

**T**he aim of the series of three articles by Tom Darby, a political Philosopher from Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada, is to familiarize us with the concept "globalization", that is much used and talked about as this century and millennium ends. In the following first part, and in the other two to be published later, Professor Darby will introduce thinkers that are less familiar in our country and the region (Alexandre Kojève, Leo Strauss, Karl Schmitt) and will also stress the aspect of Martin Heidegger's output that makes him the foremost modern political philosopher. K&K

## TOM DARBY **ON GLOBALIZATION** (1<sup>ST</sup> ESSAY)

### **Introduction: On the Right to Rule the Planet**

**B**ecause of the incessant chatter we hear about what is in store for us now that this century and millennium are about to come to a close, one must apologise for bringing up the subject. Yet apology does not just have to be a plea for indulgence, for an apology can also take the form of an explanation, but usually these kinds of apologies are minority opinions. Plato's own dialogue on Socrates' apology comes to mind as does his more extensive apology, his Republic. And then there is St. Augustine's City of God, his apology as an explanation to the Romans who thought the sacking of the 'Eternal City' was a result of the wrath of the pagan gods for Rome's having forsaken them for Christianity. Plato's apology is the beginning of philosophy, and Augustine's apology - his blending of Hellenism and Hebrewism - marks both the beginning of Western time and the defining explanation of the West itself: time as history and history as progress.

At the end of this period we call the West stand Hegel and Nietzsche who provided their own apologies, and in doing so, when considered together, set the template for both the upheavals of the twentieth century and the reflections on this century by such thinkers as Alexander Kojève, Leo Strauss, Carl Schmitt, and Martin Heidegger. These four are the most important thinkers of our swiftly eclipsing century, for just as the thoughts of Hegel and Nietzsche have best informed us as to what our own century is about, the thoughts of these four will define the boundaries of thought for the future.

The hinge that holds the thoughts of these four together is the Hegel-Nietzsche relation itself, and it is this relation that leads to the heart of their common reflections, reflections that centre on the question: 'who has the right to rule the planet?' It is well known that for Hegel the slave had won the right to rule, but for Nietzsche the rule of the slave is the greatest of all scandals, for it is tantamount to the transformation of the planet into the vulgar world of the Last Man. But the tension between Hegel and Nietzsche has proved to be more than a mere philosophical disagreement, for their conflicting theoretical visions were to become the theatre of the actual contest for the rule of the planet in the twentieth century. I refer to that which best describes this passing century - that which Nietzsche foretold in Beyond Good and Evil - global technological warfare.

Global war is impossible without global technology. Technology is the independent variable of modernity, and the contest for the planet has all along been about technology. Whether in the form of global exploration, conquest, colonialization, or in this century, world war, the contest always has been about who has had the best means - the best technology - to rule the planet. This contest has been justified and explained in various ways throughout modern times, but now it has entered a phase that we, only in the last decade of this century, have come to call 'globalization'.

Just as the destruction of Hellenic culture as brought about by Athenian imperialism - the 'globalization' of the smaller world of Socrates' day - and the sacking of Rome spelled the end to Roman civilization - the 'globalization' of that day - the visions of Hegel and Nietzsche belong both to the eclipse of the West and to the eclipse of the notion of uni-linear time: time as history and history as progress. Likewise, it is during the

current spiritual disaster of the twentieth century that Kojève, Strauss, Schmitt and Heidegger begin both a search for meaning at the heart of such calamity and make an attempt to move beyond.

These four contemporaries - and to some extent, collaborators - in attempting to move beyond, all heeded Nietzsche's words: 'one must step back before one leaps'. Considering to where one steps back or begins and where one leaps to or, if you will, lands, we should first consider Alexander Kojève because it is he who most directly and concretely addresses questions that are past of the background of global contest: questions concerning 1) how and why history ended, 2) who rules at the end of history, and 3) what this means in terms of the transformation of the planet through global technology. Thus we begin this essay in three parts with Kojève, who begins with Hegel, for like Hegel, who came with the dawn of the last century, and Nietzsche who came with its dusk, Kojève opens the door to this century, Strauss and Schmitt close it, and as we careen into the end of this century and the second millennium, Heidegger then creaks open the door to the next.

