

## TOM DARBY: ON GLOBALIZATION (3<sup>RD</sup> ESSAY)

The aim of the series of three articles by Tom Darby, a political Philosopher from Carleton University in Ottawa, is to familiarize us with the concept of "globalization", that is much used and talked about as this century and millennium end. In the previous issues (2/98, 3-4/98), we published the first two essays *The End of the History: Kojève's Serious Joke* and *Power and Wisdom: Politics as Destiny*. Professor Darby introduces thinkers that are less familiar in our country and the region (Alexandre Kojève, Leo Strauss, Carl Schmitt) and will also stress the aspect of Martin Heidegger's work that makes him the foremost modern political philosopher. The following article is the conclusion of this series. Professor Darby plans to expand those essays into a book. K&K

### Life in the Age of the World Picture

The above title is taken from Heidegger's 1938 essay, *The Age Of the World Picture*, appearing in English since 1977 as part of the collection called The Question Concerning Technology and other Essays.<sup>1</sup> But, as you see, I am qualifying the title. I do so to indicate that what a few decades ago was esoteric and abstract now has come to be part of mere life for an increasing number of people on this planet. Our experience of this shrinking world and our expanding picture of it, like the very breath of our lives, have become a kaleidoscope of the real as imagined and the imagined as real. It is a world in which the non-West is progressively transformed into versions of the West, and the West shaped by that very Other it transforms. But this world, which, not so long ago would have been unimaginable, deludes us. It deludes us because it increasingly embraces us, smothering the mysterious under the cloak of the everyday, denying us the experience of astonishment. In progressively becoming our common, virtual, yet empirical world, it also is becoming a more vulgar world, for in this world everyone is either in or is clamouring to get into the picture.

Heidegger's aforementioned essay is not only about the "world picture" [*Weltbild*], it also is about what Heidegger calls the New Time [*das Neuzeit*], this age<sup>2</sup> of the world picture. While rooted in the past of the West, this age - our time, modernity and especially late modernity - is different from previous ages, in that only in our time can one have a picture of the world as a whole. But this should not surprise those who recall Alexander Kojève's vision of the Universal and Homogeneous State (UHS), Leo Strauss' vision of the World State (WS) or Carl Schmitt's vision of the End State (ES), each, examined in parts I and II of this essay.

Indeed, Kojève was an ironic, self-professed Marxist, Strauss a Jew who embraced the "West" and its late heir, liberalism of the American variety, and Schmitt, who, to his last day, was an unrepentant Nazi. I say visions and not - as we are wont to say today - values. Nietzsche, who invented the term "value" [*Wert*], taught that value is about willing, while vision is about seeing. And yet, I will argue, while different, value and vision form part of the same picture. Differences aside, not only were these three men collaborators, their visions reinforce each other, and, as we shall see, reinforce Heidegger's own vision, for what they see is the same world, albeit from different perspectives.

Perspective has to do with where one stands. These four perspectives of our world allow us to see more clearly where we stand, for they uncover the meaning of the recent, yet already hackneyed term, "globalization", and allow us to see our past, our present and perhaps our future in a new light. And, alas, in a new darkness.

In *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, Heidegger makes the startling claim that the West - the Occident - is dis-Oriented.<sup>3</sup> This, I think, is a key to our understanding of the meaning of Heidegger's position concerning the origin and destiny of the West. If the destiny of the West results in the West's disorientation, then the West, at one time must have been oriented, and thus, this destiny - this "loss of its way" - also is tied to, and lies at, the origins of the West.

As stated in the general introduction to this essay, with the blending of philosophy and Judeo-Christian religion, the West appeared as an evolving relation of perceptions and practices that have defined its boundaries by setting it apart from how other people on this planet have seen both the world and have lived in it. The origins of the West are to be found in the origins of these other ways of seeing and doing - the non-West - as objectified and constituted by the West as Other. And, the West - from its origins - repeatedly oriented itself in opposition to everything it deigned non-western. Thus, its original orientation resulted in increasing dis-orientation.

