore, has a lot to do with consciousness. According to van Rhijn, Levinas places a lot of emphasis on the fact that the consciousness (awareness and moral conscience) of a person's natural injustice, of the damage he or she caused to others by his or her own structure of the Ego is contemporary with my consciousness as a human being (1992, p. 9). For Levinas, this implies that we need to remember the hour, time, and moment that I, as a person, became conscious of the danger that I have

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7   See Smit (2007, p. 331) on responsibility, guilt, and reconciliation.

8   See Jaspers' explanation of the four different forms of guilt: criminal guilt is a measurement of provable transgressions of clear laws. It usually leads to some kind of punishment; political guilt has to do with the actions of the citizens of a country and the degree to which each is responsible for the way they are being governed; moral guilt has to do with the personal and spiritual dimension and every individual's personal responsibility. Jurisdiction lies with the conscience; and metaphysical guilt: All people are guilty due to their humanity. The fact that I survived the past and still exist before God as a human being, implies my guilt of the past (1947, p. 33).

9   The Belgian theologian Pollefeyt (1996:156-171) helps us understand what offenders do to revert from taking full responsibility for the injustices done. This entails:
• trying to justify themselves by blaming the army, the police, or anybody else for what happened, or
• denying the fact that they have any guilt in regard to what happened in SA because they did not do anything wrong or they did not take part in any injustice, or
• trying to justify their action as white persons who were actually part of the struggle against the apartheid as they resisted to join the army, were part of the freedom movement, etc.

caused to another (van Rhijn, 1992, p. 9). Van Rhijn explains that "The 'in-justice naturelle' says nothing about my nature, but it is inseparably linked to the insight into the damage, the suffering that I brought to the other; it's my fault" (1992, p. 9). It is about becoming aware of the injustice done. The complexity is just that offenders struggle with becoming aware of the injustices done by them, in order to take the blame. We as humans need to understand that if we do not take the blame, we actually forsake the hour of our being a human.

In many ways, the way individuals understand and deal with con-science is closely link to how we as a society or collectively deal with the notion of conscience. On what is our conscience based as an individu-al or as a society? What framework do we fall back on when we need to make a decision on one or the other issue? Do we take action or not? How does religion and faith shape our conscience? As a society, South Africa is (especially in the past) a very religious-based society with a strong em-phasis, broadly speaking, on Christianity. To further break this down to the white community, in particular the Afrikaans-speaking community, in general, their theology is largely a moral theology. During apartheid, there was a strong sense of a theology of obedience, obedience to God and also an obedience to the authority granted to us by God and loyalty to the church. Obedience and loyalty to the church was in a sense also obedience and loyalty to the government due to the firm belief that the government is God-fearing government and that there was always a special relation between the two institutions. The theology was, therefore, mostly mor-ally-based and in support of the actions and decisions made by the then apartheid government.

It is as if Buber was aware of this reality when he explains that the content of our conscience as humans is in many ways determined by the commands and proscriptions of the society to which its bearer belongs or those of the tradition of faith to which its bearer is bound (1998, p. 124). He explains that this phenomenon is a reality in all types of communities and, therefore, there is always a need to take this into consideration. However, the problem with the

> table of shalts and shalt-nots under which this man (woman) has grown up and lives determines only the conceptions which prevail in the realm of the conscience, but not its existence itself, which is grounded in just that distancing and distinguishing-primal quali-ties of the human race. (Buber, 1998, p. 124)

Buber warns us as humans to be careful not to let a moralistic ta-boo-offence structure force our conscious when it comes to dealing with guilt, as it cannot engage with the real depth of the existential guilt.

Thirdly, an intervention from an ethical perspective is only possible when an individual, family, and community demonstrate a willingness to *persevere*. To Buber, an upright and calm perseverance in the clarity of the great light is what we need to deal with existential guilt (1998, p. 137). Per-severance, for a person willing to engage with their guilt and a caregiver assisting someone in the process of engaging with their guilt, is to lay his or her "hand in the wound of the other and learn" (Buber, 1998, p. 117). The key principle is the willingness to lay our hands in the wounds of the oth-er and thus to show a willingness to be open to learn. This is probably the most difficult part of the process for white people in general to undergo as it requires a real willingness to step down, identify with the reality of the open wound by 'touching' it, and staying there for some time to allow the context of the wound to teach you, in order to learn from it. The beautiful thing about cultural intelligence is that, if we are willing to keep learning, we never have to be defined by our past mistakes (Lederleitner, 2010, p. 27).

Fourthly, an intervention from an ethical perspective is only possi-ble when an individual, family and community demonstrate a willingness to engage in *dialogue* with past generations. Boszormenyi-Nagy closely links onto the relational focus of Buber and refers to dialogue, trust, and trust-worthiness between generations as a key aspect of dealing with guilt and, in this sense, they are the fruits of indebtedness of care. Boszormenyi-Nagy helps in terms of dealing with guilt not to limit one's identity to the identi-ty of the previous generations as times and context have changed. Dialogue with the past generations is inevitable as it develops one's own identity. In this regard Boszormenyi-Nagy says that it is essential to understand "... the dialogue as the shaper of identity, suggesting also that the behaviour pat-terns of any individual are not limited by the repertoire of patterns exhibit-ed by elders or other bearers of cultural tradition" (1986, p. 73). If we accept that dialogue shapes our identity, then the quality of the dialogue with the past is of the essence. Boszormenyi-Nagy affirms that what is needed in re-lationships is genuine dialogue where reciprocity of responsible caring and mutuality of commitment forms an essential part of the dialogue in both symmetrical and asymmetrical relationships (1986, pp. 73, 451). Genuine di-alogue with our past generation, as indicated by Boszormenyi-Nagy, has the potential to break through the frozen identity, shame, and guilt.

For Buber there is a very close relationship between dialogue, trust and reconciliation and one could say that the dimension of hope mediates this. According to Buber, hope is about being open to the others and the future. The future is always uncertain and, therefore, to cope with the un-certainty we need hope (1990, pp. 220-229). In this respect one needs to be able to hope without fear. If we are able to hope without fear, then hope must be very close to trust. However, Buber warns that our biggest ene-my is mistrust and it has the tendency to convince us that everything is

impossible. Mistrust[10] counters any attempt for relational dialogue between individuals, within families, and the community. In other words, with the other.

When we enter in dialogue with another person or within a family of community, trust is never simplistic but rather risky. It is risky because one could be disappointed as it can take time. Even though it is risky, it remains our responsibility to take the risk than to be stuck with shame and guilt that continues to accuse us. In that sense guilt is the opposite of trust. Meulink-Korf and Van Rhijn actually states that if we forsake the compassion and solidarity to enter into dialogue with the other it is guilt (2016, p. 100). It becomes guilt as we consciously deny the other the possibility to live and to become a harbour for those who do not have a place to go according to Levinas (Meulink-Korf &Van Rhijn 2016, p. 99). According to Meulink-Korf and Van Rhijn, Buber makes a plea for understanding guilt as a state of indebtedness to another. We are connected to others by our indebtedness (2016, p. 101). To redeem our indebtedness, we will need to take action either individually or collectively. To take action with confidence based in faith is to take responsibility to dialogue with the other. This entails that we need to be willing to take a risk. To take a risk is to open yourself up to learn and to begin to trust. Although it involves a risk, to develop trust is also comforting. In that, sense trust is the moral glue that keeps different societies together even if there were violations on both sides. When genuine dialogue starts to build trust within the relation then it slowly but surely opens the way for the current generation to take responsibility to develop their own identity that is not based on unresolved guilt from the past generation(s). Only when we are able to touch the wound of the other (previous generation) and learn from the other will we understand why responsibility and justice are so closely linked in relationships with the 'other'. Buber refers to this as genuine intercourse with one another (1990, p. 224).

Fifthly, an intervention from an ethical perspective is only possible when an individual, family, and community demonstrate a willingness to take responsibility to *restore and transform the injustices*. When we as humans do own our debt and take responsibility for it, then a natural action to restore what is broken tends to follow spontaneously. In other words,

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10   Dag Hammarskjöld (1905-1961) Swedish diplomat, author, UN Secretary-General (1953-61) already made the world aware of distrust. In his speech called "The Walls of Distrust," delivered at Cambridge University on the (5th of Jun 1958he stated "The conflict to different approaches to the liberty of man and mind or between different views of human dignity and the right of the individual is continuous. The dividing line goes within ourselves, within our own peoples, and also within other nations. It does not coincide with any political or geographical boundaries. The ultimate fight is one between the human and the subhuman. We are on dangerous ground if we believe that any individual, any nation, or any ideology has a monopoly on rightness, liberty, and human dignity" (Cordier & Fotte, 1974).

responsibility always includes justice. Action[11] that is based on responsibility and justice is future focused, as it is, therefore. committed not to burden the next generation with unresolved guilt. This explains why Levinas strongly argues that guilt does not refer to a feeling but to relationship (van Rijn, 1992, p. 10). We as humans are relationally responsible to the past generation, the present generation, and to the future generations. Boszormenyi-Nagy acknowledges the importance of relationship and that justice need to be restored within the relationship but does warn us, in an interview in 1982 that negative justice leads to mistrust (van der Pas, 1982, p. 32).

When the offender, therefore, expresses guilt, it should be an honest acknowledgement and recognition that his or her action has damaged the order of humanity. Acknowledgement of the deeds or actions done to the other is not only limited to deeds or actions that I have done myself, but it also includes those deeds or actions that I have not personally been responsible for yet benefitted from in one way or the other. The reason why this collective responsibility and acknowledgement includes collective acknowledgement is that I am equally accountable to the acts done in the name of apartheid as I, as a white person have benefited from it. This action of acknowledgement and accountability is part of justice as the motivation behind this action is because the other within the relation holds us accountable or the next generation holds us accountable. Being accountable is to admit to what you have done, commit yourself to the process of reparation and restoration.

In this regard, Meulink-Korf and Van Rhijn introduce the concept distributive justice (2016, p. 101). Their argument for this concept is to remind us that even when a person is found guilty or is guilty they can still fail to respond to the victim or victims they have violated. Justice is when the offender takes the responsibility to respond to the requests of the victim(s). Just as Boszormenyi-Nagy, they see this as a synecdoche for a larger whole and educationally as the introductory course of ethics. Distributive justice implies that it could, for example, require institutions in society to distribute resources such as money, education, and health care. When institutions collectively or humans individually answer the call for distributive justice, it is the tokens of our humanity. We as humans will need to take responsibility to engage with these efforts as it is deeply about giving and receiving. I need to give, or we need to give, because there has already been

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11   See Buber's emphasises on conscience because consciousness leads to action, and action is needed to responsibility to deal with guilt. "Conscience I can, naturally, distinguish and if necessary, condemn in such a manner not merely deeds but also omissions, not merely decisions but also failures to decide, indeed even images and wishes that have just arisen or are remembered. The action demanded by the conscience also fulfils itself in three events, which I call self-illumination, perseverance and reconciliation (Buber, 1998, p. 124)".

given to me. Therefore, we need to give back by giving forward (Meulink-Korf &Van Rhijn, 2016, p. 13). In this regard, we have to create safe spaces where people can engage with one another. Moss and Meulink-Korf conclude their discussion on justice with a very appropriate statement: "Every attempt to do justice, like acknowledging efforts and merits, even in violence, may bring justice back to where it belongs. Justice as a quality bringing principle during long living relationships" (2009, p. 258).

To conclude Meulink-Korf and Van Rhijn (2016, p. 100) propose an action guide that can assist us to engage with shame and guilt:

• Face and acknowledge the fault or negligence (I did it),
• Persevere in facing the shame[12] and guilt, even though it might have been long ago (I am the one who did or did not do it then and there),
• Take action of redemption by an attitude of active dedication to the reality of people from the here and now. In this action of engaging with guilt, the focus is on not only on responsibility, action and relationship but also especially on the future generation.

Conclusion

Many South Africans of the current middle-aged generation experience guilt and shame not only because of what they did to others, but what was done to them, and what they failed to do. In this sense, the guilt and shame based on the past, but also on the extent of continuous discrimination today, continues to haunt us. In this article, I have tried to indicate that it is no option to either deny guilt and shame, try to hide it, keep silent, blame it on collective guilt, talk about it in the third person, or blame it on the previous generation. History has taught us that if we do not deal with our guilt and shame, individually and collectively, it has a tendency to be transmitted to our future generations.

This generation would, therefore, not only need to engage with their experiences of shame and guilt in the current context but also engage with shame and guilt from the past, carried over from the previous generation to this generation. In taking responsibility for the guilt of the previous generations, it will allow us as the current generation not to further burden the next generation with our and previous generations' unresolved shame and existential guilt. In this regard, the proposed interventions from an ethical perspective do make it possible for an individual, family, and community to break through the shame and existential guilt of previous generations as well as the current generation. I would want to conclude with the words of Jonathan Sacks:

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12   I added shame.

...we all wrestle with questions about the meaning of our lives and the kind of world we will leave to those who come after us. At such times we need not only the passions of the present, but the wisdom of our several traditions, lovingly handed on from generation to generation: the gift of the past to the future, and the offering each heritage can make to the moral imagination of humankind. (2005, p. 15)

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Memory Holes and the Democratic Project: Impacts of the Abuse of Memory on the Quality of Democracy in Central Europe

Dagmar Kusá

Abstract

In the years following the proclaimed "End of History", many hoped that with democratisation and a return to Europe and the West nationalist sentiments would gradually die out and give way to the culture of human rights and liberal democratic values. Central European countries' reactions to the recent migrant crisis, as well as the debates around the rights of new minorities, suggest that the journey towards kind and inclusive societies remains long.

This paper claims that at the root of this democratic deficiency is an exclusivist perception of citizenship. It influenced the vision with which the new regimes and their institutions were formed and has an impact on the resulting lack of social cohesion, tolerance, and interpersonal trust beyond one's own kin, as well as the acceptance of discrimination. Furthermore, manipulation of collective memory from the position of power contributes towards a growing intergenerational gap and a young generation that is increasingly more polarised within itself.

Keywords: collective memory, memory regime, quality of democracy, Central Europe

At the beginning of 2018, the region of Central Europe was in turmoil[1]. There was an upsurge in mass protests, often led by students, which took on their governments for widespread corruption, and ties to organised crime or to compromised past. There was also a significant amount of changeover in the political leadership of these countries. The Slovak prime minister resigned following the murders of an investigative journalist (whose work revealed corruption scandals involving high-ranking government officials) and his partner. The governing coalition was forced to reshuffle some of the cabinet ministers, particularly the post of minister of interior. The newly elected Czech prime minister struggled to build a coalition, facing massive protests due to his past collaboration with the communist secret police and his promotion of people who had been in leadership positions before the regime change in 1989. The turmoil was underscored when the support of the unreformed Communist Party was sought

in order to achieve a parliamentary majority. His re-election was also met with a series of mass protests. Hungary also had a new government with increasingly nationalist and populist orientation, with the re-elected prime minister securing an even stronger position, banking on the politics of fear drummed up during the European migrant crisis. The Polish government intensified its nationalist agenda, passing a law criminalising statements which suggest any Polish culpability for the crimes of the Holocaust committed during the Second World War, and inviting a vigorous domestic and international backlash in the process. Collectively, the countries of Central Europe assumed a rejective stance towards the possible accommodation of asylum seekers in the wake of the 2015 migrant crisis.

This turmoil comes three decades after each state's respective regime turnover. While the historical, political, and social backgrounds of these countries differ in some respects, there are shared challenges, especially in the failure of intergenerational transmission of collective memory and the impact of manipulated memory on the ideas of democratic citizenship. Each has experienced democratic backsliding and a rise in the appeal of apocalyptic populism on the one hand, and active critical resistance in the streets on the other. Each share a deep mistrust of history with national narratives of their past often woven around perpetual victimhood. This shapes the ideas and perceptions of what is a political nation, political theory, and the practice of citizenship—who does and who does not "belong". The resulting "exclusivist citizenship" model predominant in the region impacts the quality of democracy, particularly for minorities, old and new alike, as they are among those considered not to "belong". Manipulated memory and the failure of intergenerational memory transmission have also contributed towards forming a generation that is more divided and more detached from the vision of a political nation, the very state-forming foundation of those new regimes thirty years ago.

Memory Holes and Identity

It is surprising that today's Central European young people are filling the streets to take on their governments for corruption and links to organised crime. Their parents did not do so. Yet even as this generation now entering adulthood is more radical in its protest, it is less tolerant than that of its parents. The question then is what has caused this rift, this polarisation in the collective memory of this young generation.

This paper proposes that the answer lies in the political dimension of narrating the past. In public discourse, as well as in the history lessons taught in educational systems, narratives are subordinate to the political aims of the administration in power at any given time. The framing narrative together with the resulting institutions and processes stemming from it are captured by political power. With such memory capture, intergener-

ational transmission of the past fails and the young generation is disconnected from those past narratives. It also becomes increasingly divided. What follows are memory holes—narratives not open to a diversity of voices or full disclosures, excluding alternative accounts, and used for political ends. These impact the perception and vision of a political nation, the foundation of state-formational ideals, and, in turn, the quality of democracy. Lacking accountability and self-reflection in relation to the totalitarian past also has a lingering effect of distrust in the judiciary and the perceived problem of inherited corruption.

Is a Cultural Trauma Narrative Needed for Democratisation?

The concept that there is a link between the present quality of democracy and a narrative of the past has not been dealt with in depth. Such accounts and narratives could have either positive or negative effects, moving a society forward or causing it to dwell in the past, perceiving the world through the victim-perpetrator lens. Practically speaking, there are no laws requiring a detailed public account of past traumas. No guidelines or recommendations exist that describe what such a narrative of the past would look like, who should do the telling, what should be told, to whom, and with what intended or expected outcome. To deal with this, a clear definition of democracy is required.

The thinking on democracy has undergone significant evolution over the past few decades. From the Schumpeterian minimalist definition of democracy as a competition among competent regularly elected elites, it has evolved within mainstream political science and in international organisations into a much more complex understanding, contingent on the respect, promotion, and protection of human rights, international conceptions of which have also grown increasingly robust. The democracy described by Amartya Sen (2011), Martha Nussbaum (2011), and Ronald Inglehart (1997) is founded upon the idea of distributive justice and the well-being of every individual, enabled to fulfil their full potential. Such democracy requires far more than free and fair elections. It requires the guarantee of fundamental rights and freedoms, and state intervention to create space and institutions where human potential can be fulfilled. It follows an ethics of social consequences. Such a democratic society, in consequence, is tolerant of otherness, thrives on diversity, and values social empathy and active involvement in progressive social agendas. It is a *dignitarian* democracy (Fuller, 2006), whose aim is to provide for a life of dignity for all its inhabitants.

It we accept such a definition, then the argument that narratives of cultural trauma, recorded by multiple voices and calling for accountability for previous harm, is compelling. For individual well-being, it is important to be acknowledged and listened to, to have one's identity accepted,

and to be able to practice it in public. These are what Donna Hicks labels the elements of dignity (Hicks, 2013). Cultural trauma narrative, according to Jeffrey Alexander (Alexander, 2012), goes one step further, opening the possibility of identity revision as collectives re-experience cultural trauma, becoming more inclusive and empathic. "By allowing the members of the wider audience to participate in the pain of others, cultural traumas broaden the realm of social understanding and sympathy, and they provide powerful avenues for new forms of social incorporation" (Alexander, 2012, p. 24). When the wider audience is able to participate in the pain of the former victim, it allows for empathy to broaden the circle of "we" and smudges what were clear-cut boundaries between "us" and "them" (p. 22). Such a trauma narrative is able to provide ground for greater social cohesion and interpersonal trust. This is especially important for societies in transition which have to grapple with overwhelming emotions stemming from personal insecurities tied to rapidly changing social, economic, and political conditions. Particularly after the fall of an oppressive regime—viewed with resentment, hurt, and/or guilt and shame—it is crucial for the new political regime to invest not only into new economic and political institutions, but also into institutions and processes that are able to curb the emotions of disgust, envy, grief, and fear, and turn them into compassion and reciprocity (Nussbaum, 2013).

There are those who object, saying that dwelling in the past brings more pain and suffering. The examples of Kosovo's constant memory politics resulting in conflict and Rwanda's flaming of old grievances descending into genocide are raised. Journalist David Rieff deals with such questions in his provocative short book *Against Remembrance* (Rieff, 2011) based on his personal experience working on the frontlines of conflict in those areas. He concludes, however, that dwelling in memory is harmful only when it is done for the sake of the remembering itself, where the gaze is turned solely backwards rather than also to the future. When balanced with a quest for justice in connection with the narratives of the past, the establishing of responsibility, the healing of wounds, and the building of institutions to prevent similar harm from happening in the future, remembrance does serve an important function in democratising a society.

Captured Memory Regimes

Within the realm of institutions, political structures, and processes shaped and maintained by the government and its administration, collective memory can be addressed, channelled, used, but also abused. Governments set up the main framework within which memory can flow—through constitutions, legislation, institutions set up to address the past, and symbolic politics. This framework, described in detail elsewhere (Kusá, 2018), is what comprises the memory regime of a society.

When a political establishment pushes a single story, one cherry-picked interpretation of the past, in the pursuit of a political agenda and simultaneously blocks a diversity of voices from access to the channels of narration within the public discourse, that establishment can be referred to as a captured memory regime. The is collective memory being manipulated to legitimate those in power. Among such manipulations and abuses of memory, Ricoeur distinguishes four categories: a blocked memory (a psychological phenomenon caused by wounded memory), manipulated memory (instructed memory serving a specific cause or ideology), abusively commanded memory (the recitation of official histories, often the case in school history lessons), and commanded forgetting (an act of the state, such as amnesty to an individual or group of people) (Ricoeur, 2004). The young Central European regimes have been characterised by strong captured memory regimes since their inceptions. In one variation or another, this remains the case today.

The Tragedy of the Small Central European Nations

In 1997, in the dark years of Mečiarism, US State Secretary Madeleine Albright dubbed Slovakia "the black hole of Europe" for its aggressive nationalism and violent organised crime. Today, Slovakia and its neighbours—the Visegrad Four (V4)—have a new label: "the memory hole" of Europe (Čulík & Mackinnon, 2015). They have earned this label due to their fiercely negative reaction to the European migrant crisis. This reaction stems from the ethno-linguistic exclusivist concept of nation and citizenship, and from certain "memory holes", particularly the inability and unwillingness to address the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century in a responsible way.

The exclusivist narrative has long historical roots. In 1983, Milan Kundera (Kundera, 2000/1983) echoed István Bibó's "Miseries of the East European Small States" (Bibó, 2015/1946), and pondered the origins of the sentiments present in the national narratives:

> What is Central Europe? An uncertain zone of small nations between Russia and Germany. I underscore the words: small nation... the small nation is one whose very existence may be put in question at any moment; a small nation can disappear and it knows it... Central Europe as a family of small nations has its own vision of the world, a vision based on a deep distrust of history. History, that goddess of Hegel and Marx, that incarnation of reason that judges us and arbitrates our fate—that is the history of conquerors. The people of Central Europe are not conquerors. They cannot be separated from European history; they cannot exist outside it; but they represent the wrong side of this history; they are its victims and outsiders. (Kundera, 2000/1983)

The events still perceived as traumatic in the Central European narratives are often connected with the feeling that the "West" abandoned those nations in peril to fend for themselves. A few of these are the 1848-1849 revolutions and the 1920 Treaty of Trianon that dissolved the Austro-Hungarian Empire and reduced Greater Hungary into a rather small republic; the Munich Agreement of 1938 that sacrificed Czechoslovakia to Germany in the hopes of preserving peace; and the Partitions of Poland, which are as alive in collective memories today as they were at the time of Bibó's and Kundera's writing. Emerging literature on post-socialism compares the mindset present in Central and Eastern Europe to that of postcolonial areas. Among other things, both are marked by a sense of victimhood, perennial dependency on greater powers and mistrust of their intentions, and perpetual position of periphery (Radstone & Hodgkin, 2011). The themes of colonisation have continued to persist as these countries "returned to Europe" and are frequently attached to the European and international structures that now encompass Central European countries.

The mistrust of history and the fear of the elimination of a political nation were also to blame for the shortcomings and eventual failure of the Central European democracies, Bibó maintained. Political hysteria stemming from that fear and unresolved traumas led to the rise of a particular type of a political leader: the phony realist and shrewd manipulator who rose within the ranks of the democratic framework on anti-democratic nationalist sentiment. "Thus what genuine democracies know only in the actual hour of danger became the rule in the permanent anxiety and sense of danger—the curbing of public freedoms; censorship; a search for the 'hirelings' of the enemy, the 'traitors,' excessively forcing order or its veneer at the expense of liberty" (Bibó, 2015/1946, p. 152). These sentiments and the corresponding style of political leadership cemented the specific type of ethno-linguistic nationalism that defines the nature of citizenship in Central Europe. This citizenship is exclusivist, the vision of a state-forming identity coinciding with the dominant ethnic identity of the nation. All other inhabitants hold lower ranks in the imagined hierarchy of "who really belongs".

The essays of Bibó and Kundera ring true to the observer of political sentiments in Central Europe today. Political hysteria and phony realism again dominate the political scene and no doubt bank not only on the current political crises but on the historical and cultural legacy entwined in these narratives which help nourish such anxiety and corresponding political behaviour.

After the fall of the communist regimes, the distrust of the West and sense of vulnerability were underscored by the reiterations of the identity of Central Europe as such. Battling a sense of inferiority attached to the status of Eastern Europe, the newly freed countries declared the desire to

"return to Europe". But the path was winding and non-linear. Péter Esterházy, a Hungarian novelist and intellectual, summed up these peripeteias with a sigh, writing: "Once, I was an Eastern European; then I was promoted to the rank of Central European. Those were great times... there were Central European dreams, visions, and images of the future...Then a few months ago I became a New European. But before I had a chance to get used to this status, I became a non-core European" (Esterházy, 2005, s. 74). The continuing divide between Western and Eastern Europe was deepened by the recent crises in the European Union and have reignited some of the emotions woven into these narratives. They fall into the genre of tragedy, as Kundera suggests. A tragic narrative, as Ricoeur describes in his *Time and Narrative*, highlights the role of pity and fear in emplotting and thus unifying the narrative, giving it a meaning, and stringing the individual episodes together in history (Ricoeur, 1990/1983).

Exporting Guilt: Memory Holes of Central Europe

As previously mentioned, captured memory regimes push single stories and manipulate collective memory to pursue specific political agenda. In Central Europe, this is done by nurturing and incorporating the tragic narrative into official discourse. Even when the official narrative of the past has significantly shifted with new administrations (particularly in Hungary and Poland), it has remained and become even more politicised and controlled.

After the wave of revolutions in 1989, the democratising societies of Central Europe chose similar mechanisms to address the past, creating something of a regional model of a transitional justice. In the early years, they pursued the policy of lustration (perhaps with the exception of Slovakia, which abolished the policy with its independence in 1993) and founded national memory institutes, which were tasked with investigating the crimes of the past, issuing indictments, and bringing perpetrators to justice (although they rarely fulfilled the latter function).

Another shared feature was the passing of legislation criminalising the previous regime. Despite the official proclamations by prominent political leaders of "drawing a thick line behind the past" (especially in relation to criminal justice) and focusing on the bright, economically prosperous future, anything but that was true in regard to mnemonic politics. As the West celebrated the 'end of history' and the defeat of communism, leaving liberal democracy the uncontested victor of the grand narratives of the twentieth century, many in the former communist countries were not so convinced of its passing nor of what form post-socialist regimes would take (Mark, 2010). There were radically different interpretations of the communist past and opinions on how it should be approached. These were utilised in political battles both on the home fronts, as well as within the arena of

European institutions. Neumayer highlights two opposing camps that attempted to claim space in the European market of collective memory: the one strove to emphasise the uniqueness of the Holocaust and historicise the different eras of communist regimes, pointing out some of its positive achievements; the other sought to elevate contempt for communist totalitarianism above Western abhorrence of fascism, placing the crimes of communism on an equal symbolic footing with the Holocaust (Neumayer, 2019).

At the outset of the post-socialist regimes, European memory was not the field of joint political pursuit that it has become in recent years. Unlike social and economic policy, or human rights and the protection of national minorities, leaders and institutions at that time were careful not to meddle much in how their pasts in Central Europe were addressed. They were, however, pressured to place the Holocaust centre stage in their collective memories, either by local anti-Communist entrepreneurs or by the West, often perceived as an expression of Western colonialism (Mark, 2010, s. xvi, xvii).

Nevertheless, the post-socialist states were mostly left to themselves to define their own approaches and en bloc criminalisation of the past, which combined with a good amount of amnesty and amnesia, won out in the end. The liberal anti-Communist leaders at the foundation of the new regimes often sought compromise to enable a smooth and speedy transition, Rather than searching for individual perpetrators—something advocated by the more radical anti-Communists—they wished to allow for social integration of a society which, in the past, had consisted of the majority living in a grey zone of conformity, rather than boasting strong civil societies of resistance. Ex-Communists, presenting themselves as reformed democrats, often took part in commemorations and boasted of own opposition to the previous regimes. They tolerated the creation of the national memory institutes, as long as their fates were not touched by them. In one instance, Czech Prime Minister Babiš sued the Slovak National Memory Institute for defamation over his records as an agent of the former Czechoslovak secret police. He lost the case yet suffered no political consequences of the court's de facto verification of his collaborator status. Criminalisation of the communist regime had a declaratory character rather than a criminal justice implication (with the exceptions of former East Germany and the Baltic states (Neumayer, 2019)).