## I. The End of History: Kojève's Serious Joke

Alexander Kojève's original name was Aleksandr Kojevnikoff. He was born in Russia in 1902, fled the Bolshevik Revolution, was imprisoned in Poland and in 1920 made his way to Germany where he studied with Karl Jaspers at Heidelberg and in Berlin was exposed to Husserl and Heidegger. He received his doctorate in 1926. Eventually, Kojève went to Paris and there became known as a man of letters, a teacher of philosophy, and later, as a bureaucrat.

As a man of letters, Kojève's musings on subjects ranging from politics, literature or even the films of his day, made him a public figure in the manner of Voltaire, yet he was more playful, more ironic and more radical than the latter fox.

Kojève became a serious teacher in 1931 when he took over a course on Hegel from his friend Alexandre Koyre at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, Section des Sciences Religieuses. There his reflections on the particular events of his time and of time in general defined much of what was to become twentieth century philosophy. Many of Kojève's students would become luminaries, some better known than Kojève himself. But in the last decade of this century this has changed somewhat, due largely to Francis Fukuyama's popular book about the end of history. This book was popular because Fukuyama told Americans what they wanted to hear. Ironically, although Fukuyama's conclusions about an Americanized 'future' has already begun to look rather quaint, the transformation of this serious (and for some, grim) notion into Disneyesque entertainment has given "the end of History" the cache of an urban myth. Kojève - who died during the extreme seriousness of the student revolts of 1968 - would have loved this.<sup>1</sup>

There are two more serious reasons why Kojève has become better known during this decade. First, it has been discovered that the students of this once obscure Marxist-atheist joke-teller were all reacting to his startling teachings that history was over and that his erstwhile students are either timidly manoeuvring around Kojève's conclusions or that they were brazenly trying to further elaborate the logic of these conclusions. In the camp of the former, I refer to his students such as Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and in the latter camp, the likes of Raymond Aron and Georges Bataille. Furthermore, by extension, I also refer to students-of-students. There was Louis Althusser who studied with Merleau-Ponty and whose student was Michael Foucault, and then there is Jacques Derrida who was greatly influenced by Bataille, names we have come to associate with post-structuralism or post-modernism. Ah, what an incestuous business! But then incest is the story of philosophy.<sup>2</sup> This leads to another reason why Kojève is becoming so well-known. To be clear, without an understanding of his teachings, post-modernism not only makes no sense, it is impossible. This explains the embarrassing academic fad of 'post-modernism', a fad mercifully now out of fashion.

Typical of Kojève, he joked that he had grown tired of teaching philosophy and so had become a bureaucrat, for after all, why would one want to be a teacher of philosophy when one could stay at the finest

hotels and drink the finest wines, so he joined the Ministry of Finance. In 1948 Kojève was posted to Japan, and after a long sojourn there went on to begin the negotiations for what would become the World Trade Organization (WTO) and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Eventually, Kojève went to Brussels and became one of the architects of what was to become the European Union (EU). As we shall see, although it appears contradictory, this self-professed Stalinist-Marxist practised what he preached.

Although he wrote on various subjects, Kojève is best known for the collection of notes taken from his seminar on Hegel. The notes were compiled by his students and published under the title *Introduction à la lecture de Hegel*.<sup>3</sup> It is significant that Kojève did not bother to write a book on this subject and rather left it to his students to document his thoughts. But even more important, Kojève was - in his own seemingly flippant admission - lazy. Surprisingly, Kojève's laziness is an interpretive key to his work. Kojève, like the Gods who lived on timeless Olympus, saw himself as living at the end of time or history, and that as a philosopher his task was to explain the world that had come to be in terms of the complete and final philosophy - the Science of Hegel. This world for Kojève was post-historical in that there was nothing left to do except to complete the task of universalizing and homogenizing the planet. Or as Kojève himself put it in an interview just before his death: "Since this time (1806), what has happened? Nothing at all, the alignment of the provinces. The Chinese revolution is only the introduction of the Napoleonic Code into China."<sup>4</sup>

