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The motto of our journal **KRITIKA & KONTEXT** is Joseph Schumpeter's assertion that "to realize the relative validity of one's convictions and yet stand for them unflinchingly, is what distinguishes a civilized man from a barbarian." Schumpeter's assertion has been quoted by Richard Rorty and Isaiah Berlin; among others. Only in this delicate constellation, being neither fanatical nor relativist, one is able to accept and benefit from criticism, and criticise others without forcing one's own opinion on others.

The problem is that this might be a valid motto for an academic journal but how does it fair in a society where diverse opinions are often viewed with suspicion by those in power?

How is one to uphold Schumpeter's statement, in fact, how is one to defend one's own convictions, in today postmodern, relativist world, on the one hand, and in the midst of increasingly fundamentalist, fanatical, indeed barbarian eruptions, on the other hand? If the latter is an old enemy of reason, the former is reason's own product that undermines it. This two-sided pressure begs for question of whether one is not too much exposed by showing that his or her convictions are of "relative validity". Especially, while defending liberal democracy one has to stand up against those who are convinced that they possess the "truth" and present themselves as having found "the right path" and are able to by-pass the painful aspects of democracy?

For many people in east central Europe, this is no longer an academic question; it is a question how to present, sell if you wish, the values of liberal democracy. How is one to convince those who are exposed to the bleakest side of liberal democracy – the side that is present and makes liberal democracy vulnerable – that it is "the best of all the bad systems"?

TEODOR MÜNZ

To Affirm Democracy not Withdraw from It

In theory modern parliamentary democracy was erected by the aristocrats of the spirit, (Spinoza, Locke, Rousseau at al.), for those who considered themselves to be equals. They understood freedom to involve discipline, tolerance, accommodation, and awareness of the relative value of one's own opinions. However, the progression of humanistic ideas resulted in democracy being bestowed on everyone, which is in accordance with the spirit of democracy.

Thus, democracy was even bestowed upon those who did not will it, who had no idea what it represented, who rejected it, who were afraid of it, or viewed it as a fraud, etc. Hence, there were, and still are, many who are not able to carry the burden of democratic requirements, to stand on their own and "be decent and brave". On the contrary, once they realized the scope of the freedoms they could secure for themselves, they changed them into their own image; they transformed them into anarchies and became aggressive, dictatorial, enforcing their totalitarian interests, punishing their enemies, and so on. They did all this under the rubric of democratic freedoms and rights which they simply inherited. In a sense, they welcomed democracy because finally they could do things they could not do before. Does not everyone in a democracy have the right to defend his or her own rights, especially when the majority is involved?

Democracy is virtually defenceless in such a case because it was not built to defend against such conduct. Owing to this vulnerability it has often buried because it has enabled its enemy to be installed. Democracy demands intellectually and morally mature citizens; who are often in short supply in its infancy. The tolerance of those "mature citizens" does not achieve much. It is viewed by the others as a weakness, it seems even comical and is like a voice in the wilderness.

So, what would be of help during this period? We cannot abandon democracy because for now we know of no better system. Any improvements, like participatory democracy, require even more mature citizens than today's parliamentary democracy. Defend democracy through law? Certainly, but laws can be evaded and are open to broad interpretation. After all, a non-democratic majority can pass undemocratic laws through democratic means.

Education of citizens? Perhaps this can help the best, provided, of course, democracy is not trumped before its citizens have been educated. It is, however, a worthwhile effort and the educators, for now, must bear the burden - remain patient, tolerant and take the punches.

Democracy is most at risk in those societies that have "imported" it, from the outside, because these societies were not historically preconditioned for it. Such a situation exists in Slovakia, where democracy is permanently being squeezed and returned back to the old established form of coexistence. I think what can also help democracy here is the patience, risky and sacrificial work of those who understand the meaning of democracy, and try to bring it into being by teaching others about it. Whether they should ever be "non-resistant to evil" depends solely on them. At certain moments, perhaps, it is necessary to use non-democratic means in order to protect democracy.

Thus, I did not resolve the problem, but it is an old one and it has not been resolved by even better minds than mine. I think, it will not be that simple, considering how full of internal contradictions today's democracy is. It was created to counter something which it tolerates simply on principle.