Specifically, metaphysics, as it emerged from Socrates' critique of the Olympian gods, and Christianity, emerging as a critique of late-Hebraism - gathered together the form that was to become the West and set it on its way along its path. This two thousand year journey that has resulted in the 'disorientation' is both temporal and spatial, in that, this result is the same cluster of phenomena that has been identified here as 'the end of history' and "globalization".

The destiny of the West is to be found in its origins, in that the Western perception of space lies with metaphysics, and the perception of time with the Hebrew notion of history as unilinear time, together with the Christian perception that time as history is providential, thereby has a purpose, and from this is derived the notion of progressive ages, culminating in an apocalyptic end (e.g., in the "fullness of time"). The intersection of metaphysical space and Christian time both rest on our attempt to transform the world in which we live in relation to a projected beyond. This results in the co-penetration of what we see with what we endeavour to do - knowledge with action - wisdom with power. Thus, with the eruption of modernity, time or history becomes progress, and space, a mere fixed ground plan<sup>4</sup> for objectified ideas, thereby transforming ideas into ideals, willed projects or values. As we have seen in part II of this essay, at their origin, knowledge and action were unbridgeable, but now we see that the dynamic of western time and the eventual uprootedness and consequent malleability of ideas has progressively brought them together. Together they culminate in the disorientation and the dissolution of the West. And this is the destiny of the West.

Destiny must have both an origin and an end. For Heidegger, the beginning of the West lies with the appearance of western time and space and with our forgetting that everything that we perceive in time (beings) must have a space in which to be (Being), and that Being, empty of beings is simply nothing.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, in forgetting Being, we also have forgotten the beings who we are, and thus busy [*auf betriebug*] ourselves with the task of transforming whoever we may be along with the other beings who dwell on the planet, together with whatever may lie beyond. So, while we may have gained a planet (and perhaps more), in losing our way, we have forgotten Being. But also, because we transform the beyond (the future), into the present, in turn, we forget the future, and with no future, there is no past, and so, with the eclipsing of the future and the past, we forget not only Being but Time as well. And so, bereft of Being and Time we are left with our present. This present is our legacy, for the present, lies with its origins and its destiny. This legacy is the concrete appearance of the western logos incarnated as our technology. Thus, technology is both our destiny and our fate.

Now we must ask the question: what is our technology? As Heidegger does, we must begin with a question, rather than with a problem. Metaphysics has led to the transformation of questions into problems - problems to be solved, things to be fixed - but what Heidegger means is that a true question is about what stands before us as it is and not otherwise. For those of us living today, the question is

about the presence of our technology, that which defines us most, but that which we question least. For us, it is technology that is nearest to us, or, as Heidegger says, for us "technology is at hand".<sup>6</sup>

Most today take technology to be neutral and thereby "value-free", to be, in other words, the mere application of those ideas we call "science".<sup>7</sup> And, indeed, were we to perceive of technology differently, it would not work as it does, or it would not be correct, not efficient, and thereby, would not be technology. But on the other hand, here we want to question the appearance of the boundaries of technology - technology just as it presents itself to us as it is. Questions are but means to ends, in that answers are mere ends or boundaries. But we will not question in order to find a way of altering the boundaries of technology - to view technology as a problem to be fixed - and thereby making of ourselves part of the problem we set out to solve. We question in order to learn of the astonishing (thaumazein) presence of technology, and do so in order to learn what it is.

So what is technology? One can begin with this thoroughly modern word and try to recover its meaning synthetically. Technology is a compound of the two Greek words: *techne* and *logos*. *Techne* pertains to making and *logos* to knowing, to practices and to perceptions. But technology is not a compound in word only, for it is compounded from the co-penetration of making and knowing. Technology is the progressively rational (efficient) arrangement of means and ends (for humans) and cause and effect (for nature). The former, therefore, has to do with practices, and the latter with perceptions. Technology has as its project the transformation of nature both human and non-human. Efficiency, the goal of the projection of technology, is and can only be measured as a progressively diminishing difference between these means and ends or causes and effects. Thus, technology is 1) self-referential, 2) relatively autonomous and 3) progressively sovereign, and, being so, 4) tends toward the systemization of nature both human and non-human. If the relative difference of means and ends (or cause and effect) were ever reduced to zero, or to complete efficiency, then technology would become a totality (i.e., a total or complete system)<sup>8</sup>; and here, of course, come to mind the visions of the Universal and Homogenous State, the World State, the End State, and, as we shall see, Heidegger's *Neuzeit*.