The term "the alignment of the provinces" in the above quote is a reference to none other than the progressive elaboration of the technological world system, what Kojève called the Universal and Homogeneous State (U.H.S.) or what we now call 'globalization'. The date 1806, refers to the eve of the battle of Jena when Hegel says that he realized the significance of Napoleon's historic action, the date when Hegel's realization that Napoleon's action brought into the concrete, historical world the principles that have been elaborated into the global system. Thus, Hegel saw that Napoleon's action was the last action, in that everything that has come after it has been, is and will be a mere elaboration of it. This is what Kojève means when he says that nothing new has occurred since 1806. Indeed, what appeared to be a flippant remark, is now seen to be deadly serious, for since there is nothing left to do or say except to elaborate Hegel's system.

Long before Kojève's serious encounter with Hegel he was influenced by the thought of Vladimir Solovyov, a fellow Russian, who gave and later published a series of lectures on what he called 'God-manhood' (1878) and published his last work called *War, Progress and the End of History* (1899). Solovyov's notion of God-manhood is an extrapolation of his religio-political vision of a unified planet and man becoming god. While Kojève's *Introduction* was influenced by Solovyov's own reading of Hegel, Solovyov also influenced Dostoyevsky, who modeled Alyosha in *The Brothers Karamazov* on him. While Solovyov's vision of the end of history has an obvious influence on Kojève, above all, Solovyov's influence on Kojève appears most precisely in Kojève's filtering Hegel's notions of time through Solovyov's mysticism and gnosticism found most explicitly in his unfinished work, *The Foundations of Theoretical Philosophy*, (1899). Although Kojève never mentions his erstwhile Russian compatriot in his *Introduction*, Kojève wrote his doctoral dissertation on him, and the shadow of Solovyov is everywhere present in Kojève's reading of Hegel.<sup>5</sup>

Another early but less profound influence of Kojève was the polymath - philosopher, physician, science fiction writer and embalmer of Lenin - Alexander Bogdanov. Bogdanov, also guided by Solovyov's vision of planetary universality, developed what he called 'tectology' (1922), the guiding principal behind which is that Truth is the totality of experience and Truth, therefore, becomes a method for organizing experience, leading to the construction of a coherent system based on the control of experience itself. The circular logic is underscored by the fact that Truth here is spelled with an upper case "T", an eccentricity that Kojève himself would adopt to indicate universality, totality and circularity.<sup>6</sup>

Solovyov's, and to a lesser extent, Bogdanov's influence on Kojève are essential for understanding not just where Kojève came from but where he was going. The latter is a reference to Kojève's own vision that guides his interpretation of Hegel, principally Kojève's notion of the Universal and Homogeneous State and its relation to technology and its mystical and gnostic foundation. Many today who call themselves post-moderns natter on about the evils of Hegel's philosophy in that it is the most totalizing, hence the most



ALEXANDRE KOJÈVE

hegemonic of all discourses. Ironically, Kojève, the father of late twentieth century post-modernism, would agree. Hegel's philosophy is logocentric because it is complete and final, and because it is complete, it is rational. But if it is complete it must contain everything, and everything must include its opposite. Thus the absolute philosophy is not only the final philosophy, the final philosophy is undergirded by the irrational.

Kojève's reading of Hegel is an interpretation and not a commentary. Interpretation, unlike commentary,<sup>7</sup> begins both outside its text and transcends it. All interpretation, for this reason is deliberate misreading, in that it entails playful revision, and in Kojève's reading of Hegel, even the jettisoning of large portions of Hegel's philosophy, such as his philosophy of nature. This is not to say that any text can be read in any manner one wishes to read it; on the contrary, while commentary entails the attempt to faithfully render what an author meant, interpretation is an interplay between what an author meant and what an author means. Thus interpretation is about the past, the present and the future. This is what I meant when I said that interpretation transcends the text, and for this reason it is also about time - the transcending of time. Kojève's Introduction is not about Hegel as such, but about Kojève's reading of Hegel and what it means for the twentieth century and beyond. It is this to which we are to be 'introduced', and this is captured in the sheer irony of the title itself. It is not an introduction to Hegel but to Kojève's reading of Hegel. Kojève's Introduction is a form of 'serious play'.

