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Artes Liberales

An Association for the Furtherance of Liberal Education and Democratic Values in Post-communist Societies

Artes Liberales was founded in Prague in January 1997 as a cooperative endeavour of educational leaders from Central Europe, the Baltic States, and Ukraine. As a regional educational association, **Artes Liberales** sponsors regular professional exchanges and other collaborative programs to promote liberal education and democratic leadership among scholars and institutions of higher learning in post-communist countries. **Artes Liberales** encourages colleges and universities to adopt innovative liberal arts curricula as a counter-weight to the premature and often excessive specialization typical of communist and post-communist pedagogy. **Artes Liberales** is actively engaged in expanding cooperative ties with other liberal arts institutions, both in the region and in the United States.

Members of the **Artes Liberales** steering committee: Samuel Abrahám, Director, Society for Higher Learning, Bratislava; Jerzy Axer, Director, Centre for Studies in the Classical Tradition, Warsaw; Agnes Erdélyi, Eotvos University, Budapest; Serhiv Ivaniouk, Rector, University of Kiev-Mohyla Academy, Kiev; Nikolai Kopasov, Smolny College, Sankt Peterburg, Russia; Peteris Lakis, Rector, Latvian Academy of Culture, Riga; Rein Raud, Rector, Estonian Humanities Institute, Tallinn; Jan Sokol, former Minister of Education, Czech Republic, Deputy Director, Institute of Fundamental Learning, Prague; and Julia Stefanova, Executive Director, Bulgarian-American Commission for Educational Exchange, Sofia; Stasys Vaitekunas, Rector, Klaipeda University, Lithuania.

US Representative: Nicholas Farnham, Director of Educational Programs at **The Christian A. Johnson Endeavor Foundation**, acts as the Foundation's program liason with **Artes Liberales**. His New York office serves temporarily as the organization's secretariat.

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ARTES LIBERALES NEWS

THE CHALLENGE OF LIBERAL EDUCATION FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY - ARTES LIBERALES CONFERENCE

Warsaw, October 19 -22, 2000

Artes Liberales, an association of university leaders in Central and Eastern Europe and Russia dedicated to the encouragement of liberal education, announces its second general conference on the topic of "The Challenge of Liberal Education in the 21 st Century." Ten years after momentous changes began in this region, the conference will address the questions: what are the challenges facing liberal education today, and how best can we demonstrate its relevance to contemporary society? Scheduled to take place in Warsaw from October 19 to 22, 2000, the meeting will focus on the opportunities and obstacles to sustaining liberal education initiatives in fifteen countries in the region. Approximately 125 rectors, institute directors, university students and high school teachers in the region will be invited. Also, out of the growing recognition that Artes Liberales' concerns are relevant to contemporary societies globally, fifteen to twenty university presidents, deans and school heads from the United States will be invited along with a half dozen university rectors from Central Asia as well as several from Western Europe.

The transformation of societies in Central and Eastern Europe over the last decade has been rapid, dramatic and difficult. It has changed the circumstances of life, hopes, values and ideals for many, while holding out to the entire world the possibility of freer and more dynamic communities developing from rigid systems of the past. In this situation, the proper role of education has changed in most countries from political and ideological control into a process of raising self-assured, free individuals who are able to cope with the challenges of a rapidly evolving environment. Efforts to liberalize education have begun in universities throughout the region, in new educational institutions as well as in innovative structures both within and outside more traditional academies. As it is being practiced throughout the region, liberal education shows itself to be increasingly important for positive regional change as well as essential for citizens of a globalized world.

Founded in 1997, Artes Liberales held its first general conference in Budapest in October 1998. Participants included more than 100 university rectors, vice rectors, professors, educators and students from 15 countries. As a result of the four-day conference of focused addresses, intensive debates, and classroom workshops, participants issued an urgent plea to educational leaders, politicians and the general public to support the idea of liberal education. They called for the joint effort of all involved in higher education to introduce the liberal arts as a way of cultivating a spirit of critical thinking and promofing the values of civic maturity.

At the same time, they underlined the need for more attention to some of the following areas: interdisciplinary study; teacher training; integration of teaching and research; a transparent (and transferable) academic credit system; student and scholarly mobility; models of international education; increased access to higher quality education.