Although in our time technology is embraced by not only the West but by the non-West as well, technology is a compound of western perceptions and practices. The perceptions point to the radically revised relations of God, Nature and Man that crystallize in early modernity, but go further back, and to practices of radically increasing prowess<sup>9</sup>, which, in turn, dynamically shape, and are shaped by those radically revised perceptions. First, I refer to the perceptions of Bacon, who urged us to put nature on the rack and to vex and torture it so as to force its "reasons for being", and to Hobbes who told us that man's artificial creation, the World, is superior to God's natural creation - the Earth and the beings upon it - except, of course, man. Bacon was among those whose observations of nature led to what we call the "scientific method", which, in turn, enhanced our control over nature, qua nature, through developing a way of transforming it, and eventually systematizing it.

But, as Heidegger notes, Bacon's new perception of nature was not enough, in that it pertained exclusively to perception. What was needed to bring about the scientific method was a practice coupled with this changed perception. This practice - a practice that allowed man to act upon nature - resided in imitating God's action, in creating the world and His eruption into the Earth and the World, that resulted in His embodiment within the realm of nature (Space) and history (Time). I refer to what lies at the heart of Christianity itself, to the doctrine of the incarnation of Christ. This doctrine became a practice with the medieval Schoolmen who attempted, through their interpretation of the Word, to embody the divine Will itself. But I suspect that these roots lie even further back, in the cabalistic and Gnostic practices of both Jews and early Christians.<sup>10</sup>

The perceptions of men like Bacon, together with those practices rooted in Christianity, result in attempts to systematize nature qua nature, while Hobbes systematizes human nature. Hobbes begins by

his attack on God's creation and Aristotle's doctrine of causality. His "artificial man", Leviathan, is a systemization of human nature, in that it is a system built by man, the Maker who makes Himself.<sup>11</sup> But this "new man" is a creature with neither conscience nor a longing for transcendence. He exchanges conscience for the rational calculation of self-interest and the longing for transcendence for his immanent safety. Bacon and Hobbes were among the men who discovered that the power of modern science (technology) lay in its tendency toward systemization. Because of this, they are harbingers of the new age for the West.

But, according to Heidegger, this still is not enough. For in order for it to be, technology requires the advent of research, for without research, there is no procedure, or way [*lomo*], as Machiavelli calls it (mode = the way of today, hence what is the modern, e.g., the present). However, research is not just procedure, it is the projection into nature (into what is) of that "fixed ground plan" [*Grundriss*], mentioned above. The projection draws (wills) the boundaries, in advance, and the way of knowing must adhere to these orders or boundaries. Heidegger calls this "binding adherence" of research, "rigor". Projection of the fixed ground plan is the first command of research. "Science becomes research through the projected plan, and through securing that plan in the rigor of procedure."<sup>12</sup>

Its second command is methodology. Methodology is the way of clarifying the known, and relating the unknown to it, thereby increasing the sphere of the known as facts. This is at the heart of what I call metaphor. This leads to explanation, explanation to law, and law to experiment, the latter itself, mirroring - albeit in a disembodied or abstract way - learning itself. "The more exactly the ground plan is projected, the more exact becomes the possibility of experiment."<sup>13</sup> Exactness leads to the objective knowledge we call facts or information, because the ground plan that is willed and projected is both controlled before the experiment itself, yet continually adjusts itself to its results. Thus, the way of method is what I identified above as the self-referential, self-adjusting aspect of technology.

The third command of research is that it be what Heidegger calls "ongoing" [*Betrieb*], that its activity both pertain to its proper (ordered = bound = fixed) sphere, that it, in other words, be specialized, and that the facts be coordinated so that the methodology can be adjusted to the results. This simply means that one must specialize and that specialists need to communicate and cooperate. This is why the business of research must be ongoing.<sup>14</sup>

Research brought technology to this point. But because of what became an overwhelming mass of facts (facts = information = de-contextualized knowledge) generated by it, a new way of ordering, storing, and explaining was necessary. Since explanation is a relation of the known to the unknown, or what I identified in our general introduction as the relation of our Underlying Concern to our Overarching Metaphor, new metaphors were needed for ordering this mass of information.