The prevailing narrative thus led to legislation declaring a communist regime criminal in all of the Central European countries. Hungary included the criminalisation of communism in its new constitution in 2010, while Czechia, Slovakia, and Poland introduced acts on the criminality and immorality of the communist regime. These acts lifted the statute of limitations on crimes committed by the communist regime, opening the door to the judicial rehabilitation of victims. However, the political leadership

of the now-defunct communist regimes enjoyed a great deal of impunity, or amnesty, as a result. Even in the Czech Republic, where the policies of decommunisation—the lustration and vetting of public officials based on secret police records—went the furthest, only low-ranking Communist Party members suffered any real consequences (Rupnik, 2002). "New dominant nationalist discourses on the 'martyrdom of the nation' under Communism meant that bearing witness to one's victimisation had the potential to align individual experiences with a right-wing analysis of the past they might not support" (Mark, 2010, s. xxviii). Any change to the narrative of the criminality of the former regimes elicits emotional reactions. French anthropologist Muriel Blaive faced a wave of heated responses when she stated in an interview, "If we wish to understand the functioning of the pre-November society, we cannot limit ourselves to political prisoners and dissidents and omit the 'satisfied vacationers²'. Contrary, it is important to focus on the sources of legitimacy of the regime" (Smlsal & Stachová, 2017). Her study of the networks of everyday collaborations and negotiations with the system received incensed rejection on a variety of grounds. Some argued that totalitarian regimes do not negotiate with their subjects, and their criminal nature is stated in law and should remain so, otherwise their oppressive nature is made light of (Švehla, 2017). Others argued that totalitarian regimes by their very nature use repressive measures and manipulate many to gain support, or that such support was due to a subject mentality and the failure of the intelligentsia to resist Communist oppression sufficiently (Kubík, 2017). These emotional responses insist on the criminality of the regime and resist analysing the day-to-day modes of survival of the majority as anything other than oppression and manipulation.

A memory regime is shaped in a contest among various memory entrepreneurs. In Hungary and Poland, Mark maintains, the narrative construction was shaped by the struggles among the radical anti-Communists, moderate liberal anti-Communists, and former Communists. The negotiated form of the transition of power favoured the pact among the moderate anti-Communists and the former Communists, a direction supported by some former dissident intellectuals like Adam Michnik (Mark, 2010). That idea, however, has been overturned by the current political leadership which ascended to power on a counter-narrative of an 'unfinished revolution', proclaimed the need to oust reformed Communists from power, and wrapped the narrative in nationalist rhetoric, increasingly claiming the legacy of the distant past and its continuity. The cultural trauma narrative is utilised, not for greater inclusion and healing, but to increase exclusion, to exploit the political emotions nurtured through a sense of victimhood and injustice stemming from the interpreted past. The Trianon partition

2   Referring to the system of state-subsidised "recreations" that many took advantage of.

of Hungary and the historical partitions of Poland are, in particular, openly or symbolically summoned in current political discourse and legislation.

The Czech Republic and Slovakia are slightly different. The mainstream narrative has been maintained by both moderate anti-Communists, but also increasingly by former Communists and those who benefited personally and professionally under the previous regime. The memory of 1989 has, therefore, been purposely downplayed and interpreted from the critical standpoint of the "losers" of the transformation process (Mark, Blaive, Hudek, Saunders, & Tyszka, 2015).

Central European regimes have also had a complicated relationship with their fascist past. While the pre-war and interwar regimes could not be praised directly, political actors often took inspiration from them and their leaders. In Slovakia, for example, the pre-war nationalist-oriented politics of the Slovak People's Party and its leader, Catholic priest Andrej Hlinka, are promoted and intertwined with the reawakening of religious life after 1989 (Buzalka, 2015), instead of the legacies of the pro-Czechoslovak civic leaders such as Milan Rastislav Štefánik and Milan Hodža. The Christian Democrats and the Slovak National Party also practiced selective memory, attempting to legitimise parts of the legacy of the Second World War Slovak fascist vassal state and its president, Catholic priest Jozef Tiso. In Hungary, the current prime minister, Viktor Orbán, has on several occasions lauded Second World War leader Miklós Horthy for his exceptional statesmanship, leading to a diplomatic kerfuffle with Israel in 2017 (Winer, 2017).

The public discourses, shaped by the dominant memory entrepreneurs, allowed the collective amnesia negating any individual responsibility for the crimes of the two totalitarian regimes, both fascist and communist. As Zoltán Dujisin maintains, Western Europe's memory project revolved around the "politics of regret", while, in attempts to strengthen their own position at home as well as vis-à-vis the West, the new elites of the post-communist regimes chose to challenge the Holocaust-centred narrative, equate the horrors of the two regimes, and export the guilt for their crimes to the West and to the East (Dujisin, 2015). While quite a bit of attention is paid to the stories of the victims and those who helped people survive—via life story collection projects being done by institutes, research grants, and print and broadcast media—the leaders' responsibility for the crimes receives far less attention.

Abused Memory and its Impact on Democracy

Memory regimes are importantly framed, especially in the founding laws of the countries and their constitutions. Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia each build on mythologies of ancient nation-states (or at least of an old nation, in Slovakia's case). "We, the Slovak nation" in the Preamble of the Slovak Constitution addresses not the political nation of all Slovak citizens, but ethnic Slovaks. Others receive a mention later in the document as members of national minorities who also happen to live on the same territory. The Polish Constitution refers to the thousand-year heritage and the best traditions of the First and Second Republics while Hungary claims responsibility for all ethnic Hungarians (including those outside the state's borders) and assumes the position of defender of Europe. Hungary constitutionally establishes a direct link to its pre-World War past by rejecting what it calls the suspension of the Holy Crown and Kingdom of Hungary by "foreign occupants" and invalidating the communist constitution due to its tyrannical nature.

In all but one, the exclusivist sentiment, victimhood, and export of guilt for the totalitarianisms of the twentieth century were embedded in the constitutions of the Central European countries. In the case of the Czech Republic, the sentiments were present in the political processes at the time even though they were not enshrined constitutionally. The narratives were extended by gazing at a distant, idealised past, a mythical "Golden Age", and the twentieth century was treated as a glitch, an anomaly in long heroic national histories. The reframing of the past was cemented by introducing national holidays representing the distant past (e. g. Saint Stephen's Day in Hungary or Saints Cyril and Methodius Day in Slovakia) in lieu of others commemorating important events from the recent past. Poland's true shipmaster Kaczynski, who steers the country from the helm of the ruling Law and Order Party, proclaimed the need to found a "Fourth Republic", replacing the post-communist "Third Republic" with a paternalistic welfare state ruled by a strong hand (Puhl, 2017). Even the Czech Republic, upon its divorce from Slovakia, cast its gaze to the glorious past of the Czech Kingdom (though struggling with which historical legacy to bring to the forefront), building the vision of the new state upon the national idea. Former Czech prime minister Petr Pithart maintains that despite the rhetoric of a political nation built on a civic principle, the Czech project was just as nationalistic in the 20th century—and still is—as its V4 neighbours. It was, however, a "dormant nationalism of the well-fed" (Pithart, 1998, p. 191). The "well-fed" refers to the opportunity given to create the Czechoslovak Republic after the Second World War, satisfying the drive to re-establish Czech statehood, ethnically cleansed of Jews and Sudeten Germans—the former eliminated, the latter deported. The "dormant" refers to its lack of reflection, as typified by the avoidance of dealing with the illegal expulsion of the Sudeten Germans (Pithart, 1998, p. 191). Even symbolic adherence to the civic principles declared by the founders of the first Czechoslovak Republic is perceived as undermined at this point. When Andrej Babiš was appointed Czech prime minister with the Czech Communist Party providing the votes needed to secure a parliamentary majority, several personalities proclaimed the end of the first post-socialist republic and the beginning of

a qualitatively new era. On October 26, 2018, in a televised speech to Parliament upon the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Czechoslovak Republic, former foreign minister Karel Schwarzenberg stated that just as the interwar republic abandoned the humanistic and civic principles of first Czechoslovak President T.G. Masaryk, the post-1993 republic has also abandoned not only those same principles but also the message of first post-socialist President Václav Havel. What is left, Schwarzenberg argued, is national egoism, devoid of any of the principles upon which the republic was founded (TOP 09, 2018). Petr Zídek, playing off of Masaryk's motto of "not to be afraid and not to steal", describes the departure: "Where are those Czechs that are not afraid and what are they doing? They must exist, but the majority of the society is overwhelmed by pathological and irrational fear of people who look different, have different habits or pray to a different god. We fear the terrorists, the maladaptive, we shake in fear of losing that small safe bit of ours" (Zídek, 2018).

Political leaders affirm the main values and messages through symbolic politics, public rituals, and memorialisation. In 2010s, the leaders of the strongest party in Slovakia, SMER- Sociálna demokracia, contributed to the creative history-telling via a wave of building links to the Great Moravian Empire. This included pilgrimages to statues from that time period in addition to the commissioning of new statues, such as the one of King Svätopluk unveiled in front of Bratislava Castle two weeks before the general election with the inscription "The King of the Ancient Slovaks".

Political leaders also seek to manage twentieth century interpretation in public discourse. In 2014, Viktor Orbán's administration unveiled a monument to the victims of the Second World War in Budapest. The statue depicts Hungary as the Archangel Gabriel, an innocent victim, as the prey of the imperial German eagle, representing the Nazi occupier. The monument clearly places full burden of responsibility for the atrocities committed in Hungary throughout the Second World War, including anti-Jewish legislation and the deportation of its citizens, on the wings of the swooping eagle and not those of the helpless archangel. Family members of survivors, opposition parties, and the Jewish community responded a year later by placing a counter-memorial of personal items belonging to a few of those 450,000 Hungarian Jews who perished in concentration camps at the foot of the statue. The Polish government has also manipulated its twentieth-century past on several occasions lately. In 2017, the question of reparations for losses incurred during the Second World War was opened for the first time since 1953, when Poland had declined payments from Germany. A parliamentary investigation concluded that Poland had not been sufficiently remunerated, a sentiment echoed by former President Lech Kaczynski and current President Andrzej Duda. Many saw the investigation as a diversion away from the crises arising from judiciary system reforms and the curb-

ing of media freedom (Dudek, 2017). Shortly thereafter, Poland criminalised any implication of Polish citizens having committed crimes related to or during the Holocaust. A war on the expression "Polish concentration camps" ensued. The enhanced narrative of victimhood and export of responsibility for the twentieth century regimes became part of the process of establishing Poland's "Fourth Republic".

The Central European memory regimes are reinforced by commanded memory, particularly in the national history curricula for public education. By nature of ordering, every historical narrative, and the mode in which it is delivered to students, is just one selective story and interpretation of past events. However, some offer more inquiry, more space for questioning, more openness to interpretation than others. In Central Europe, however, the state of education and curricula lag in the process of transition. Rote learning of the narrative of the past is the express outcome, and that narrative is the one monopolised and shaped from the political centre of power. Rather than inquiry, the selected story is presented as the unshakable truth. Textbooks mirror the broader discourse and offer a strongly emplotted story that highlights myths of origin, mission, decline, and rebirth of a nation. They present the 'Golden Age' as a natural location of the origin of the nation despite the factually impossible historical link to that Age, as is the case of the modern Slovak nation and the Great Moravian Empire. This supposed link, however, provides an anchor in times of crises, and continuity among generations (Findor, 2009). The era after 1989 has produced many purposefully manipulated and commanded textbooks, often with the support and recommendation, or under the auspices, of each of the V4's respective ministry of education. Developing a myth of ancient nations, weaving in archetypes of Christianity with the mission of defending Europe from the attacks on the Christian world from the East, and a cultural code of a thousand-year long suffering are among the themes that these narratives tend to share (Findor, 2009, p. 177).

These narratives also react to each other. For instance, the "thousand years of suffering" usually means under the yoke of a stronger neighbour: For the Slovaks, it was the Hungarians; for the Czechs, it was the Austrians; and for the Poles, there were the Russians, Austrians, and Prussians. The history often takes a linear and natural evolution toward the present nation state, where the twentieth century totalitarianisms were inflicted upon the nations as challenges to overcome on the quest for the nation state. But without inquiry and reflection, textbooks generally provide little space for ethical learning, making the turning points of recent history as distant as Napoleon, for their historical significance is not analysed with this in mind. With the ever-diminishing number of hours devoted to history and civics lessons, it is up to the creativity of individual teachers, who lack sufficient training in this, to inspire interest, arouse empathy, and in-

stil values toward social cohesion by working through the past. The result contributes to a civic culture that does not include, tolerate, and work with the other, but rather mistrusts, competes, and envies, leaving lasting consequences on the practice of democracy in day-to-day life and in all spheres of society.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE MEMORY REGIME CAPTURE
Exclusivist Citizenship

Among the consequences of the abused memory, woven around the archetype of the tragedy of the small Central European nations, is exclusivist citizenship, a concept of hierarchised membership in a society. In this hierarchy, the ethno-linguistic community of the dominant nation comes first and is perceived as the foundational element of each new regime, and the "rest"—old and new minorities alike—come second, or possibly last.

This understanding of a common political community impacts the rule of law. In relation to our topic, this can particularly be observed in the implementation of human rights without overt or subconscious discrimination, as well as in the abysmal lack of awareness of human rights in all spheres of society, including the courts, public administration, and the education system. This stance was best captured by former Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico in February 2013, speaking to the members of Matica slovenská (the Slovak cultural heritage foundation): "I wish that we cease to be blackmailed with minority rights, and it does not matter if it is a minority of the Roma, people with different sexual orientation, opinion, or ethnic minority. It holds that this state is national, and the society is civic. Our independent state was not primarily founded for its minorities, no matter how much we appreciate them, but first and foremost for the Slovak state-forming nation, because it was the Slovaks who were not allowed to develop all their skills and talents in former Czecho-Slovakia" (Robert Fico: "Štát sme založili…", 2013). Due to ignorance of international human rights law, the rights of minority citizens are frequently violated even in accordance with civil law. One minority that faces this are the Roma. Despite the right as citizens to adequate housing and equal access to education, they are routinely evicted without substitute accommodation and their children segregated into special schools. Most often this requires acrobatic interpretations of the law by the courts, but human rights are certainly not implemented on equal footing.

Moreover, the exclusivism translates into political culture. As mentioned previously, the quality of democracy is measured through political culture— especially tolerance towards diversity—which has priority over democratic institutions (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). In advanced democracies, with high levels of socioeconomic development, these are the distinguishing features evaluating the depth of democracy. "[I]n the postin-

dustrial phase, a trend toward gender equality becomes a central aspect of modernisation...This transformation of established gender roles is part of a broader humanistic shift linked with rising self-expression values, bringing increasing tolerance of human diversity and antidiscrimination movements on many fronts" (Inglehart R. , 1997, s. 272). Central European countries perform particularly poorly in this. The 2015 Special Eurobarometer 437 on Discrimination in the EU places countries in this region at the tail end of rankings on tolerance towards Muslims, with only 12% of Czechs and 16% of Slovaks feeling comfortable if a Muslim was a family member (European Commission, 2015). Slovaks and Czechs, with other post-communist countries following closely, are also least likely to be comfortable working with a black person (48% and 53% respectively, compared to 97% for Sweden) and feel much the same about Asians. They are also least likely to condone relationship between their child and a Roma person (11% for Czechs). In these countries, people are also the least tolerant toward people with disabilities and the LGBT community. Only 36% of Slovaks (vs. 96% of the Dutch) believe that they should have the same rights as the majority population and only 28% of Poles believe same sex marriages should be allowed throughout the EU (European Commission, 2015). The most recent Pew Research Center survey on *Religion and Public Life* confirms the continuing divide between the West and the East in Europe on the social acceptance of Muslims but also Jews, and young adults largely opposing gay marriage (with the exception of the Czech Republic) (Pew Research Center, 2018).

When stereotypes are prevalent and discrimination is widespread, few will stand up to hold the state accountable for the violation of the human rights of minorities. They themselves learn to tolerate the status quo when institutions of education teach little about human rights, tolerance, inclusion, and empathy.

Weakened Rule of Law

Another aspect of democracy impacted by Central Europe's stance of "misery" or "tragedy" and the subsequent exclusivist citizenship is the weak rule of law, including little trust in the judiciary, a lack of public accountability, nominally independent judges, and weak courts. On the World Bank's annual index of six indicators of good governance, the V4 countries receive the lowest marks on rule of law and control of corruption, with Poland and Hungary also dropping in political stability, and voice and accountability in the last few years. (The World Bank, 2018). In new composite index of public integrity (checked for socio-economic development), Slovakia ranks particularly low in judiciary's independence, strength, and autonomy placing 93rd among the 109 evaluated countries. Hungary placed 78th, Poland 61st, and the Czech Republic 35th (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2017).

Captured memory regime contributed to the lacking criminal justice measures during the years of transition. A recent, as-yet unpublished survey conducted by the author, *Heritage of the Past and the Quality of Democracy in Slovakia[3],* shows that people perceive a strong link between the missing accounting with the past at the outset of the transition and the continuing corruption today. For most of the respondents (57%), addressing the past would mean uncovering past crimes and punishing them. This response is quite different from countries such as South Africa, where the top priorities in terms of dealing with the past are forgiveness and moving on (as captured in the South Africa Reconciliation Barometer). These priorities are in line with the institutional choices that South Africa made to address the past: the robust Truth and Reconciliation Commission with its public hearings resembling the process of criminal justice for some of the perpetrators. In Slovakia, 78% of the respondents believe the society has not dealt with the past sufficiently, and slightly over 80% hold that former communist leaders should be punished for the crimes of the past. These answers are highly correlated, showing a consistent pattern of attitudes. The absence of accounting with the past also translates to an unwillingness to forgive—over 55% do not think forgiveness is a good idea even if a former perpetrator publicly acknowledges his or her crimes. People strongly perceive the impact of this past on the quality of democracy—over 45% think corruption is currently flourishing because of the totalitarian past. Close to 80% do not trust the judiciary or the parliament, and 70% do not trust the police. Those who do not are at the same time more critical of the lack of addressing the past, and are more likely to be tolerant towards the minorities.

Research on political support and participation suggests that while it is healthy for a democracy when citizens do not readily trust specific individual political leaders and administrations, it is important that they support democratic institutions and regimes on a more general level. In Central Europe, however, the opposite occurs, with, for instance, individual leaders being more trusted than the institutions of the judiciary. And while support for democracy is still high, there is a worrisome divide among the young generation. On one side of that divide are those more likely to vote for the extreme right, for example, and a growing proportion of young adults who are also more willing to support the rule of a strong hand instead of democracy (The National Democratic Institute, 2018).

A Generation Divided

The past year in Central Europe was marked by mass protests against corruption and the curbing of freedoms. It was young people, those born

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3   Survey results are available upon request from the author and will be published in the near future.

after the revolutions of 1989, who led the way. Their willingness to take to the streets to uphold democratic values is a good sign of "assertive citizenship" taking hold. At the same time, another part of the same generation is increasingly inclined towards the extreme right and the easy answers provided by populism. An exit poll conducted just after the 2016 Slovak general elections showed that the presence of the extreme right in the Slovak Parliament is largely due to the support of the young generation, including university students. (Bútorová, 2017). Public opinion polls in June of 2017 showed that young people between 18 and 35 years of age, who represent only 34% of the population, represent 61% of the support base of the extreme right party ĽSNS (People's Party Our Slovakia) (Bútorová, 2017). It is clear that the young generation is increasingly polarised.

One reason for this polarisation is the ethical vacuum in which this cohort of people grew up. There is a disconnect, a failed intergenerational transmission of collective memory. The communist past is not a topic discussed at home, for most existed within the grey zone of complicity with the regime. Normalisation, as the period from 1969 to 1987 was called in the former Czechoslovakia, is a minefield that few are willing to enter, according to Petr Pithart (Pásztor, 2018). Manipulated memory in the official discourse and commanded memory in schools also serve as buffers against such transmission and moral or ethical learning. This has significant implications for the democratic futures and visions of society that young people might form. So far, they are becoming democratic citizens *despite* rather than *thanks to* socialisation into a democratic political culture by public institutions, political experience, and previous generations.

Conclusion

Narratives about the cultural trauma stemming from previous oppressive regime(s) is an essential part of democratisation. The governments of the new regimes play an essential role in setting up the institutional framework and shaping the master narrative, in addition to the values and norms that are interwoven within it. This engaging with the past—addressing it, and ideally drawing responsibility and consequences out of it—must be also open to healing, providing space for multiple narratives, and allowing a variety of actors to take part in the process. The cultural trauma narratives are essential in shaping the vision and trust in a political community, the pillar of political support and legitimacy. Willingness to do so must be a priority at the political level. If trust, solidarity, and empathy fail at this level, the "national project" will suffer, resulting in negative consequences on the "democratic project", for the quality of democracy depends on such sentiments. The capture of trauma narratives by political power—the single-story narrative and manipulated memory—excludes segments of a population; leads to the hierarchisation of citizenship, defining

"who belongs" to the political nation; and contributes to the failure of inter-generational transmission of collective memory.

Memory holes, therefore, produce fractured memory in the young generation and a fractured political community, resulting in significant detrimental consequences for the quality of democracy.

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Improving the Past, Damaging the Present. Memory Politics Seen Through the Post-Transitional Justice Framework.

Mateusz Mazzini

Abstract

As argued by Cath Collins (2010), the chronological distance from the events of democratic transitions and an amended collective memory ecosystem begin to render the traditional transition justice framework obsolete to explain most recent developments in memory politics globally. Thus Collins proposes a new theorem, that of post-transitional justice (PTJ). It accounts for a greater variety of actors, motives and strategies employed to usher in renewed accountability pressure and, free from the transitional "justice vs. stability dilemma". This framework, however, focuses only on "positive" re-irruptions of memory politics. It fails to account for "negative" re-irruptions by incumbent actors, driven by interpretative motivations to rewrite the existing memory narratives, most often for partisan gain. This paper argues that the PTJ framework needs to be complimented to distinguish between the two said types of re-irruptions. By comparing examples of policymaking from Chile since the Valech report publication (2004) and Poland under the second Law and Justice government (2015-2017) and examining their impact on partisanship, polarisation and stability of democratic institutions, it seeks to conceptualise the notion of positive and negative re-irruptions and prove the latter being detrimental for social cohesion and reconciliation.

Keywords: memory, transitional justice, post-transitional justice, Poland, Chile, mnemonic actors, reconciliation.

As argued by Cath Collins (2010), the chronological distance from the original events of transition and the amended contextual environment rendered the traditional transition justice framework obsolete at explaining the most recent developments in memory politics. Instead, Collins proposes a new theorem, that of post-transitional justice. It accounts for a greater variety of actors, motives and strategies employed to usher in "renewed accountability pressure" (2011:8). This framework, however, offers only a partial explanation of the most recent instances of accountability action. It focuses on "positive" re-irruptions, and improving quality of democracy, but fails to account for "negative" re-irruptions, driven by motivations of political actors to rewrite the existing memory narratives for partisan gain. This paper argues that the PTJ framework needs to be expanded in order to distinguish between the two said types of re-irruptions. By comparing examples of mnemonic policymaking from Chile and Poland, it seeks to

conceptualise the notion of positive and negative re-irruptions and prove the latter is detrimental to social cohesion and reconciliation. This will be presented by examining the drastic overhaul of Poland's collective memory ecosystem, ongoing since Law and Justice's all-out electoral victory in October 2015, as an instance leading to exacerbating polarisation within society, debilitating trust in institutions, and negatively impacting the quality of partisan debate.

Upon approaching the construction of democratic institutional frameworks, countries moving away from both right-wing dictatorships and single-party socialist regimes had to face the challenge of settling their non-democratic past. The nascent democracies differed in their non-democratic heritage regarding, inter alia, regime duration and scope, and nature of crimes perpetrated (Linz & Stepan, 1998, p. 42). Hence, different frameworks of transitional justice were adopted, yielding a variety of diverse results. Within this universe of cases, two countries particularly stand out as outliers in terms of solutions adopted in memory regime construction. Chile, which approached democracy from a violent civil-military dictatorship (Baradit, 2018, p. 43; Valenzuela and Constable, 1991, p. 201), ushered in measures of accountability action in the immediate aftermath of its transition (Stern, 2010, p. 7). Throughout the decades that followed, it maintained a steady, unrevised course of expanding the scope of accountability efforts, bringing to justice more and more former dictatorship institutions and functionaries, both literally and symbolically (Ros, 2012, p. 36). Poland, in turn, finds itself at the opposite side of the spectrum, constituting a case of delayed and unresolved non-democratic past settlement. Faced with the justice versus stability dilemma (Brito, 2004, p. 375), a perennial difficulty for post-transitional policymakers, the country's first democratic government introduced the so-called "thick line" policy (Kuczyński, 2010, p. 87) of forgetting (about) the past, leaving the problems of lustration open to multiple public interpretations (Szczerbiak, 2016, p. 433).

Nowadays, almost three decades after the events of transition, neither of the two countries is completely free of collective memory disputes, mainly as such a state of affairs is by definition impossible. From an empirical as well as theoretical point of view, no country, no society, no community is entirely free of a mnemonic conflict. As argued by Durkheim, Halbwachs, and, more recently Olick, collective memory is "inherently plural" (Olick, 2014, pp. 189, 193). Establishing a universal, monopolised mnemonic regime is impossible, as "[different] groups provide the definitions, as well as the divisions, by which particular events are subjectively defined as consequential. These definitions then trigger, or result in, different interpretative phenomena. Collectivities have memories, just like they have identities" (Olick, 2014, p. 194).

Although the instances of the present-day mnemonic conflict in both countries are of completely different nature, they share an important conceptual feature, namely, they fall outside the explanatory potential of the traditional transitional justice framework (Collins, 2011). Chronological distance, amended contextual environment, and the employment of memory politics as a tool of building partisan support all render the toolkit of transitional justice obsolete and insufficient. The incumbent authorities are no longer constrained by the unstable political and institutional environment, as it was in the immediate aftermath of the transition. As argued by de Brito (Brito, 2004, p. 377), the efforts of transitional justice were irreversibly marked with the justice-versus-stability dilemma, in which democratic governments had to "consider [to what extent] justice measures be compatible with goals such as securing the irreversibility of democratic change" (Collins, 2011, p. 28). A more graphic representation of these limitations would constitute an axis in which one extreme would be occupied by truth and institutional stability, the other by justice and reconciliation, understood here as "restoration of social harmony" (Little, 1999, p. 65). The current policymakers are no longer facing these obstacles; the impact of mnemonic frameworks they introduce is also different. Although in both countries they still have issues of democratic transition at their core, they affect a much wider array of policy dimensions and symbolic areas. The current mnemonic policies are policies of *meta-memory*, that is, the memory of how certain events were already narrated by various collective environments. Present changes in the realm of memory politics can no longer be explained by means of transitional justice.

Cath Collins, a renowned scholar of transitions and memory in the Southern Cone, addressed that shortcoming by putting forward a new analytical framework, that of post-transitional justice (Collins, 2011). Collins argues that while transitional justice focused on "attaining and preserving" the newly established democracies, post-transitional justice (hereafter, PTJ) centres on "what comes after, and what was impossible to focus on and assess back then—the quality and perfectibility of the democracy established" (Collins, 2011, p. 25). PTJ allows for the assessment of the outcomes of transitional justice, especially when no such measures were introduced and a vacuum of collective memory narratives emerged (Collins, 2011, p. 26). Collins in her original theoretical stipulation made also an extensive conceptual argument in favour of the PTJ framework, built on how the passage of time affects the outcomes of transitional justice. Drawing on works of other prominent scholars in the field, to name Ana Ros (Ros, 2012, p. 43) and Ulrike Capdepón, she argues that in some cases it is even more desired to have "late justice", as it is "less politically costly, even if one accounts for the potential reduction of possible positive individual and institutional outcomes" (Collins, 2010, p. 28).

In terms of operationalising the concept, PTJ is a more pluralistic and heterogenous framework. It encompasses a greater variety of actors (also non-state ones) and means, which, in turn, implies a variety of goals. And this last assumption is perhaps most crucial, as it unveils the dangerous shortcomings of this theorem. Collins originally argued that the newly established instances of mnemonic conflict in post-transitional societies, defined as "re-irruptions", manifest itself "in the form of renewed accountability pressure" (Collins, 2011, p. 28). Thus, they can be viewed as "positive signs of democratic institutional health rather than a crises or breakdowns of transition" (Collins, 2011, p. 28). In other words, Collins attributes a purely positive character to post-transitional re-irruptions. Such approach constitutes a treacherous deficiency, short-sighted and reductionist in nature. Seeing the present-day interruptions as rendering only positive outcomes upon quality of democracy overlooks the complexity of mnemonic policy-making and ignores the context in which they are being developed, as well as a vast array of social, political and legal consequences they produce.