PHILIPPE AZZIE

If I realize the relative validity of my convictions, why should I stand for them unflinchingly? The reason would seem to lie in the universality of the predicament. I cannot realize the relative validity of my convictions without, at the same time, recognizing the relative validity of all convictions. Under these conditions, there is no foundation for my convictions apart from my own arbitrary will, and, on this basis, there seem to be only two options: either hold to my convictions unflinchingly, or abandon them for some other equally valid, because equally arbitrary, convictions. However, it is not readily apparent under these circumstances why holding unflinchingly to one's convictions is better than abandoning them. This might be the position of the extreme relativist. He moves immediately from the plurality of different convictions to the relativity of these convictions, as if the mere fact of plurality provided the basis for pronouncing them all arbitrary. The fanatic, on the other hand, sees plurality as a sign of disorder, and relativism as a lack of clarity, to be swept away by the light of truth. Unlike the relativist, who may or may not stand unflinchingly by his convictions, the fanatic always stands unflinchingly by his convictions because he is convinced that they are true. But, if by "the relative validity of one's convictions" one means the realization that we have good reasons to hold to our convictions even though they fall short of absolute certainty, then one avoids both relativism and fanaticism. In this sense, the plurality of convictions reveals the limited or partial, rather than the arbitrary or erroneous, nature of various convictions. Hence, arises the possibility of judging, clarifying and improving one's convictions while recognizing that such progress might never yield complete certainty. This realization is not an apriori intuition with which we begin our encounters with others. Unlike the fanatic and the relativist who need never engage in dialogue, the realization described by Schumpeter can only result from the encounter with others through dialogue and discussion. Such encounters, however, involve risking our perspectives, and this demands that we stand by our convictions courageously. In this sense, what distinguishes the civilized man from the barbarian is not the ability to stand by his convictions unflinchingly, but the courage to examine them unflinchingly.

MILOSLAV PETRUSEK

Neither fundamentalism nor relativism are distinctive products of this century. However, they attained monstrous proportions in the new context of our century. Although I am rather afraid of fundamentalism, I simply dismiss the relativism advocated by radicals, or what Pauline Rosenau calls affirmative, postmodernists. I do not believe, (no one has "empirically" proved it), that a society is simply a text, that the world is thoroughly fragmented and that we do not need heroes. I reject the idea that there are no truths that we should believe in and that we should keep in mind while pursuing science. Relativism is rarely advocated by "exact" scientists; rather, it is strictly the domain of philosophers, humanists and some historians, and currently also of anthropologists. (It is most inexplicable in the case of anthropology and most appalling to Ernest Gellner, himself an anthropologist.)

The relativity of our knowledge - unless we talk about such trivialities as "birds usually possess a beak" or "some cats eat mice" - has been known since antiquity, and that the level of reliability or exactness of our knowledge differs with each studied subject, is almost a trivial assertion. We can read in the writings of a former authority (written in 1877), that "a true scientific work refrains from such dogmatic-moralistic expressions as truth and error". Today in general, the terms "truth" and "error" are avoided by those who transfer the topic and problem of relativism and relativity from the realm of knowledge and culture into the realm of morality. If the relativization of moral

norms, in the short term, might sometimes make the life of an individual easier, relativism in social life, in the long term, breeds ambiguity and unpredictability. I am convinced that a life with totally relative values and norms is more of a social construction, (perhaps wishful thinking), than a reality. In any case, what we might find ourselves in is Merton's famous self-fulfilling prophecy: so long as we recklessly and indolently claim that everything is relative, everything will become relative. However, I am not afraid of such an outcome, because I want to believe, with the same former authority that, "we should take our knowledge with great reservation, because most likely we stand at the beginning of human history, and the subsequent generations that will be correcting us will be in greater number than those whose knowledge we correct today and whom we often quite underestimate".

P.S. My somewhat sinister quotation from the former authority, (a keen reader might have noticed that I refer to Fridrich Engels), has a single purpose - to show that the relativity of absolute disapproval is equally comical, and in the end as equally unconvincing, as is mindless and absolute approval.

RICHARD RORTY

Thanks for your invitation to contribute a statement to the first issue of "Kritika & Kontext". I hope that the following will do.

Perhaps the best construal of "relative validity" is "the sort of validity a belief has when it is based only on the results of the experiments conducted so far". If histories of previous attempts to replace the liberal democracy with something better do not convince one of its irreplaceability, nothing will. I hope that "Kritika & Kontext" will help its readers use historical details as an antidote to philosophical and theological abstraction.