Among the organizers of *Artes Liberales* are Dr. Samuel Abraham, Editor of *Kritika & Kontext,* Journal of Critical Thinking, Bratislava, Slovak Republic; Dr. Jerzy Axer, Director of the Center for Studies on the Classical Tradition in Poland & East-Central Europe, Warsaw, Poland; Dr. Agnes Erdélyi, Lorand Eotvos

University, Budapest, Hungary; Dr. Serhiy Ivaniouk, Rector of the University of Kiev - Mohyla Academy, Ukraine; Dr Nikolai Koposov, Dean, Smolny Institute of Liberal Arts, St Petersburg, Russia; Dr. Peteris Lakis, Rector of the Latvian Academy of Culture, Riga, Latvia; Prof. Dr. Anatoly Mikhailov, Rector of the European Humanities University, Minsk, Belarus; Dr. Rein Raud, Former Rector of The Estonian Humanities Institute, Tallinn, Estonia; Dr. Jan Sokol, Former Minister of Education of the Czech Republic, Prague, Czech Republic; Prof. Gheorghe Stefan, Technical University of Bucharest, Romania; Dr. Julia Stefanova, Sofia University, Bulgaria; and Dr. Stasys Vaitekunas, Rector, Klaipeda University, Lithuania.

The Artes Liberales Conference in October, 2000 seeks to continue the discussion of the issues raised in 1998, deepening understanding of their complexity and relevance to contemporary civil society.

The conference is being sponsored by the Educational Leadership Program of the Christian A. Johnson Endeavor Foundation.

CONFERENCE PROGRAM

October 19, 2000

Welcome by Nicholas Farnham, Director, Educational Leadership Program and Jerzy Axer, Director, Artes Liberales Institute and Artes Liberales Chairman

October 20, 2000

Opening Session **What is Liberal Education?** *(Nikolay Koposov, Dean, Smolny College, St. Petersburg)*

Liberal Education and Democratic Leadership *(Elizabeth Coleman, President, Bennington College, Vermont, USA)*

Panel Discussion *(three concurrent groups)* **Liberal Education Demonstrations: Three Interdisciplinary Presentations and Discussion**

1. Reading, Subjectivity and the Internet - 2. Genetics and the Ethics of Cloning - 3. Memory and Identity in Post-Soviet Space *(Student Presentation)*

Plenary Session **Four Strategies for Introducing Liberal Arts Educations in Eastern Europe**

October 21, 2000

Plenary Session **Democrarcy and the Organization of Knowledge in the Contemporary University** *(Jehuda Elkana, Rector and President, Central European University)*

General Discussion

Panel Discussion (three concurrent groups)

Liberal Education Demonstrations continued (held concurrently)

1. Tradition and Postmodernity
2. The Connections between Literature and Philosophy and Political Developments

Plenary Session: General Discussion of Demonstrations

Plenary Session **Secondary School Education, the Liberal Arts and Universities**
The Future Structure of the University *(Bronislaw Geremek, Foreign Minister of Poland)*

October 22, 2000

Plenary Session**The Situation in Poland Today: Building an Inter-University, Interdisciplinary Studies program**

Final plenary Session **What Challenges for Artes Liberales Lie Ahead?** *(N. Farnham, S.Abrahám)*

ARTES LIBERALES RECTOR FELLOWSHIP: TWO EASTERN EUROPEAN RECTORS VISIT THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

The first Artes Liberales Fellowship, hosted by the University of Chicago, proved a rewarding experience for its two recipients: Prof. Boyan Biolchev, Rector of Sofia University, and Prof. Piotr Weglenski, Rector of the University of Warsaw, Poland. Over the course of eleven days this past April, the two Rectors saw the University, its administrators, its scholars and its students, from many different angles. The Fellowship officially began with a meeting with John W. Boyer, Dean of the College and Professor of History during which the Rectors learned about the present challenges facing the University. The rectors themselves peppered Dr. Boyer with questions ranging from alumni pride to development to institutional expansion.