Due to the radical and rapid changes compounded into the perceptions and practices that constitute technology, the modern world has had three phases, or what I have called elsewhere, "waves".<sup>15</sup> Each wave has its own metaphor rooted in its own experience and its own symbol that best allow for an ordering, storing and explaining each phase of the experience of modernity. Each metaphor, along with its symbol, has been technological.

The experiences of Bacon and Hobbes' day required a mechanical metaphor, which was encapsulated within the symbol of the clock. Because symbols are wholes, they too are systems, as is the very machine we call the mechanical clock. The day of Kant, Hegel, Marx and - to a lesser extent - Nietzsche - needed an hydraulic metaphor, symbolized by the engine. During the last century, and for most of the twentieth century, the hydraulic metaphor - and its symbol, the engine - have sufficed. Indeed, most people are still stuck with the vocabulary based upon these older metaphors and symbols, in that we still describe both nature and human nature in terms of forces, pressures, processes and movements. Our everyday assumptions about nature both non-human and human nature are those mechanical

perceptions granted by Galileo and Newton, and the hydraulic perceptions associated with the second law of thermodynamics.

While most people today (including philosophers and scientists) still rely on these metaphors and symbols for explaining their experience, I think that Heidegger, Schmitt, Strauss and Kojève anticipated a change that did not become apparent until the last decade of the twentieth century.

Heidegger, especially, and to a lesser extent the others, realized that, while all technology pertained to a summoning forth of energy from nature, transforming it and storing it for future use, that something fundamental had changed. Heidegger calls this process of extraction and transformation "enframing" [*das Ge-stell*], and its storage for future use, "standing reserve."<sup>16</sup> Although still in embryonic form, what Heidegger saw as so basically different was that energy could be extracted, transformed, and stored differently, and that which, in his part of this century, was manifest only nascently, at the end of this century now is commonplace.

First mechanical energy was extracted from nature and stored in the weights and springs of the frame of machines such as clocks - machines that held the energy of nature in reserve until transformed by setting it on its way by winding a spring or releasing a weight. Next, hydraulic energy was extracted from nature, transformed and reserved within the walls of a frame called an engine and set it on its way by releasing water, steam or a regulated explosion to drive a turbine, a piston, a jet engine, a rocket engine or, at the end of this wave, crude nuclear power. But what fundamentally has changed is that now we are able to extract, transform, store, and set on their way the less apparent, even invisible, yet fundamental energies of nature. I refer to what lies within our inner space such as the DNA of our bodies and to that energy within the atomic structure of all bodies (beings), electricity - the spark of life, and one might say, its spirit. I speak of the wave of the electric metaphor, the symbol of which is the electric computer, without which the present phase of the western project, the "end of history" and "globalization" would not have become possible, much less apparent.

The universal use of the electrical computer marks the appearance of the coming together of perception (knowing) and practice (action = making) through the co-penetration of the computer's superstructure (its software = perception) with its infrastructure (its hardware = practice). I say appearance, as this coming together only appears to be, in that the space between them is relatively but progressively invisible. This is so because in the space "in between" is Time itself. Granted, we neither see force nor pressure, but we see their effects, relate them to their causes, and call this change. But the change we see in our time is becoming so swift that we see it less and less, and we are progressively coming to see change as normal, for the normal is precisely what is nearest, and therefore, not questioned. Time is Being. And both Time and Being are progressively becoming invisible.

Whereas, the power (efficiency) of mechanism is measured as force, and that of hydraulicism as pressure, the power of the computer lies in the difference "in between" the on and off pulse of a charge of electricity, and thus is measured by speed. Hence, the technology of mechanism and hydraulicism is manifest in the representation [*Vorstellen*] of the apparent as objective, ergo concrete, in that it demands the centralization, hence the massification of force and pressure in machines; and in human technologies, the massification of money in economies, the massification of people in societies of large nations in great cities, governed by extensive bureaucracies, all protected by great armies. So the power of the technology of our day is derived from the relative but progressive rate of diminished time, with the apparent disappearance of the representation of the time that the West has called history.