With good wishes for the success of your enterprise -



MARTIN M. ŠIMEČKA

The vulnerability of those who apriori accept the possibility of error is at the same time the best defence against those who are convinced about their truth; because the former are able to differentiate themselves from the latter. To my mind, this differentiation is more important than any type of convincing argument about the validity of a certain argument. The ability to doubt is one of the qualities which helps us to distinguish a civilized individual from a barbarian. This ability allows us to communicate above the heads of fanatics. Someone who doubts is invincible unless a fanatic shoots him.

The vulnerability of democracy stems from that fact that it allows for the possibility of its own demise - it is the only political system that incessantly doubts itself. The greatest defenders of democracy are notorious sceptics. Thus, they are at the same time democracy's weakest link because they will never be truly convinced that democracy must be defended against fanatics. I do not believe, that it is possible to refrain from doubting, not even in the name of liberal-democratic values.

PETR PITHART

You could hardly choose a more appropriate and topical motto for your journal. It is, however, easier to articulate than to act upon. I am afraid that alone and isolated, we could not withstand the powerful but necessary tension generated by Schumpeter's requirements without some kind of transcendental base. Hence we build the impersonal institutions of an open society, and we thus formulate universal rules for their operation. The reason for this building and formulating is to allow us to recognize, right from the beginning, any possible error - whether mine or yours, ours or theirs -, so it can be corrected without delay, without purges of any kind, without economic lose, and, in particular, without spilled blood. So, those that hold power and who have made mistakes can be replaced, without much fuss, by those who will make mistakes later on.

But what if there is an error resulting from a dispute over exactly those institutions and with respect to those rules? Naturally, they will be challenged, of that we can be sure. Always, even now, they have been in stake. So there is no other option but to start posing questions and to do this right from the very beginning....

However, until your question, Schumpeter's challenge, ceases to provoke us, nothing has yet been lost. The moment it does, perhaps one fine morning, we will gain a feeling of certainty as to what to do, and we will be on the road to hell.



The most treasured questions are those to which we have no answer. And even then, only if they keep us alert, rather than spiritually lethargic, or in a rage with this messy and meaningless world.

ALBERT MARENČIN

Only a human being who is aware of the relative value of his or her convictions, to my mind, is able to admit and tolerate the differing convictions of others, and is able to recognize the plurality of opinions which is the precondition of democracy. However, inside the mutual interconnectedness and dependence of these two components lies not only the strength but also the fragility and vulnerability of democracy. A democratic society, that is unwilling to betray its own values and defy its own identity, must protect political plurality, and the beliefs and convictions of its opponents, (fanatics, fundamentalists and barbarians), precisely in the name of democratic freedom. It must allow them to hold their convictions which at the same time contribute to the destruction of democracy. This is evident in cases where democratically elected parliaments, following democratic rules, gradually extinguish democracy and establish dictatorial regimes.

The question of conviction, its formation and application is, above all, a question for an individual to resolve – using his or her own reason, morality and conscience; it involves the rational and irrational segments of the human psyche. As a rule, the irrational segments prevail over the rational ones once the convictions of an individual extend to that of family, a social group or a nation, and become a collective, socio-political and ideological phenomenon. And that, retroactively, acts on an individual who is unaware that it is the monstrous variation of the same genie which they themselves released from the bottle.... And we know the rest.

How should a "civilized individual" behave if one should "stand unflinchingly behind one's convictions" while being aware of the relative validity of one's convictions? How to protect and apply them, how to behave and live up to them while respecting the "circles" of fellow citizens while keeping one's own "circles" "intact"? Should one preserve one's own convictions, or should one follow Voltaire's dictum and defend the freedoms of an ideological opponent? Or should one follow Saint Just and request "freedom for all but the enemies of freedom", or follow Galileo's example and embark on the path of compromises and retreats while believing something different, i.e., "stand unflinchingly behind once own convictions" and not speak them out?

I believe, in a human being not burdened by any "isms", a human being aware of their human value, and even the relative validity of their convictions has no other choice, (unless in danger of losing "face"), than to defend against all who profess to know "absolute truths" or be "the discoverer of the right path". Simply by claiming to hold the "absolute truth" or to have "discovered the right path" these people leave an individual with no free choice; thus depriving one of freedom which leads to destruction.