Kojève's own serious introduction to Hegel came when Alexandre Koyre convinced him that Hegel's philosophy was above all else a philosophy of time and that in order for Hegel to have known this, and in turn for Koyre and then Kojève to come to know it, that time or history somehow had to have stopped.<sup>8</sup> Thus Kojève's introduction to Hegel began with this seemingly absurd claim by Koyre, a claim based on his own conclusions, conclusions Koyre neither understood nor could deny. Koyre's conclusion was the following: 1) that Hegel had himself experienced all stages of consciousness by re-thinking them, and in doing so had attained complete knowledge or wisdom, or put boldly, non-relative and therefore Absolute Knowledge. 2) Since Hegel had experienced these stages of consciousness, and since the experience constituted a totality of consciousness, then he, Hegel, had to exist at the moment when actual historical events gave rise to the consciousness that he experienced. 3) And since experience is historical, and since Hegel experienced all moments (the reflections on all previous events) that gave rise to his experience, then Hegel had to exist, at least in principle, at the end of time in order know what he knew. In otherwords, time or history had ended with Hegel's realization. Now I will present a sketch of what Kojève found when he turned to Hegel in his attempt to understand the conclusion reached by Koyré. Let us begin as Kojève did by asking the following question: What are the conditions that had to apply in order for Koyre's to reach such conclusions? And here is a sketch of the answer.<sup>9</sup>

First, if Hegel had to have thought all moments of consciousness, then he would have had to account for the beginning as well as the end of human consciousness. Next Hegel would have to have accounted for all moments of consciousness between this beginning and this end, thereby accounting for how and why one moment leads to the next. Kojève explains that Hegel does this by showing the difference between animals and humans. Humans, like all animals, have both consciousness and desire, but unlike other animals humans are conscious of the difference between themselves and of that which they are conscious, together with the difference between themselves and of the objects of their desire. Humans are thereby self-conscious, conscious of the self, the desiring conscious self.

Humans also are conscious of the presence of other selves, whose desire they desire. This is to say that all humans desire to be recognized (re-cognized, re-membered) and it is upon the desire for recognition that both internal time consciousness (past-present-future) and external time consciousness (history) arise. The former appears because one must recognize himself in the future and must remember (in the past) in order to do so. History appears because of the fight to the death that results from the desire for recognition. In the fight for recognition both must remain alive and one must yield to the other. The one who yields becomes the slave and the victor becomes the master.

As slaves cunningly observe their masters, it appears to them that their masters can do whatever they desire. This the slave calls 'freedom', and this freedom arises because of the slave's bondage and the fact that the slave is forced to transform nature as the master desires. This transformation of nature is called

'labour'. Thus freedom is tied to bondage and labour. Furthermore, it is the labour of the slave that allows the master freedom to do what masters do: to eat, drink, copulate and to fight. Masters are good at fighting, but fighting, if it has no point, is even more meaningless than eating or drinking or sex, which at least sustain or produce life. But fighting that has a point (a purpose, an end, hence a meaning) is called 'war'. War is organized fighting directed toward an end, and politics is a subspecies of war. But politics must occur in a common space and this common space is called the 'city'. Slaves build cities through 'work'. Thus it is the work of the slave that constructs the 'relatively permanent' common space called the city, a theatre where masters exercise power through speaking and acting before their peers and are in turn recognized and perhaps even remembered to the extent that they become immortalized. It is through and because of politics that freedom increasingly appears. This progressive appearance of freedom resulting from politics is what we call the 'historical process'.

Having sketched the above, Kojève's interpretation of Hegel reveals that if freedom is the engine that powers history, then it is the slave whose power progresses along with his freedom as he drives history to its final battle between slaves and their masters. This final battle is the French Revolution with its principles summed up in the battle cry, '*liberté, égalité, fraternité*', final because, its principles, when made concrete, do away with actual mastery and slavery, and because everything that follows is just an elaboration of the progressively actualized principles themselves. Alas, after the terror the French Revolution, on its own, fizzled out. But this is why it took Napoleon to make the principles actual, concrete or historical, for it is Napoleon's final action and Hegel's realization of the meaning of it, that brings knowledge and action together.