Thus electronic technology demands not the overstatement of appearance (representation) that in the time of the mechanical and hydraulic metaphor Heidegger calls the "gigantic"<sup>17</sup>, but the dissolution of the boundaries in which power was previously contained, hence the decentralization and dispersion of power. Artists, as usual, realized this first. Witness the dissolution of the image in

impressionist and abstract painting, and then, there is our present anti-reality, and hence reactionary movement - so-called post-modernism. While artists need not account for what they see and do, unlike those modernists, most "post-modernists" are not artists, nor are they philosophers. Rather than questioning what is, they resent it, and so, with their rhetoric, try to conjure it away. Yet, in their reaction to modernity, they are, in turn, conditioned by it, and hence, unwittingly, are an integral part of it.

But in terms of the serious demands of our technology today, I am thinking of the level of coordination in scientific and humanistic research, and how without the advent of the computer this would not be possible. I am thinking of electronic communications in general, but specifically of television and the Internet, and how these two modes of communication are destined to come together. And, I am thinking of how all of this makes us witness to the ever swiftly, disorienting eclipse of the sovereignty of the nation-state, creating as it were, a new political arena and a new political actor, the form of which we are yet to imagine, much less to name. Ah, shades of Machiavelli's *Prince* and Ovid's *Metamorphosis*.

Our technology at the end of this century is manifested by the disembodiment of power in the form of the appearance of the invisible. This is why the power of technology during the time of globalization often is referred to as soft power, soft because it is both malleable and boundless. It is a technology the power of which either appears benign or, because of its stealth, appears not to exist at all. Its use always is justified by that abstraction called "values". This power is as soft and as illusive as the electronic image itself. Mass communications is both decentralized and dispersed power. It also is mass illusion and delusion in that the more decentralized and dispersed it becomes, the less natural and historical reality exists. Given the "world picture", more and more people are coming to take the "virtual" as an improvement over the "givens" of nature and history, or they simply are taking the "virtual" itself as the given, and therefore, not questioning the picture they see.

So we flip on the TV. There is CNN. But maybe not. Perhaps a talk-show in Icelandic, Slovak, or Urdu. But for now, most are in English. Tomorrow, perhaps, in Chinese. Crudely put, news or talk about the news is "history as journalism,"<sup>18</sup> as Heidegger termed it. This is the world picture - the world as a picture - the world pictured as a whole in which the past and future are zapped into an electrical image of the present. The specific language matters less and less, for the format (the frame) increasingly is the same, the content is conditioned by the context and the context by the perspective. "Truth is relative", so they say, but this is not the point. While truth is relative to the perspective from which the world is being viewed, limiting, thereby, both what one "sees" and how one interprets it, greater numbers of people are seeing versions of the same picture. Thus more and more people are becoming less and less tied to their "little corners" of their necessarily "limiting standpoints" - and coming closer to what Heidegger calls a "standpoint without standpoint."<sup>19</sup> This point is so obvious that it likely is to be missed (and this is the point), for it is about that which defines us most, but which we question least. It is about our "Archimedean Point", our technology in general, and, electronic technology, in particular.

Let me repeat myself from part I of this essay: technology is our common denominator, our independent variable. Thus it both defines the world upon which we stand and our view of that world. Simply put, no thought of our world makes sense without taking into account the phenomenon of technology. Its major reason for being depends on our perception that all there is there is only in relation to us, and thus, is there for our use. But because of technology, we are able to do/make what we see - to re-present a universe as we will to see it.<sup>20</sup>



## CONCLUSION

While the West began with the blending of the Greek view of the whole that Plato called the Good with the Judeo-Christian whole called God, the centre of this whole, this world (and indeed, of any whole or world) is that "in-between" where the heavens meet the earth. Previously, because humans were earth-bound beings, every view of the whole was limited to the ground upon which they stood, constituting their various centres, or worlds bound by space and time. Today, because of our technology, the centre is wherever man deigns to stand, and thus the boundaries of our world now are constituted only by whatever we will to do and can do. And, we will do whatever we can. So, for ill or good, our technology provides us with a view of the "patterned change" that is necessary for our picture of the whole. Through technology the planet has become our eternity in non-Time, our everywhere in no-Where.