Politics of memory in post-transitional societies is an enormously context-dependent notion. Therefore, the outcomes and reactions of a given re-irruptions needs to be seen as contingent upon the character of the re-irruption itself. This paper opposes the argument that re-irruptions can be exclusively of a positive nature. On the contrary, in fractured memory regimes (Bernhard & Kubik, 2016, p. 68), such as Poland (Bernhard & Kubik, 2016, p. 231), where no dominant narrative of collective memory has been firmly established, they can pose a major threat to social unity, hamper reconciliation and exacerbate political polarisation. The Polish case constitutes a fitting example of such modality. Given, inter alia, the initiative in accountability action (or even in politics of memory in general) being monopolised by political actors, re-irruptions of memory politics draw new lines of societal division. Post-transitional mnemonic re-irruptions are more than simply a "gap-filling exercise" in the country's memory regime. As evidenced by findings from Poland under the governance of the second Law and Justice (PiS) cabinet (2015-present), they create more gaps than they fill in and make the narrative of collective memory even more fractured. Thus, in order to make the framework of PTJ a fully capable, comprehensive explanatory tool, it requires a conceptual expansion. This paper introduces a division into negative and positive mnemonic re-irruptions, evidenced by examples drawn from, respectively, Poland under the second PiS government and Chile since the publication of the first Valech Report (2004).

The remainder of this essay will encompass three primary areas which illustrate differences between positive and negative re-irruptions. First, it will discuss the agency of re-irruption: in Chile, a highly heterogenous and pluralistic; in Poland, monopolised by the state. Second, it examines the scope of the present-day mnemonic conflict. In this case, Chile

represents an example of accountability action narrowing the memory dispute, Poland—its radical enlargement. Lastly, this paper analyses the relationship between memory and partisanship. In that regard, Chile constitutes a rather successful case of avoiding excessive politicisation of the memory conflict. Poland, on the contrary, represents an example of politics of the past being employed as politics of the present, not instead of it (Welsh, 1996).

Collins argues that accounting for actions initiated by a plurality of different actors is among the greatest advantages of the PTJ framework (Collins, 2011, p. 27). It is certainly the case for Chile, which constitutes a flagship manifestation of successful involvement of non-state actors. Both during the democratic transition, as well as throughout the post-transitional period, an extremely rich universe of NGOs, human rights organisations (HROs), and church-backed movements contributed to efforts of holding former dictatorship functionaries accountable for their crimes. All the key institutional bodies that produced milestones in Chilean accountability efforts were composed of representatives of these different environments. The first National Truth and Reconciliation Commission, established by president Patricio Aylwin in 1990, was composed of eight special commissioners representing political parties across the entire spectrum, members of the judiciary and one notable HRO activist (Truth Commission: Chile 90, 2014). The 1999 *Mesa del Diàlogo* initiative, launched notably by the conservative president Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, which laid foundations for acknowledging a systemic nature of violent crimes committed by the dictatorship, was in turn composed of members of the Senate, the Church, HROs and the military itself (Collins, 2011, p. 146). Eventually, the 2003 National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture, also known as the Valech Commission, was composed primarily of lawyers and state investigators, but presided over by monsignor Sergio Valech, a Catholic Bishop (Collins, 2011, p. 148). Such multiplicity of different actors allowed for not only for representation of all parties involved in the mnemonic conflict, but also ensured continuity and inclusivity in accountability action. At no point in time were any of the parties in the conflict excluded from the negotiating table. As a result, the milestones of post-transitional justice were a coherent evolution, not a mere extension, of the compromise achieved during the transition itself. Although the initial exit conditions of the Pinochet regime were largely favourable for the former dictatorship officials (Collins, 2016a), their privileges were gradually narrowed down, up to the publication of the 2004 Valech Report, in which the military itself admitted that forced disappearances, torture, and killings were part of the systemic composition of the dictatorship (Boyle, 2017). Through ensuring this move, Chile successfully blocked any further attempts of historical revisionism of institutional nature—given that the admission of the guilt came directly from the

military representatives, the post-dictatorial right-wing parties lost the possibility to claim otherwise (Grindle, 1996, p. 93). Further sections of this analysis will also prove that the heterogeneity of actors involved yielded other positive outcomes, including de-politicisation of accountability action.

At this point it is, nonetheless, necessary to stress that the process of social reconciliation and expansion of accountability action in Chile is by no means completed nor has it been free of notable shortcomings. The latter are particularly visible in the legal landmark, where the post-transitional Chilean governments were only relatively successful in bringing to trial high-profile individuals but failed to advance large-scale cases with numerous officials involved (Luna, 2018; Peñaloza, 2014). Although of huge symbolic nature, these convictions created a social perception of "looking for scapegoats" instead of pursuing a systemic inquiry into the crimes of the Pinochet regime (Atria, 2018 in Luna, 2018). Moreover, the Chilean society of today battles a significant degree of economic inequality, persistent largely due to wealth enfranchisement taking place under the Pinochet government. This phenomenon, coupled with the lack of legal and political measures to pursue accountability action against civilians, complicit both passively and negatively in the regime's crimes, remain a major obstacle to a near-complete social reconciliation.

Poland, in turn, has seen its post-transitional memory conflict entirely monopolised by state institutions. Since the 1989 democratic transformation, no single body was established outside the realm of elected or appointed political offices that would deal with issues of transitional and post-transitional justice (Ost, 2006). The Round Table talks, which set the tone of the compromise between the Solidarity movement and the outgoing regime, produced no binding solutions with regard to non-democratic past settlement. The entire legal body of documents dealing with the settlement of non-democratic past was produced by the parliament exclusively. The first lustration law of 1997 established the institution of Public Interest Ombudsman (Williams, Fowler, & Szczerbiak, 2005), who in practice acted as the defender in numerous high-profile lustration cases. The second lustration act, introduced in 2006 by the first PiS government, dissolved this institution under claims of inefficiency (Williams, Fowler, & Szczerbiak, 2005). The Institute of National Remembrance (IPN), established in 1999, was supposed to become an independent body tasked with "filling the gaps" in Poland's collective memory narratives, but due to its flawed institutional design it became a tool of partisan support building. The head of IPN is elected by the Parliament for a 5-year term, which in practice transforms it into another governmental agenda, dependent on the decisions of the incumbent authorities. Thus, the Institute cannot be classified as a judicial institution either, even though it is equipped with considerable prosecu-

torial powers and has an investigative department (Dz.U. 1998 nr 155 poz. 1016 - Act on the Establishment of the Institute of National Rememberance, 1998).

The monopoly of state institutions in creating memory re-irruptions deprived numerous transition protagonists of a voice in the debate. This was the case particularly for trade union members, especially those who did not decide to pursue an active political career. In contrast to the Chilean case, the initiative in Polish accountability action has always been the exclusive domain of state institutions, with particular emphasis on politically accountable, elected partisan officials.

Second, re-irruptions concerning the scope of mnemonic conflict evolved in opposite directions in both countries. The Chilean approach, based on continuity, resulted in the debate gradually narrowing, as subsequent accountability initiatives were covering those areas of TJ and PTJ which were inaccessible in the immediate aftermath of transition (Collins, 2013). First, they focused on the prosecution of "illustrative" rather than "paradigmatic" crimes, that is those demonstrating the systemic pattern of human rights violations (Collins, 2011, p. 221). Later, lethal crimes were accounted for, with particular emphasis on the assassinations committed outside of Chile through the infamous Condor intelligence operation. Subsequently, the 1999 *Mesa del Diàlogo* forced the military to admit the systemic nature of violence, leaving no room for further dispute about the culprits of the crimes.

The 2004 first instalment of the Valech Commission provided an account of 3,178 confirmed cases of homicide, while between 500 and 700 bodies of victims were located and identified (Collins, 2016a). Eventually, the Commission's second tenure, concluded in 2010, examined over 32,000 testimonies and identified further 15,000 cases of non-lethal crimes (Collins, 2016a). As a result, the scope of collective memory areas which remain under dispute is considerably narrower. The issues subject to uncontested mnemonic narratives include the systemic nature of dictatorship's violent crimes, the existence of black sites and the post-transitional governing elites allowing accountability actors to pursue their agenda independently. The only major area of conflict, ignited by post-dictatorial right, focuses on whether the 1973 military coup was a justifiable measure in light of political and economic chaos stemming from the policies of Salvador Allende's socialist government (Basaure, 2018). This, however, remains a notion which gradually receives less and less political gravitas and does not fuel contemporary party disputes.

Poland under the current Law and Justice government has experienced, in contrast to the Chilean case, a significant expansion of the mnemonic conflict. Several re-irruptions were introduced in this dimension, mostly of negative nature, aimed at incorporating new dimensions of pol-

icymaking and historical events into the grey area of contested memory narratives. First, events which enjoyed a relatively undisputed, coherent interpretation were re-narrated, while the new interpretations were used as instruments of partisan support building. That was the case with the commemoration of the Warsaw Uprising, a widely respected mnemonic event, which the government merged with a roll-call devoted to the victims of the 2010 Smolensk presidential airplane crash, despite the two events having no historical commonalities. Subsequently, policy dimensions which have previously never been narrated from the angle of collective memory, now fell victim to historical revisionism. An example of such modality includes Poland's foreign policy, which is now developed according to the government's collective memory narrative. Poland's bilateral relations with neighbouring Germany, Lithuania and Ukraine are determined by Warsaw's efforts to, respectively, make Germany pay reparations for WWII damages, use Vilnius's Gate of Dawn as the watermark on new Polish passports, and have the Wołyń massacre unilaterally acknowledged as the genocide of Polish citizens committed by the Ukrainian Insurgence Army (UPA) (Mazzini, 2017).

Eventually, previously undisputed singular events from Poland's post-transitional trajectory are being reinterpreted in the context of present-day politics. When Warsaw hosted the NATO Summit in July 2016, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared a public exhibition devoted to the history of Polish accession to the Alliance. According to the narrative presented there, and contrary to the hitherto prevailing consensus, most of the Polish post-transitional governments initially opposed Poland's NATO entry and it was, in fact, Jarosław Kaczyński himself a President's Chancellery official at that time, who individually pushed for accession. Given all the above evidence of expanding the memory conflict, it is possible to advance a claim that the entirety of the post-1989 societal, political and institutional realm has become subject of mnemonic dispute. It was best reflected in the words of president Andrzej Duda, while commemorating the victims of the December 1970 anti-communist protests, when he confessed on 15 December 2015 to being "ashamed for the entire Polish Third Republic [established post-1989]" (Prezydent Duda w Gdyni: Wstyd za III RP).

The final area in which post-transitional memory re-irruptions of Poland and Chile differ in their impact is the relationship between memory and partisanship. In Chile, the evolution of mnemonic regime was marked by continuity. As pointed out by Collins (Collins, 2008) and Grindle (Grindle, 1996), at no point did the political class manage to wrestle the initiative away from the hands of the judiciary, NGOs and HROs in conducting accountability action. For most of the post-transitional period, especially under the governance of the conservative president Eduardo Frei (1994-2000), politicians showed little interest in pursuing memory politics, deeming it

politically risky and unrewarding. That is, however, not to say they impeded accountability action and hampered memory initiatives ushered in by other bodies. A fitting example of this modality is the fact that the process of retaking ownership of memory sites, such as former detention centers: Londres 38 and Villa Grimaldi in the capital, Santiago de Chile, began precisely under the rule of the conservative government. Frei also gave his approval to the establishment of *Mesa del Diàlogo* and did not impede the attempt to bring Augusto Pinochet to trial. Thanks to a multitude of actors involved, a strong position of the pro-accountability community and a deeply rooted perception of this area being a domain of non-political actors prevailing in the Chilean society, the country managed to maintain the issues of post-transitional justice outside present-day political conflict, keeping "the politics of the past" away from "politics of the present" (Collins, 2016b).

An opposite picture emerged in Poland, where post-transitional memory re-irruptions were ushered in only by politically motivated actors. No initiative in this area came from a body other than a purely political one. A redefinition of collective memory of transition became synonymous with the vision of "revitalised Poland" pursued by PiS. One of the most controversial and recognisable illustration of this process took place in December 2016, when during the same session of the parliament the incumbent party voted both a draft budget bill, passed in clear violation of the constitution, as well as a bill reducing pension privileges for former communist functionaries.

Thus, when opposition protests erupted outside the parliament against the violation of the constitution, PiS turned the message around and presented the protesters as defendants of the status quo, actually objecting to the pension's limitations.

The societal assessment of memory politics largely overlaps with political preferences, which in contemporary Poland draw a rigid line of polarisation. As of September 2017, a total of 47% of Poles positively assess the existing collective memory politics, while 20% does so negatively. 74% of PiS voters stand in favour of this policy, while 51% of liberal Modern party voters and 42% of Civic Platform supporters are critical of it ("Poles tired of lustration", 2017). Societal trust in IPN reached an average of only 57.4% since its establishment, while the average distrust reaches 28%.[1]

Assessment differs sharply also with regard to individual re-irruptions. When in February 2016 IPN released controversial documents on Lech Wałęsa's alleged cooperation with communist secret services, the decision was positively assessed by 72% of PiS voters, while negatively by 18%. For the two opposition parties (Civic Platform and the Modern), these figures were, respectively, 20-24% and 72% (CBOS Research Poll communique, 2016).

1   Author's calculations based on OBOP trust opinion poll from January 2016:
      https://ipn.gov.pl/pl/dlamediow/ komunikaty/12238,CBOS-Polacy-ufaja-IPN.html

In comparison, a total of 74% of Chileans trust the Valech Report and 86% believe the testimonies given to the Commission were truthful (Collins, 2011).

In conclusion, it is necessary to revisit the paper's initial thesis. Evidence from Chilean a Polish memory politics proves the claim that re-irruptions of accountability action within the PTJ framework can yield both positive and negative results. A gradual expansion of accountability action, kept away from political spotlight and aimed at "filling the gaps" in memory landscape, can significantly improve the quality of democracy and contribute to social reconciliation. However, evidence from the Polish case unequivocally proves that re-irruptions of post-transitional justice hijacked by partisan politics and monopolised by state institutions exacerbate polarisation and foster social divisions. This paper also demonstrates that, in terms of theoretical delimitations, PTJ is an extremely context-dependent theorem and, when presented in such parsimonious optics, can hardly lead to generalisable, universal assumptions. Hence it becomes evident that it needs to be expanded to include different types of re-irruptions: positive and negative. Further research in this area could bring about a wider, more exhausting taxonomy of re-irruptions. Only then will PTJ become a framework fully capable of explaining a wider time span of changes to post-transitional memory regimes.

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Franco's Totalitarian Temptation and the Recovery of the Political: An Analysis of the Franco Regime and Spanish Social Memory

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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it seeks to re-evaluate whether (episodes in) Franco's rule (1939-1975) can be qualified as totalitarian. This is done using Raymond Aron's model, which describes five features of totalitarian regimes: a monopolistic party; an ideology which becomes the official truth of the state; a double monopoly of the means of coercion and persuasion; the subjection of most economic and professional activities to the state; and the politicisation of all possible crimes of individuals resulting in police and ideological terrorism. This paper concludes that Franco's Spain can be considered totalitarian between 1939 and roughly 1953. However, the fourth aspect of Aron's model—the subjection of economic activities to the state—is where gradual regime changes begin limiting its classification as totalitarian.

The paper's second purpose is to discuss how the 15-M Movement challenges and changes existing constructions of social memory in Spain. In order to answer this question, the paper discusses the different layers of interpretation of the Spanish Civil War, Francoism, and the transition to democracy. It explains how the transition was characterised by amnesty for all and became the keystone of the democratic Spanish narrative, thereby earmarking alternative interpretations of the transition as undemocratic. The paper argues that this singularisation of the social memory narrative narrowed down the political sphere as understood by Arendt. It concludes that the 15-M protests constitute the definitive break-up of the Transition consensus, thereby re-opening Spain's political sphere.

Keywords: totalitarianism; Spanish Civil War; Francoism; social memory; political theory

Introduction

At the start of 2017, the name of a veteran of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) who died more than fifty years ago re-appeared on all the best-seller lists. Popular demand to read George Orwell's classic novel *1984* has surged worldwide, encouraging the general public to revisit the concept of totalitarianism: what did it look like, and how do we relate to it today?

In academia, the concept has never really been off the bestseller list. Its boundaries and academic merit have been discussed extensively for over half a century, resulting in a wide array of interpretations. While

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some argue that the concept's fuzziness limits its academic value, others believe that to say that its boundaries and applications are contested, does not imply that there are no clear cases. This latter group holds that that contention is a built-in feature of all normative concepts, which does not automatically deprive them of analytical value. It is exactly the attempt to establish conceptual boundaries that helps us understand (historical) realities. Among the defenders of this view, there now exists a considerable consensus on what constitutes a totalitarian regime, providing the tools to produce fruitful historical analyses.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, this paper follows the second interpretation and sets out to re-evaluate whether (episodes in) Franco's rule (1939-1975) can be qualified as totalitarian using Aron's model. This paper argues that, although not universally recognised as such, Franco's regime can be classified as totalitarian between 1939 and (roughly) 1953. Secondly, the paper will discuss the developments in the twentieth-century Spanish social memory, putting forward the thesis that the 15th of May 2011 not only popularised an alternative interpretation of Spain's past, but also constituted a (belated) re-opening of the political sphere.

Franco's Totalitarian Aspirations: "A Suit with a Spanish Cut"

As suggested above, historicising and remembering always imply some degree of normativity. As such, history as an academic discipline has to deal with the philosophical debate between consequentialist and deontological ethics in one way or another. Do we judge individuals and the entities they together form by their intentions or by the state of affairs brought about by these intentions? Or, in the context of this paper, is a regime totalitarian because it wants to be, or because its outcomes are totalitarian?

In existing literature, Franco's regime (1939-1978)[1] tends to be labelled as "fascist" more frequently than "totalitarian" despite the second label occasionally being employed, for example by Pegenaute (1994), who describes National-Catholicism as "Franco's contribution to the history of totalitarianism" (p. 87). Although some see Franco's rule as a military dictatorship that in some way "prevented" fascism from happening (Paxton, 2007, p. 81), others label the Falange, Spain's Fascist movement and one of the three "pillars of the Franco-regime" (Preston, 1989, p. 32), "clerical fascism" (Passmore, 2014, p. 77) because of the importance of the Spanish Catholic Church in the regime's early years. Indeed, if we follow Stanley Payne's definition of fascism, which shies away from defining it solely in negative terms (anti-Communist, anti-liberal, etc.), it becomes difficult to maintain

that the (early) Franco regime was not fascist—a nationalistic one-party authoritarian state with a charismatic leader, employing an ethnicist ideology, controlling the economy through syndicalism, and built upon the principle of voluntarist activism (Gentile, 2004, p. 335).

Moreover, as pointed out by Albanese and Del Hierro (2016), Spain underwent a process of fasticisation, a "tendency among elite groups to restore to a controlled adoption of fascist novelties without subscribing to fascism's overall ideological vision" (Kallis, 2003, p. 221) starting in the 1920s. Significantly aided by Mussolini, who financially safeguarded the Falange's future (Preston, 2004), this intensified between 1939 and 1941, leading to "a sort of Hispanised fascism" whose crucial differences with Italy lay in the role of the military and the Church (Albanese & del Hierro, 2016, p. 53).

All in all then, accepting the qualification of the Franco regime and its Falangist party as (Hispanic) fascism, it is notable that the regime is usually not linked to totalitarianism as is, say, Nazi Germany's fascism. For instance, rejecting Arendt's classical interpretation of totalitarianism because of its focus on state terror, Grieder (2007) holds that Spain is among the examples that do not qualify as totalitarian. Rather than totalitarian, Franco's regime is commonly described as "authoritarian" (Muñoz, 2009; Golob, 2008; Blakeley, 2007) or simply referred to as "Francoism" (franquismo) (Aguilar & Humlebaek, 2002; Davis, 2005; Muñoz, 2009). While the latter term clearly communicates the what and when, its use avoids engaging with existing frameworks and thus impedes a meaningful historical classification of (periods in) the regime in the context of twentieth-century European totalitarianisms. How to determine whether Spain's fascism was, at a certain point in time, totalitarian in nature?

Though primary sources are scarce and fragmentised, it is beyond doubt that Franco had totalitarian aspirations. During the war, the Caudillo declared several times that after the imminent victory, Spain would be rebuilt following the example of totalitarian Italy and Germany, though as a "traje con medidas españolas"[2], tailoring totalitarianism to Spanish needs (Franco cited in San Francisco, 2012, p. 82).[3] In 1944, however, clearly influenced by the Axis' nearing defeat, Falange ideologist José Luis de Arrase declared that "we do not, therefore, seek a totalitarian state" (Arrase cited in Payne, 1961, p. 224). Despite some arguing that the aspiration to total power justifies the qualification of a regime as totalitarian (Bergman, 1998), considering this rhetorical fuzziness, characteristic of the regime, the relevance of holding the practical historical reality rather than the intentions of the regime against the totalitarian theoretical light becomes evident.

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1 Even though Franco died in 1975, it is generally understood that 'Francoist Spain' refers to the period between his assumption of power (1939) and the passing of the Constitution in 1978.

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2 "A suit with a Spanish cut"

3 Translations mine.

Gentile (2006) sees (Italian) fascism as "a form of totalitarianism" (p. 327), a phenomenon which he considers dynamically, as "a continuous experiment in political domination" (p. 328) that is never "completed" (p. 352). Considering that most theorists coincide on the elusiveness of the concept, with Friedrich stating that "no such [total] control is actually achieved" (Friedrich quoted in Grieder, 2007, p. 571), a working definition of totalitarianism, must leave room for interpretation and change, while also setting some necessary conditions. An example of this kind of model is Aron's, dating from the 1960s, which identifies five features: a monopolistic party; an ideology which becomes the official truth of the state; a double monopoly of the means of coercion and persuasion; the subjection of most economic and professional activities to the state; and the politicisation of all possible crimes of individuals resulting in police and ideological terrorism (Grieder, 2007, p. 564). Below, it will be evaluated whether Spanish Fascism was, like its Italian kin, "a form of totalitarianism" as defined by Aron (1969).

Franco's Totalitarian Reality: "War Against the Republic by Other Means"

Walter Benjamin famously said, "Every rise of fascism bears witness to a failed revolution" (Benjamin as cited in Žižek, 2014, p. 25). In the case of Spain, the failed Revolution refers to the Second Republic, "an exciting experiment" in restructuring traditional Spanish society into a more egalitarian state through the adoption of a progressive Constitution (Preston, 1989, p. 28). What followed was a "series of wars" (Preston, 1989, p. 30) between factions that later became known under the umbrella term of "two Spains" by those interpreting the war as a fratricidal conflict: between right and left; owners of great estates and landless laboureres; industrialists and workers; militant Catholics and anti-clericals; and regionalists and centralists (Hristova, 2016; Preston, 1989). Or, if one adopts an alternative narrative, what followed was a Crusade (the early Francoist interpretation); a class war; or an antifascist struggle (Hristova, 2016). Despite the heterogeneity of the involved groups—a detailed description of which is beyond the scope of this paper—a coalition of Falangists, Carlists, authoritarian Catholics, and aristocratic monarchists managed to unify in 1937 under general Francisco Franco's leadership.[4] Baptised *Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista* (FET y de las JONS) or simply *El Movimiento*, the Francoists reached victory in 1939. Interestingly, from this point on until his natural death in 1975, Franco's position was never seriously challenged from within the Movimiento, and international players, in the

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4   To give but one example of the variety of visions within this coalition, when a Falange leader was asked what he would do if monarchy were to be restored, he replied, "There would simply be another revolution. And this time, I assure you, we would not be on the same side" (Payne, 1961, p. 191)

light of Cold War containment politics, benevolently cooperated with the dictator (Preston, 2004).[5] The exceptional longevity of the regime and the perceptions abroad, then, are factors that problematise its classification: throughout the years, the regime's economic policies and its position in international affairs significantly changed.

As mentioned, Aron (1969) identifies one party with a monopoly on political activity as one of the key features of a totalitarian regime. After Franco's victory in 1939, El Movimiento became the sole legal party in Spain until its dissolution in 1977.[6] While it is true that certain elements of Falange ideology were incorporated into the regime, with Franco lacking ideological direction, the Caudillo ultimately saw it as no more than a "totalitarian instrument for holding the state together" (Payne, 1961, p. 212), never thinking of Spain as a real party-state in German or Italian fashion.

The repression of other parties had already been formalised with a decree issued in 1936 which outlawed "all political parties, trade unions and social organisations that supported the Popular Front and opposed the National Movement" (Preston, 2012, p. 473). From 1939 onwards, these measures also worked retrospectively, meaning that those who had once, voluntarily or not, occupied any position favourable to the Republic (ranging from nudists to Jews) were to be "cleansed" through institutionalised persecution, justified by legislation on "political responsibility" and the creation of "certificates of political and religious reliability" (Davis, 2005, p. 861).[7] Thus, while the Movimiento was not a monolith nor a party in the traditional sense of the term, it did hold an indisputable monopoly on political activity, employing an ideologically ambiguous yet powerful narrative which later became known as National-Catholicism. The widespread and violent ideological (state) terrorism resulting from this situation, politicising every act an individual might undertake, clearly corresponds to Aron's model.

In terms of monopolising the means of coercion, it must be noted that Franco, dividing and ruling over the different factions of the Movimiento, never allowed the Falange a militia like the Nazi's SA. Instead, the Falange guards, during the war, always acted with back-up from the Army, and from 1940, the official Falange militia started in that same year was officially incorporated under the army command, with Franco as the generalísimo (Payne, 1961, p. 208). Martial Law was in place from 1936 until 1948,

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5   President Nixon went as far as to state, after Franco's death, that "General Franco was a loyal friend and ally of the United States" (*Nixon Asserts Franco Won Respect for Spain*, 1975).

6   In 1943, instructions were issued that the classification "party" should be structurally replaced by "movement", complicating our analysis when it comes to terminology (Payne, 2011, p. 322).

7   Officialised by the Law of Political Responsibilities (1939) and the Law of Repression of Masonry and Communism (1940).

with the aim to "perfect the machinery of state terror" (Preston, 2012, p. 472).

The precise scope, intensity, and results of terror, both during and after the War, are beyond the limits of this paper, but are extensively described by Preston in *The Spanish Holocaust* (2012).[8]

With regard to a monopoly on information, the Spanish press in the early years of the regime (1939-1951) has been described as "a slave to political power" (Sinova, 2006, p. 13). This is partly explained by the severe isolation of the regime after the defeat of the Axis powers in 1945, leading to both the sidelining of "purely fascist" Falange ideology and the development of a "closed system" which refused any type of external influences (Hristova, 2016; Pegenaute, 1994, p. 86). However, prepublication censorship was introduced as early as 1938, in wartime, partly as a result of the heterogeneity of the Movimiento. It was more occupied with repressing alternative cultures than with constructing its own cultural basis, which, arguably, was complicated by the fact that most intellectuals had sided with the Republicans (Pegenaute, 1994). As a result, the monopolisation of symbolic power in the form of censorship, with Falange officials controlling all information outlets, took precedence over the production of "active" propaganda (Pegenautre, 1994; Payne, 1961). Notwithstanding, purely propagandistic measures, too, were swiftly introduced across cultural life (education, media, and orchestrated events) after the fascist victory, with the NO-DO (*Noticiario Español Cinematográfico*, 1942) and the SEU (Falange Student Syndicate), the latter monopolising student representation, as examples (Davis, 2005; Payne, 1961; Swyngedouw, 2007).

The fourth aspect of Aron's model—the subjection of economic activities to the state—is where gradual regime changes begin limiting its classification as totalitarian. Post-war reconstruction was, in Romero Salvadó's (1999) words, pursued "with the tools of war economy" based on the key concepts of autarky and state interventionism. Prices, wages, production, and the exchange rate were centrally controlled, resulting not only in a flourishing black market but also in the classification of the years from 1939 to the early 1950s as "los años de hambre" (p. 126).[9] Labour unions were abolished and replaced by the Spanish Syndical Organisation, staffed and administered by the FET (Payne, 1961; Witney, 1966). All social services were taken up by the Falange through the *Sección Feminina*, formed in 1934 (Payne, 1961). The aspirations of economic independence significantly impacted the Spanish landscape through an ambitious set of technonatural "revolutions" (e.g. the building of dams and reservoirs) that was meant to make Spain

self-sufficient in terms of water. Perhaps the economic situation in the early Franco years is best summarised by Swyngedouw (2007), who describes it as a system with "strong state-economy linkages" that would cement "a corporatist state structure that could count on an endogenous capitalist sector" (p. 15), thereby effectively consolidating the power of large landowners, industrialists, and clerics, all of which the 1931 Constitution of the Second Republic had challenged (Salvadó, 1999).