Drs. Weglenski and Biolchev, presiding over institutions in the process of enormous change (and/or under enormous fire) in their home countries, were especially interested in learning about the ways in which the University of Chicago administratively organized and financially sustained itself. To this end, they met with a diverse group of administrators and committees, including the committee of the faculty governing body, the associate provosts responsible for faculty hiring and promotion, the director of university research, the dean of students staff and the chief financial organizer. In addition, each of the rectors met separately with those scholars and students who specialized in his own particular discipline. In the case of Dr. Weglenski, an expert in genetics, meetings were arranged with the Chair of the Department of Molecular Genetics and Cell Biology, as well as with the Chair of the Committee on Genetics. Dr. Biolchev, a Slavic Studies scholar, met with the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures as well as with members of the German Studies Department.

President of the University of Chicago, economist Hugo Sonnenschein, and Nicholas Farnham, Director of ELP, met with the rectors as well. Their conversation focused on the advantages of competition in state-supported higher educational structures. Emerging from educational systems that were under Communist rule for over forty years, both Dr. Biolchev and Dr. Weglenski were very interested to learn about the ways in which competition - particularly in terms of faculty appointments, promotions and salaries - could be used to improve the quality of their universities. In answer to their question of how best to initiate academic centers of excellence, President Sonnenschein answered from an economic as well as experienced administrative point of view, suggesting that finding and supporting one already strong institute within their universities would be the best way to foster the overall strength of their universities; focusing resources now would lead to larger, more general benefits later.

The Educational Leadership Program hopes that the fellowship has inspired the rectors theoretically and practically with ideas for their own universities, and it looks forward to the continuation of the fellowship program next year.

JUSTICE AND LIBERAL EDUCATION

BY NICHOLAS H. FARNHAM

(From "Liberal Education," 1986, Vol. 72, No.4, Association of American Colleges)

(Also published in Reading Selection of Christian A. Johnson Leadership Seminar for College and University Presidents)

If we consider justice in society from a broad perspective, it is plain that we rely on its occurrence in human dealings at all levels, without resort to "official" justice (that is, justice as decided by law and the courts). It seems obvious in our complicated world that there are far too many contingencies for legislation to deal with and too many incidents where justice is at issue for the courts to handle. A fair society must count on most of its citizens behaving justly most of the time. Whether it is the police officer on a beat, the small businessperson relating to customers, the farmer with workers, or the corporate executive or professional making complex decisions about employees or clients, there is no way to adjudicate every decision, either beforehand through rules or legislation, or afterward through the courts.

The same is true, I would argue, with institutional justice in a free society. We count on justice to occur in any institution's dealings with individual members of society and with other institutions more often than not without explicit resort to rules or the courts. However, because any institution by definition represents a public system of rules (charter, license, constitution, and so forth), there is a specific and rational concept of justice that is expected to be applied in certain cases – but not always so, nor even in most cases – by its leaders. A business is free to expand, to alter its product, to charge what it likes, and to do business with whomever it likes. A nonprofit organization, to fulfill its stated intentions, is free to select members, solicit funds, create programs, expand, or go out of business pretty much without restriction. This freedom to operate is, of course, not a prerogative of the private sector. Public institutions, whether hospitals, educational institutions, or political agencies, are likewise able to decide on specific services, modes of operation, and types of programs involving the exercise of considerable freedom. The extent to which an institution is free to do as it chooses, it would appear, is the extent to which we rely on justice to occur as a result of the personal qualities of its leadership rather than from a political or institutional concept of justice.

Such dependency upon "human virtue" can be frightening. Aristotle would find it so. Good citizenship does not coincide with human virtue except among the rulers in an aristocracy or kingdom, he argued. It is not possible for the larger populace to identify with and decide upon the common interest, and, therefore, its civic virtue cannot be predicated on human virtue. Aristotle was, of course, writing in a very simple society. He had no conception of managers, officers, directors, and bureaucrats, nor the intricate gradation within these categories that go to make up our richly diverse institutional structure today. Nevertheless, the development of this institutional texture, which began in the eighteenth century, has not been based on any greater optimism about human virtue. Rather, it has been based on philosophical theories geared to the rise of the scientific movement and industrialism that attempted to extend scientific knowledge and technical control to all political and moral aspects of human behavior. As influenced by philosophers such as Auguste Comte, Im-

manuel Kant, and John Mill, it has relied heavily on the assumption that an empirical basis for ethical behavior would emerge, one that would greatly restrict, if not obviate, the need for justice to be based on human virtue. The concept of the "professional" was extended to many new activities, along with the idea of a technical rationality to guide leaders' actions, to be imparted through specialized training. By determining the "end" of society scientifically, the question of what is just in any given situation can be reduced to a technical question about what means are best suited to achieve that end. Leaders at all levels can then be expected to refer back questions of justice, not only to a public system of rules representing their institutions or the law, but also to the rules and systems of thinking reflected in their professional training.