Since Hegel's knowledge is final knowing - non-relative knowing or wisdom - and Napoleon's action is final action, the system is, in principle, complete. So all that there is left to do is to make the system progressively complete. And complete means *concrete, ergo, real*. This elaboration of the system is made possible through that co-penetration of knowing and making we call technology. Through technology the abstract (possible) and the actual (concrete) become one.

Classically, the difference between theory and fantasy is that with the former, our dreams, our ideals, our principles, are possible, which is to say that they can be made actual or real. But we have nothing of the classical today, for today that boundary between the possible and the actual - between the virtual and the real - has been wiped away. Thus to speak of class is to speak of boundaries. Today class does not exist; which is to say that those boundaries separating the possible from the actual have been erased. Asked if one thought it possible that everyone on the planet could be made free from want, able to reach his or her potential, could be made equal despite differences, and live together like the members of a happy family, one might answer that yes, this is possible, given the right conditions. Granted, this could entail removing from the planet all those who could not be transformed into happy 'humans'. This is not likely. Prozac would be more efficient.

By whatever method, it would be possible because our technology is that which, by my definition, is capable of making both the unequal equal and the equal nonequal - and by its ability to erase and to reconstruct boundaries - to alter the relation between the actual and the possible - technology can transform literally anything. Without technology (or modern science, which is but its other name) Kojève's vision of the U.H.S. would be but a fantasy. So what did Kojève think this globalized world - his U.H.S. - would look like? As one might guess, Kojève described this concept.

Kojève's clearest picture of the U. H. S. is presented in a now famous footnote appearing on page 157 of the present English edition of his Introduction. He writes of what he calls the 're-animalized man', resembling Nietzsche's last man and Nietzsche's description of the timeless life of animals as found in his Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life. His description is not too far from the Disneyfied consumer democracy championed by Fukuyama. But then, in typical form, after having lived in Japan while tending to his duties as a high-level bureaucrat with the Ministry of Finance, in a subsequent edition, without altering the original note by a jot, Kojève appends the note. He tells us about what he calls 'japanized man', a post-historical creature who has for some centuries lived at the end of history, a creature somehow associated with the code of honour of the Samurai warrior and who is capable of committing a 'perfectly gracious suicide'.



KARL SCHMITT

So who lives after history, the re-animalized man or japanized man? Both do. The re-animalized man and the japanized man are post-historical archetypes of victorious slaves and non-reconstructed masters. Usually taken as one of Kojève's flippant riddles, this again, is one of Kojève's serious jokes. Here he gives us the picture of what lies between the end of history and its concrete realization. Also, this is but an echo of the tension between Hegel's slave and Nietzsche's master that has played itself out during this century of global technological war.

So, contrary to Professor Fukuyama's gleeful conclusions resulting from our victory in the Cold War, that war was but a civil war - a family feud. But alas, echoing a statement of Heidegger's in The Introduction to Metaphysics, Kojève himself said that 'Americans are just rich Russians, and Russians, poor Americans.'<sup>10</sup> As we shall see, Kojève was describing the tension between re-animalized man and japanized man as that which lies in between the globalizing slaves and the remnant of masters who refuse to be globalized - between civilization and culture - between totalitarianism and tyranny. This will take us to Strauss and his discussion with Kojève of this very subject, to Schmitt as related to both Kojève and to Strauss, and then to Heidegger and what he calls our 'age of the world picture'.