By the early 1950s, with the socioeconomic situation further deteriorating, this approach becomes a threat to the regime's sustainability, leading to the pursuit of the insertion of Spain into the Western Alliance (Swyngedouw, 2007). In 1953, with Cold War geopolitics institutionalised, the Pact of Madrid ends the international isolation of the Franco regime. The country is gradually opened up to tourism, with government campaigns portraying Spain as an exotic, almost oriental destination in Europe's heart (Hristova, 2016). Aided by US dollars,[10] this results in increasing living standards, a loosening grip on the flow of information, and a loosening of ideology. While Franco's regime drifts further away from Aron's qualifications, by the end of the 1960s these same changes, combined with a deteriorating public order (especially in the Basque region), result in the last episode of increased levels of state violence (Davis, 2005, p. 861).

In conclusion, the absence of "one party, one state", the ambiguous ideology of the regime and the loosening grip of the economic and symbolic monopoly in the 1960s make the Spanish case stand out from those that Aron qualifies as totalitarian: Nazi Germany, Mussolini's Italy, and the USSR (Aron, 1969). These differences, however, do not a priori exclude an analysis in terms of totalitarianism. It simply requires a fragmentation of the analysis to different phases. When focusing on the early Francoist state (1939-1953), then, one cannot help but coincide with Pegenaute's qualification (1994): Franco did not only intend to, but effectively contributed to the history of totalitarianism.

"Since the present is the unexpected, the formless can be determined only by an excess of memories" – Jean-Paul Sartre, On the Sound and the Fury (1939)

With the importance of this academic classification exercise clarified above, a turn from the theoretical to the social is justified in order to grasp the immense legacy of Franco's rule in Spanish society. As pointed

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8   Its very title an indication of the strength of the regime's monopoly on the means of coercion.

9   "The hunger years".

10   In the Pact of Madrid, Spain and the US agreed for the latter to use part of Spanish territory for military purposes in exchange for economic, military, and technical aid. Between 1951 and 1963, more than 1.3 billion aid dollars were granted to Spain (Swyndegouw, 2007, p. 23).

out by Sartre in the year of Franco's victory, the present is elusive, the future unknown, and the past has, materially, "definitely receded" (Cubitt, 2007, p. 29), so man inevitably turns to memories of this past to shape his present and future. Social memories (and silences), defined as "the processes by which knowledge and awareness of the social past are generated and maintained in human societies" (Cubitt, 2007, p. 26), are crucial because they not only generate contemporary interpretations of the past, but also produce "space for public politics *today*" [emphasis mine] (Narotzky & Smith, 2002, p. 189). Hence, to gain a better understanding of Spain today, it is important to know how its twentieth-century history was publicly remembered, and why it was remembered this way.

Spain's curious collective[11] decision in 1978 to define its transition to democracy by "disremembering" the past (Davis, 2005, p. 862) implied "facing that past and reaching the conclusion that it wouldn't determine the future" (Faber, 2005, p. 207). Golob (2008), Labanyi (2008), and Quiroga (2014) agree that during the Spanish Transition, social memory of the Francoist past was "made private" (Labanyi, 2008, p. 120) and remained so until recently, as a result of a general fear of violent conflict produced by the presence of Civil War memories. Ironically, it was these memories that led to Spain's consensual decision to, on a collective level, forget its Francoist past. Practically, this resulted in amnesty for all parties (Republicans and Francoists) and "a kind of institutionalised amnesia" on a social level (Davis, 2005, p. 863).

The memory of the Civil War and the following dictatorship on the one hand and that of the Transition Period (1975 - debated)[12] on the other are thus highly intertwined. According to Santamaria Colmenero (2016), the birth of the Spanish democracy and the founding myth of modern Spain tends to be situated exactly in the consensus on the Pacto del Olvido and the 1978 Constitution instead of the pre-war Constitution of the Second Republic (1931). This resulted in the idea of consensus as a key feature of the Spanish democracy (Davis, 2005; Santamaría Colmenero, 2016) and the institutionalisation of a "collective memory myth" (Aguilar, 1997, p. 90)—all were equally guilty.

In this light, it is less surprising that the reconsideration of the Civil War and the Franco regime taking place since roughly 2000 is simultaneous with the reconsideration of the Transition, whereas the first usually takes place during the second (Blakeley, 2005). Several authors (Aguilar, 1997;

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11   While most argue that the Pacto del Olvido was a reconciliation brokered by political elites (Blakeley, 2005; Davis, 2005), authors debate the extent to which civil society (dis)agreed with it, ranging from "widespread public support" (Aguilar, 1997, p. 95) to "low salience of the issue within civil society" (Davis, 2005, p. 866).

12   Some locate the end of the Transition in the 1978 Constitution; others in the 1981 failed coup; or the PSOE's 1982 electoral victory.

Blakeley, 2005; Golob, 2008) roughly concur on the factors that explain the timing of this meltdown: the Pinochet-case and the proliferation of transitional justice culture pressuring Spain from the outside, while the anniversaries of the democracy (2001) and the Constitution (2003), combined with the political landscape and a generational factor, raised the temperatures domestically.[13] This recent reconsideration of the Francoist past has led some to claim the Transition is ongoing. From 1978 until roughly 2000, they argue, the so-called "Transition" was rather a "deep freeze" of memory for the sake of stability (Golob, 2008, p. 127). The idea that Spanish democracy does not deserve the name (yet) has recently surfaced in the public sphere, with large-scale popular protests in major cities from 2011 to 2015, a social movement called *Democracia Real Ya*[14] at its base. Santamaría Colmenero (2016) suggests that this indicates the refusal of the "birth myth" of Spanish democracy by large parts of Spanish civil society—for the first time in decades contestation was chosen over consensus. Since the case of Spain has proven that "even forgetting is not forever" (Blakeley, 2005, p. 56), this "Spanish Revolution"[15] or 15-M (15 de Mayo) provokes an interesting question: how does the 15-M Movement challenge and change existing constructions of social memory in Spain? More specifically, how does it reconstruct the memory of the Spain's transition to democracy, if, in its eyes, that democracy has not been realised?

Memory and the Political: A Resurrection

Spanish historical memory is complicated since it consists of different layers. First, there is the memory of the Civil War proper, which, as mentioned, produced several narratives. During the first years of subsequent Franco-rule, however, only one of these (the War as a crusade/a new Reconquista) was allowed while the exiled kept alive alternative interpretations. During the 1960s, influenced by the above-mentioned changes, the regime deliberately transformed the dominant memory discourse from the "justification of war to the exaltation of peace" (Aguilar as cited in Davis, 2005, p. 862), portraying the War as an inhumane, senseless fratricidal conflict,[16] captured by the phrase *Nunca más*.[17] This narrative would greatly influence the second stage of memory: Spain's transition to democracy, characterised by the collective amnesia regarding the Franco years, the so-called *Pacto*

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13   For a comprehensive overview of factors behind the recent changes, see Aguilar, 2008, pp. 427-429.

14   'Real Democracy Now'

15   The name given to the 15M-movement on social media.

16   1964, for instance, was portrayed by the regime as the year that marked 25 años de paz (25 years of peace) (Hristova, 2016, p. 73).

17   "Never again".

del Olvido. Today, with Spanish civil society more active than ever before, a novel, third layer of interpretation is added: the War, the regime, and the transition as a violation of democracy (Hristova, 2016).

Predominantly right-wing groups are increasingly claiming a Spanish form of constitutional patriotism, rooted in the 1978 consensus as the founding myth of the modern nation. They present a reconciliation of the "two Spains", politically represented by PSOE (Spanish Socialist Workers' Party) and PP (People's Party), based on a rational, non-violent Habermasian consensus. Many of the organisations claiming recognition of the Republican victims of the Civil War, however, challenge this idea of the "immaculate Transition" (Antentas, 2015, p. 143). They insist on the implementation of the Law on Historical Memory and, as long as this does not happen, embrace the Second Republic as a "truly" democratic reference point instead (Hristova, 2016; Pino, 2013). They oppose what some have labelled "Cultura de Transición" (CT) (Fernández-Savater, 2012): the depoliticising and deproblematising discourse of the Transition as the "sacrosanct founding myth of the current political regime" (Antentas, p. 143). Within such culture, anyone not reproducing to the "fraticidal war-narrative" implied by *Nunca más* is considered a threat to stability and, by extension, to democracy, with the Transition becoming a "depoliticising anaesthetic" (Antentas, 2015, p. 136), thus not only an instrument to broker a democratic pact, but an ideology in itself.

Today, the parties that negotiated the Transition are rapidly losing political credibility exactly because of the technocratic homogenisation brought about by CT, which, moreover, was reinforced through the imposed austerity measures of the IMF and the EU in response to the financial crisis (Feenstra & Keane, 2014; Pino, 2013).[18] This situation could be compared to Hannah Arendt's description in *The Human Condition* (1998) of a double political crisis: not only is CT a violence to plurality, practically oppressing the Republican memory, it also constitutes a collapse of the political domain through the elimination of dissent and the regelation of inherently political memory to the private sphere. This situation is called *gobernabilidad pospolitica*[19] by political scientist and Podemos-secretary Iñigo Errejón (2011, p. 185), and is expressed popularly by referring to Spain's political duopoly as PPSOE.[20]

As a result, the political sphere is narrowed down to what Arendt identified as the "household", i.e., economic management (Arendt, 1998, p. 178). With this logic catastrophically failing during the crisis, the Spanish took to the occupation of public space on May 15, 2011. They appropriated the term *indignados* (the indignant), not only referring to the absence of basic levels of subsistence, but also to "unsettled memories and unfulfilled pasts", thereby popularising previously minority positions on the Transition (Franquesa, 2016, p. 69). 15-M, then, more than merely a protest against dire living conditions imposed by the crisis, constitutes the "definitive break-up of the so-called Transition consensus" (Antentas, 2015, p. 142).

Conclusion

This paper argues that Spain between 1939 and (roughly) 1953 can be qualified as a totalitarian state by applying Aron's five-point theoretical framework to the Franco regime. Moreover, it suggests that while during much of the Franco regime politics violently permeated the private sphere, from Franco's death onwards the inherently political issue of collective memory was exiled to the private, accompanied by a general process of homogenisation and technocratisation of Spanish politics. From 2011 onwards, this situation is being challenged, with the indignados actively re-politicising public space. However, their attempt to reform the present "can be compared to a man sitting in a convertible looking back" (Sartre, 1994, p. 228)—it inevitably involves and changes perceptions of the past, resulting in an increasing scepticism of the Spanish model of transition to democracy.

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18   A much-mentioned example of the apparent absence of political difference between PP and PSOE is the 2010 Reform of Labour Law introduced by the left-wing Zapatero (PSOE) government (Pino, 2013).

19   'Postpolitical governability'

20   Podemos, it should be noted in this context, is a direct outcome of the indignados protests and embraces Piketty's economic analyses as popularised in *Capital in the Twenty-First Century* (2014).

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Reconciliation: The Ultimate Goal for a New Identity After Transition

Walter Philander

Abstract

The effect that colonialism and institutionalised oppression had is insurmountable for millions of South Africans. Its purpose was to dominate over others and make people of colour inferior to white people. Colonialism was deeply rooted especially in the spheres of religion, politics, and economics, as that is what binds people together, what people do together, and how people produce and exchange goods and services together.

The result of these oppressive behaviours was an assault on people of colour's human dignity and their true identity as human beings. Amidst the legacy of these atrocities, we find ourselves at a junction of rebuilding and various processes of reconciliation. This paper goes into conversation on the creation of safe spaces, truth telling, facing voices of vengeance, restorative justice, and forgiveness as a power tool. These are the pillars which are paramount in the creation of a new identity or reconciling perpetrator and victim.

Keywords: reconciliation, forgiveness, community, inequality, South Africa

I come from a country still very young in its democracy—23 years to be exact. One of the major hurdles we faced after transition from an era where the apartheid system was the norm and rule to democratic dispensation is the processes towards a reconciled nation, the establishment of a new identity, as South Africans. The more we journey, the more I realise the negative impact colonialism and institutionalised oppression, in the form of apartheid, had on the oppressed masses of our country. It was and still is insurmountable for millions of South Africans of colour. One must understand its purpose was to dominate others and make people of colour inferior to white people. The colonialist "enforced and maintained domination on subject peoples through military might, economical oppression, and ideological belief systems" (Boesak & DeYoung, 2012, p. 13).

Colonialism was deeply rooted especially in the spheres of religion, politics and economics, as Boesak explains it, in what binds people together, what people do together, and how people produce and exchange goods and services together, respectively. It was segregation based on race, colour and ethnic origin (i.e. homelands) (Tingle, 1992, p. 11).

The result of these oppressive behaviours was an assault on people of colour's human dignity and their true identity as human beings, and

"societies were drained of their essence, cultures were trampled upon, people's artistic creations destroyed" (Aimé Cesaire cited in Boesak & DeYoung, 2012, p. 15).

The African National Congress (ANC) government and the opposition, the then-Nationalist Party, agreed on a process of truth telling and reconciliation by establishing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC, 1995). Its main aim or function was to get to the truth of apartheid atrocities or, as Geiko Müller-Fahrenholz puts it, for the ANC to bring justice to the victims of apartheid, and the National Party to gain amnesty for the perpetrators (Müller-Fahrenholz, 1997, p. 85). Because this was not done in all honesty, with many perpetrators never coming to testify and those who did not telling the full truth, we are still experiencing the after effects.

In a new dispensation where we are in processes of rebuilding our country, it is clear that the TRC did not fully succeed in its objectives to promote national unity and reconciliation. Racism is raising its ugly head, just as in certain white circles, people are raising the old South African apartheid flag. The minority still owns most of the land, and the economy is still controlled by the rich white minority.

But there is also the other side of the coin—an elite group of blacks are on the rise. They are the politically well-connected which gives rise to problems such as poor service delivery, nepotism, corruption, and tender rigging. The list is long. And anew, people are crying for justice and economic emancipation.

Based on the experiences of today, the transition failed the people of South Africa. We do not succeed in "relation to democratic transition and national reconstruction" (De Gruchy 2002, p. 4). The importance of political significance to the oppressed masses of South Africa was never reached, hence what is presently experienced by the people of colour is still living in absolute poverty, and with no economic power.

To the masses, the principles of the Freedom Charter, the guiding document of the African National Congress (ANC), is but a political slogan with little meaning. Allan Boesak is of the viewpoint that "unless we remove injustice at the roots, the weeds of alienation and fragmentation will return and choke the hope for reconciliation" (Boesak & DeYoung, 2012, p. 1).

When one seeks to find lasting reconciliation, one has to address the critical questions of "justice, equality, and dignity" (Boesak & DeYoung, 2012, p. 1). This has to be done with openness and brutal honesty, also taking the risk of being exposed to the other (person). German writer and theologian Geiko Müller-Fahrenholz says that we have to "bring concrete content" (Müller-Fahrenholz, 1997) to true reconciliation, if we are serious about restoring human dignity.

South Africans of colour have shown throughout history that they are resilient people. Amidst the fight against colonialism and apartheid

there was always hope that life can be different, that freedom is possible, and that South Africa belongs to all who live in it (as stated in The Freedom Charter). Herein, faith communities played major roles in the struggle against apartheid. Many alliances were formed between the faith communities as they believed one cannot speak about justice if there is no hope. Christians, for example, believed that "Christian hope for liberating justice is confident as to its grounds in Christ, while at the same time it is humble…" (Volf & Katerberg, 2004, p. 12). If human life and its future means something to us than we have to "work for the future without arrogance and without despair" (Volf & Katerberg, 2004, p. 16). I believe this is a global challenge and not only for South Africans.

Our biggest mistake as South Africans is best described by Miroslav Volf when he says that we viewed "democracy as a condition we possess, not as a process which we are involved in" (Volf & Katerberg, 2004, p. 20). He explains it as something "that requires active participation, participatory interest, and personal commitment of the people" (Volf & Katerberg, 2004, p. 20). When this did not happen for millions of South Africans, people lost interest and the political class became estranged from the people, and the people lost trust in the politicians, as the will of the people is not taken into account when it comes to decision making. Examples of this are the #FeesMustFall demonstrations by university students, lack of housing, an ever-changing unstable education system, poor health system, poor justice systems which include policing and prosecuting authorities, and state capturing by certain families. In layman's terms, we are in need of a participatory democracy for the sake of restoring human dignity and the forming of a new identity as South Africans.

Anew we live in an age of despair even with a democratic dispensation. Yes, it is complex and not easy to analyse and define. Many experience hopelessness for this "dream of freedom, is turning into a nightmare" (Nolan, 2010, p. 4). But we must stay refocused on the processes of reconciliation, for we have painfully learned that reconciliation is not a condition we possess, but a process in which we are involved.

I am of the opinion that hope in general is communal. Gabriel Marcel writes that "there can be no hope which does not constitute itself through a *we* and for a *we*." Others (Bauckham and Hart,) explain it as "real hope is essentially rooted in the qualities and capacities of otherness, of that which lies beyond itself in other people" (Volf & Katerberg, 2004, p. 172).

This brings me to the conversation about the creation of safe spaces as a starting point of reconciliation. It is imperative that we create spaces where the perpetrator (or those who benefited from an unjust system) and the victim (those who suffered under injustice) can face one another in honesty and vulnerability. In the South African context this was tried, through the TRC, but failed because it lacked honesty and true vulnerability by the perpetrators. There was no real remorse and it left more questions than answers.

But the creation of spaces for interfacing (De Gruchy, 2002, p. 148) is critical for a community seeking justice and reconciliation. This has, in essence, the opportunity of dialogue. Martin Buber, as cited by De Gruchy, speaks of "the basic movement of the life of dialogue" as "a turning towards the other". De Gruchy says that "without meeting face-to-face and entering into conversation with an adversary on equal terms-subject to subject—the process of reconciliation is impossible" (De Gruchy, 2002, p. 151). It is thus true that this has no guarantees that reconciliation will take place, but "at least a critical first stage in the process has been reached" (De Gruchy, 2002, p. 152).

It is within the created space that we can see and interact with one another as equal human beings. We can discover the identity of the "other" and rid ourselves of assumptions we had of one another. As De Gruchy puts it, "Thus the 'other' makes an ethical demand on us, challenging not only our claims but also our self-understanding and identity" (De Gruchy, 2002, p. 152).

In our South African context, these round table talks are what should have happened in all communities that suffered under apartheid and colonialism. Sadly, ours were restricted to 1960, and only some political deaths were dealt with. Yet millions of people were left homeless and/or landless when colonialists invaded our shores in 1652, with the arrival of Jan van Riebeek, and later on through slavery and institutionalised racism, such as apartheid.

De Gruchy asks pertinent questions such as who we think we are, and what we are trying to become, what our interest and values are, and how they serve the common good. "We discover the identity of the 'other' as a person, and one who may be quite different from what our prior assumptions told us" (Ford, 1999 cited in De Gruchy, 2002, p. 152). This seems to be one of the major challenges we face. We seem to be engulfed by assumptions which are most of the time incorrect, we ask from a distance and we answer from a distance. Meeting face to face, however, demands respect for the 'other' as a human being even if we may disagree on critical issues of discussion.

De Gruchy mentions one important element as an important step, and that is firstly, the *willingness to listen to the other* side of the story even if we remain unconvinced. Secondly, to learn to relinquish our control of the encounter, and to become vulnerable to the "other", so that the relationship may develop its own momentum and direction. He continues to challenge us in the process of reconciliation to put ourselves in the place of the 'other' who addresses us (De Gruchy, 2002, p. 152). Here *empathy* plays an integral part in the reconciliation process. Thus, it is important that the spaces we

created are safe spaces which will nurture the processes of reconciliation.

These spaces can only be fruitful and of value if *truth telling* is an integral part of it. In our South African context, this was a critical point at which, in my opinion, we failed. Even De Gruchy admits that "the relationship between discovering the truth and the possibility of achieving reconciliation through its telling was by no means self-evident…" (De Gruchy, 2002, p. 159). He cites Frederick van Zyl Slabbert who said that notions "were based on sentimental theological assumptions that very often bear no relation to reality" (De Gruchy, 2002, p. 159).

De Gruchy mentions three fundamental issues that we must consider when truth is told: firstly, the nature of the truth sought to be uncovered; secondly, the difficulty of arriving at this kind of truth, given the nature of the truth being elicited and the problems of subjectivity; and thirdly, which according to him is the most critical, what do we do with the truth uncovered in the pursuit of reconciliation (De Gruchy, 2002, p. 155).

One must arrive at a point where truth telling opens the window or door to why things happened the way they happened. Again, in our context, the TRC was incapable of uncovering the whole truth, which in my opinion, resulted in where we are at now as a nation. To me, this truth telling has to go much further. If you have benefited from a history of an oppressive past, and you have national reconciliation at heart, you must be able to get to the point of not only acknowledgement but also restoration (restorative justice). You must be open to the voices of vengeance in order to understand where it originates. And in hearing these voices to, then in all honesty and sincerity, have *empathy* towards such feelings and not try to justify or make excuses. As a reconciler, one has to take into account that that "there is an inevitable discrepancy between what happened, and how we perceive and narrate what happened" (De Gruchy, 2002, p. 155).

Yes, it can be argued that within our own context, for example, the majority of white people were not perpetrators in the direct sense, and it may even be true. But the whole truth is that because of the system of apartheid, all white people were beneficiaries. Within our own context this has not been dealt with in any way.

Yes, this process has its own risks, it may even be traumatic for many, it may even not bring about healing, but it is a risk necessary to take, if national reconciliation and the formation of a new identity is to be taken seriously. Within this whole process, religious groups and faith communities can play a major pastoral role, in order to keep the processes dignified, and in order to restore human dignity. I acknowledge that there is a question of whether telling the whole truth can be used as a weapon or a tool of destruction. In such cases, truth becomes a lie, because it was not used in the interest of seeking a new identity or national reconciliation.

De Gruchy argues that it is not a question of *whether* the truth should be told, but *how* and *when* and to *whom* it should be told, and therefore, for what purpose. I am of the opinion that truth telling has the ability and capacity to keep us from repeating what has happened in the past where people were stripped of their human dignity, but it also has the ability and capacity to call for remorse and humility on the part of the beneficiaries and bystanders, together with a willingness to work for the common good (De Gruchy, 2002, p. 164). If it fails in this, it has failed in its goal and purpose.

This brings me to the point of *restorative justice*. To De Gruchy, restorative justice is the "attempt to certain neglected dimensions that make for a more complete understanding of justice. Its emphases is on rehabilitation, on compensation, on the recovery of dignity and the healing of social wounds" (De Gruchy, 2002, p. 102). I am of the belief that true reconciliation is only possible if justice is restored, to what was before colonialism and institutionalised racism reared its ugly head. Dieter Hessel speaks of "modes of social action" (De Gruchy, 2002, p. 134). He is of the opinion that "the social task is to do, or participate in, what needs doing for the sake of reconciliation by means that respond to injustice and human need" (De Gruchy, 2002, p. 134). One must be clear on the fact that restorative justice seeks to undo what should never have been done in the first place.

In order to restore, we are asked to be creative in our approach. This cannot be done in isolation, but as Hessel puts it, it can be pursued locally, in togetherness. In other words, it can be done in collaboration with other groups, such as faith communities and other social groups operating at the local level of communities. For it is at the local level where reconciliation will manifest its true identity. Within our own context, this is where the utmost challenges lie. We have no community structures which focus on reconciliation or the creation of new democratic identities which can help us in nurturing a future where human dignity has been restored. This needs intentional programmes focussing on what is at stake for each community.

Because reconciliation has to do with the equality and consequences of human action, Hessel names types of response of which the following are central themes: (a) *social service*, which means attempts to meet human needs by providing encouraging assistance, which demonstrates care for the burdens of others by trying to alleviate them as we would want others to alleviate ours; (b) *issue-probing*, which means keeping dialogue alive, consultation with experts, etc. It means to meet social problems creatively, and not closing your eyes to the needs and challenges of others. For example, what is being done to counteract poverty in my area? There has to be availability of good health services, participation in public policy decisions. "There is a need for c) *political advocacy*, meaning the act of supporting, or pleading for, the cause of the other; (d) *direct Intervention*, which means what it takes to move the structures of a complex society toward justice (people on farms,

cheap labour, racism, land reform). Hessel explains it as action-orientated with a degree of risk-taking, but it is initiated to change a part of the social structure, for it has at heart the redistribution of power arrangements and social resources for the common good of humanity.

In conclusion, having experienced a life of oppression and being raised under an apartheid regime, I (we) have the choice of vengeance and hatred towards those who oppressed me and those who benefited from it. But because the apartheid system failed to chain and oppress my mind, I (we) intentionally choose to work tirelessly for a reconciled society, where all human beings are seen and treated as equals in all spheres of life.

This compels me (us) to acknowledge and undertake the putting to an end of the abuse of power and all injustices in society. I (we) am compelled to co-operate in redressing the structural imbalances which for centuries oppressed millions of South Africans and even today, within a democracy, fail to successfully address the eradication of poverty. Within seeking rec- onciliation as the ultimate goal for a new identity after transition, it is my (our) duty to raise awareness of tolerance between different races and cul- tures. No one in society can stand neutral when injustices occur and where people are deprived of their human dignity. For even those who stay silent in circumstances of poverty and oppression elsewhere on the globe have taken a stand. Restoration can only be possible if we make it possible. True reconciliation can only succeed if we are intentionally involved in actions of reconciliation and with a deep conviction for justice and peace in our different societies.

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Redefining Self-Identity as Military Ex-Combatant in the Post-Apartheid Era

Mbulelo Patrick Gcaza

Abstract

During the struggle for liberation against apartheid, one of the key components of struggle was the use of armed forces. The government used the South African Defence Force (SADF) to enforce law and order. Political movements such as the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan African Congress (PAC) and the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO) established military wings namely uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK), African Peoples' Liber- ation Army (APLA) and Azanian Peoples' Army (AZANLA) as part of the struggle to resist unjust laws. As much as first democratic elections brought hope for political and socio-economic change, for the ex-combatants it was the beginning of the struggle to re-establish their identity. The reason for this was the fact that military's fate was decided by politicians. Political decisions during negotiations led to the demobilisation of military forces on both sides. The results of demobilisation led to militarised personnel struggling to reintegrate into society, thus leading to a continuity or dis- continuity of identity amongst military veterans. Programmes to assist the ex-combatants in fitting into society and re-establishing their identity were not created, thus affecting their human dignity. This paper focuses on the struggle of redefining the identity of military veterans after 1994 and fur- ther explores the identity affirmation and survival of military veterans in South Africa using the former Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) as it is the former liberation military wing that still has a voice today through the MK Military Veterans Association (MKMVA). Theological reflection on continuity or dis- continuity of identity will also be carried out. The paper also explores the effects of militarisation of South African society which had an impact on masculinity even after the struggle for democracy has long passed.

Keywords: human dignity, identity affirmation, military veterans, ex-combatants, integration, narrative

Introduction

South Africa achieved democracy by peaceful means after a long struggle against apartheid. The struggle encompassed mass mobilisation in the country, gathering international support which led to internation- al trade sanctions and militarisation of youth as well as armed struggle. The armed forces of liberation movements were trained in exile in neigh- bouring countries as well as in West Africa with the support of some East- ern European funding. Combatants believed insurrection the best way for

total takeover of power from their enemy. The understanding was that achieving freedom through armed resistance would result in total emancipation of socio-economic and political power. The leading organisation, on the other hand, had a different perspective about armed struggle.

> "For the ANC, armed struggle was not its sole form of resistance. In fact, it was viewed as merely one pillar of a 'four pillar' strategy, with the other three being mass mobilisation, underground organisation and international solidarity work". (Mashike & Mokalobe 2003, p. 10)

Negotiated transition to democracy led to the integration of seven armed forces into a new South African National Defence Force (SANDF) from both statutory and non-statutory forces led by the SADF. Some of the members of the armed forces and members of the liberation movements joined the SANDF in a form of military integration to secure employment and with the intention of defending revolutionary gains. Some members did not join because of the suspicion that integration would be an absorption of other armed forces into the former enemy force, the SADF. The negotiated settlement also agreed on the demobilisation of some members with the intention of downsizing the force. It is worth taking note that the effects of demobilisation affected both the SADF and the former armed forces of the liberation organisations. In this paper, I will refer to former members of armed forces of liberation organisation as ex-combatants.

The effects of non-integrating into the SANDF were not positive as there was a lack of support from the former liberation movements as well as the government. The juxtaposition is that most government officials are former comrades, such as the current president of the country[1]. One of the interviewed comrades had this to say:

> "In South Africa, ex-combatant identities remain salient to political and social life 20 years after the end of apartheid. South Africa's post-apartheid president, Nelson Mandela was the founder of Umkhonto we Sizwe, the branch of the African National Congress (ANC). South Africa's third president, Jacob Zuma, is also an MK ex-combatant. MKMVA (MK Military Veterans Association) remains an active voice in ANC politics". (Heideman, 2015, p. 50)

The challenge that faces ex-combatants is the lack of respect for their human dignity that manifests itself in such forms as unemployment, having no housing, as well as a lack of medical care.

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1   The president of South Africa, at the time of writing, was Jacob Zuma.