This vision of an empirically ordered society, however, has been under increasing challenge in the twentieth century. It is perhaps our most fundamental social frustration that as we advance to new heights of professionalization and bureaucratization, our doubt in our ability to order society empirically along lines that will assure ethical behavior also advances. As fast as one social philosophy has arisen, another has cropped up to refute it. The dominant influence on our social institutions is still, if Rawls is right, utilitarianism with its "greatest happiness principle," but there is no expression of this theory that holds up to empirical test. The claim of technical rationality and professional training to being the source of extraordinary knowledge in matters of human importance is, as we move into further social complexity, being questioned even by professionals themselves. The limits of technical rationality in a practical situation have recently been examined by Donald Schon in a critique of professional education. He provides this sketch of the problem:

From the perspective of Technical Rationality, professional practice is a process of problem solving. Problems of choice or decision are solved through the selection, from available means, of the one best suited to established ends. But with this emphasis on problem solving, we ignore problem setting, the process by which we define the decision to be made, the ends to be achieved, the means which may be chosen. In real-world practice, problems do not present themselves to the practitioner as givens. They must be constructed from the materials of problematic situations which are puzzling, troubling and uncertain. In order to convert a problematic situation to a problem, a practitioner must do a certain kind of work. He must make sense of an uncertain situation that initially makes no sense. When professionals consider what road to build, for example, they deal usually with a complex and ill-defined situation in which geographic, topological, financial, economic, and political issues are all mixed up together. Once they have somehow decided what road to build and go on to consider how best to build it, they may have a problem they can solve by the application of available techniques; but when the road they have built leads unexpectedly to the destruction of a neighborhood, they may find themselves again in a situation of uncertainty.[1]

If we are no longer certain that justice will occur in the professional setting, we are no more certain of it at the political and institutional level. Critics such as Jurgen Habermas, Ivan Illich, Herbert Marcuse, and others have gained considerable attention by strongly criticizing our institutional fabric. It has become common among many other intellectuals and journalists to view the managers of society as a power elite bent upon their own interests rather than on furthering the common interest. The theme has, of course, been echoed in countless novels. On the political level our loss of certainty has led us, as C. S. Lewis and others have suggested, increasingly to turn away from the question of "what is good for democracy" (for

example, just laws) toward "what a democracy would like" (for example, the will of the majority). Seemingly, in our conditioned expectation that we can derive justice from social conditions rather than human qualities, and in the absence of any absolute definition of justice, we appear blindly tempted to make the democratic process a virtue unto itself. Lewis has the experienced devil Screwtape advise his fellow devils in Hell how to tempt modern humanity as follows:

Democracy is a word with which you must lead them by the nose... It will never occur to them that democracy is properly the name of a political system of voting... Nor of course must they ever be allowed to raise Aristotle's question: whether "democratic behavior" means the behavior that democracies like, or the behavior that will preserve a democracy. For if they did, it could hardly fail to occur to them that these need not be the same.[2]

Given the dilemma our doubts have placed us in, it would appear that even at this late stage in our industrial advancement, we may have no alternative but to risk turning to basic human qualities as the primary basis for ordering society. Rawls and other meta-ethicists may still hope to derive justice in a scientific manner from other conditions, but their work is unlikely to provide ultimate answers. We are more likely to harken in our better moments (assuming Screwtape claims our worst) to more simple wisdom, such as the words of Martin Luther King:

A just law is a man-made code that squares with the moral law or the law of God. An unjust law is a code that is out of harmony with the moral law... Any law that uplifts the human personality is just. Any law that degrades human personality is unjust.[3]