So, who has the right to rule the planet? Since rule is about setting limits or boundaries and right depends on adherence to those rules, then our technology has the right to rule because it progressively sets its own rules and adjusts its rules to whatever is efficient at any moment. Nobody knows if our time - our *Neuzeit* - will result in the complete transformations visioned by Kojève, Strauss, Schmitt or Heidegger. Nobody knows if the entire planet eventually will fit into the self-adjusting frame of the self-adjusting picture, or if something altogether unforeseen will occur.

But we do know this: at least for this age, and for the life of the West, technology is here to stay, as are its temporal and spatial offspring - the end of history and globalization. So we are left only with an old question that is both philosophical and political - philosophical because it is useless and political because it is practical. This is the question: how ought we to live and what are we to do? But, then, since our technology rules and has the right to rule, how can we find an answer to this question when we cannot see an horizon over which an answer might dawn on us? We can take the safe way and call the darkness light, or can embrace our destiny and accept our fate, taking the dangerous way, trying to see and do what we can, and, along whatever way, continue to question.

## ENDNOTES

- 1) Martin Heidegger, *The Age of the World Picture*, in *The Question Concerning Technology and other Essays* (New York, 1950); in German as *Holzwege* (Frankfurt, 1950).
- 2) Heidegger, *In the Age of the World Picture*, p.115. Also, *An Introduction to Metaphysics* (New Haven, 1959). Since philosophy cannot judge the real until the real has passed away, philosophy always is 'untimely'. But '...what is untimely will have its own time...and imposes its measure on its epoch.', p.8. Thus, the 'way' of philosophy is to enforce its own perspective on its own age, and in this way mis-judges its own time. Put tersely, because of the untimeliness of philosophy, Being, in its own time, will be concealed. The last moment of our age is on the cusp of what Heidegger calls, the 'planetary culture' of the 'age of the world picture' - the 'Eveningland' of the West- the last of the last age. Hence we view the last moment of this, our modern age, from the perspective of the dusk of the age of metaphysics.
- 3) Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 19; see also, pp. 37-39, and p. 45.
- 4) Heidegger, *The Age of the World Picture*, p. 118.
- 5) Heidegger, *Being and Time* (New York, 1962). This relation of beings and Being is the driving theme of this, Heidegger's most famous work, and centres around the question: 'why are there things that are rather than nothing?' It is about the question of 'thereness' [Dasein] and the way Being discloses itself as it reveals itself. Also, see n. 2, above.
- 6) Heidegger, 'Technology is at hand', is a phrase used in 1931 by Carl Schmitt, but we do not know if Heidegger got the phrase from Schmitt. It likely was one of those utterances that constituted the discourse of 'reactionary modernism'. See part II, K&K 3-4/98, of this essay.
- 7) Heidegger, *The Age of the World Picture*, p. 116; and *The Question Concerning Technology*, pp. 5-6, in *The Question Concerning Technology*.
- 8) According to the second law of thermodynamics, systems tend toward totality, and totality leads to entropy. In relation to the emerging 'system' of 'planetary culture', entropy = nihilism.

9) This radically increasing prowess appears early in the modern age with what I have called elsewhere, interrelated 'Sovereign Regimes' of religion, art, science and politics, appearing in this order. See *The Three Waves of Technology in The Literary Review of Canada* [LRC] (Oct:1995); and, also see Heidegger who inspired my elaboration of his idea in *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, p.48. Incidentally, my three waves have nothing to do with Toffler, but everything to do with Plato. On Plato, I elaborate below. See n.15.

10) Heidegger, *The Age of the World Picture*, p.122. My suspicions are best explained by *Epilogue : Gnosticism, Existentialism, and Nihilism* in Hans Jonas, *The Gnostic Religion* (New York: 1963). p.320. Also, see, Eric Voegelin, *Science Politics and Gnosticism* (Chicago: 1968) ; and Flannery O' Connor's novel, *Wise Blood* (New York : 1962).