Human Dignity

Once in exile, you are forced by political circumstances to be away from home, from loved ones and the country you love. Whilst in exile, ex-combatants were the heroes to those who were suffering under apartheid inside the country as they were a beacon of hope for a new South Africa. Freedom songs such as "Sizongena ngejambo sipheth' i-AK" ("*we will enter our country dancing with our AK rifles*") were sung about them and by them, with the hope of coming home as heroes. The reality of coming back home is described as follows by a former MK soldier in his book:

> "We did not return as we expected. We did not return home with AK47 on our shoulders, toyi-toying and singing 'Sizongena ngejambo'. Instead we entered individually or in small groups to an uncertain future. We left our homes in exile to set up a new life in South Africa. We had to be integrated into new life. We dependent entirely on the ANC for accommodation, food and clothing when we were in exile. Our children were sent to schools provided for, or paid for by, the movement. Instead of having jobs, we were full-time cadres of the movement—as MK members, political leaders, or ANC members in exile". (Ngculu, 2009, p. 204)

The challenge after 1994 until today for most of the ex-combatants is conditions that negatively affect their human dignity. Meeks uses the definition of Jürgen Moltmann to define human dignity:

> Dignity is not bestowed by persons or institutions. It does not derive its meaning from any human actions or status. Dignity is rather a given, universally shared reality. It is not itself a moral principle but rather the source of all moral principles. (1984, p. 2)

For most of ex-combatants, especially those who did not integrate into SANDF, their circumstances have not changed for the better since 1994. For ex-liberation combatants in particular, current socio-economic circumstances often underlie the sense of betrayal.

Identity Affirmation

When one speaks with the military veterans, there is no sense of future. For them, exile or the time in the military camps was the best time ever lived. The state of the ex-combatants is described by Maringira as closely linked to the "nature of training, the armed wing in which they belonged, their experience of violence and the circumstances of their lives..." (2015, p. 74). This is confirmed by the conduct of most ex-combatants in terms of their current identity. Most of the ex-combatants still live in the

times of exile. It becomes more evident when one speaks with them, as they smile when they relate the stories of the times in exile. They express joyful stories only, although there is written evidence of the bad too. The use of pseudo-names[2] is still preferred as if this "false identity" gives them a better identity. The question arises as to who affirms victims' identity after traumatic experience of oppression: is it supposed to be the victim, the former comrades, or the perpetrators?

It is strange that the victims of colonialism, apartheid, or oppression most of the time require affirmation of their identity from the same perpetrators of violence. One will always seek the approval of the perpetrator to affirm their identity in order to be able to re-establish his/her dignity. One example that comes to mind is when the victim wants to excel in the language of the perpetrator to impress the perpetrator or to assimilate into the lifestyle of the perpetrator of violence. In an informal interview that I conducted with five members of my family, it became evident that we have a totally different point of view on this matter. There is one group who believes that victims depend on the perpetrators to re-affirm the victim's identity as they have all the resources and are structurally advantaged. At the other extreme, there are those who strongly believe that victims' our identity need not to be affirmed by former oppressors. They believe that victims' identity in South Africa can only be rediscovered by means of dedicated black scholars who must come and give back the information to the people and equip them with necessary knowledge about themselves. This can be done by means of narratives about the heroes who fought tirelessly for freedom, those living and those who have passed on. Secondly, technology and media need to be pressured into changing from promoting the West as the best whilst in Africa into encouraging the love for our country, culture, and humanity.

Gobodo-Madikizela strongly believes that "a starting point for dealing with the past is telling the narratives, a telling about suffering in a way that addresses those who want to hide from the truth in order to get affirmation and validation" (2012, p. 253). Military ex-combatants strongly require identity affirmation. In my visit to Worcester[3] in 2016, it was interesting to discover that the community has formed a group that uses the narratives of personal trauma of the past in trying to bring the community together, both the victims and perpetrators. It is in sharing stories together that there can be a point of contact, recognising each other's pain, expressing

anger, and finally starting to journey together towards the direction of reconciliation. One cannot jump to forgiveness and reconciliation skipping these steps. In the preface of his book, Lapsley (2012, p. x) affirms this when he says that healing memories is an opportunity for the people who suffered pain under apartheid to begin the road of healing.

The argument of R. A. Wilson regarding the TRC[4] approach in South Africa seems to be quite relevant as he argues that the real psychological pain suffered by victims of gross human rights abuses cannot be reduced to a national process as it happened during TRC (Gobodo-Madikizela, 2008, p. 332). The danger in the approach is that it only scratches the surface of the real trauma that affected the people as individuals and forges artificial reconciliation with the intention to attain national peace and stability. It is against this background that Lapsley[5] (2012, p. 142), in understanding the emotional needs of the survivors of violence and torture of apartheid, realised the need to focus on how the journey of the nation had affected the journey of an individual.

It is easy to feel being marginalised by the community especially if one does not have economic means to contribute to the society. The concept of social exclusion has taken on many different meanings and definitions over the decades thus social integration is important.

Psychological and Social Reintegration

Louw argues that there are six existential issues that are the existential reality of human suffering:

anxiety:
the fear of rejection and the threat of loss and isolation; guilt and shame: being haunted by past transgressions, the threat of irresponsible decision-making and the painful acknowledgement: 'I have failed'; despair: severe doubt, despondency and the threat of nonsense and desperate hopelessness; helplessness: the inability to cope and the threatening possibility of total loneliness; anger: frustration and the threat of unfulfilled expectations, inappropriate role functions and the disappointment of unfulfilled needs emanating

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2　Pseudo-names in the military camps were used for security reasons to protect the identity of the members in the camp. The threat of the enemy infiltrating the camp as a volunteer who joins the organisation was always a problem.

3　Worcester is a town in the Western Cape, South Africa. It is located 120 km north-east of Cape Town.

4　Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in SA is viewed as an exercise that focussed on restorative justice based on an elaborate objective of building national reconciliation rather than persecuting perpetrators of violence.

5　Father Michael Lapsley is an Anglican priest who was sent from New Zealand in the religious order at the height of apartheid. He joined the ANC when his voice was not heard by the government. He was banned to Lesotho and later to Zambia where the apartheid government sent him a letter bomb which left him with one arm and one eye. Fr. Lapsey has established a Trauma Centre for Healing of Memories in Cape Town, South Africa.

in violent and aggressive behaviour; greed and the insatiability of human desires and the tendency to exploit life and other human beings. (2013, p. 2)

In this paper, I argue that these are the psychological issues that are evident in the majority of the ex-combatants. The effects of the past are manifested in the lifestyle that some lead with the intention to run from the past or rather to survive it. Some resort to alcohol abuse, some to crime in order to put bread on the table, and others sell old bottles for daily survival.

Community Role
in Reintegrating Combatants

According to Daniel Louw, life as an existential phenomenon evolves around the basic human need for intimacy, recognition and human dignity. To live a meaningful life requires empowering and supporting structures and systems (Louw, 2013, p. 11). The community thus becomes essential in recognising and accepting one into it so that a person feels self-worth.

Gear offers what he calls cross-cutting issues on the research of ex-combatants. He argues that

"The psychosocial challenges facing ex-combatants in their transition require attention. All too often these are side-lined from reintegration support initiatives… Questions of identity and trauma, as well as the interaction of these with transitional environments and the individual stress of transition, are key potential sources of conflict and violence". (2006, p. 141)

Given a chance by the community, ex-combatants can contribute positively to the security of the society as they have the skill. If not, they may resort to what they know best—violence.

Government Policies
(A Reflection on Military Veterans Act of 2011)

It is evident that the definition of military veteran depends on the context of each country as Heinecken and Bwalya (2013, pp. 32-33) give international definitions of ex-combatants. The Military Veterans Act 18 of 2011 defines a military veteran as follows:

A military veteran is any South African citizen who rendered service to any of the military organisations, statutory and non-statutory, which were involved on all sides of South Africa's liberation war from 1960 to 1994; or served in the Union Defence Force before 1961; or became members of the new SANDF after 1994; and has completed

his or her military training and no longer performs military service, and has not been dishonourably discharged from that military organisation". (Government Gazette No. 18 of 2011, p. 1)

One discovers inclusive language used to define military veterans in South Africa which refers to former perpetrators of violence as well, such as the SADF. Heinecken and Bwalya (2013, p. 33) indicate that the then-Deputy Minister of Defence and Military Veterans clearly explained that social assistance schemes in the policy are aimed at former liberation forces and those who in the statutory forces whose names appear in the state's database. It also needs to be considered that the policy that was approved in 2011 was only effectively implemented in 2016. The question might be whether it is not too little too late for this as some of the comrades have passed on, some are in jail, and some are in mental hospitals. The context of the ex-combatants speaks of going from hero to zero.

Theological Reflection on Ex-Combatants'
Challenge of Redefining Self-Identity

In the wake of the political turmoil in South Africa in 1985, predominantly black theologians reflected theologically in response to apartheid policies by writing the Kairos Document[6]. The Kairos Document challenged those of the Christian faith to be responsible citizens who stand up against the evil "Caesar" of the day. In the wake of political uncertainty in Zimbabwe where the military peacefully took over the country, ZHOCD[7] responded with a press statement calling for the nation to pray together, for calm and peace, for respect of human dignity, for transitional Government of National Unity, and for national dialogue. As theologians we are called to do that in the time of instability and insecurity.

The universal struggle against racism or any kind of segregation for that matter is a human cry for human dignity, human rights for all humanity. It is about restoring human pride, self-worth as well as self-esteem. In Christian anthropology, humans are created in the image and likeness of God; *imago dei*—subject to temptation and fallen into sin, redeemed through the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, and destined to share in the glory of God. The Christian doctrine of human beings finds its foundation in the Biblical Old Testament account of the creation of the first human beings out of the dust of the ground and their endowment by the Creator with divine image and likeness.

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6   The Kairos Document is a Christian, biblical and theological comment on the political crisis in South Africa in 1985 that was signed by 156 predominantly black theologians.

7   ZHOCD is the Zimbabwe Heads of Christian Denominations which comprises the Zimbabwe Council of Churches, the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops and the Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe.

Most of the ex-combatants had their share of being demeaned and de-humanised, of rejection, of the erosion of confidence, of self-blame, of sub-servience, and of a sense of inferiority, stripped of dignity, with low self-es-teem. We do not have a scientific approach to describe hatred that humani-ty goes through. We do not have a theological explanation either. Therefore, my argument here is to merge everything that can assist in restoring hu-man dignity and self-worth with the aim to bring people together as one. Redefining identity in the post-war era is difficult for the former combat-ants of all nations. It is therefore necessary to seek a permanent remedy to the situation to prevent this social ill which may affect societies negatively.

Conclusion

A popular South African idiom states, "It takes a village to raise a child." The wisdom comes from the Xhosa tribe tradition that it is the community that gives an identity to its children. It is the community that teaches the moral ethics and culture to the child and it is the community that teaches empathy, or responsibility of one for another. At the end of the day, this child belongs to this community.

Let the world learn from this practise of community responsibility towards each other. Ex-combatants belong to the community irrespective of race, gender or belief. Ex-combatants will never be able to define their identity unless the community accepts them, journeys with them, and as-sists them to reintegrate into their societies. They are brothers, sisters, fa-thers, and mothers within their communities. The worst part about trau-ma is that it is generational if it is not thoroughly dealt with. Prof. Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela in a public lecture at Stellenbosch University on 20 Oc-tober 2016 warned that,

"…for many South Africans, especially young people, the trauma of the past is still happening and often causes rage and violence. Young people today carry with them the trauma experienced by their par-ents and grandparents. Years and years of trauma is now experi-enced as memory and one's identity becomes imbued with stories of oppression. Young people know this trauma intimately even though they haven't experienced it themselves."

It is imperative that the global community hold hands in helping those who seek to establish their identity for their identity is infused on the community. Thesnaar correctly argues that collective memory calls for the community to embody it, participate in processes, integrate mem-ory in their own existence, and popularise memory in their daily living for the memory to assist the community to achieve social and political transformation (2016, p. 16).

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Remembering and Misremembering: A Reconsideration of Narratives of the Nigerian Civil War 1967–70

Dominique Otigbah

Abstract

The main aim of this paper is to encourage a reconsideration of the historical narratives that have dominated not only the war's historiography but also its popular memory in relation to rising ethno-nationalism in south-eastern Nigeria, and the threat of violence conflict between the Nigerian state and pro-Biafran agitators. The paper will look at how and why the war has been articulated as a form of Igbo ethno-nationalism despite the fact that Biafran ethnic policies advocated for ethnic inclusion not exclusivity. It will also look at how modern day pro-Biafran movements (which arose in the years following Nigeria's democratisation) articulate Biafran identity in mostly Igbo terms, as an example of how misconstrued narratives can affect the way civil conflicts are remembered, and how it can affect modern politics and society.

This paper holds that current image of the Nigerian civil war is very unbalanced, and that the war has been, in many ways, "misremembered". As we approach the traumatic events of our past, it is crucial to consider all aspects, not only the warring parties but those who found themselves caught in between, not just at the political or military level but also at the social, not just the majority but also the minority.

How are we to fully understand or claim to understand the political, social and economic legacies of the war if our historical knowledge of it remains uneven? While there is much that has been already written about the war, there are always new perspectives and narratives to be considered. Moving forward we need to encourage a critical examination of past works, not only to identify inherent bias and subjectivity, but to form new theories on how the war has been treated as an event in Nigeria's historical consciousness.

Key words: Civil War, Nigeria, ethnic groups, minorities, historical narratives, ethno-nationalism

Introduction

On the 15th of January 1970 a conflict that had been going on for two years and six months in the South Eastern regions of Nigeria finally came to an end. It was a conflict fought between the Federal Military Government of Nigeria (FMG) and the secessionist territory of Biafra. On 30th of May 1967, the Eastern Region of Nigeria under the leadership of Lt. Col. Odumegwu-Ojukwu had declared its independence as the Republic of Biafra. This move followed months of political and social instability in Nigeria, which included two coups, retributive massacres carried out in the Northern Region, and a large population displacement of Eastern migrants in the north moving back to the east. On 6th of July 1967, after negotiations failed to come to a peaceful agreement, war broke out with Nigerian troops advancing into Biafran territory. The conflict received widespread media attention, especially because of the blockade of Biafra and the resulting food crisis. Even before the Nigerian Civil war came to an end, it had already become the main focus of a large number of media and academic publications. In the ten years after the war, over 60 books were already written, and it continues to be an area of intense academic, literary and public interest.

The historical trauma of a war 50 years past still has a hold on the South East with the increasing activity of neo-Biafran separatists agitating against the state with misplaced claims of marginalisation and underdevelopment of the region by the state for its role in the war (Smith, 2014, p. 788). Their main claim is that 50 years on, the South East is being punished because of the Biafran attempt for independence. At the same time, these neo-Biafran groups mainly articulate themselves as part of an Igbo nationalist movement, despite the fact that the Biafra of the 1960's advocated for ethnic inclusion not exclusion.

Meanwhile, historical narratives of the war from a Nigerian perspective are imbalanced, and also serve to perpetuate the image of a monocultural Biafra, where the Igbo ethnic group is put forward as the only ethnic group of the area who experienced the conflict. They can be broadly categorised into three narratives: the first being the current official state narrative of a military action against the rebel territory, which tends to gloss over any and all issues that critique FMG actions and decisions as well as distancing itself from the conflict (Falola & Ezekwem, 2016, p. 6). This is crucial because it has had a significant effect on how the war has been remembered officially by the state, and how the war is taught in schools. There is also an Igbo narrative of independence and survival, which often posits the FMG as intent on wiping out the Igbo population (Korieh, 2012). This is the narrative that is often advanced and highlighted by neo-Biafran groups.

Finally, we have the narratives of the minority groups caught between Nigeria and Biafra, notable mainly because there are so few of them. The Eastern region was and is a highly diverse area, with an Igbo ethnic majority but with a large number of ethnic groups making up a significant minority population. Yet the Biafran struggle for independence is often seen as an Igbo struggle. Up till now no substantial or comprehensive text concerning the minority experience exists. And where there are discussions of minority experiences, they are often embedded within discussions of the Igbo narrative or the FMG narrative and are never treated as one singular narrative (unlike the two dominant ones).

The main aim of this paper is to encourage a reconsideration of the historical narratives that have dominated not only the war's historiography but also its popular memory, considering events and aspects of the war that have influenced the three narratives mentioned above. At the same time, the paper will also look at how modern day pro-Biafran movements articulate Biafran identity in mostly Igbo terms as an example of how misconstrued narratives can affect the way the conflict has been remembered. In essence, the war is constantly being misremembered. The true aim of the Biafran struggle has been misrepresented as an Igbo struggle for independence and self-rule for a very long time. By extension, this has also led to a misguided reframing of Igbo nationalism through calls made for political sovereignty by neo-Biafran groups, drawing on ahistorical legacies of the first Biafran state.

Imbalanced Narratives and Flawed Reconciliation

While arguments for the imbalance in narratives may be made that the majority population of the South East comes from the Igbo ethnic group, it is simply too easy to generalise and present Biafra as a monolithic Igbo endeavour. This is a problematic generalisation. This does no service to those who all suffered during the conflict no matter their ethnic background and region of origin. Biafra's attempt to secede did not just affect a certain ethnic group. In the lead up to the war the Biafran government made significant efforts through the use of propaganda to gain minority group support (Nigerian Civil War Collection, 1967). The creation of this imbalance stems from three different areas: the Igbo focused anti-Biafra propaganda of the Federal Military Government; the intense media coverage of famine and starvation in Biafra during the latter stages of the war; and the ineffective reconciliation policy at the end of the war.

Anti-Biafra Propaganda

The Nigerian government's attempt to convince the population in the Eastern Region to not support the secessionist government used two approaches. The first was the polarisation of majority and minority ethnic groups in the Eastern region in late 1966-67. As part of their plan to destabilise Biafra, the FMG appealed to minority groups for their support by presenting the Igbo majority as a threat to minority autonomy in the region. In FMG publications and statements on the crisis at the time, the population figure of five million non-Igbo Easterners and seven million Igbo was repeatedly emphasised (Federal Ministry of Information, 1967c). In another pamphlet, the idea of longstanding Igbo dominance throughout the Nigerian history was also stressed (Federal Ministry of Information, 1967d). The Igbos were put forward as the most "tribalistic", with the Hausas in the North being highly tolerant and patient of "the aggressiveness and

insults of the Ibos" (Federal Ministry of Information , 1967d). The FMG simultaneously stressed the ethnic diversity of the region, focusing specifically on the minority groups and singling out the Igbo's for their part in the conflict.

As more minority areas fell under Nigerian control over the course of the war, and the ethnic demography of the secessionist state changed, so too did FMG propaganda. By late 1968, Biafra's territory was mostly concentrated in the traditional Igbo homeland, so the FMG's propaganda focused on trying to convince the Igbo population to abandon their support of Biafra and come back into the Nigerian fold. One of the most notable ways they did this was by enlisting prominent Igbo politicians, some of whom had formerly been on the Biafran side[1]. Calls on Igbos to accept the FMG were made at conferences, press releases, and in many government publications (Federal Ministry of Information, 1968). Additionally, the FMG effort to gain the Igbo's trust also manifested in their peace proposals and offerings. In these, emphasis was placed on the plans for reconciliation and rehabilitation of the Igbos in the war afflicted Eastern region (Kirk-Greene, 1971, p. 220). In essence the FMG both attacked the Igbo ethnic group for their supposed ethnic rebellion at the beginning of the conflict, but then also tried to win them over in the end.

Global Media Coverage and the Biafran Famine

Even today, the word Biafra conjures up images of starving children, suffering from 'kwashiokor', or severe protein malnutrition causing their distended bellies and gaunt faces. These victims, the true casualty of the war, have been embedded in the Western consciousness as a result of the intense press coverage not only throughout the war but crucially at the height of the famine in Biafra (Ugochukwu, 2010). As Biafra was reduced to a small enclave on the Igbo land, many Igbo Biafrans sought refuge in what little was left of the state. This increased the population, coupled with a lack of access to supplies and the disruption of agricultural patterns led to widespread malnutrition. In foreign press, articles about the war published after 1968, the minorities were rarely mentioned, and even then, they often took a backseat to the Igbos (Nigerian Civil War Collection, 1970).

With the majority of those suffering from the humanitarian crisis being ethnically Igbo, and the wide media focus on the war intensifying at this time, it is easy to understand how the image of the war from a Western perspective was one of Nigeria versus an Igbo Biafra, and not one of Nigeria versus an ethnically diverse Biafra. This in turn has contributed to the large Biafran and Igbo bias found in many Western texts about the war.

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1   Such as Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, the first president of Nigeria and former Biafra spokesman; and Ralph Uwechwe, the former Biafran representative in Paris.

Flaws in the 3Rs: Rehabilitation,
Reconstruction, Reconciliation

At the end of the conflict, head of state at the time General Gowon famously declared, "No Victor No Vanquished" and set upon a policy of "Rehabilitation, Reconstruction, and Reconciliation" also known as the 3Rs (Ojeleye, 2016). While Gowon himself stressed a general policy of reconciliation, with leniency towards former Biafran military leaders with the sole aim of bringing former Biafrans into the fold, rather than establish a specific commission to handle the 3Rs, he simply shifted the work onto the various administrative structures allowing them to handle things as they saw fit (Dent, 1970, p. 107). This meant that in the former Biafra, still reeling from the effects of the war, the state administrations had a large task at hand while dealing with limited resources. This led to an inefficient and slow reconciliation and reintegration, where the underprivileged that needed the most help received the least, and where the trauma of the past was not resolved.

Gowon granted a general amnesty, but did not lay down explicit rules for reintegration of the former Biafrans into Nigeria (Dent, 1970, p. 107). Instead, a large focus was placed on the implementation of universal education and the creation of the National Youth Service Corps, as a means to foster unity (Bray & Cooper, 1979, pp. 34-36). Rather than approach and deal with the specific issues relating to post-war reintegration, and in light of the 1970's oil boom, it seemed as the FMG preferred to gloss over the war, forget what happened, and start afresh with an imposed but underdeveloped national unity. As a result, many former Biafrans did not really benefit from the 3Rs, which contributed to this idea of marginalisation as punishment for their support of secession. With the majority of former Biafrans being Igbo, it became very easy for neo-Biafran groups to use these grievances for their ethno-nationalist aims.

Neo-Biafra and Igbo Nationalism

Modern Biafra does not stem from the 1967-70 conflict. It is more closely linked to the eased freedom of speech following Nigeria's democratisation in 1999 and the re-radicalisation of Ojukwu (Biafra's former leader) in 2003, with a particularly pro-Igbo sentiment in relation to his candidacy in the presidential elections of that year (Ukiwo, 2009, pp. 24-25). Prior to 1999, Nigeria had been under a military rule for over 30 years and for the most part, freedom of speech against the government was harshly curtailed (Olukotun, 2004). Yet with the end of the military rule, political and social movements sprung up all around the country to declare their various grievances against the government. Additionally, many of these movements took on strong ethnic or religious identities and often focused on their specific region.

In the South East, two separate movements arose: the neo-Biafran groups in the mostly Igbo majority areas, and the groups active in the oil producing region of the Niger Delta (these violently advocated against marginalisation caused by the government and oil companies and are considered separate from the more peaceful Ogoni movement led by Ken Saro-Wiwa). The neo-Biafran groups are often described as "responding to feelings of victimhood among the Igbo, especially since the mid-1990s" (Ukiwo, 2009, p. 24). They capitalise on public frustrations with the state to gain support, and widespread corruption and inequality are reinterpreted as economic marginalisation and political exclusion in "a language that highlights ethnic discrimination" (Smith, 2014, p. 789).

These claims of marginalisation often include, and revolve around issues regarding budgetary allocation. For instance, the fact that the Igbo South East political zone has five states while other zones have at least six is often mentioned as a reason why this political zone receives a lower proportion of government funds (Onuoha, 2012, p. 34), disregarding the fact that there is no physical space to create a sixth state. The exclusion of the Igbo majority Imo state and the Abia state from the Consolidated Council on Social and Economic development of Coastal States of the Niger Delta is another claim of ethnic marginalisation (Onuoha, 2012). The key word here is coastal as these states do not actually have any coastline. Other claims include that a seaport should be built in coastal Igbo states (Ojukwu, 2009, p. 187), despite there being no coastal Igbo majority states and already four operating seaports in the South East.

Within these modern grievances, old narratives of Igbo persecution during the war, the supposed state attempt at genocide of the Igbo people (Heerten & Moses, 2014), and post-war policies that were allegedly created to suppress the Igbo development have all become intertwined into a confusing and sometimes illogical but very powerful rhetoric to capture the imagination of the disenfranchised population of the region. Thus, while the neo-Biafran groups can be understood as a means to put "pressure on the Nigerian government to address structural resource redistribution" (Lu, 2017), their language of secession complicates matters. They want to be treated better by the Nigerian state, yet simultaneously use rhetoric that advocates political separation.

The memories, realities and experiences of the Nigerian Civil War have been co-opted, appropriated for the contemporary reimagining of Biafra. In a way, new Biafra, its political discourse and related propaganda have negatively affected the true history of the Nigerian Civil War, where imagined grievances are recreated as facts and inserted into the popular memory of the war. Fiction becomes truth and so the war is re-remembered according to the needs of the neo-Biafran groups. The language used and the recurrent claims of special marginalisation could be understood

as a means of coping with trauma and economic disparity, yet in a country where arguably the majority population is marginalised in one way or another, the rhetoric used serves to "alienate them from other Nigerians" (Harnischfeger, 2011).

Reconsideration and Rebalancing

Most crucially, but often forgotten, is the fact that Biafra was not a reiteration of ethno-nationalist politics that dominated pre and post-independence Nigeria, where political parties based on ethnic lines fought for political control. Rather, the Eastern region' path to secession started as a commitment to federalism and as a call for an inclusive nationalism that treated all members of the federation equally (Okonta & Meagher, 2009, p. 4). The Eastern government positioned itself as the defender of federalism against the political manoeuvres taking place in Lagos after the second coup of 1966. Ukiwo argues that it was state violence following the two coups in 1966 and not cultural difference that led to the civil war (2009, p. 11). Over time, as the opposing parties failed to come to agreement, the Eastern Region evolved into Biafra and gained aspirations of sovereignty. Secession was posited as the only solution to the ethnic violence carried out in the north of Nigeria against indigenes of the South East. By separating from the whole, the new state would be a refuge for these victims. To re-iterate, this new state was to be a refuge for all those of the Eastern Region, not just one specific ethnic group.

Just like the FMG, Biafra too attempted to gain minority group support. Looking at primary sources from the Biafran side, such as pamphlets, press releases and official communiques, it becomes clear that their political aims and goals were ethnically inclusive (not exclusive) and aimed to draw support not solely from the Igbos but from all peoples of the Eastern region.

Whether the Biafran leadership was sincere in their intentions in regard to the particular challenges faced by Eastern minorities, or whether they simply wanted to ensure they kept the economically valuable minority areas in their grasp (in order ensure their future state's economic viability) is still up for debate. Yet in either case, this ensured that appeals for Biafran support were broad, inclusive and made to all inhabitants of the Eastern region.

It is ironic, in a sense, that the neo-Biafran groups who agitate against the Nigerian state now are simply falling into the stereotypes and images propagated by the Igbo by the Federal Military Government during the civil war era, rather than of the original Biafra. But as explored above, with the flawed effort at reconciliation as well as the intense focus on Igbos during the war, one can see how this situation has come to be.

There is a crucial need to stop equating the original Biafran project with the neo-Biafran movements that simply appropriate the images of statehood. They have arisen in two completely different contexts, with the only similarity being their association with the Igbo ethnic group as their main source of support. The events of the 1960's are not the events of the post-democratisation Nigeria, and the challenges of the Nigerian state are different. Yet both the current Nigerian state and neo-Biafran groups tend to "oscillate between collective amnesia and active remembering" (Onuoha 2016, p. 9) ignoring key facts, and selecting convenient memories to serve their interests. This is not unexpected, yet it is quite problematic if we want to move forward with truly understanding events of the war at all levels.

By misappropriating the history of the conflict, the neo-Biafran groups do a disservice to the experiences and narratives of those who came face to face with the conflict. While it is clear that issues of marginalisation have affected the South East, the repetition of this rhetoric, not only by the groups but by a certain number of Nigerian academics, errs on the side of self-victimisation and ethnic chauvinism. And whereas these neo-Biafran groups are rooted in Igbo ethnic nationalism, the Biafra of 1967 was not.

The dominance of the Igbo focused narratives of the Nigerian Civil War, as well as the biased FMG narratives, has led to decades of misplaced prejudices against one of Nigeria's most populous ethnic groups. Not all Igbos supported the Biafran secession and even now not all Igbos support the neo-Biafran groups. This has also led to the obscuring of the experiences of minority groups during the conflict.

In short, the current image of the Nigerian Civil War is very unbalanced. As we approach the traumatic events of our past, it is crucial to consider all aspects—not only the warring parties but those who found themselves caught in between, not just at the political or military but also at the social level, not just the majority but also the minority—to ensure as much as possible that everyone's history and experience is adequately treated. How are we to fully understand or claim to understand the legacies of the war if our historical knowledge of it remains unbalanced?

While there is much that has been already written about the war, there are always new perspectives and narratives to be considered. Moving forward, we need to encourage a critical examination of the past works, not only to identify inherent bias and subjectivity, but to form new theories on how the war has been treated as a historical event.

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III.
REPERCUSSIONS OF GLOBALISATION AND DECOLONISATION

The Clash of Histories: Can Japan and China Overcome Their Historical Dispute?