We can see our society turning to look for the connection between justice and human personality on a number of levels. Take, for instance, the concept of "leadership," which only in the last fifty years has become a topic of major intellectual interest. Theories of leadership being propounded by J. M. Burns, Warren Bennis, and others represent an effort to derive ethical behavior from the personal characteristics of the individual rather than from the structure of society. So far, however, little has been written that would help the practitioner understand how a leader applies or should apply a sense of justice to a given situation. Bennis and others speak of the leader "doing the right thing," of "being fair" without being able to define exactly what that involves. Movements have sprung up to try to teach leadership in colleges and universities, without any clear evidence that there is a subject matter that can be grasped intellectually. What these leadership movements seem to be stressing, however, is that the capacity to do the right thing lies in the qualities and will of the leader (that is, in her or his entire personality, not just in technical capacity).

Likewise, theorists in the fields of philosophy and the social sciences have become interested in the twentieth century in investigating human personality. Related, perhaps, is the recent tendency in many academic fields to turn to psychology as a source of explanation for politics, history, and culture, as scientists hope to answer the question "what is the end of society" through a scientific determination of the operation of the human mind.

In our judicial and political practice, personal qualities have increasingly become an important consideration. Judicial decisions have moved increasingly to take account of the personal qualities of the individual defendant rather than to adhere strictly to the "reasonable man" theory of law. We have become more and more aware that legal traditions cannot define insanity nor tell us with certainty how a reasonable person would behave in a complex social situation. The Bernard Goetz case in New York is a recent example. On the political level, perhaps because of social complexity also, personal qualities seem to be replacing principles and

issues as a primary basis for the election of public officials. As politicians have recently become all too well aware, party platforms and stands on issues are becoming less important to the public than what we perceive about politicians' personalities in their discourse on the issues.

In sum, it would appear that we are coming increasingly in our practical lives to rely on the connection between justice and the personality of human beings for social order. We have reached this point largely because we have come to recognize the intricacy of the setting in which individuals must operate.

If so, it may be important to consider what it is in the personality that justice might result from. To look at this question, we must clearly understand what we mean by a "person." The Greeks had no word for it, and our usage of the term does not derive from classical sources. The word came into common use only in medieval times, when theologians were trying to make a philosophical distinction between a "thing" and a "self," who has mastery of his or her own acts. Boethius's definition came to be generally the most accept-ed: "A person is an individual substance of a rational nature."[4] Thus, in employing the word "person," we appear to be adding, even today, the notion of rationality to what we affirm to be an individual. "Personality" is the rational individual in his or her relationship to others (that is, his or her particularity in comparison with other persons' particularities). Therefore, to say that justice is connected to personality is simply to say that it is connected to the rational nature of particular beings in their relationship to others.

To say this, however, is to use the term "rational nature" somewhat differently from the way it is used today, normally to mean some-thing synonymous with intellect or reason. Since at least the eighteenth century, our rational nature has tended to be viewed as a power of reason apart from moral nature. Moral "sense," as conceived by Hume and other British philosophers, derives from our feelings, whereas reason, strictly considered, is our ability to reflect on ideas. Thus, we have tended in our educational theory to separate activities leading to intellectual development from activities leading to moral development. Moral development takes place by training the sensibilities to appreciate particular values, done, we typically think, in the home and early school years. Intellectual development takes place by training the mind in skills of reasoning. This separation seems to work well enough for most virtues, such as love, honesty, courage, and the like, perhaps because the deliberation required in order to carry out acts based on them is not what we consider to be the essence of their "goodness."

This is not the case with justice, however, where the deliberative process itself appears to contain the fairness or goodness. Justice is not only based on reason, however, for it necessarily must resolve conflicting values, which can only be perceived through sentiment. It would appear, therefore, that justice requires both feeling (to perceive values in a situation and to empathize with others) and reason. We must conclude, then, that the rational nature from which justice may derive is composed of more than the intellect – rather, perhaps, many elements in the human consciousness, including all the feelings, emotions, sensibilities as well as moods and desires, along with the intellect.

When this nature is functioning rightly, fair or just decisions will result; that, in essence, seems to be the connection between justice and personality toward which we are turning. We must assume the primacy of the intellect in this nature, but we cannot neglect the emotional elements that serve to inform and rectify the intellect's judgment. These emotional elements must be focused outward on the subject or object being considered by the intellect; otherwise the intellect

cannot be right. Justice, in this sense, can be said to be the result of right intellectual reasoning (for example, intellect conditioned by real emotion).