#### END NOTES / POZNÁMKY

- 1) Mark Lilla, *The End of Philosophy: How a Russian Emigre Brought Hegel to the French*, TLS (April 5, 1991) pp. 3-5
- 2) Vincent Descombes, *Contemporary French Philosophy*, trans. L. Scott Fox and J. M. Harding (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980)
- 3) Alexander Kojève, *Introduction à la lecture de Hegel*. ed. Raymond Queneau (Paris: Gallimard, 1947). *Introduction to the reading of Hegel*. Assembled Raymond Queneau, ed. Allan Bloom, trans. James H. Nichols, Jr. (New York: Basic Books Inc. 1969)
- 4) Kojève, *Entretien avec Gilles Lapouge* *Rozhovor so Gillom Lapougeom*. *La quinzaine littéraire* 53 (1-15 July, 1968), pp. 18-19
- 5) Kojève, *Religionsphilosophie Vladimir Solowjews*. Philosophy diss. Heidelberg, 1926. also see Review of R. Ambrozaitis, *Die Staatslehre Vladimir Solowjews*. *Archive für Sozialpolitik* I, no. I (February 1929); Kojève, *Die Geschichtsphilosophie Vladimir Solowjews: Sonderabdruck*. *Der russische Gedanke: International Zeitschrift für russische Philosophie, Literaturwissenschaft und Kultur* I. no. 3. Bonn, 1930
- 6) Alexander Bogdanov, *Matter as a Thing in Itself*. trans. George L. Kline in *Russian Philosophy*, Vol. III. ed. James M. Edie (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, Inc. 1969) pp. 390-4
- 7) Hugh Gillis, *Anthropology, Dialectic and Atheism in Kojève's Thought* (New York: *Graduate Faculty Journal*, Vol. 18, no.2, 1995) pp. 24-34. There were no accurate commentaries written during the nineteenth century and only two reliable interpretations, these being the critiques of Hegel by first Kierkegaard and then by Nietzsche. (Commentary, as opposed to interpretation, more closely resembles an author's understanding of himself.) However, aside from the famous letter Hegel wrote to his friend, Niethammer, where he identifies Napoleon as the man who actualizes freedom, there is textual evidence in the Phenomenology that Hegel understood himself to mean that history had ended in 1806. For examples, see Hegel's comments about the love of knowledge and the possession of actual knowledge on p. 70, together with his comment about the 'New World' on p. 75 of the Baillie tr. of the Phenomenology. Napoleon is the 'true' Christ, "the Logos become flesh", so says Kojève. Jesus entered Jerusalem astride an ass while carrying an olive branch. Napoleon entered Jena astride a white steed while brandishing a sword. Yet, it was Hegel who reminded us in his Philosophy of Right that Minerva's owl flies after dusk, so perhaps the twentieth, rather than the nineteenth, is really Hegel's century, the century in which Hegel is actually understood.
- 8) Alexandre Koyre, *Hegel à Iena*. *Revue d'histoire et philosophie religieuses* (1934); in *Etudes d'histoire de la pensée philosophique*. Paris, pp. 247-289; *Note sur la langue et la terminologie hegeliennes*. *Revue philosophique* (1931). in *Revue d'histoire et philosophie religieuses*. Paris, pp. 191 - 224
- 9) Many have remarked about how different Kojève's account of Hegel is from the more conventional accounts of Hegel. While Hegel certainly knew more about what he meant, Kojève knew more about what Hegel means. After all, Kojève could read Hegel while Hegel could not read Kojève, and, of course, Kojève could read Marx, Nietzsche and Heidegger. But most importantly, Kojève experienced most of the twentieth century. In this sense, Kojève knew Hegel better than Hegel knew himself. Kojève's violently anthropocentric account is accomplished by reading all of Hegel (and thereby all of Western experience) through the "Lordship and Bondage" section of the Phenomenology. But this is the point, man all along has been the *teios* of the West, and by extension, of the planet.
- 10) Kojève, *Entretien avec Gilles Lapouge / Rozhovor so Gillom Lapougeom*. *La quinzaine littéraire* 53 (1-15 July, 1968), pp. 18-19

jenom s kódom cti samurajského bojovníka, ktorý je schopný spáchať „dokonale vznešenú samovraždu“.

Kto teda žije po dejinách, animalizovaný človek alebo japonizovaný človek? Obaja. Animalizovaný človek a japonizovaný človek sú posthistorickými archetypmi víťazných otrokov a nepokorených pánov. Aj tento výrok, zvyčajne považovaný za jednu z Kojevových prostorekých hádaniek, je jedným z jeho vážnych žartov. Poskytuje nám tu obraz toho, čo leží medzi koncom dejín a ich konkrétnym uskutočnením. Takže je to iba ozvena napätia medzi Hegelovým otrokom a Nietzscheho pánom, ktorí sa navzájom vyšachovali v tomto storočí globálnej technologickej vojny.