Junjiro Shida

Abstract

Japan and China commemorate the Second World War, but always with different memories. When it comes to the Second World War, Japan always recalls the Pacific War (1941-1945) fought against the United States and ending with atomic bombs, whereas modern China narrates the Chinese Communist Party's success in defending their motherland against the Imperial Japanese Army during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945). While being the great powers who contribute to regional security as well as global governance, Japan and China have different historical interpretation which becomes a series of hurdles for Japan-China relations. Recently, due to the regional security issues arising from the North Korean nuclear crisis and the "rise of China", the Japanese conservative narrative of Second World War has become more popular. First, this essay introduces the Japanese conservative historical narrative which has spread within Japanese society. Second, it shows that this narrative corresponds to the actual shift of global balance of power driven by the "rise of China". And third, it analyses future prospects for Japan-China relations, concluding that due to the harsh reality in East Asian security, it is less likely that the memories of the Second World War between Japan and China will merge.

Keywords: Japan-China relations, Japanese Conservatives, collective memory

Clash of Histories: Can Japan and China Overcome Their Historical Dispute?

On November 6, 2017, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe met American President Donald Trump in Tokyo, where both leaders agreed to strengthen the bond of the U.S.-Japan alliance. During a summit meeting, Abe and Trump discussed bilateral trade issues as well as regional security. On the topic of regional security, they agreed to exert maximum pressure on North Korea's nuclear missile program. In addition, they shared concerns over any kind of attempt to challenge the status quo in the East China and the South China Seas (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2017b). Strikingly, they avoided referring to the name of a certain country: China. Possibly they refrained from blaming China for its aggressive policy in the Western Pacific because Trump was to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing a few days later. Although only a small number of opposition par-

ties, like the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), criticised Abe and Trump's "honeymoon", Japan was in a festival mood (The Sankei Shimbun, 2017c).

This event is not unrelated to Abe's strong leadership. One analyst said, "factors such as uncertainty over North Korea are likely to drive voters towards the current government, which is seen as the conservative choice" (McCurry, 2017). Abe's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the conservative ruling party in Japan, indeed won the general election in October 2017.

North Korea's nuclear missile program matters not only for regional countries but also for global governance which seeks global nuclear non-proliferation. To solve the North Korean nuclear crisis, great power cooperation between the U.S., Japan, and China is required. Yet, the reality of great power relations conflicts with this ideal. In addition to the geopolitical struggle between a rising China and the U.S.-Japan alliance,[1] there is another hurdle which blocks triangular cooperation: Japan and China's different memories of the Second World War. Conservative pundits in Japan currently stress the preparation for incoming regional insecurities arising from mainland China or the Korean Peninsula based on their own historical interpretation of wars, whereas modern China criticises the strong U.S.-Japan alliance, as well as the resurgence of Japanese militarism under the Abe administration. They refer to Japanese aggression during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), even in a time of regional and global turbulences driven by North Korea's ambition to become a nuclear power. As a first step in thinking about possible cooperative great power relations between the two Asian giants beyond the historical dispute, we have to consider why the Japanese conservatives have become more popular since the LDP led by Abe returned to power in 2012.

This essay aims at introducing the recent developments in the Japanese conservative narrative concerning Japan-China relations, which is almost always published only in Japanese preventing international audiences having access. In this respect, it aims at neither supporting the Japanese conservative narrative of wars nor blaming it. First, it introduces the Japanese conservative narrative of wars which has spread among Japanese society. Second, it shows that this narrative corresponds to the actual shift of global balance of power driven by the "rise of China". And third, it provides future prospects for Japan and China.

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1   In order to protect and promote Japan's national interests, Japan follows the three pillars of its foreign policy: (1) strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance, (2) enhancing relations with neighboring countries, and (3) strengthening economic diplomacy as a means of driving the growth of the Japanese economy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2017a,p. 7). Following this principle, Japan intends to deepen cooperation with the U.S. as well as tries to establish a "mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests" with China.

In this essay, the term of Japanese "conservative" is mainly and tentatively used as a political and diplomatic stance, which stresses the importance of military power for protecting national interest[2] and prefers cooperation with the allied partner, the U.S., rather than the communist China. For the sake of establishing a more symmetrical triangular balance of power between Japan, the U.S., and China (Hughes, 2012, p. 115), the latter option was pursued by the government under the former Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) from 2009 until 2012. This essay defines collective memory as a socially constructed discourse encompassing mnemonic practices carried out by social actors in symbolic forms such as narratives, images, and sounds between the present and the past. Societies reinterpret their collective memories to shape them to the demands of the present (Reilly, 2011, p. 465; Ako, 2016, pp. 146-147).

Japanese Conservatives' Narrative

According to the narrative of conservative pundits (Watanabe, 2015; Gilbert & Hyakuta, 2017; Gilbert, Muroya, & Seki, 2017; Sakurai, 2017), Japanese modern history could be explained as follows.[3] During the Edo period (1603-1868), Japan was strongly shocked by the Opium Wars (1839-1842, 1856-1860) between the Qing dynasty and the United Kingdom. At that time, in the seas of Japan, the gunboats of the Western powers often appeared, showing their interest in shifting Japanese isolationist foreign policy (*Sakoku*). This new configuration of the East Asian affairs urged Japan to think "after the Qing dynasty, the next target is us". For the sake of its own survival during the age of imperialism, the newly established Meiji government pursued its policy goal of enriching the state and strengthening the military (*Fukoku Kyōhei*). From the viewpoint of the Japanese conservatives, this is the beginning of preparation for a war of self-defence against the Western imperialism. They considered both the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) as self-defence wars against the Russian Empire's southward expansion which covered Manchuria and the Korean Peninsula. This narrative of the two major wars during the Meiji period (1868-1912) is nurtured not only among the conservatives, but among the ordinary people due to the widespread reading of the historical novel *Clouds above the Hill*, written by a national novelist Ryotaro Shiba (Narita, 2012).

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2   To this end, Japanese conservatives are split into two opinion camps: pro-American and anti-American. Susumu Nishibe, a leading figure of anti-American conservatives, Shintaro Ishihara, the former governor of Tokyo, and Yoshinori Kobayashi, a popular nationalist cartoonist, keeps distance from LDP's pro-American conservative foreign policy.

3   See Kurosawa (2014) for a detailed classification of the schools of modern Japanese history.

After the Manchurian Incident on September 18, 1931, Japanese military influence gradually expanded into mainland China, and eventually, Japan declared total war, known as the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), against China under the leadership of the Chinese Nationalist Party (*Kuomintang*, KMT). Four years later, on December 8, 1941, the Japanese Imperial Army launched the Malayan Campaign against the British and Dutch armies, and simultaneously, the Japanese Imperial Navy attacked the U.S. naval station at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii. The Pacific War (1941-1945) had begun. For Japanese conservatives, the battles on the two fronts were not a war of aggression but of self-defence. For them, Chinese internal turmoil among military cliques—the KMT under Jiang Jieshi, and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under Mao Zedong—forced Japan to become involved in military affairs in mainland China. Japan had to break the "ABCD line", a series of embargoes against Japanese aggressive policy on the continent imposed by the major powers: America, Britain, China, and the Netherlands. After efforts in vain, with the losses of young Kamikaze pilots, the tragic battles on the Pacific islands such as Iwo Jima and Okinawa, and finally, the dropping of the two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Japanese battle for its own survival ended in defeat.

Embracing the self-image of a "victim" of war, conservatives attack the Japanese liberal historical perception which regards Japanese aggressive policy during the war as the "evil", labelling it the "masochistic view of history (*Jigyaku Shikan*)". They also regard the CCP's historical interpretation as "revisionist". According to their interpretation, the Imperial Japanese Army once fought against the official army of the Republic of China (ROC) led by the KMT and the CCP was one of the guerrilla organisations. They point out that the People's Republic of China (PRC), which did not yet exist during the Second World War, has no right to criticise wartime Japan. Additionally, they think that the CCP uses the historical dispute to make Japan a scapegoat for the sake of demonstrating political legitimacy of the CCP to govern the nation in mainland China to the Chinese people.

In fact, after the late 1980s, China experienced domestic and global turbulence. On June 4, 1989, there was the Tiananmen Incident and China witnessed the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. For the sake of regaining the CCP's legitimacy, the Chinese President, Jiang Zemin, launched the nationwide patriotic education campaign, focusing on China's traumatic and humiliating experience in the face of the Western and Japanese imperialism. This is why PRC describes its past as the "100 years of humiliation", identifying herself as a "victim" of war by foreign invaders (Mitter, 2003, p. 128; Wang, 2008, p. 795; Shoji, 2012, pp. 132-133).

Ignoring the CCP's narrative of the war in mainland China, Japanese conservatives always highlight the battle in the Pacific where the U.S. forces

gradually approached the Japanese Home Islands. Furthermore, almost all live-action and animated movies or animation films in Japan feature the Pacific War, not the Second Sino-Japanese War.[4] In addition to these symbolic forms which create collective memory, Japanese conservative pundits appear on television, give seminars, and try to spread their own narrative via their publications and blogs.

Concerns over the Real Japanese Security

Conservatives in Japan are concerned not only with the "History Wars" with the rising China, but also the real Japanese security in the region where the North Korean and the Chinese aggressive policy are palpable. Nowadays, North Korea has repeatedly fired ballistic missiles over Japan (Phipps & Russel, 2017). To solve the North Korean missile crisis, cooperation with China is necessary for Japanese security. Yet, in the eyes of the conservatives, instead of showing a cooperative attitude, China invests its economic resources into modernising the capabilities of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and causes tension with the U.S., Japan, and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries. By displays of military force, the Chinese "irredentism" appears in the East China and South China Seas.

Moreover, President Xi launched ambitious goals based on the CCP re-creating collective memory. On September 3, 2015, Xi delivered a speech during the ceremony to mark the 70th anniversary of the "victory of the Chinese people's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War". The traditional CCP's collective memory of the "War of Resistance against Japan"[5] has started to be situated in a much broader context of the "World Anti-Fascist War" (Ji, 2015). Xi stressed that after the great triumph over the Japanese military aggressors, the Chinese people had finally ended national humiliation (Xi, 2015). This is the very first event that commemorated the victory of the Second World War, and he held a massive military parade in Tiananmen Square, and invited many foreign government officials. And very recently, during the country's 19th Party Congress held in October 2017, President Xi stressed the following points. First, after mentioning the "100 years of humiliation," he promised to restore China to its rightful great power status by 2049 (Doshi, 2017). This is what a former expert on Chinese affairs in the U.S. once called the "Hundred-Year Marathon" (Pillsbury, 2015). Second, he dutifully declared that China will never give up its efforts at Chinese "irredentism" and expand its sphere

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4   *Barefoot Gen* (1983), *Grave of the Fireflies* (1988), *Yamato* (2005), *For Those We Love* (2007), *Isoroku* (2011), and *the Eternal Zero* (2013) are popular war movies in Japan.

5   Shi (2010), Xu (2015), and Kawashima (2017) provide detailed information about the historiography of the "War of Resistance Against Japan", described as one of the most popular academic fields in modern international history.

of influence through the scheme such as the "One Belt One Road" (OBOR) initiative.

Under these circumstances, since 2016, the Abe administration with the support of LDP politicians, conservative academicians and journalists, has started to think about Japan acquiring capabilities of "deterrence by denial" and "deterrence by punishment", in concrete terms, enhancing sea power for maritime warfare and developing the "Aegis Ashore" system and "counterattack capabilities" for missile warfare (The Sankei Shimbun, 2017a; The Sankei Shimbun, 2017b). China criticises the Japanese military build-up, describing it as a "resurgence of Japanese militarism in the 1930s" (Record China, 2016). Every time this kind of criticism appears, conservative pundits in Japan and the CCP in Beijing harshly blame each other, calling the party a "historical revisionist". In this way, the memories of the Second World War between Japan and China never merge.

Future Prospects

For the sake of solving the North Korean nuclear crisis and tackling other global issues, can Japan and China overcome their historical dispute? Considering they commemorate the Second World War in a different way and that this trend has become more salient these days due to regional security issues, there are few prospects of overcoming this hurdle. Due to domestic pressure, Chinese ambition for a peaceful but strong growth until 2049 will not depend on the development of the North Korean affair. China's rise will sometimes be accompanied by anti-Japanese sentiment. If great power cooperation fails to make North Korea give up becoming a member of the nuclear club, Japanese security will be further threatened.

Under these circumstances, conservative pundits would increase their presence with their own version of collective memory of the modern Japanese history, which is totally different from the CCP's. In this scenario, no one can deny the possibility of the LDP government in Japan considering a full-scale military build-up to survive regional insecurities and prepare for an incoming "war of self-defence", the "official" terminology of Japanese conservatives. Considering the geographical location, however, Japan and China will never escape the common future. Japan and China should try not to limit all levels of communication, with the expectation that mutual interdependence through inter-governmental, business, and people's inter-exchanges will keep the two countries from misperceiving each other in a globalised world. As history tells us, war is most likely when all concerned parties misperceive each other (Jervis, 1982-1983/1988).

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(Dis-)continuity of Colonial Religious Identities: A Challenge for Christian/ Muslim Coexistence in Northern Nigeria

Oholiabs D. Tuduks

Abstract

Muslims and Christians are the major religious groups in Northern Nigeria who have had, and sustained, distinct and conflicting identities. It was argued that such identities among the two religious groups were established in the British colonial era. The identities reflected in the superiority/inferiority complex became challenges to Christian/Muslim inter-religious co-existence. The challenges became responsible for the dysfunctional relationship which has periodically resulted in inter-religious crises among the two religious groups leading to the state of devastation in Northern Nigeria. Today, the contesting voices among Muslims and Christians agitate the continuity or discontinuity of the distinct religious identities. As non-empirical qualitative research, the study followed the methodology of a hermeneutical approach in practical theology through the following phases: the phase of description or observation; the phase of critical analysis; the phase of critical reflection and systematising; and the phase of design or strategic planning. These phases examined the religious policies of British colonial administration in Northern Nigeria and the postcolonial consequential effect on the Christian/Muslim inter-religious relationship. As a strategic plan towards addressing the challenge, decoloniality as a means to breaking the wall of differences among the two religious groups was argued for realising an inter-religious functional relationship.

Keywords: Northern Nigeria, Christians and Muslims, inter-religious relationships, discrimination, decoloniality

Introduction[1]

The region of Northern Nigeria was identified in the pre-colonial period as the Central Sudan and also referred to as Hausaland as the dominant ethnic group in the region was the Hausa (Turaki, 1993). In the pre-colonial period, the relationship between the Muslim groups[2] and the traditional ethnic group was characterised by ethnic and religious hostility, slave raiding, slave trading, slavery and wars of territorial expansion and annexation (Turaki, 2010). According to Sodiq (2009), Jihad was another moment

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1   Some part of this work is extracted from my MTh thesis research submitted to the Faculty of Theology Stellenbosch University.

2   This refers to the Muslims in the Hausa land of the north-western sub-region and the Kanem-Bornu Muslims of the north-eastern sub-region.

of difficulties in the region as it was during the period that Islam gained a stronghold in Northern Nigeria, and the adherents of traditional religions were hardly tolerated but rather subjected to social pressures. They were forced to convert to Islam for their security and economic freedom in the region. During the period of colonisation, the region was politically called the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, and later as the Northern Province of Nigeria (Turaki, 1993). In the 1950s it was referred to as the Northern Region of Nigeria, and during the post-colonial period the political entity was broken up: into six states in 1967, then ten states in 1975, and seventeen states in 1991 (Turaki, 1993). Today, Northern Nigeria consists of nineteen states (with the Federal Capital Territory) out of the thirty-six in Nigeria.

Map of Nigerian Northen Region (Northen Region, Nigeria, n. d.)
From "Northen Region, Nigeria," by Alaminalpha, 2014 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northern_Region,_Nigeria). © WikiMedia Commons.

States of Nigeria (States of Nigeria, n. d.)
From "States of Nigeria," by Domenico-de-ga, 2009 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/States_of_Nigeria). ©WikiMedia Commons.

The notion of (dis-)continuity of colonial religious identities depicts the contesting voices among the Christians and Muslims in Northern Nigeria for or against the existence of the distinct religious identities. Such identities have been argued to have had their origins in the British colonial era in the region which placed the religious groups into a state of a superiority/inferiority complex. The identities thus create imbalanced statuses and considerations among the religious groups, and consequently became the trigger for a dysfunctional relationship[3] and inter-religious crises. Today, whereas one religious group appears to be comfortable and invariably wishes for the continuity of the distinct identities, the other calls for its discontinuity. The paper, through hermeneutical phases, will examine the religious policies of the British colonial administration and the consequential effects on the Christian/Muslim relationship in Northern Nigeria. The first phase to be considered is the phase of description or observation which will explore the historical context of Christian/Muslim relationship in Northern Nigeria. The phases of critical analysis and critical reflection and systematising the findings will discuss the implications of the continuity or discontinuity of distinct identities among the religious groups. And lastly, the phase of design or strategic planning will discuss the possibility for creating and maintaining a Christian/Muslim inter-religious functional relationship that will be free from a superiority/inferiority complex.

Historical Background to Christian/Muslim Relationship in Northern Nigeria

Islam and Christianity came to Northern Nigeria at different times through different means. The former was the first to arrive, coming in the seventh and eighth centuries through Arab traders and the latter arrived in the region in 1857 through the Anglican Niger Mission of the Church Missionary Society (CMS) led by Bishop Ajayi Crowther (Gaiya, 2004). The arrival of Islam in Northern Nigeria first had its influence in Kanem-Bornu, the present Bornu state, and later proliferated to the Western part of the region among the Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups (Sodiq, 2009). The distinct civilisations of the ethnic groups attracted the interest of scholars, political leaders, and religious leaders including colonial adventurers and Christian missionaries in the Middle Ages (Turaki, 2010). The Hausa elites were in charge of the Islamic religious leadership when the problem of social oppression, insecurity, and lack of commitment to Islam brought about

a *Jihad*[4] at the end of the eighteenth century (Sodiq, 2009). According to Sodiq, Dan Fodio's primary objective with the *Jihad* was to see Islam and its law applied to all Muslims and to make the word of Allah supreme. While some saw it as a struggle against the Hausa elites, Sodiq argues that Dan Fodio saw it as a call from Allah which resulted in the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate[5]. Although the aim of the *Jihad* was religious, a reformation against injustices and oppression, yet, the result brought about ethnic transition from the Hausa to the Fulani. Since then the Fulani have been the custodians of Islamic religious beliefs and practices in Northern Nigeria with Sokoto as the leadership seat of the caliphate. The *Jihad* also resulted in integration of the Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups through inter-marriage, language, and culture; today the two ethnic groups are referred to as one—the Hausa/Fulani ethnic group (Turaki, 2010).

The coming of the British colonial administrators into the region of Northern Nigeria from 1900 to 1903 was at the time when Islamic rule had already been established and consolidated among the Muslims (Ubah, 1991). When the region was conquered, the British authority opted for an *indirect rule* to enable it to take advantage of the established Islamic leadership, thus retaining the basic institutions of the emirates to facilitate and consolidate the imperial rule (Ubah, 1991). The British colonial government gave Muslims charge over all territories at the expense of non-adherents to Islamic faith. The British in turn provided security to the Islamic religion, vowing not to interfere in the religious affairs in the emirates (Barnes, 2004). While the attention of the British colonial administrator in charge of the protectorate of Northern Nigeria was focused on the development of Muslim areas, the non-Muslim areas were left with the leadership of Muslims who were appointed as judges of courts (Ubah, 1991). Islam gained a stronghold in Northern Nigeria as the result of the support and freehand enjoyed from the British colonial administrators, and the adherents dominated the colonial hierarchical structure (Sodiq, 2009). Sodiq further reveals that non-Muslims were denied many rights and privileges in the region, and to worsen the situation, they were forced to convert to Islam as the only means of enjoying the security and free trade enjoyed by Muslims.

When Christianity arrived in Northern Nigeria, its mission activities were made difficult as the missionaries were not welcomed in the region, with the Muslims therefore becoming hostile to Christianity (Sodiq, 2009).

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3   In the context of the Christian/Muslim relationship, dysfunctional describes a relationship that lacks an inter-religious consciousness and its moral ethics, a relationship characterised by the practices of religious exclusion and discrimination causing inter-religious discomfort among the religious adherents.

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4   The word Jihad literally means *an effort*, or *struggle*, the term referring to a religious war with those who are unbelievers in the mission of the Prophet Muhammad. The Jihad was staged by Uthman Dan Fodio, a Fulani Islamic scholar. (Hughes, 1988).

5   The Sokoto Caliphate in Northern Nigeria was one of the largest empires in Africa during the 19th century. The empire developed as a result of the Fulani jihads, and was the centre of politics and economics in the region until it fell to British colonial armies in the early 20th century (BlackPast.org, 2011).

The British colonial administration on the other hand supported the denial of the Christian missionary activities among the Muslims in fulfilling its promise of Islamic religious non-interference (Turaki, 1993). Christian mission activities were therefore carried out outside the Muslim dominated areas. The Muslim leaders deterred their people from identifying with Christians, denying them western education which was only found among Christians, and believing that the schools were a means of the conversion of their children (Sodiq, 1994). The Christian missionaries accused the colonial government of taking action through a covert policy that favoured the expansion of Islam at the expense of Christianity (Barnes, 2004). They reported the colonial religious stratified inequality and bigotry at a meeting in London in 1927 (Turaki, 1999). Turaki explains that it was at the meeting that the Christian missionaries expressed their opposition to the prohibition policy and the anti-Christian attitude of the British colonial administrators of Northern Nigeria. Consequently, the colonial administrators promised to change their policies towards the Christian missions and to educate the Muslim rulers on principles of religious tolerance.

The Implication of the Distinct Religious Identities

The distinct identities in the colonial era through British indirect rule were translated into the attachment of superiority and inferiority statuses to the two religious groups in Northern Nigeria. While the Muslims maintained the status of superiority in the community, the non-Muslims were tagged with an inferior status, as their colonial mode of administration was referred to as the *Pagan Administration* (Turaki, 1993). In his more recent work[6], Turaki (2010) reaffirms his earlier point on the instituted stratification of inequality explaining its consequence among Christians and Muslims today. He points to the fact that the claimed superiority by the Muslims is manifested in their address of non-Muslims as *arna*[7] indicating their sociological pattern of dominance and subordination (2010). According to Turaki (1993), the consequences of the indirect rule among Muslims and non-Muslims are as follows: first, the subordination of the non-Muslim group to Hausa-Fulani rule and political control; second, the institutionalisation of Hausa-Fulani dominance through the development of their ruling families and socio-political values and institutions; third, the colonial maintenance and defence of the privileged ruling families and the

maintenance of the socio-political status quo; fourth, the creation and development of the Muslim political elites to succeed the colonial administration; and, fifth, the unjust colonial political and economic institutions that reflected class, religious or ethnic biases. The effect of the colonial administrative stratification has been confirmed in the report of the International Joint Delegation of the World Council of Churches (WCC) and the Royal Aal al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought as one of the causes of the dysfunctional relationship leading to inter-religious tensions and crises in Northern Nigeria (The Royal Islamic Strategic Studies Centre, 2012). The distinct identities further became the source of the religious discrimination and exclusion among the religious groups in Northern Nigeria today.

In a situation where a religious group sees itself as superior over others, the inter-religious relationship will definitely be characterised by discrimination and exclusion. This will further be discussed in the concept of coloniality. Coloniality refers to the long-standing patterns of power emerging as a result of colonialism, this defining culture, labour, intersubjective relations, and knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations (Maldonado-Torres, 2007). This is further explained in the context of coloniality of being, the concept originating from a discussion about the implications of the coloniality of power from different areas of society. Maldonado-Torres described the coloniality of power as referring to the inter-relation among modern forms of exploitation and domination. He refers to the coloniality of knowledge to the impact of colonisation on different areas of knowledge production; therefore, the primary reference of *coloniality of being* is the lived experience of colonisation and the impact on the language and society. Maldonado-Torres argues for decolonisation as a means of confrontation of any discrimination caused by colonialism. In other words, with decolonisation, Maldonado-Torres expresses his thought as opposing coloniality of power, knowledge, and being. Today, coloniality is quite evident in Northern Nigeria with religious discrimination and exclusion that has made the relationship dysfunctional among the two religious groups.

Exclusion is described by Miroslav Volf (1996) as a destructive evil whose result is eventually a creation of a world without the other, and an ultimate price of having rivers of blood and tears. He further reveals the ugly faces of exclusion as elimination, assimilation, domination, and abandonment. Exclusion creates an encapsulated mindset that isolates the two groups from each other in the context of an inter-religious relationship. Such encapsulated mindsets are further created by community languages that only speak of *we* and *us* as being different from *they* and *them*. An encapsulated mindset could also be seen as a disregard for religious or cultural variations among people (Augsburger, 1986). It made the two religious groups develop little or no interest to acquire knowledge and understanding

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6   Tainted legacy: Islam, colonialism and slavery in Northern Nigeria. Published 2010 in McLean by Isaac Publishing.

7   *Arna* is a Hausa word referring to pagans, its singular form is *arne*. The term *arne* (singular) is sometimes used interchangeably with *Kafir* (Arabic) which means infidel. The two terms are mostly used by Muslims to describe non-Muslims, but this is not supposed to include for example Christians and Jews who already have their nomenclature inscribed in the Qur'an as *ahl al-kitab*—people of the book (Qu'ran, 3:64).

of each other's religion (Omotosho, 2003; The Royal Islamic Strategic Studies Centre, 2012).

Exclusion by domination leads to one religious claim of geographical location at the expense of the other. For example, Northern Nigeria is often claimed by Muslims, as the region is predominantly occupied and influenced by Islamic culture (Kwashi, 2004). Mallam Aliyu Gwarzo believes that the leadership of Northern Nigeria was given to Hausa/Fulani Muslims by Allah through the British colonial leaders (Gwanzo, 2014). Similarly, in Jos, the capital city of Plateau State, the Christian majority denies the Muslim Hausa/Fulani minority indigeneity claiming that the city belongs to Christians (Human Rights Watch, 2006). As another form of exclusion, Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW) in its submission to the United Nations Human Rights Council reveals areas of discrimination against Christians: community development; public employment and promotion; the establishment of public religious institutions; and the construction of religious places of worships (CSW, 2008; *cf.* Mulders, 2016; The 21st Century Wilberforce Initiative, 2016). What seems to be more challenging in the relationship among Christians and Muslims in Northern Nigeria today is coloniality which condones the continuity of the religious exclusive and discrimination as allowed in the colonial era. Decoloniality will be argued as a means of addressing the menace of coloniality among the religious groups.

Towards Inter-Religious Functional Relationship
in Northern Nigeria

In response to the coloniality that sustains the distinct identities among the religious groups thus triggering inter-religious tension, decoloniality was argued as a choice for discontinuity of colonial distinct religious identities. Decoloniality is a way of rehumanising the world through breaking hierarchies created for differences that dehumanise people and communities (Maldonado-Torres, 2016). Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013) asserts that decoloniality is both an epistemic and a political project that seeks for liberation and freedom for people who experienced colonialism and who are today surviving and living under the bondage of global coloniality. In the context of Christian/Muslim inter-religious dysfunctional relationships, decoloniality condemns the practices of exclusion and discrimination, and argues against the distinct identities among the religious groups. It creates room for inclusivity through an inter-religious functional relationship that gives equal status, respect, tolerance and consideration for all religions.

To realise Christian/Muslim inter-religious functional relationships, sociology has contributed in the context of functional behaviour. Such behaviour describes the situation where a social norm prevails in the community. According to Gale (2006), the notion of functional behaviour was used by Emile Durkheim and W. Robertson Smith who are considered the

pioneers of modern sociology and anthropology. In functionalism, religion is meant to always function towards supporting and maintaining the internal harmony of the equilibrium of a society (Maduro, 1982). Maduro explains that social conflict is an accidental reality in the functioning of a society as a result of the lack of contribution by religion to the social equilibrium and thus seen as dysfunctional. The importance of religion in a society is noted by Durkheim who sees religion as having a functional element that unites followers to a single moral community (Hamilton, 1995). Hamilton points to the functionalist perception of religion which often emphasises the term *inclusive,* defining religion as anything that promotes unity or social cohesion in a society. Abrahamson (1978) asserts that the term functionalism comes from the emphasis made on contributions in such a system that make things work normally. But if the contribution made is negative, thus disrupting the system, then the element is dysfunctional.

Towards a functional relationship, Wallace and Hartley (1988) suggested the friendship viewed by Durkheim as a functional option to religion for individuals in modern society, and social solidarity—a collective cohesion that depends on shared values. In this context, a religious behaviour is done inter-religiously with the consciousness of others. An inter-religiously disciplined person is open-minded with interest in diversity, and as found in the dictionary's elegant words, has a *catholicity of spirit (*Little, 1998). The *catholicity of spirit* was found in Mother Theresa who in her lifetime committed herself to serving humanity inter-religiously (Wuthnow, 2005). In living her Christian religious life inter-religiously, Mother Theresa proclaimed *I see God in every human being* (Wuthnow, 2005). Such a statement can only be made by an inter-religiously disciplined mind, a mindset needed among Christians and Muslims, particularly in Northern Nigeria, for a functional relationship. Therefore, while the paper argues for the discontinuity of the religiously distinct identities, it suggests bridge building among the religious groups as a means to addressing the divide of superiority/inferiority and majority/minority complexes.