It is interesting to note in passing how very different this argument is from any that Rawls would make. His concept of the stages of moral development follows the Enlightenment's assumption about the separation of moral sentiment from reason.[5] We are, he suggests, brought to an appreciation and even love of the principles of justice at a particular time in our lives through our moral development. From then on we are not expected to bring our emotions to bear along with our intellect in particular situations. We are expected to make just decisions solely through our intellect, by referring back to principles that have been adopted. The road builder, in the sketch by Schon cited earlier, will not have to feel the need of the people the road will serve nor the pressures of the financial backers nor the pain of the inhabitants in the neighborhood about to be destroyed to reach a fair decision in the "puzzling, uncertain situation" the builder is in. He or she must only apply the principles espoused. Increasingly, I have suggested, such a technical solution is being seen as an inadequate basis for justice in our complex society.

The real intention of liberal education, I would argue, is precisely the development of right intellectual reasoning of the kind from which justice, in the terms just stated, can be said to be the result. In a world such as ours, which separates intellect from emotion, the true value of liberal education is often disguised. It is frequently argued that its purpose is to train individuals to think, to discriminate, to look for and examine alternatives with disciplined exactness. The usefulness of these intellectual activities to the practical world can be easily demonstrated. We can think of a number of intellectual skills that liberal education can provide that would be helpful to the road builder in Schon's sketch. These might include the developed ability to bring order out of complex situations, the skill of recognizing appearances from reality, the training to evaluate the importance of historical fact, the knowledge to think numerically about data, and finally and importantly, the skill to know and question the limits of one's knowledge.

Not one of these skills, of course, will make possible by itself a fair decision. However, such a decision lies squarely within the mission of liberal education. For properly conducted liberal education goes beyond training of the intellect to aim at the expansion of one's entire rational nature. It demands both intellectual and emotional growth by requiring that the intellectual processes be directed outwards at the expressions of humanity contained in the curriculum–expressions that exist in poetry, art, music, mathematics, and literature, as well as historical and scientific phenomena. In this way it enables the person to perceive and appreciate real emotion and, thereby, to allow the intellect to understand real value. Its method is to demand that the student reflect upon and shape his or her intellectual and emotional responses with respect to a particular fragment of human expression by comparing these responses with the intellectual reasoning of others – other students, teachers, critics, and scholars. It offers diverse fragments from different areas of human experience because right intellectual reasoning is relevant to all of them. The way Shakespeare saw Henry V treating his men, the way Robert Frost and Thoreau saw their surroundings, as well as the way Aristotle, Kant, Newton, and Einstein saw the universe: All are important to the practitioner in mak-ing daily decisions, not for their direct applicability to the situation, but as the subjects on which in the past the practitioner has focused emotions, and which have thus helped to shape his or her intellectual reason. Properly conducted, I would argue, liberal education represents the only reliable

assurance that we can have, that fair decisions in our business, professions, and institutions will take place. The curriculum for any particular liberal education program should never be seen as a purely intellectual judgment. It must itself be the result of right intellectual reason about human experience. If liberal education can acquire confidence in this mission, the dilemma in which we find ourselves – a society increasingly doubtful in the face of complexity about our ability to order ourselves – may possibly be alleviated.

Of course, we will always rely on principles and rules for the basic structure of the social order, but with more confidence in our ability to develop right intellectual reason we shall be better able to accept what our historical experience since the Enlightenment has made clear to us: Whatever principles and rules leaders in one generation may construct through their right intellectual reason, the right intellectual reason of another generation may challenge and modify.

1. Donald A. Schon, The Reflective Practicioner: How Professionals Think in Action; (New York: Basic Books, 1983), 41-42.
2. C. S. Lewis, The Screwtape Letters; (New York: 1961). 125-126.
3. Martin Luther King, Jr., "Letter from Birmingham Jail," Why We Can't Wait (New York: Mentor Books, 1964), 82.
4. Boethius, quoted by Thomas Aquinas in Summa Theologica, 1, q. 29, a. I.
5. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice; (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 462-479.