I know of only one possible answer to the question as to whether we are not too vulnerable under the double pressure of relativism and fanaticism: yes, we are vulnerable, in fact more vulnerable than any other creature, and I am not talking solely about our convictions and our ensuing civic stance. I am talking about being vulnerable in every walk and at every level of our existence and thus we are left with no choice but to defend our convictions and freedom and, however pathetic it might sound, democracy too.

BÉLA EGYED

One obvious reply is by Popper: of all the alternatives, democracy is the least offensive because there is a self-corrective component built into democratic institutions, i.e., they are susceptible to radical change. What Popper has in mind is the power of the ballot box. To this extent I agree. What is frustrating, and at times even depressing, about liberal democracies is that popular decisions never seem to lead to anything positive, in fact they often undo, or undermine, positive results achieved by previous decisions. But, one tends to forget that they do serve a very important negative function, and perhaps in politics this is the most we can hope for.

My own comment, in the spirit of the Enlightenment rationalism is this: Enlightenment rationalism may be characterized by two convictions: a) No doctrine, belief, or conviction is immune to criticism. b) All criticism relies on certain assumptions which are themselves open to criticism. Consequently, the Enlightenment exhorts us to reflect critically on our convictions, but, also, to hold onto them steadfastly with the knowledge that we are fully responsible for them, as well as for the assumptions, (which may be unknown to us at the time), on which they rest. By doing this, we are inviting all enlightened individuals to share our convictions, when this is required for the fulfilment of our common tasks. Or, if they disagree, to engage us in a critical discussion showing us what it is that we have not, out of choice or out of ignorance, subjected to a sufficiently critical examination.

FEDOR GÁL

I am almost certain – along with many others – that a multitude of religions, political ideologies, philosophical systems, even professional, national and ethnic groups create profuse and hardly compatible worlds. And along with many others, I believe that under certain circumstances these differences might be stimulating. Thus, one should, by all means, stress their likeness and support their interaction. However, the topic of dialogue in today's overly fundamentalist and liberal world is getting rather tiresome. It involves strictly intellectual elites, i.e., that part of population that has little will to act. Discussion about the relativity of one's convictions is nothing but a form of escape for intellectuals, an excuse for their inability to act. It is not surprising then that power is seized by ruthless crooks who waste no time with pointless blabbing.

Thus I claim: „Yes, my truth is only one of many. You better respect it! Did you get it?!”

PETER SYKORA

A Modern Barbarian and Postmodern Civilization

Who is the barbarian Schumpeter is talking about? Is it not, paradoxically, the modern, civilized human being himself? Until recently the terms, modern and civilized, had been considered synonymous. That was until modern civilization built concentration camps right at its cradle; where in the midst of great barbarity millions of modern and civilized people were tortured and exterminated simply because they were deemed different. The distinctness of others always seems barbaric; the barbarians are thus equally Greeks and non-Greeks, Christians and non-Christians, Cortez and Montezuma, Serbs and Croats, Slovaks or Hungarians.

The barbarity ceases at the moment when the distinctness is perceived as a part of a greater whole. The trick is that this greater whole does not have to be a system free of conflict and contradiction; as was imagined for centuries by scholars. It seems a bitter, although perhaps a deserved, lesson for civilization to experience; while witnessing how easily such a dream can turn into a nightmare. Contemporary civilization is waking up to a postmodern stage.

The postmodern position comprises a notion of individual responsibility, of which the modernists could only have dreamed. Namely, the responsibility for one's own thoughts, attitudes and, above all, deeds. On the contrary, in the modern period responsibility was a "meta-story": who was responsible for the liquidation of a class enemy? Well, of course, the dump heap of history and the objective laws of social development.

How many people believe even today, sadly, that the tragedy of Communism was that it erected the wrong laws; because the truth is that the Communists were not civilized, nor educated people but were in fact barbarians. How many people are still convinced of the existence of some social wheel of history that moves slowly, but certainly, towards justice. It does not matter that we lost the elections, we are going to win them at some point because "Truth and Love will prevail over Lies and Hatred." How many believe that sooner or later democracy is going to triumph over any authoritarian regime. Really, does it have to? "Where do we find support for such a claim?", Jean-Paul Sartre would ask.