Takže na rozdiel od radostných záverov profesora Fukuyamu, pochádzajúcich z nášho víťazstva v studenej vojne, toto bola iba občianska vojna - rodinná roztržka. No bohužiaľ, sám Kojève, narážajúc na Heideggerovo tvrdenie v Úvode do metafyziky povedal, že „Američania sú iba bohatými Rusmi a Rusi chudobnými Američanmi“.<sup>10</sup>

Ako uvidíme, Kojève opisoval napätie medzi animalizovaným človekom a japonizovaným človekom ako to, čo leží medzi globalizovanými otrokmi a zvyškom pánov, ktorí odmietajú byť globalizovaní - medzi civilizáciou a kultúrou - medzi totalitarizmom a tyraniou. To nás vedie ku Straussovi a jeho diskusi s Kojevom práve o tejto téme, k Schmittovi, vzťahujúcemu sa ku Kojevovi i k Straussovi a potom k Heideggerovi a k tomu, čo nazýva naším „vekom obrazu sveta“.

Z anglického originálu preložil Martin Kanovský

POZNÁMKY ( 1-6, 8 a 10 nájdete na strane 19.)

7) Hugh Gillis, *Anthropology, Dialectic and Atheism in Kojève's Thought* ( New York: Graduate Faculty Journal, Vol. 18, no.2, 1995) pp. 24-34. Nejestvujú presné komentáre z 19. storočia a poznáme len dve primerané interpretácie, ktoré sú kritikami Hegela - prvá od Kierkegarda, druhá od Nietzscheho. (Komentár na rozdiel od interpretácie sa viac približuje autorovmu chápaniu seba samého.) Okrem slávneho Hegelovho listu priateľovi Niethammerovi, v ktorom považuje Napoleona za toho, kto zaktualizoval slobodu, existuje ešte svedectvo vo Fenomenológii ducha, kde sa sám Hegel domnieva, že dejiny skončili v roku 1806. Pozri napríklad Hegelove komentáre o láske k poznaniu a vlastníctvu aktuálneho poznania na s. 70 spolu s jeho komentármi o „Novom svete“ na s. 75 Baillieho prekladu Fenomenológii ducha. Napoleon je „skutočným“ Kristom, „slovom, ktoré sa stalo telom“, ako vraví Kojève. Ježiš vstúpil do Jeruzalemu na oslvi s palmovou ratolesťou v ruke. Napoleon vstúpil do Jeny na bielom koni s mečom v ruke. Práve Hegel nám pripomína vo svojej Filozofii práva, že Minervina sova lieta za súmraku, takže nie devätnáste, ale skôr dvadsiate storočie je skutočne Hegelovým storočím, teda storočím, v ktorom bol Hegel skutočne pochopený.

9) Mnohí znalci Hegela upozorňujú, ako sa Kojevova interpretácia Hegela líši od tradičných komentárov. Hoci Hegel nepochybne vedel viac o tom, čo mal na mysli, Kojève vedel lepšie, čo Hegelove myšlienky znamenajú pre súčasnosť. A Kojève mohol študovať Hegela, Marxa, Nietzscheho, Heideggera, čo Hegel samozrejme nemohol. Čo je však dôležitejšie, Kojève zažil väčšiu časť dvadsiateho storočia. V tomto zmysle poznal Hegela a význam jeho diela lepšie ako samotný Hegel. Kojève dosiahol svoj výsostne antropocentrický (človek ako stred a zdroj všetkého) pohľad čítaním celého Hegela (a teda nazeraním na celkovú západnú skúsenosť) cez tú časť Fenomenológii ducha, kde Hegel popisuje vzťah medzi pánom a otrokom. A o to práve ide - človek vždy bol *teios*, vládca, Západu a teda celej planéty.

## DOPORUČENÁ LITERATÚRA / ADDITIONAL SUGGESTED READING

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