11) In his three page introduction to *Leviathan*, Hobbes attacks Judeo-Christianity and philosophy. This attack is Hobbes' hypothesis or, the projection of his 'fixed ground plan' . Here he says man is superior to God, which is the same thing as saying there is no god but Man, and he metaphorically describes Man's 'artificial creation', *Leviathan*, as a clock-like machine. In his attack on the heart of philosophy (science) - Aristotle's Doctrine of Causality - he compounds Aristotle's first and third causes (material and agency) and the second and forth causes (idea and purpose), thereby bringing together a new practice and a new perception. What follows, e.g., the text itself, is a proof of his 'ground plan'. As Hobbes' advises: 'Read thysself.'

12) Heidegger, *In the Age of the World Picture*, p. 120.

13) Heidegger, p. 122 .

14) Heidegger, p. 125. The 'ongoing activity' of research requires institutionalization. In our universities the researcher will replace the scholar, as indeed, today this almost has come to be. It seems that the only refuge for erudition left is in the liberal arts (artes liberales), a small enclave for humanity, perhaps its last hope for dignity during 'the age of the world picture'.

15) Darby, see n. 9, above. While in actuality globalization is new, the experiences engendered by it are old. These experiences are the theme of *Republic*. In Plato's dystopian book V, Plato, playing on Aristophane's *The Assembly Women*, outrageously eradicates the difference between the public and private realms, by 1) eliminating eroticism, 2) then the family, and last 3) the difference between action and thought. These conditions are his famous 'waves'. His first wave is about universalization, his second about homogenation, and the third is the end of politics and philosophy with the reign ('state') of the philosopher-king. This is the greatest of Plato's serious jokes. And, then there is *Genesis* 11: 1-9, that recapitulates the 'Fall' in the story of the Tower of Babel. But then there was God and the Good. Destiny has a beginning and an end.

16) Heidegger, *The Turning*, in *The Question Concerning Technology*, has Enframing and Standing Reserve as its major theme. My term for 'Standing Reserve', has its shallow roots in our late-modern experience and is part of our worn-out late-modern vocabulary. My word for it is simply, 'Stuff' . See my *Sojourns in the New World* (Ottawa: 1986).

17) Heidegger, *In the Age of the World Picture*, p. 153. An explanation as to why the U.S.S.R. fell: it was not able to make the transition from 'hydraulics' to 'electricity', and instead of exploding (= revolution), merely imploded from leaking pressure due to a lack of fuel (= money), thereby, collapsing under the gigantic weight of its engine (= frame). Now the rubble (Russia) has reverted to a frontier (=lawless = criminal) society somewhere between 'mechanism' and 'hydraulicism'. The U.S.S.R. tried to escape the past and today Russia is being squashed by its past as the U.S.S.R., and a series of anemic revolutions could pop out anywhere and anytime. Yet, the Russians still make the best rockets, e.g., engines, their only significant contribution to the International Space Station Project. For now, the micro-electronics of the 'electric age' still must depend on engines to move its hardware, e.g., its frame (= body = being). Tomorrow, when another way is found, perhaps the Russians will become like the early-modern Chinese, who, after having invented gunpowder and ballistics, then were reduced to making and exploding fire crackers to ward off the spirits of evil ancestors.

18) Heidegger. What is meant by 'History as Journalism' is the following: 1) politics and its result, history, is transformed into culture and culture into entertainment[see Schmitt / Strauss in part II of this essay], 2) the imploding of the past and future into the present, and 3) instant global communication. See, as described in *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, pp. 37-38 . As I write this I am entertained by the electronic implosion of the drama of sex and death on CNN - the impeachment of the American president during the electronically controlled bombardment of Iraq. Nietzsche wrote that the politics of the future would be beyond good and evil, but, as my colleague, Hugh Gillis has noted, Nietzsche may be wrong, the politics of the future (our present) appears to be below good and evil.

19) Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, vol. II : The Eternal Return of the Same ( New York: 1984), P. 117.

20) Heidegger, *In the Age of the World Picture*, p.132.