Conclusion

The dysfunctional relationship existing among Christians and Muslims today originated in the British colonial era through the privileges bestowed on one religious group who saw itself as superior to others. The distinct religious identities, therefore, continue to be a trigger for inter-religious tension between the two religious groups. In response to the (dis-)continuity of colonial religious identities, a choice for discontinuity through decoloniality was argued towards realising a common identity for a functional relationship among the religious groups. For effective application of decoloniality, emphasis was made on bridge building towards cordial inter-religious relationships among religious adherents to promote

an inclusive society. And for a society to be functional, individuals and groups must always function towards supporting and maintaining the internal harmony of the equilibrium of the inter-religious society.

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The New Language of Hate: Misogyny and the Alt-Right

Daniel Odin Shaw

Abstract

Recent high-profile events such as the disturbances in Charlottes-ville have pushed identitarian populist movements such as the Alt-Right to the fore. Their exclusionary rhetoric towards minority groups is accompanied by misogynistic attitudes and an opposition to feminism, which has led to harassment campaigns and attempts to undermine modern notions of consent. A common explanation for the increasing prevalence of these groups is economic anxiety and a general discontent with the prevailing social and economic system. By analysing the discourse prevalent in on-line forums dedicated to anti-feminism, as well as the literature produced in support of their ideas, it is clear that these groups are attempting to re-assert a narrowly defined and heavily mythologised vision of masculinity. It is a vision which stands opposed to modern feminist thought and gender non-conformity. What is unclear is how economic concerns drive this anti-feminist aspect of right-wing populism in a developed economy such as America.

This paper will examine the linkage between far-right populism and anti-feminism through the rhetoric and actions of these groups, suggesting that economic changes such as globalisation and increasingly insecure working conditions are fuelling "neo-masculinity" and anti-feminism. However, by looking in depth at the notion of "Sexual Economics" as espoused by online anti-feminist communities it is possible to see the language and the logic of neoliberalism applied directly to the sexual sphere, despite this movement being associated with disenchantment under the neoliberal paradigm. Drawing on Mark Fisher's ideas concerning capitalist realism and a range of feminist literature linking post-Fordism and sexual commodification, this paper will argue that this movement represents the transference of anxieties arising from the neoliberal economic system onto women and sexual minorities in a way which mirrors the commodifying tendencies of this economic system itself.

Keywords: far-right, anti-feminism, extremism, neoliberalism, online social movements, masculinity

Introduction

Misogyny is a common feature of the exclusionary right, one which is often based on a patriarchal and broadly anti-feminist philosophy which views women as outsiders. This is a feature shared by groups on the so-called "Alt-Right/Alt-Lite", a diverse movement which has gained prominence in America and other Western countries. This misogyny is exemplified in groups associated with "neo-masculinity", men's rights activism and the online discussion spaces known as the "Manosphere" (Heikkilä, 2017; Ging, 2017). For simplicity, this paper will refer to these groups as masculinist groups, although they do not represent a homogenous position. Masculinist groups associated with the Alt-Right are primarily concerned with a perceived domination of society by feminist ideology and their own place in the "Sexual Economy". Several theories have attempted to explain the emergence of the Alt-Right, with the most common being that economic anxiety under neoliberalism has fuelled an exclusionary backlash[1].

However, although some in this movement advocate forms of economic protectionism, they rarely attack the key assumptions of neoliberal capitalism. Instead, they focus their anger on cultural and sexual issues. Inglehart and Norris (2016) set out the economic anxiety thesis, but instead explain the rise of exclusionary American populism in terms of this cultural backlash. What has not yet been argued is that these two competing theories are in fact mutually reinforcing aspects of the same driving force.

By looking in depth at the notion of Sexual Economics as espoused by online anti-feminist communities, it is possible to see the language and the logic of neoliberalism applied directly to the sexual sphere, despite this movement being associated with disenchantment under the neoliberal paradigm. Drawing on Mark Fisher's (2009) ideas concerning capitalist realism and a range of feminist literature, this paper will argue that this movement represents the transference of anxieties arising from the neoliberal economic system onto women and sexual minorities in a way that mirrors the commodifying tendencies of this economic system itself.

Economics and Exclusion

In order to understand the most extreme and virulent anti-feminist groups on the right, it is important to understand the forces underpinning the broader movement to which they belong. The emergence of a renewed and resurgent far right in America, exemplified by the election of Donald Trump in 2016, has been explained in a number of ways. The idea that exclusionary populist politics is driven by economic insecurity has a strong grounding in the literature (Inglehart, 2016; Ignazi, 2006), although this does not paint a full picture of the racial and sexual resentment present in this movement. Recent research into the 2016 US election has shown that both economic worries and misogynist attitudes contributed to the election

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1   While this exclusionary backlash includes both racial and sexual components, this paper will focus on misogyny for the sake of parsimony. It is also worth noting that attitudes towards women are more consistent on the new right, with attitudes to race being more fragmented. For more on race and the Alt-Right please see Summers (2017) and Chang (2017).

of Donald Trump, a presidential candidate who was embroiled in several scandals involving sexism and racism. Schaffner, MacWilliams and Netea (2017) conducted research which shows that sexism, racism and economic dissatisfaction were all correlated with support for Donald Trump. Wayne, Oceno and Valentino (2017) similarly found a strong correlation between sexist attitudes and support for Trump. While this research does not examine the Alt-Right in particular, they do make up a part of Trump's electoral support base and can be seen as broadly reflective of it. Furthermore, several of Trump's key allies and former advisors are associated with the Alt-Right, such as Steve Bannon and Stephen Miller. This research can, therefore, be seen as establishing a link between sexist attitudes, economic anxiety and support for right-wing policies. The deeper question is how economic anxiety links with the specific and extreme form of sexism prevalent in groups associated with the Alt-Right.

Post-Fordism, globalisation and neoliberalism have brought cultural and economic changes which challenge the primacy of the white male worker in the West. The search for cheap foreign labour and the growing financial independence of women has eroded the economic privilege which American men could have expected in the mid to late 20th century. As Salzinger points out, "Under neoliberalism, the breadwinners of the global north are a dying breed" (2016, p. 9). Many men no longer have the economic stability that they might have expected, while they have increasingly had to adapt to types of work that challenge their sense of masculinity (Nixon, 2009). The move from an industrial society centred around the male breadwinner and based on traditional masculinity towards a post-Fordist environment based around the service sector has remade gender relations. Linda McDowell's (2003) work shows specifically how economic instability and changes to working practises have disproportionately affected young working-class men. In the post-industrial working environment masculinity has been increasingly pathologised and problematised. The reassertion of traditional gender roles can be seen within this context as a reactionary attempt to resist this process. This can be seen most sharply in the neo-masculinist movement and attempts to push back against gender fluidity and trans-rights. This focus on traditional masculinity is a unifying theme for the extreme right-wing of the American political spectrum (Kimmel & Ferber, 2000).

This challenge to traditional masculinity has been compounded by economic shocks, capital flight and a lengthy recession. Increased competition, wage depression, growing inequality and a more precarious economic position are established features of the modern neoliberal capitalist system which is now being challenged by the economic nationalism and cultural chauvinism of the right. Kimmel conceptualises this reactionary anger as "aggrieved entitlement":

It is that sense that those benefits to which you believed yourself entitled have been snatched away from you by unseen forces larger and more powerful. You feel yourself to be the heir to a great promise, the American Dream, which has turned into an impossible fantasy for the very people who were *supposed* to inherit it. (Kimmel, 2013, p. 18, emphasis in original)

The broad economic forces which underpin this are being somewhat challenged by renewed calls for protectionism and America First polices. However, in many quarters this anger has mainly resulted in exclusionary politics directed against women and minorities. The sense of anger at economic elites has spilled over into a more aggressive form of politics more generally, while attempts to seriously reform the economic system have been associated primarily with the fringe left. People without a college degree are the most economically vulnerable group in America, and also the most likely to support exclusionary political positions (Schafttner, MacWilliams, & Netea, 2017). Furthermore, a recent survey of young Americans showed a strong correlation between economic vulnerability, racial resentment, and misogynistic attitudes (Cohen, Luttig, & Rogowski, 2016). While there has been a debate over whether it is racial resentment, economic anxiety or sexism which drives right wing politics in America, the best explanation is that all three are closely linked.

The evidence that economic vulnerability under neoliberalism and exclusionary politics are linked is strong, although more research is needed. The deeper challenge is in understanding the mechanism by which economic anxiety translates into misogyny. Anti-feminist groups and the Alt-Right more generally may be drawing on pre-existing ideas, but they have only come to prominence in the past half-decade. America has been experiencing neoliberal economic policies and post-industrial work for closer to half a century, although inequality has reached a new high in recent years (Piketty, Saez, & Zucman, 2016). It is therefore worth exploring what has caused their increased influence, in order to better understand the factors driving them. Disillusionment with the current economic paradigm is certainly a factor in the reaction against pluralism and equality, but it cannot alone explain why this movement is gaining in influence now. To understand this, it is important to examine the link between neoliberalism and feminism.

Identities in Conflict

Anti-feminist rhetoric in the Alt-Right specifically targets modern liberal feminism, which is seen as being inexorably linked to identity politics, political correctness, and multiculturalism. Adolph Reed (2009; 2015) has described progressive identity politics as providing rhetorical cover

for what is essentially a right-wing neoliberal economic paradigm. It is in response to identity politics and this specific brand of feminism that the misogyny of the Alt-Right is typically situated. Modern feminism has been described by Nancy Fraser as "capitalism's handmaiden" (Fraser, 2013) and termed "neoliberal feminism" by Rotternberg (2013). Dodge and Gilbert (2015, p. 333) go further, claiming that feminism has been "colonised by patriarchal and capitalistic interests". This form of feminism combines social inclusivity and economic liberalism with an internationalist outlook, which is clearly anathema to the economically anxious nationalists of the right. While this connection is rarely articulated by those on the right, their form of attack against feminism retains a similar pattern to their attacks against neoliberalism and globalisation. Just as neoliberal working practices undermine traditional masculinity and globalisation is seen to flood Western countries with cheap labour, so neoliberal feminism encroaches on the masculine social sphere. It is possible to see this most clearly in the events which triggered the most virulent campaigns of anti-feminist rhetoric in recent years. Gamergate, the online hate campaign waged against prominent women in the gaming industry, is seen as a key factor in the radicalisation of many young men who now identify with the Alt-Right and men's rights groups (Marwick & Lewis, 2017, pp.7-9). The most vitriolic abuse was directed towards Anita Saarkasian, a media scholar who attempted to advance a feminist analysis of videogames. This furore can be seen as a reaction against the growing commercial and political power of women in traditionally masculine gaming culture. Similarly, attempts to make the prestigious science fiction Hugo Awards more inclusive triggered a wide-ranging backlash against women and minorities (Oleszczuk, 2017). This attempted exclusion of women from what are often viewed as masculine aspects of culture is a form of cultural protectionism, mirroring the economic protectionism central to the nationalistic politics of the right.

Another major issue for masculinist groups and the Alt-Right more generally is the dominance of political correctness, particularly on college campuses and in the media. For example, conservative speakers have been protested or de-platformed at many colleges in the US, while there is an increasing sensitivity to issues around race and gender. Feminist groups have been at the forefront of this, promoting progressive views around gender, sex, and sexuality while critiquing what they view as unacceptable views. For many people this represents an attempt to be more inclusive and more aware of issues around identity and equality. However, for those on the right, this is often seen as a chilling attack on free speech. Part of Donald Trump's appeal was his lack of political correctness, showing an impulse to defend freedom of speech from perceived liberal attacks. Masculinist groups draw on this, seeing liberal feminism as being in fundamental opposition to free speech. The growth of these groups can be viewed as

a reaction from the right to the growing influence of socially progressive viewpoints in politics and culture. For these groups, feminism has become the focal point for their broader concerns about culture, tradition and free speech. Free speech in particular is seen as a right or entitlement without limitation, which is being eroded by attempts to impose pluralistic cultural norms. Although the link between feminism and neoliberal globalisation is rarely articulated, they are seen in shared terms as an unacceptable encroachment on Western male entitlement. However, for many groups on the Alt-Right fringe, the cultural encroachment of pluralism and feminism trumps the economic concerns with which their anger is often explained. To illustrate this focus on resisting feminism and social justice, it is worth looking at the language used within this movement.

Language of the Manosphere

The language and rhetoric of the right comes in many forms, depending on the precise nature and goals of each group. However, the broad coalition of groups associated with the Alt-Right have developed a shared vocabulary as refers to gender and feminism, which can be found being articulated most clearly on the collection of online masculinist spaces known as the Manosphere (Ging, 2017). This vocabulary focuses overwhelmingly on sex, supporting Wendy Brown's (1987) argument that women and sex are often seen as synonymous in political thought. This can also be seen in the policy agenda of anti-feminist groups, which focuses more on issues of consent, false rape allegations, and sexuality than on economic justice or support for men's health. Prominent arguments from this movement suggest that sex is a human right for men, drawing on the idea that men and women have differential sex drives (Dannato, 2014). The centrality of sex to this movement seemingly runs counter to the idea that this group is driven largely by economic vulnerability. However, a close examination of their language reveals an economic undercurrent to their thinking about sex, gender and relationships.

A key facet of the theory espoused by masculinist groups is the idea that society is largely based around sexual competition in a way which fundamentally disadvantages men. Women, as the choosier sex, have greater power in the sexual arena than men. Men's high libido makes sex a resource over which women have control, placing men in a weaker position. In addition to this, women utilise various mating strategies which further oppress men. One example of this might be the so-called "Cads vs Dads" strategy, in which women prefer masculine and aggressive cads for sex but responsible and caring dads for long-term relationships (Aitken, Jonason, & Lyons, 2013). This is a contested biological theory, which is understood in masculinist groups to prove that nice guys always finish last. It is more bluntly put as an example of women "riding the cock carousel" until they are past

their peak "SMV" or sexual market value (scarletspider3, 2016). Men in these groups very much see themselves as the victims of this system, manipulated and used by not only women but also the more economically successful men who monopolise them. The role of patriarchy and religion in policing sexuality allowed men to achieve parity with women, but feminism has worked to undermine this. These groups draw on other ideas from socio-biology to build what can be described as a theory of sexual economics. Women and men are seen as having "sexual market value", with sex seen as a form of resource exchange. While the ideas might rely on pop biology, the language frames the issue in much more economic terms.

The phrase sexual economics can be traced to the work of psychologist Roy Baumeister (Baumeister & Vohs, 2004; Baumeister & Mendoza, 2011), who argues that sex can be analysed in the same terms as markets. Many of his arguments, such as the idea that sex is used by females as a tradable resource, fit with the thinking of men's rights groups. Although some cite Baumesiter's work directly, many in this movement seem to deploy his ideas reflexively. Many examples of this can be found on the popular neomasculinst website "Return of Kings" (ROK), a blog for "heterosexual, masculine men" which:

> aims to usher the return of the masculine man in a world where masculinity is being increasingly punished and shamed in favour of creating an androgynous and politically-correct society that allows women to assert superiority and control over men. (Return of Kings, n. d.)

"Return of Kings" features numerous articles discussing sexual economics, including "The One Law of Economics That Shapes Your Sex Life" (Hume, 2014) and "How the Sexual Marketplace Can Be Restored to Balance" (Albrecht, 2017). These articles advise men to use economic theory to their sexual advantage, and reflect a belief that sexual competition is skewed in favour of women. Although ROK takes a pro-capitalist and anti-leftist stance, many articles reflect a strong discontent with both globalism and neoliberalism. The sixth most popular article on the site bemoans the "de-regulation of the sexual marketplace" (Hobbes, 2014), arguing that social, religious and legal restrictions on sexuality protected the majority of men from being disadvantaged by women.

This article reflects a desire for sexual protectionism, and the belief that the majority of men are oppressed by a sexual upper-class consisting of rich and attractive men and women. The same logic is displayed in a post on r/Incels, a Reddit forum associated with men's rights activism and particularly extreme misogyny. The post "I am entitled to sex" demands that the government provide sex for men in the same way they guarantee access to food:

> If the people who lack basic necessities such as food, healthcare and so forth are provided for, thanks to the government, why aren't their (sic) any support for the needs of thousands of sexually frustrated men? We are all taxpaying citizens. If the government can't provide us with such a basic thing, why do we continue to given (sic) them money to things that basically doesn't (sic) concern us in anyway? Single mothers are given welfare by the government using the money that we provide them. (Lookismisreall, 2017)

This quote illustrates not only the centrality of sex to the arguments of this movement, but also how these concerns about sexual deprivation are intertwined with more conventional concerns around economic redistribution. There is also some confusion here, as the author appears to take a broadly anti-state position on welfare and taxes while wanting the state to provide for his personal sexual needs. This tension is not unique to this post, and is often displayed through an adherence to libertarian economics and authoritarian social policy. Although some responding posts disagree with this demand, there is some support for it: "You're absolutely right. At the very least prostitution should be legalised and subsidised by the government" (fukmylyf, 2017). While this is only a small example, this language and logic is present in the online forums and published work associated with the masculinist movement. This represents a synthesis of economic anxiety and sexual resentment, which illustrates the connection between economics and misogyny described in the section above. What remains unclear is the reason why the vitriol directed towards women and feminism outstrips the anger directed towards the economic system.

Capitalist Realism and the Hopelessness of Reform

The apparent economic underpinnings of this movement should suggest a desire to reform the economic system, but this is often sublimated into a fixation on the sexual sphere. Indeed, the Alt-Right movement is heavily associated with libertarianism and free-market ideology while being fiercely opposed to socialism and other alternative economic systems (Lyons, 2017; Lewis, 2017). This reflects the tendency for online communities to create echo chambers, in which dissenting views are ignored or misrepresented. This creates a sense of cognitive dissonance as political beliefs fail to match up to lived experience, resulting in ego defence mechanisms such as projection of negative characteristics onto outgroups. Discontent with the economic system is instead expressed through a desire to reassert masculine control over sex and sexuality, representing a form of defensive sublimation as class frustrations channelled into the culture wars' assertions of masculinity. As Wilson (2010) argues in her study of Bangkok sex shows, male discontent with their loss of relative economic power under

neoliberalism has resulted in the impulse to reassert control over women and their bodies. This transference of frustration and control from the political to the sexual can be best understood in terms of capitalist realism, as described by Mark Fisher (2009, p. 2). Fisher argued that an acceptance of neoliberal capitalism has become so pervasive in Western society that it is impossible to imagine a coherent alternative (2009). When anti-capitalist thought appears in popular culture, it is merely deployed to reinforce capitalist ideology by providing a fantasy escape without political action. This is true of unstructured utopian protest groups like Occupy Wall Street and of superficial businesses which seek to mitigate the worst excesses of neoliberalism without presenting a rival system. What is on display in masculinist groups is discontent with the economic ideology under which they live being transferred onto women and minority groups. Their inability to successfully conceptualise an alternative to capitalism has led them to focus their anger at class inequality onto the sexual sphere, articulating a desire for the control and stability which they are denied in an increasingly precarious economy. The language with which they talk about sex belies the undercurrent of economic anxiety driving their frustrations, while the exclusionary and nostalgic rhetoric of the far-right functions as a form of cathartic release. By looking at how masculinist groups speak about themselves and society, it becomes clear that they are not driven purely by either economic anxiety or an inherently hateful mind-set. Rather, these two factors are intertwined, a function of an economic ideology which provides no other alternative than exclusionary identity politics and cultural animus.

Conclusion

The misogyny of the new far-right is a complex phenomenon, which confounds attempts at simple answers. The election of Trump, and the newfound prominence of extremist and exclusionary groups, has produced several competing explanations from concerned scholar and commentators. There is a tendency to reduce these explanations to either material or cultural factors, with the acceptance of one leading to the dismissal of the others. However, there is a strong argument for attempting to understand how these factors inform each other. Neither the economy nor our culture and values exist in a vacuum. Therefore, more work aimed at conceptualising the connection between these disparate factors would make a valuable contribution to our understanding of contentious political groups.

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The More Distant "Other"? Impact of the Refugee Crisis on the discourse about identity in the Slovak Republic

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Abstract

When considering the emergence of identity, people inherently identify themselves in relation to membership positions vis-à-vis others, differentiating between "us" and "them". However, I demonstrate that the dividing line is rather imprecise and shifts back and forth depending on which characteristics of groups are relevant at the given moment. I claim that the media in the Slovak Republic negatively target refugees more predominantly given the current tendencies throughout Europe, softening the rhetoric for other, more traditional minorities. Minority groups, which were previously negatively framed or ultimately dehumanised by the media, can be considered to be perceived as less an out-group with the appearance of a more distant other, creating stronger feelings of threat.

Keywords: media, framing, minorities, Roma, dehumanisation.

Introduction

Group thinking is a necessary component of human lives, crucial to adhering to specific culture, traditions and symbols. Classifying ourselves into the groups entails a process of othering, which often includes a perception of the inferiority of the "others" that can, in extreme cases, lead to the dehumanisation.

In the case of Slovak Republic, no less than 37% of people consider the relations between people from different cultural or religious backgrounds or nationalities as rather bad (European Commission, 2008). The level of prejudice of the majority society is reported to be extremely high namely towards its Roma minority. According to opinion polls from 2009, 78% of Slovaks have unfavourable views of the Roma minority (Pew Research Center, 2009). The report by the Open Society Foundation claims that the majority of people rank Roma among dehumanised groups, not perceiving them as members of the human race (Mareček and Stanek, 2014). However, more recent opinion polls depicting Slovak views of the Roma minority are missing, suggesting possible lesser interest in the topic. However, with the refugee crisis beginning in Europe in 2015, an increasing number of opinion polls have been carried out regarding the approach towards immigration and Muslims, which is most often marked as "very negative" (Eurobarometer, 2015).

I am interested in whether the described tendencies can be mirrored by the media coverage, as media importantly shape public debate in terms of setting agendas and focusing public interest on particular subjects. I, therefore, investigate the framing adopted by the Slovak media in portrayals of minorities and immigrants/refugees, by content-analysing newspaper articles. The main research questions of the paper are: *Are articles about minority groups in Slovakia framed in a dehumanising way? Has reporting on Slovak minorities changed with the introduction of the more distant "other"—the refugees, immigrants and Muslims?*

The research paper is going to test two hypotheses. First, I expect to find dehumanising framing when reporting on the Roma minority and refugees. However, this trend is only expected to be found in tabloid and semi-tabloid types of media, as compared with quality newspapers. The tabloid press often reports on the events in a populist manner, accompanied by various levels of distortion, aiming for any form of sensationalism (McNair, 2003). Quality papers are expected to outline their views in more reasoned terms, as compared to the tabloids. Second, I expect dehumanising framing to target the refugees more predominantly due to the current tendencies throughout Europe, softening the rhetoric for the Roma minority. This assumption is based on constructionist theory, as the sense of who is "us" and who is "them" is created depending on the current context and situation. The Roma can thus become considered as less an out-group with the appearance of a more distant other.

IDENTITY POLITICS
Us and Them

"Homo sapiens is inescapably a tribal animal."
(Berreby, 2005, p. 327)

The feeling of belonging in a group is one of the defining traits of a human beings—since the early history of humankind, people have arranged themselves into seemingly similar, physically close, and fate-sharing groups in order to coordinate their actions, exchange communication more easily and resist threats and intrusions from the outer world. Humans distinguish among various categories and their human thinking is a necessary component of their lives, crucial in adhering to specific culture, traditions, and symbols (Berreby, 2005).

Therefore, when considering the emergence of identity, people inherently identify themselves in relation to the membership positions vis-à-vis others. Their perception of identity and belonging within the context of social relationships, groups, and institutions is shaped by necessary differentiation between "we" as "us" and "them" as "others" (Zahavi, Grünbaum, and Parnas, 2004). The recognition of "us" serves as a guideline for who to consider as fit for the respectful exchange of goods, information, services, and emotions that constitute life in a human community (Berreby 2005).

Human groups are based on differences in race, tribe, language, background, or culture which provide meaning for inclusion. Easily noticeable, these differences often seem to be given, natural or even essential. The essentialism, also referred to as psychological essentialism, is a theoretical stance that suggests that there are core qualities and characteristics of each group of people creating "essence"—a deep, and often unobservable and nonobvious property (Smith, 2014). Human groups are, according to this view, inherent, natural, and hidden truths about people that cannot be questioned or modified (Berreby, 2005). Phillips (2010) points out to the obvious critique of the essentialist thinking—there is a problem of over-generalisation, stereotyping, and a resulting inability to consider characteristics not fitting the given preconceptions, which leads to discrimination. Moreover, ascribing a static essence to the differences among the groups completely ignores the possibility of an historically or socially created origin of such differences (Phillips, 2010). Accordingly, there is an opposing theory accounting for the differences between the human groups. Constructionism considers references to the other groups as forms of social achievement, created by the historical and cultural traditions, which can be effectively altered or completely eradicated (Gergen, 1999). Constructionists thus claim that we learn about our own identity and the identity of the others through interactions with family, peers, institutions, organisations, or the media. All of these help to construct our perceptions of the differences of the "others," but these perceptions are not stable and can change depending on the specific social context.

Being constructed in the process of identity formation, certain groups are frequently assigned subordinate positions. By drawing a line between "us" and "them," we often demarcate a line between the more and the less powerful, through which "social distance is established and maintained" (Lister, 2004, p. 101). However, the dividing line is rather imprecise and shifts back and forth depending on which characteristics of human groups are relevant at the moment (Berreby, 2005). Schwalbe et al. (2000) also consider the othering as a process of creating power relations, with a dominant group defining the existence of a subordinate group, which is "morally and/or intellectually inferior" (p. 423). In extreme cases, the "others" can be reduced to negative and stereotypical characteristics in such a way that they are ultimately dehumanised (Riggins, 1997).

Dehumanisation

Dehumanisation is the psychological process of denying an individual agency connected with basic aspects of being human (Khamitov, Rotman and Piazza, 2016). These basic aspects and traits of agency, as identified by Khamitov et al (2016), are the following: the capacity for cognition and intelligence, rationality, planning, self-control, imagination, emotion recognition, and ability to lead a goal-directed activity. Smith (2014) classifies dehumanisation as referring to any perception of others as subhuman creatures, whether in rhetorical practices metaphorically likening humans to animals or inanimate objects, or in direct treatment of people in a manner which denies them distinctively human attributes.

The emergence of dehumanising elements can be explained by the simple attribution of feelings towards the "others". For instance, the study carried out by Leyens et al (2000) demonstrates that in relation to the out-group members, people predominantly express the primary emotions[1], which are typical for both humans and animals, in contrast with the uniquely human, so-called secondary emotions[2]. More familiarity with the in-group members naturally provides for the higher attribution of secondary emotions. Moreover, recent studies on the dehumanisation explain this phenomenon using the theory of psychological essentialism (Smith, 2014; Haslam, 2006). Smith (2014) claims it is impossible to understand dehumanisation without considering the essentialism, because dehumanised people are explicitly perceived as lacking the human essence—"that special something that makes one human" (p. 821).

The main implications of dehumanisation stem from our consequent mind processes and moral considerations. For instance, perceiving someone as an object creates a cognitive bias characterised by a lack of feelings and empathy as the judgments about inanimate objects do not activate the region of brain ascribed for the social cognitive functions (Amodio and Frith 2006). Similar patterns can be expected towards animals, especially towards ones sharing few human attributes[3]. Consequently, the identification with the dehumanised people is blocked by considering them not anymore "as persons with feelings, hopes and concerns but as sub-human objects" (Bandura, 2002, p. 109). Not being considered as fully human, these people can be more easily placed lower on the moral hierarchy (Smith, 2014), or completely excluded from the scope of morality and justice (Hodson, Kteily, and Hoffarth, 2014). Buckels and Trapnell (2013) demonstrate that the dehumanisation reduces intergroup helping and justifies aggression towards members of other groups. Moreover, the animalistic dehumanisation can create stronger emotions of disgust and revulsion, especially when relating to organisms with typically negative connotations or contamination threats, such as rats, parasites, and cockroaches. An experiment on the effect of disgust by Wheatley and Haidt (2005) demonstrates that physically disgusted people are far harsher in their moral opinions. Therefore, by

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1   E.g. joy, sadness, anger, fear, disgust, or surprise.

2   E.g. affection, admiration, pride, conceit, nostalgia, remorse, or rancour.

3   Amodio and Frith (2006) point out to the previous research demonstrating that dogs, in fact, do activate social cognitive functions.

likening humans to objects or organisms which do not activate compassion and moral standards, an excuse and legitimation for immoral acts is effectively provided, without experiencing distress when treating actual people inhumanly.