This "Sartrean" question was on Richard Rorty's mind during his lecture in Bratislava, when he claimed that to stand behind democracy is no more rational than to stand behind Fascism. It might be considered better, but not according to any objective criteria; better in God's eyes or according to unconditional moral laws. It is better in the eyes of us who belong to a certain community. A community in which the feeling of responsibility manifests in an effort to achieve "a satisfactory mixture of nonviolent agreement with tolerant disagreement".

PETER ZAJAC

When Jirka Šykora and I were standing in front of the statue of Jefferson in Washington in 1989, he uttered a sentence that has stayed in my mind: "People are divided between Rousseauates and Jeffersonites. The Rousseauates are convinced that people are basically good and that what spoils them is "bad contracts". The Jeffersonites claim that within each individual there is good and evil and that the latter cannot be eliminated. What is needed are rules that would contain evil."

It seems easy for us to respond to "fundamentalism and fanaticism" hence we cloud a proper response - which would state that fundamentalism and fanaticism must be placed outside of law - with superfluous moralizing in order

to avoid a more formidable question concerning "relativity".

The endorsement of the rights of individual among the "civilized" countries during the past fifty years has turned into irresponsibility and even ruthlessness in some individuals; the rights fully overshadow the importance of duty. A civilized individual has often turned into a civilized barbarian; who embraces fundamentalism and fanaticism.

To be more emphatic: the ever increasing contemporary fanaticism is not simply the result of a transformation of the old collectivism into new ones. It is also the result of the radical relativization of values within the "civilized societies"; their brutalization stemming from oversensitivity. In other words, it is the result of being tolerant of intolerance which, in turn, leads to intolerance of tolerance.

The question then stands as follows: what is the breaking point of tolerance, when does it break down and become powerless in the face of intolerance? The only answer I have to this is that breaks down exactly when it ceases to protect itself with rules, laws and order. One has to differentiate between moderation connected with the realization of the relative validity of one's own conviction, and fanatical relativization; differentiate between the force of law and the coercion resulting from fanaticism which undermines law.

A wish to maintain the "relative validity of one's own conviction and hope for its utmost protection" while not confronting the threat of "fundamentalism and fanaticism" is a utopian view that is based on the assumption that people are "basically good".

TATIANA SEDOVÁ

I do not believe that accepting Schumpeter's statement distinguishing a civilized individual from a barbarian renders us powerless in the face of fanaticism and relativism. If, at a theoretical level, we can readily handle barbarism, at a political level it is not as simple.

When dealing theoretically with the relative validity of one's convictions, one should distinguish between problems connected with their sources, the process of verifying them, and their validation and operation.

The tension between cognitive convictions and the values one holds influences the values that constitute a liberal democracy. In such a case, it is useful to differentiate between facts, different degrees of confirmation, the validity of cognitive convictions and finally values. I see distinguishing between facts and values as a necessary, though not sufficient, factor for allowing rational criticism while facing extreme relativism. Simply respecting a plurality of values does not necessarily mean that all convictions and values are equal.

If I attempt to apply Schumpeter's statement to Slovakia I become puzzled. In my opinion liberalism is not deeply rooted here; neither politically nor culturally speaking. It might also be interesting to analyze (interpret) Schumpeter's statement with regard to communitarianism and democracy ruled by the "dictate" of majority.

CEM DEVECİ

Even to an ordinary reader the contradiction in Schumpeter's statement is an obvious one. The question that immediately comes to mind concerns the difficulty of imagining such a person. That is, how can one stand for his convictions "unflinchingly," while at the same time retain the consciousness of the fact that any given set of convictions are binding only for himself, or one's community, nation or religion. And, then there is the last part of the sentence which introduces another strange but crucial dichotomy of civilization and barbarism. This indeed, makes the statement even more perplexing and leads to further questions: Do we need to cultivate a kind of split personality in order to be "civilized" and guard ourselves against the claims raised by a "barbaric" outlook? If this is the case, then, being civilized loses most of its attraction, because it seems to require a constant and tedious practice of self-reflection which also demands a keen memory of the tension between the status of our convictions and our actions. Doesn't the statement allure us to the thought that, indeed, it is the barbarian who enjoys the integrity of soul and who is content with pure actions without any sign of regret, hesitation, second-thought or calculation? Isn't he the one who is truly happy without any recourse to alternative views of happiness? Overall, why do we need to confine ourselves to the terms and conditions of this tension that is characteristic of civilization? Why do we have to carry this heavy burden levied by the awareness that whatever we stand for is nothing but a relative view among others and that any struggle we engage in is just a struggle among a possible thousand other struggles?