Methodology

The online version of three news media were chosen for an in-depth content analysis: one quality liberal newspaper, one semi-tabloid conservative news portal, and one tabloid news portal without a declared ideological stance. An online search using keywords was made for three time periods: 2013—before the refugee crisis in Europe started, 2015—when it has reached its peak, and the period starting with 2017—when the people might already feel saturated by the topic[4]. The given time periods enable me to compare the development in the trend of reporting on refugees, but mainly see how this context influenced the coverage on the Slovak ethnic and sexual minorities.

I have included national and foreign news articles containing keywords identifying each of the four minority groups (Roma, refugees, Hungarian minority, and LGBT), excluding editorials, columns, commentaries, interviews, or blog articles. Altogether, I have accessed and content-analysed 1077 articles corresponding to the given criteria.

I have coded each article based on several variables. I have assessed the overall tone of the article—whether neutral, positive, negative, or mixed (as a combination of both positive and negative aspects). I have also included middle categories—neutral/positive and neutral/negative, where the tone was not unambiguous. Subsequently, I have identified the main topics, themes, and frames used to inform about minorities. When it comes to the dehumanisation aspect, I have coded each article as either containing or not containing dehumanisation references. The same pattern was used for identifying presence of dehumanisation in user comments under each article, together with a further description of dehumanising frames.

Results

While refugees or immigrants were not of the focus of Slovak media in 2013, with the introduction of refugee crisis, the time period of 2015 presents an unforeseen popularity of articles informing about not only about refugees, but also immigrants and Muslims, with as many as 17% of the articles doing so in a clearly negative manner.

When it comes to reporting on the Roma minority, as many as 10% of the sample articles had a clear negative tone[5]. An even more striking figure

is achieved if we disregard coverage of the quality paper from the sample—the number of articles with a negative tone rises to a disturbing 38%. Looking separately at the results corresponding to individual time periods, we can observe a change in coverage on the Roma. As can be observed in the Figure 1, coverage of the Roma dropped by almost three times in 2015 as compared with 2013, and even more in 2017. Moreover, the number of positive articles started rising in 2015, and in 2017 the trend continued together with the number of negative articles decreasing by 2%, as can be seen in Figure 2. The decrease in coverage may logically stem from increased concern about the refugee crisis. However, the change in tone can suggest a less negative perception of the minority due to the emergence of more distant "other".

Figure 1: Amount of Coverage of Roma   Figure 2: Tone of Articles about Roma

Two other minority groups, namely the LGBT community and the traditional Hungarian minority, can serve for a comparison. When it comes to LGBT community, the overall representation is fairly neutral[5], but the conservative semi-tabloid daily is the one presenting the LGBT community in a negative manner—precisely half of its articles are negative. There was also a tendency towards an increasing number of articles from 2013 to 2017 by all three media portals, which, contrary to expectations brought by refugee crisis, can be explained by the growing demands for legalising registered partnerships in Slovakia and an apparent increased salience of the topic.

The Hungarian minority attracted very little coverage during the selected time period. The majority of articles were neutral and were written in 2013, and the coverage dropped in 2015 and 2017. The lack of articles suggests the decreasing salience of the topic, and possibly a less common perception of "otherness".

Within the time periods of 2015 and 2017, there was also a rise in positive topics in the articles written about the Roma minority and a decrease in the negative topics, as shown by Figure 3. There were no visible changes in topics adopted for the remaining three groups in those time periods.

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4   The months June, July and August of each year were chosen to create a sample.

5   Specifically, 81% of articles have a neutral tone.

Dehumanisation was altogether present in 52 articles. There were 17 articles containing dehumanising references towards refugees, immigrants, or Muslims published in 2015 and 14 in 2017. For example, an article from August 2015 informs about verbal threats and diseases experienced in a Czech refugee camp. Refugees were reported to spread diseases varying from Chlamydia to HIV, be out of control, aggressive, and uneducated.

When it comes to the Roma minority, there were eight dehumanising articles published in 2013, four in 2015 and only one in 2017. We can again see a softening trend in reporting on the Roma since 2015. An example of dehumanising reporting can be seen in an article from 2015 presenting a story of how "Roma can destroy [disgust] an otherwise nice day," describing the experience of a visitor at a local swimming pool. The article says that the behaviour of the Roma cannot be compared with the behaviour of "normal" people, and that the odour of their bodies could not be covered by any deodorant. Their loud conversations and lack of manners allegedly contributed to disgusted people suddenly leaving the pool.

When it comes to the LGBT community, there were two dehumanising articles published in 2013, three in 2015 and three in 2017. There is therefore no obvious change in the time periods that could be discerned using the refugee crisis reference. Contrary to expectations, we can thus see the dehumanising framing adopted also for the LGBT community. There was, however, no dehumanisation present in the few articles published about the Hungarian minority.

Figure 3: Roma Topics in Slovak Media

The articles presented mostly implied dehumanisation without direct references to animals or objects. However, if we look at user comments, the vast majority contain direct comparisons to animals, varying from monkeys, dogs, and pigs to cattle, parasites and vermin. Out of the articles informing about refugees, immigrants, and Muslims, 73% of user comments contained open forms of dehumanisation. For the Roma minority, the dehumanisation was present in user comments of 89% of articles with enabled discussion. However, there is again a decreasing trend—in 2015 it was 65% and in 2017 "only" 52%. Articles about sexual minorities provoked dehumanising discussion as well, in precisely 40 articles out of 75. And although the Hungarian minority had seemed more resilient towards dehumanisation previously, eight out of fourteen articles with enabled discussion contained dehumanising references.

Conclusion

Confirming the first hypothesis, dehumanising framing has been found in the coverage on the Roma minority and refugees/immigrants. It has been, as expected, more present in semi-tabloid and tabloid type of media. Contrary to expectations, the dehumanising framing has been found also in connection to the LGBT community, although to a much lesser extent. The second hypothesis can also be confirmed, as we can see a softening of rhetoric in 2015 and 2017 articles on the Roma minority translated in a decreased amount of coverage, a less negative tone of the articles, a rise in positive topics and decrease in negative ones, a lower percentage of dehumanising articles, and less dehumanisation present also in user comments as compared with 2013. There is also a softening trend for the Hungarian minority, but the coverage on this minority was already very low in 2013, which suggests less "other" status of this minority group. Coverage on the LGBT community is following different trends, influenced mostly by the conservative/liberal divide and following on requests for increased rights for this group and the overall public discourse after such demands.

Nevertheless, I believe this research provides important insight into the coverage on the minority groups in the Slovak Republic. Othering, as presented in the literature review, is a natural process that is expected to find its place in media discourse. Frames adopted by the media regarding minority groups can be negative, but when found also dehumanising, there is a danger of justifying and legitimising the immoral acts adopted by the majority population and political elites. Media frames, as demonstrated by previous research on political communication (Iyengar, 1990; Entman, 1993; Scheufele, 2000), effectively find their way into the audience frames, presenting a framework employed by audiences to interpret the events. Therefore, research of this type is crucial for developing a more responsible way of reporting to decrease the levels of prejudice and racism in the

public sphere. Moreover, thinking about identity perceptions as able to change with the emergence of new actors, although lacking any clear causal relations or more cases to confirm the pattern, presents an interesting contribution to the literature on identity politics.

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Recognising Each Other: An Identity-Based Argument for Multiculturalism

Marta Boniardi

Abstract

In this context of growing globalisation, the "cultural trauma" is nothing but the result of a self-fulfilling prophecy, based on the artificial cohesion strategy of the common enemy of the people, portrayed as radically Other from it: the immigrant. The aim of this paper is to offer an argument for a different model of cohabitation, one that can avert the fulfilment of this ominous prophecy: multiculturalism. This argument will not be a moral, but a political and practical one, and will not reject the existence of cultural identities, nor will it promote their overcoming. On the contrary, my argument for multiculturalism will presuppose and give new dignity to the notion of cultural identity, too often neglected in the contemporary philosophical debate due to the at least ambiguous use that is made of it in everyday political discourse. The core argument is based on the Hegelian notion of mutual recognition—only if a collectivity recognises the Other as Same, this collectivity, with its values, norms and ideals will in turn be considered a legit interlocutor in the process of reconstruing a new identity after the shock of the migratory process. If this recognition does not take place, if the Other will not be recognised as Same, on the other hand, a cultural trauma will occur both in the individual and in the collectivity: the first will feel segregate and will develop a pathologically hostile post-migratory identity; the second will lose its chance to evolve, and will be less united because of the dots of hostility that it will grow inside.

Keywords: multiculturalism, identity, Other, Hegel, cohabitation

Models of Cohabitation

Every society in the contemporary world is a plural society: this is an irreversible matter of fact, and any attempt to question it is both anachronistic and doomed to fail. What now needs to be discussed is how this factual cohabitation of different ethnic groups sharing a common political and social environment is, and should be, shaped in a specific context.

As in the whole liberal West, nowadays EU framework of immigration is characterised by the action of schizophrenic forces: on one side, through the porous nature of global production borders, migrant workers are attracted by the capitalist production system. This very system, though, hinders their social and legal legitimation, to better exploit their rights-deprived workforce (Mezzadra & Neilson, 2014). Beside the "structural"

opposition connatural to the capitalist system, lies an open hostility expressed by many "superstructural" components of society as a new interest towards identity dynamics, hazy economical concerns, or a generic feeling of unsafety. The consequence, though, is one only: the aprioristic rejection of those who are considered strangers by the community they live in, and their relegation to a reified, invisible existence.

The chance to escape this is through legal and social legitimation: whilst the first path, even though harsh and strict, at least belongs to a normed and granted space, the latter may never be accomplished. Frantz Fanon, Afro-French philosopher and psychiatrist, one of the first intellectuals to inquire into the psychological, ontological and sociological aspects of the white-black relationship in the postcolonial world, has provided a model of this process of social legitimation. As Fanon suggests, the condition for the achievement of such an approval is homologation, the abandonment of one's own difference, the need to renounce identity in a process of "whitening", as Fanon himself calls it: "the Negro"—but his words can be extended to anyone who does not belong to the original community—"is appraised in terms of the extent of his assimilation" (Fanon, 1952, p. 23). The adoption of "Western-like" behaviour is seen with a favourable eye by the European; still, the whitening process is eventually doomed to fail, "as colour is the most obvious outward manifestation of race, [and] it has been made the criterion by which men are judged, irrespective of their social or educational attainments" (Burns, 1949, as cited in Fanon, 1952, p. 89). Renouncing difference, thus, will never make equal, because the difference is worn in the skin, and calls for diffidence and suspicion.

Given those premises of hostility and mistrust, the cultural shock, both caused and received by the two opponents of this supposed struggle—the community and the stranger—is perceived as inevitably leading to a clash of civilisations. This is an exemplary case of moral panic, defined by Z. Bauman (Bauman, 2016, p. 1) as the widespread feeling of fear that some evil threatens the wellbeing of society. In a world of constant contact and growing globalisation, however, the idea of a "shocking" collision between rigid and incommensurable identities is actually the exception, and not the rule of cultural encounter. In the contemporary metropolitan context, the chances for a cultural contact have multiplied giving birth to the unexpected phenomena of appropriation, contamination and exchange, both in Western society and in the so called "third world" (Beneduce, 2004). Therefore, in a long-distance encounter, the cultural gap, although actually existing, might count less than other gaps such as the educational, social or biographical. If, in such a context, a clash of civilisations took place, this would only be the outcome of a self-fulfilling prophecy, as will be shown.

The aim of this paper is to offer an argument for a different model of cohabitation, one that can avert the fulfilment of this ominous prophecy: multiculturalism[1]. This argument will not be a moral, but a political one, and will presuppose the notion of cultural collective identity[2], too often neglected in the contemporary philosophical debate due to the at least ambiguous use that is made of it in everyday political discourse.

Despite the aim to discuss a collective theme, the starting point of this argumentation will be the analysis of the cultural encounter from an individual point of view; therefore, the instruments that will be used, alongside the traditional philosophical and anthropological, will include psychological models, borrowed from the phenomenological school and from the theories on acculturation psychology.

"Those phenomena which result when groups of individuals having different cultures come into continuous first-hand contact, with subsequent changes in the original culture patterns of both groups" (Sam & Berry, 2006, p. 11) are collectively known as the acculturation process. Acculturation psychology is therefore the field that *par excellence* investigates the forms of the cultural encounter, as well as the factors involved. It is important to specify that no value judgement is implied in the idea of acculturation, as the reciprocity of the phenomenon—opposed to the idea of a linear teleological evolution—implies. Those changes are nothing but empirically verified reactions, necessary adaptation to a different physical and social context, regarding the physical, biological, political, economic and linguistic identity of the group or the subject.

The form, the entity and the direction of those changes are, in part, subject to the control of the groups involved, as schematised by J. Berry, whose model is summarised in the following table:

Original cultural identity	Daily interaction with other cultures	If this acculturation strategy is adopted by the subject	If the acculturation strategy is adopted by the host community (fostering the adoption of that strategy by its guests)
Dismissed	Accepted or sought	Assimilation	Melting pot
Held and valued	Avoided	Separation	Segregation
Held and valued	Accepted or sought	Integration	Multiculturalism

Note: Adapted from Berry, J. (2006). Contexts of acculturation. In D. Sam & J. Berry (Eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Acculturation Psychology (Cambridge Handbooks in Psychology, pp. 27-42). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 33-38. doi:10.1017/CBO9781316219218.004

Since in the liberal West the segregational model has no real advocate, at least in the academic discourse, the contemporary debate on how a plural society should be shaped is characterised by the opposition between the sustainers of the melting pot (fostering an assimilative strategy) and those who promote multiculturalism (integrative strategy). In a melting pot society, "ethnic diversity is diminished and distinctiveness is harmonised" (Sam & Berry, 2006, p. 20), the subject is free to maintain her own difference, as long as this difference is kept as a part of her private self. In a multicultural context, on the other hand, the individual is invited, if, and in the form she prefers, to participate in the social network as a member of an ethnocultural group. The opponents of melting pot contend that an assimilative attitude, especially when imposed, is unable to provide a solid basis for a plural society, undermining the chances of a peaceful cohabitation, and creating "a pressure cooker" (Sam & Berry, 2006, p. 36) ready to explode. Its advocates are accused of promoting the 'whitening process' that Fanon had denounced, encouraging the neglect of the difference carried out by the subject in the name of the defence of the superior collective identity of the host society.

The refusal of the melting pot and the embracement of multiculturalism usually stand on one of the two following argumentations. The first concedes that a multicultural scenario may in fact threaten an existing European collective identity in its values and beliefs. Yet, imposing them by a forced assimilation is not morally acceptable nor rationally justifiable. The second, on the other hand, refuses the very idea of a collectively shared cultural identity as contrived and superfluous. Those who endorse this view usually agree on the Schmidtian thesis of the reactive and oppositive nature of cultural identities, accusing them of being the true cause of the victory of cultural prejudice and hostility over a more natural recognition

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[1]   Some would point out that multiculturalism has already been experimented with and adopted in many Western countries, and it is thus no big news. Even if we concede that parts of the EU adopted an officially multicultural approach, this policy does not permeate the civil society, where an assimilative (if not segregationist) trend is still undeniably preeminent. Until multiculturalism is enshrined within universities and courts, then, I believe, every argument for its utility and value should be greeted.

[2]   The concept of *cultural identity* will be used in this paper with a subjective focalisation, as a constitutive element of the personal identity of an individual (within a specific psychological paradigm that will be presented). By *collective identity (or cultural collective identity)* I refer to the particular symbolic structure shared by a human group, that includes its traditions, its paradigmatic values, beliefs and attitudes. The cultural identity of a subject, then, usually has its roots in a collective identity, from which it can either be more or less directly derived, or - even radically – deviated.

of sameness. Therefore, the concept itself of a collective identity should, in their view, be dismissed.

I believe that the thesis of the collective identity as *flatus vocis* is biased by a mistaken conception which is often confused with its political implications, while, in itself, it is just a "set of tools" used by the subject to develop an important component of her personal identity. Such a function will be deeply investigated later on. What I really want to make clear here, is that collective identities are precious instruments for individuals to make sense of the world, and that renouncing them is not an option.

On the contrary, my attempt in this paper is to offer a third position in defence of multiculturalism, one that does not need to stand on moral, and potentially fragile, grounds, and that, at the same time, not only does not renounce the concept of collective identity, but, paradoxically, has the preservation of European cultural identity as one of its objectives.

Re-negotiating One's Identity

According to acculturation psychology (as seen above), after a long-distance cultural encounter the individual is subject to some unavoidable changes: those changes imply, or, even better, they constitute, a change in her identity, and the consequent need to redefine it.

First, a clarification is necessary here: by identity, I'm referring to the personal, in a broadly sense psychological identity of the subject and to the transcendental conditions of her own experience, the set of instruments she makes sense of the world with. According to a classical phenomenological view, here exposed following G. Stanghellini (2016) and the framework he delineates in *Lost in Dialogue*, a psychic life can be modelled as the work of giving an order to "alterity", everything that is external to the subject's self, shaping it in a way that allows the subject to symbolically manipulate it. Alterity can be both internal and external: the first lies "in the involuntary dimension of ourselves, our un-chosen "character", including needs, desires, emotions, and habits", whilst, "in the external world, alterity is encountered in the challenging otherness of the events and in the meetings with other persons that constellate our life, [that can bring to] a collision between opposite values: private conscience and social customs, desire and reality, one's and the others' values, nature and culture" (Stanghellini, 2016, p. 33).

Such an activity is carried out by instruments that are not culturally determined, and that are strongly influenced by many other factors such as education, spoken language, social class, religion, sexual orientation and, of course, personal attitudes and choices. That said, it would be naive to fail to acknowledge that culture does play a role in this, since every society provides it members with specific paradigms of sense and symbolisation (Beneduce, 2004), shaped by the particular human, social and

physical environment they will more typically need to relate to. This is the reason behind the empirical necessity, stated by acculturation psychology, for the subject to reformulate her identity after a radical change of her experiential context. When this happens, her identity must adapt to the new situation, equipping itself with a different set of instruments to deal with it. This does not imply the abandonment of everything she was, but its reformulation, adaptation and translation. The metaphor of the translation can indeed be developed: speaking a different language does not change the main content of the communication, but it makes it apt to the context of a different listener; furthermore, expressing the same content in a different language offers the chance to see it in a different light, to think it through in an unprecedented way—which can lead to modifying it, or to sticking to it in a more conscious fashion.

The theoretical model most commonly used to describe this process within the field of acculturation psychology is "stress-coping-adaptation" in which there is a first "cultural shock" (caused by some inevitable orientation difficulties in a world where at least some of the stimuli were previously unknown), followed by a period of "acculturation stress", whose intensity may vary according to several factors, such as pre-migratory situation, cultural distance, future perspectives, linguistic obstacles, acculturation strategy, and behaviour of the host group. The need for an identity redefinition is also theorised and studied by anthropologists. For example, for the Italian anthropologist R. Beneduce, migration always implies a crack, threatening the integrity of the self and leading to a cultural hybridisation with uncertain outcomes that may jeopardise the balances achieved over the years (2004). When a subject tries to keep the core of her identity and symbolic universe unchanged, although living in a linguistically, culturally and emotionally different environment, her self may lose its organisation and become discordant (Beneduce, 2004). The process of adaptation can itself be destabilising, since, as T. Nathan points out, one needs to build as a separate individual what would normally require the work of generations (T. Nathan, *La Migration des Âmes*, 1988, as cited in Beneduce, 2004, p. 116).

Additionally, this scenario portrayed by the two disciplines may be worsened by the presence of a traumatic element. Especially refugees, but also some of the so called "illegal economic migrants", have often been victims of torture—in the pre-migratory environment or during the voyage. According to *The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice*, the primary scope of torture is that of "destroy[ing] the creed and beliefs of the victims in order to deprive them of the identity structure that defines them as people" (Cassese, 2009, p. 12). In this very case, the rebuilding of the identity does not follow the display of its epistemological inadequacy, but a programmatic annihilation. This condition, if the subject is forced to face it alone, often jeopardises the chances of its autonomous reconstruction.

The Role of Recognition

But how does this needed reconstruction actually take place? The working hypothesis here is that the re-formulation of identity follows the same path of its formation, and that the genesis and re-genesis of the self need similar conditions and comparable processes. Such conditions are therefore the object of this inquiry.

The theories of the social genesis of personal identity (i.e. the idea that the making of the self is a relational activity) have the longest tradition, whose origin can be found in the idealist overcoming of the monological centrality of the subject that characterised the modern age. Thereafter, this account has been subscribed to by authors that were distant in space, time and field of research—from G. H. Mead, to P. Ricoeur, to C. Taylor—yet united in identifying this relational activity with a form of intersubjective recognition, a reciprocal (dialogical, for most) interaction of peers, bestowing on each other the status of Persons.

The idea of recognition as a *conditio sine qua non* for self-consciousness first appears in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Despite the entirely theoretical point of view adopted here by the author, the *opus* set some paradigmatic characteristics of recognition that would have been, thereafter, the unavoidable referent of any other study in regard.

This is one of the reasons why F. Fanon—whom I will primarily refer to (since the philosopher and psychiatrist from Martinique was the first to apply the Hegelian model to ethnic encounter)—opens his considerations on recognition with a quote from *The Phenomenology of Spirit*: "Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged" (Hegel, 1807, as cited in Fanon, 1986, p. 178). The reference to Hegel is continuous and explicit in *Black Skin, White Masks*, one of Fanon's most famous works, entirely dedicated to the racial relations in the postcolonial context.

The most important trait of Hegel's account of recognition is, for Fanon, its necessary reciprocity. "Action by one side only would be useless because what is to happen can only be brought about by both. [...] They recognise themselves as mutually recognising one another" (Fanon, 1986, pp. 183-184). If the only way to escape a reified existence, to quit being a thing and fully become a subject, is to be recognised as such—as a self-consciousness—then, him who "prevents the accomplishment of movement in two directions" (Fanon, 1952, p. 169) does not just deny the other the chance to be for a You, but also the being for itself.

Fanon, influenced by his biography and by the milieu he lived in, worked and fought in, focuses on recognition as a true political—and personal—claim:

When it encounters resistance from the other, self-consciousness undergoes the experience of desire—the first milestone on the road that leads to the dignity of the spirit. [...] As soon as I desire I am asking to be considered. I am not merely here-and-now, sealed into thingness. I am for somewhere else and for something else, insofar as I pursue something other than life; insofar as I do battle for the creation of a human world—that is, of a world of reciprocal recognitions. (Fanon, 1952, p. 169-70)

This historisation of the Hegelian model allows Fanon to underline, following Karl Marx, the elements of violent oppositionality running through it. In the master and slave dialectic, before the recognition, the two are, for each other, "shapes of consciousness which have not [...] exposed themselves to each other in the form of pure being-for-self" (Hegel, 2013, §186). In order to do that, they need to show that they are not attached to any specific determination of existence—which means not attached to life. During the staking of their own lives, the individuals prove themselves and each other through a life-and-death struggle. In Hegel, this fight sets the roles of the master and slave. As is well known, the servant will gain himself the status of self-consciousness. This will not happen by means of a new fight, however, but through the relationship he sets with things by means of his work (Hegel, 2013).

Fanon knowingly merges those two different moments, stating that the recognition of the black (the servant) by the white (the master) will never occur without a fight and a violent stance by the first that will have to put his life at risk once again, fighting his master to get self-consciousness. The reason for this is explained in a footnote: "For Hegel there is reciprocity; here the master laughs at the consciousness of the slave. What he wants from the slave is not recognition but work" (Fanon, 1986, fn. 8). The white man, the white race, the white society don't need to be recognised by the black man (Fanon, 1986). For Fanon, the white man is the emblem of self-consciousness, of being-for-self.

I believe that those words are too closely tied to Fanon's colonial milieu. My thesis is that, in contemporary societies, what the host group needs the most is indeed to be recognised by its cultural Other. I will now try to explain why, starting from the account of recognition offered by Hegel and accepted by Fanon.

Recognition can never be unilateral. The imposition of an assimilative acculturation, though, is nothing but the request—nay, the demand—of a unilateral recognition. Promoting cultural conformity and rewarding homologation mean forcing someone whose identity is *in fieri* to a non-dialogical reformulation of her self. The values, the customs and the attitudes of the host collectivity, when imposed, will not become integral and healthy

components of the new identity to be. At the same time, to hinder the preservation of a part (or the whole) of what constituted the pre-migration self means to bereave the subject of some fundamental components of her identity – still fundamental for her coming adaptation. As Beneduce summarises, "in a situation where it is already hard to draw from the centripetal forces of tradition, the institutions promote interventions whose aim seem to be exactly to whither those cultural schemata whose purpose is to succour the individual during existential or psychological distress" (Beneduce, 2004, p.201).

Recognising the Other is a necessary (yet insufficient) condition for her to make the analogous operation and recognise her recogniser—the society—as a rightful interlocutor in her identity reformulation. When this is the case, not only is this process less fragmenting and conflicting, but it is also more likely—this is the hope—to result in a renewed personal identity that will not be entirely disharmonious with the collectivity it is joining, which will be open to the idea of adopting some of its principles and values, mashing them with elements of its previous symbolic and cultural baggage.

Conversely, imposing a unilateral recognition, and thus the absence of a dialogue between the subject and the collectivity in the process of identity reconstruction, can only have two outcomes, both socially pathogenical. In the first scenario, deprived of the collectivity's recognition, the subject will not find her recogniser elsewhere, and consequently her identity will not have the chance to be properly reformulated. Left without the instruments to process alterity, she may succumb to it, and develop a clinically pathological relationship with reality[3]. In the second outcome, the recogniser will be found in the closed cultural community, thus denying the possibility of an encounter.

Recognition and Collectivity

A problematic issue remains, though: how can the collective identity of the host community be preserved as promised, if the key of intersubjective recognition is reciprocity? Can multiculturalism, and mutual acculturation, be compatible with the safeguarding of European values?

The apparent contradiction is actually easy to solve. What needs to be kept in mind is that the function of a collective cultural identity is to predispose part of the instruments necessary to individuals to deal with alterity. In a context of rapid, constant and radical change as the contemporary one, alterity is in constant evolution. This implies that a static and

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3   As cited from G. Stanghellini (2016), p. 1: "I will argue that to be human means to be in dialogue with alterity, that mental pathology is the outcome of a crisis of one's dialogue with alterity, and that care is a method wherein dialogues take place whose aim is to re-enact interrupted dialogue with alterity within oneself and with the external world".

un-evolving identity may eventually fail to perform this role. If a culture, a collective identity, does not evolve, it is doomed to be abandoned, since it will not be able to guide the individual inside a changed world. In such a scenario, dialogue and confrontation, recognition and acculturation can be a stimulus for a vital evolution of a modus vivendi, a set of values, a culture, or of adopted praxis, before their being inadequate to a becoming reality entails their complete and irreversible decline. The encounter with the Other can then be considered the lifeblood of the cultural identity of a community, while the refusal of the encounter will eventually lead to its atrophic stasis.

A possible objection can be that this process will so radically distort the collective identity to imply its abandonment, when not theoretically, at least factually. But the contamination that is innate in encounter and recognition creates the conditions for the rise and discovery of a closeness that was implicit and hidden. Dialogue and translation usually give birth to a result that embraces the values of both parts, all present, though mitigated and contaminated. No other option, on the other hand, is preferable. A lack of mutual recognition would lead at best to a separate co-habitation that would be problematic at least politically. Two groups that do not share anything will hardly be able to create the substratum of mediation and compromise that democracy needs, and eventually one group would just surrender (at least numerically) to the other. If, conversely, cohabitation is not indifferent and impermeable but hostile, there can be negative consequences at any level. Violent confrontations would tear the community apart. Individuals would suffer from constant identity conflict, and, in the end, the prophecy this paper began with would come to its fulfilment.

What I am claiming here is, therefore, that the adoption of a strategy based on mutual recognition and multiculturalism is not only morally just but may in advance be useful for the preservation of the host group's identity, and, moreover, avert—or make less probable—a conflict within society. This conclusion is, both theoretically and practically, as problematic as it sounds. Firstly, the fact that the host community encourages multiculturalism does not necessarily imply that the incoming population is willing to adopt the same view. The need for a double and reciprocal movement increases the risk of a stalemate condition, overcoming of which is crucial, as this paper has made clear: and since the power relation that connects the two groups is uneven (as the dominant group would run a much lower risk of breaking the stalemate, while it would enjoy analogous advantages), the host society is to make the first move.

Secondly, this theoretical model needs to be translated into collective practices that will lead public choices towards justice and convenience. The major challenge in this translation is to offer a collective version of the intersubjective recognition that is specifically bound to personal

identity, unlike the already available accounts of political recognition, widely analysed in the studies about identity politics.

Finally, even if this model was successfully filled with a concrete meaning, a dose of personal, collective and social wisdom is still needed to question one's own culture, and to accept that the result could be the fruit of a mediation that might diverge from it. And even if our society had this wisdom, how can collective praxis be modified? Can they be led, and if so, how? The only certainty is that the law will not be sufficient. As F. Jeanson states in his introduction to Fanon's first edition of the *Black Skin, White Masks*, thanks to an already existing just and fair law, "the Negro (sic) has become a man; the ideal negro is a human being. But the real Negro, with his black skin, has been left among real white men. And the problems solved by the white science haven't ceased to recur in the live black flash" (Jeanson, 1952).

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