How does a barbarian deal with his or others' convictions, according to Schumpeter? While the "civilized man" is engaged in an endless inner dispute which, nevertheless, lets him occasionally defend his convictions "unflinchingly" will the barbarian imitate him by busying himself with "realizing" how relative his convictions are? Or, will he be participating or supporting "unflinchingly" an ethnic cleansing here, an assassination there?

Put in this way the statement seems more transparent. For Schumpeter the barbarians is the one who will never accept the relative status of his "convictions." Needless to say, he will never reflect on the inclinations or drives that motivate him. Indeed, in such a scene of simplicity and innocence, "convictions" are not separated from blind faith, customs, command of a superior, or an emotion. Yet, we should also admit that, in a paradoxical manner, thanks to this incapacity, the barbarian will always be capable of "standing for his convictions unflinchingly."

The civilized man, on the other hand, is able to see the historicity of his "convictions," of the social and cultural forces that shape them. Perhaps, a little courage is necessary for being civilized, for being able to proclaim an obvious inconsistency: "I know I may be wrong and with respect to the others' convictions, mine is a mere interpretation; but I am ready to defend them without any concession." Don't you think that Schumpeter naively anticipates the possibility of converting sceptical, cynical and overly self-conscious modern individuals into heroes who can endure the tragedy assigned for them? If civilization would be left to such a "man" dwelling in the permanent tension created by consciousness, how can we still defend "the civilisation" against the barbarism which emerges at the end of our century with its resoluteness, speed and efficiency?

One should not, however, dismiss Schumpeter's argument as not worth considering at all. The major problem of the statement stems from its language of consciousness which inevitably treats a genuinely political problem with the terminology of psychology. We may reconsider the motto in a context that is sensitive to the particularity of the political realm. Only then can we conceive that, indeed, the distinction between "the civilized" and "the barbarian" is itself a political dichotomy. And, we always make sense of this dichotomy by remembering the boundaries of the political.

As a postulate, let me argue that civilisation is an historical process through which, among other things, the political is separated from the extra-political. Only upon this division can economic and cultural spheres flourish and develop. Once established, this division arises as a border that is to be defended constantly against the infiltration of the extra-political, against those who seek to blur it with the hope of returning to the times when the political was still married with force, arbitrary will, annihilation and bloodshed. From the perspective of an "ideal-type" barbarian, there is no difference between a legislative act and a massacre. They are both political as long as they derive from power relationships. Barbaric temperament cultivates an exceedingly comprehensive view of what is political. In the process of civilisation, however, the elements of public judgment, dialogue, consensus and decision are recognized as the essential qualities of the political realm. In this sense, political man is also civilized man to the extent that he realizes the impossibility of finalizing answers to political questions. (The opposite for the most part is practised by the so-called "political" activity of today.) He is expected to be on guard against the easy ways and solutions available in the extra-political realm. It is not a coincidence that those who speak through the words of faith, identity and history are always much more inclined to celebrate the faculties provided by the extra-political realm. This call from the extra-political is generally the call of anxiety similar to the one in a case of an emergency. Political man, on the other hand, insists on the necessity of mediating and articulating social problems in the public sphere together with alternative viewpoints in an institutional setting. The necessity for meditation, of course, will always sound tiresome to a mind who is already possessed by the appeal of easy and time-saving means of the extra-political.

Therefore, it should be the maintenance of this border separating the political from its "extra" which makes us, among other things, civilized. This effort should go hand in hand with the recognition and caution that the desire for the extra-political ideas and programs may always be growing in any "civilized" nation-state. This is mainly because the border remains imprecise. Hence, we must not deceive ourselves by employing the romantic images of "civilized man" who is completely detached from "the barbarian". A "civilized man" can easily cross the border without even noticing it. Maybe there is a potential for the barbaric temperament in all of us. Then, the pertinent question becomes at what moments this temperament escalates and how the division gets obliterated. With respect to politics, the matter is not whether one is conscious or not about the relativity of "one's convictions." It is a matter about being ready to guard against the kind of projections that blur the division. What is to stand for is the division itself which enables us to distinguish persuasion from force, a law from a command, and plurality from anarchy. Yet, without forgetting that what makes us civilized also involves the ability to defend the political realm against the extra-political by political means.